Introduction:
A dominant narrative among academic debates on Middle Eastern Politics holds that religious diversity in the region fuels instability and cycles of sectarian-based reprisal killings and repression [i,ii]. In this context, the region’s politics in fragmented nations are predisposed to politicized identity structures [iii]. Yet in Oman, we see a counter to this narrative. Despite deep religious diversity — having Ibadhi, Sunni and Shia Muslims and non-Muslim minorities — Oman has maintained internal peace and cohesion with its citizen population, only experiencing its first and only sectarian-motivated terror attack in 2024 [iv,v].
This article argues that Oman’s pluralism and stability are not incidental or attributable solely to its resource wealth [iv, vi]. Instead, it is a function of four mutually reinforcing mechanisms:
- Civic national identity superseding tribe or religion
- Economic interdependence across religious and tribal lines
- Predictable legal enforcement
- Leadership creating legitimacy through inclusion
This article examines how Oman’s sectarian plurality among its citizen population, dating back to the founding of the Sultanate in 1970 under Sultan Qaboos after a British-backed coup, remains stable [v,vi]. We’ll also use Yemen, since its founding as the Republic of Yemen in 1990, as a counterexample to Oman to illustrate how politicized identity structures can lead to disaster [vii,iix]. We’ll then examine how these two case studies can inform the reform of a post-Assad Syria toward long-term stability [i].
Escaping the Sectarian Trap Through Civic Identity:
Sectarian backlash in the Middle East often occurs when a once-repressed majority enacts reprisals against the formerly dominant minority and/or minorities [i]. This cycle has defined modern Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria [i]. In the case of Lebanon, Hezbollah formed around the formerly repressed and now dominant Shi’a community, which is now roughly equal to both the Sunni and Christian communities [ix]. While in Yemen, the Zaydi Muslim minority was repressed under the Sunni majority government, leading eventually to the Zaydi-majority Houthis [vii,iix].
Oman gives us a counterclaim to this pattern. Although sectarian-wise diverse and sharing regional rivals, Omani politics did not devolve into sectarianism and conflict. Rather, Oman has taken up a policy of integration among its citizens [iv]. There have, of course, been significant challenges to this integration policy. Oman’s first trial was the Dhofar Rebellion (1965 -1979), in which Soviet-backed Dhofari rebels battled the British-backed Sultanate [v]. Dhofar is known as a primarily Sunni region, while the majority of Oman is Ibadhi; as such, fears of sectarian violence emerging were real [v]. However, to alleviate these tensions, Sultan Qaboos began a policy of “public” Islam, rather than Ibadhi domination [iv]. This meant Sunni religious figures leading prayers and sermons, and vice versa for Ibadhi and Shia figures [iv]. This would help formulate an “Omani” Islam in which Shi’ism, Sunnism, and Ibadhism all played a part in the public practice of Islam, rather than one sect dominating the others. In essence, the policy began by creating a national religious identity that transcended sectarian boundaries [iv].
An additional crucial move was Royal Decree 84/97. This decree established the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs (MARA) [x]. The ministry became a centralizing body for religious affairs and a check on division. The ministry continues to ensure that religious officials do not incite hatred and promote unity among all Omanis [x]. These two policies have not only prevented future tensions from rising but are also the cornerstones of Oman’s unity, despite the trials of a post-conflict nation [iv].
Yemen, by contrast, fared far worse. At its foundation, the first government of the Republic of Yemen allied itself with al-Ishlah, a Sunni extremist movement that morally justified the killing of socialists and non-Sunnis [vii]. This further escalated in 1994 when extremist Sunni scholars issued fatwas, a religious ruling, calling for the deaths of non-Sunnis and socialists in Yemen [vii]. The central government, rather than countering this course, allowed it to play out, as the rebellious faction was predominantly non-Sunni [vii]. Compounding this was Al-Iman University. Founded and funded by the Yemeni government, the university became a breeding ground for al-Ishlah and similar ideologies [xi]. Sunni extremism was not only rising in Yemen with Al-Iman, but it was also actively being cultivated by the Yemeni central government. In contrast to Oman, these policy moves became the bedrock of sectarian violence in Yemen, leading to the sectarian-based Sa’ada wars from 2004 to 2010 and the ongoing civil war since 2014 [vii].
Economic Inter-Sectarian Dependence
Following the re-establishment and liberalization of the Sultanate, the government redistributed primary hydrocarbon rent revenues through government programs [iv,vi]. These programs included infrastructure that linked provinces, education promotion, and public-sector employment based on citizenship rather than sectarian membership [iv]. Through these programs, Omanis of all backgrounds entered military, bureaucratic, and academic hierarchies together, creating an economic network based on sectarian patronage to support national stability [ii,iv].
The Republic of Yemen, in contrast, built its system on a sectarian-based patronage from its birth in 1990 [vii, iix]. While Yemen has hydrocarbon resources similar to Oman’s, their distribution in Yemen differs greatly from that in Oman [vii,iix,xii]. Financial resources and government employment were distributed along sectarian and tribal lines as a form of political patronage [vii]. As the Republic’s authority waned, paramilitary groups seized revenue sources within their areas of control [xii]. This further fostered a parallel economy based on communal allegiances [xii]. Identity in Yemen became an economic asset; your affiliation determined access to political advancement, aid, and protection [vii].
Institutional Reliability
Compounding the previous mechanisms was Oman’s ability to establish a consistent legal order [iv,v]. Oman’s legal system and security apparatus operate within a national hierarchy based on merit rather than on sectarian quotas or a distribution of labor based on tribal connections [iv]. This has allowed the Sultanate to maintain a monopoly on the use of force in legal enforcement, thereby curtailing extrajudicial violence [v]. While Oman’s system is non-democratic, being a monarchy, enforcement has been procedurally consistent across sectarian lines [iv]. This consistency has enabled Omanis to rely on state institutions rather than sectarian ones for legal procedures, justice, and protection [iiv].
Throughout Yemen, low judicial capacity, along with sectarian-based and politicized security forces, has undermined the foundations of state institutional legitimacy [vii]. Following the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, communal justice often surpassed that of Yemeni courts, with paramilitary forces enforcing their own rulings [xii]. As a result, multiple parallel legal systems have emerged throughout Yemen [xii]. Legal rulings became contingent on the territorial state, further pushing communities to ally with paramilitary groups composed of their co-sectarianists [vii]. As of 2025, Yemen ranks as the fifth most corrupt nation in the world [xiiv].
Legitimacy Building:
The late Sultan Qaboos grounded his legitimation strategy in developmental performance [iv,xiv]. For example, at his wedding, he included performances from each Omani province, including the newly reintegrated Dhofar [xv]. Additionally, as discussed above, Sultan Qaboos was the principal architect of an inclusive national identity [iv]. He framed pluralism as an integral part of the Omani national character rather than as a tool for division and political competition [iv]. This strategy enabled elite cooperation and integration through consultative councils and economic alliances, without dependence on formal or informal Sectarian patronage or representation [iv].
Ali Abdullah Salah’s leadership style in Yemen rested almost solely on sectarian-based patronage and fomenting division [vii,iix]. The balancing of sectarian, regional, and tribal identities created an environment in which one’s sectarian affiliation was the primary basis for political negotiation and allegiance [vii]. With the collapse of the state, leadership legitimacy found its roots in tribal, regional, and or sectarian protection, the three often being interlinked [vii]. For example, Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis, drew on Zaydi revivalism and fears of Sunni oppression as a source of political legitimation [vii].
Issues with the Omani System:
A clarification is necessary on Oman’s broader pluralist framework. The kafala system, the sponsorship mechanism by which migrant workers — primarily from South Asia — obtain work visas across the Gulf Cooperation Council, falls outside the scope of this analysis. While the system has been the subject of sustained human rights criticism, it governs non-citizen labor and pertains to discrimination affecting the non-citizen population [xvi]. It is the GCC’s structural particularity that also renders its applicability to post-conflict Syria minimal. However, there are three minority communities within Oman’s citizenry we should consider: Afro-Omani, Baloosh, and Ajam.
The first of these communities is the Afro-Omani population, more precisely characterized as Omani-Zanzibaris, whose origins lie in the Omani Empire’s commercial and territorial presence in East Africa. This population emerged through intermarriage between Arab Omani traders and East African populations, and through the Indian Ocean slave trade, formally abolished under Sultan Qaboos in 1970 [iv]. Many Omani-descended individuals have returned to the mainland, with citizenship extended to those able to demonstrate tribal linkages or, failing that, strong cultural and linguistic ties to Oman [xvii]. Socioeconomic outcomes within this community vary considerably. Some Omani-Zanzibaris have achieved significant economic standing through established merchant families. In contrast, others have been largely relegated to a representational role, their African heritage absorbed into the state’s national folklore apparatus under the category of funūn taqlīdīya. This nomenclature domesticates differential identity within a unified national frame [xiix].
The Baloosh, Omanis of Baloch descent, constitute the largest non-Arab community within the Sultanate. Their integration predates the modern state, with Baloch forces serving successive Omani dynasties as what Arabic sources termed al-shawkah, the military backbone of the state [xix]. This relationship has been institutionalized in the post-1970 period, with the Omani-Baloosh constituting a substantial portion of the Sultan’s Armed Forces [xix]. The Baloosh thus occupy a dual position: a non-Arab ethnic minority whose claim to political belonging is mediated through their military service.
The Ajam are Omanis of Persian heritage, a community reflecting Oman’s maritime trading history and proximity to Iran [xx]. The term ajam, derived from the Arabic for “non-Arabic speaker”, carries historically ambivalent connotations, functioning in some contexts as a neutral descriptor and in others as a marker of cultural foreignness [xx]. Religiously, the Ajam are predominantly Shia, placing them in a minority position within Oman. Compared to other Shia communities, such as the Lawatiyya, they are underrepresented in political and economic institutions, with many concentrated in the lower ranks of the security apparatus [xx].
It is important to acknowledge that discrimination exists within Omani society, a meaningful limitation of the model this article otherwise presents as instructive. However, social stratification operates through tribal lineage claims to Omani identity rather than through racial and or sectarian categories per se [iv]. While these dimensions can overlap, the dominant social logic remains tribal rather than sectarian. It is this distinction that separates Oman’s management of diversity from the sectarianized patronage structures that have produced instability elsewhere in the region.
Applications For a Post-Assad Syria:
Oman’s experience demonstrates that sectarian diversity is not a destabilizing factor in and of itself, but rather a function of the structures of political economies, institutions, and legitimacy narratives [i,ii]. Syria’s post-civil war period will then depend not on sectarian demographics but on how the new government establishes arrangements with sectarian communities [i]. There is potential for both the patronage-based and fragmented model we see in Yemen. But we also see the potential for a system like Oman’s, one that cuts across sectarian lines and in which the incentive for sectarian mobilization becomes costly [iii].
Much like Oman, Syria’s priority must be to formulate a unified civic national identity [i]. This is needed to ensure that communal categories from the civil war do not become ingrained, permanent political structures. While sectarian representation quotas reduce long-term violence, comparative research shows that the institutionalization of Sectarian representation entrenches identity as the primary site of political competition and incentivizes elites to maintain communal instability [ix]. In Syria, where wartime displacement and demographic engineering have already reshaped balances, a quota system would likely entrench zero-sum politics [i]. Research shows that a geographic system of government based on administrative decentralization, centered on pre-existing provinces rather than confession, would allow for diverse governance without codifying religious identity within government institutions [i].
Next, economic rehabilitation should prioritize cross-regional interdependence over the recovery of communal enclaves. Syria’s war economy created territorial-based economies based on smuggling, localized taxation, and militia-controlled aid distribution [i]. Post-conflict economies remain territorially divided, with access to resources tied to identity and factional membership [i]. Reconstruction, therefore, must include infrastructure corridors that integrate labor markets and importantly, a centrally administered public payroll distribution system. Its key is replicating the investment in human development, especially education, that we saw Sultan Qaboos achieve. Evidence indicates that cross-cutting economic networks reduce the likelihood of confession by aligning material incentives with stability rather than competition [ii]. Yemen illustrates the consequences of not taking this route: when income and aid are contingent on factional links, identity becomes the primary mode of economic survival, thereby reinforcing sectarian fragmentation [ii,vii].
Thirdly, the establishment of a predictable and centralized legal framework must precede political liberalization. Syria currently comprises multiple overlapping systems of authority: regime courts, tribal mediation structures, and militia-based enforcement [iii]. Political liberalization without a unified legal framework risks reproducing the Yemeni trajectory, in which weak state capacity transformed electoral competition into sectarian violence [vii]. Therefore, a unified framework of standardized procedures and a nationally recruited pool of specialists are essential for the state to serve as the guarantor of rights and facilitate stable political liberalization [iii]. The security apparatus must also be reformed. Prioritizing integration and professionalization is key. A fragmented coercive authority incentivizes communities to retain sectarian militias as a survival mechanism [xii]. The transitional justice process must focus on individual accountability, rather than collective blame. As a result, the risk that legal processes become vehicles for sectarian retribution is diminished.
Leadership legitimacy will decide whether these new institutions are defined through a civic or sectarian lens. Oman constructed legitimacy through a developmental and inclusive national narrative that framed pluralism as a benefit rather than a national threat [iv]. Post-conflict Syrian leadership must ground itself in service provision and institutional reliability rather than sectarian protection. Authoritarian resilience literature demonstrates that regimes rely on performance-based legitimacy, and bureaucratic integration minimizes the salience of political identity mobilization [i]. At the same time, patrimonial methods that distribute resources through communal lines reinforce fragmentation [i]. Political rhetoric that portrays leadership as the protector of specific confessions will reproduce the Yemeni model, in which legitimacy is tied to communal protection rather than to national unity [iii].
The policy suggestions do not assume that Syria can reproduce Oman’s politics, nor can we discount the scale of wartime destruction and sectarian violence. This is rather a structural lesson. Durable stability in pluralistic societies emerges when economic incentives, legal frameworks, and legitimacy narratives align with citizenship rather than sectarian protection [ii,iii]. The fusion of patronage, coercion, and identity, as in Yemen, renders sectarian mobilization not only rational but also self-reinforcing [vii]. In Oman, institutions provide predictable access to both resources and justice across sectarian identities, as a tool for political mobilization loses its vitality [iv].
For Syria, the key challenge is an institutional implementation strategy. Civic identity can be embedded through educational programs and a shared Syrian history [i]. Economic reconstruction must produce cross-regional interdependence. Legal institutions must be established and unified before political liberalization and competition. Leadership legitimation should be defined by unification rather than by sectarian preferential treatment. Diversity will remain a defining characteristic of Syria. However, its political outcomes depend on whether the new government and subsequent governments treat diversity as a shared stake in stability or as a tool for political competition [i].
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