Time Is Running Out
On October 14, 2024, the Chinese military conducted a series of encircling military drills around Taiwan, surrounding the island with ships and flyovers while publishing graphics of missile strikes on Taiwanese cities. As part of a wider series of “Joint Sword Exercises,” the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to demonstrate its willingness and desire to control Taiwanese waters, airspace, and the island itself.[i] Satellite imagery from January 2025 revealed the construction of a new naval fleet of special purpose barges “tailor made for [an] amphibious assault.”[ii] Last month during his New Year’s speech, Xi Jinping characterized the subjugation of Taiwan as “inevitable,” saying that “no one can stop…reunification.”[iii] While some Taiwanese citizens dismiss the concerns of a full invasion as U.S. hysteria, they risk falling into the same trap of denial as Ukrainians who repeatedly ignored U.S. intelligence on Russian invasion plans.[iv][v] Growing PLA aggression since 2020 shows that a major conflict over Taiwan is not a matter of if, but when.
Even as President Lai Ching-te, leader of the more pro-independence Democratic People’s Party (DPP), holds the reins of the Taiwanese government, skepticism about American assistance to Taiwan in the event of an invasion is growing. Domestically in the United States, criticism of military funding to Ukraine and Israel and hesitancy about military interventionism abroad is at an all-time high. Polarizing debates in the United States have left Taiwanese observers unsure of U.S. reliability; just 34% of Taiwanese think that America is a trustworthy partner.[vi] With President Trump in the Oval Office, Taiwan must justify continued American support by implementing large-scale and painstaking military reforms to show how seriously it takes its own defense. Large-scale reforms will align with Trump’s focus on allies becoming more self-reliant and deserving of US sacrifice.
To successfully engage with President Trump and his incoming administration, Lai must immediately demonstrate a concrete commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense by first, sharply increasing the defense budget to 4% from 2.5% of GDP, and second, doubling down on asymmetric warfare capabilities.
Let’s Make a Deal
On June 16, 2024, when asked by Bloomberg Businessweek if he would defend Taiwan against China, Trump complained: “Taiwan should pay us for defense… we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.”[vii] His remarks suggest that he views defending Taiwan as offering little value to the United States. This perspective reflects a departure from the Biden administration’s more overt support for Taiwan, which included frequently sailing warships through the Taiwan Strait and brokering $18.3 billion in arms sales.[viii][ix] Clearly, arms sales are not enough to convince Trump that Taiwan is paying its fair share.
Although simplistic, the only number that Trump and his administration is likely to pay attention to is the share of Taiwan’s GDP spent on national defense. President Trump, whose foreign policy has been marked by a desire for effective “deals” with other countries, previously demanded that NATO countries also uphold their 3% GDP commitment to defense spending. As the defense to GDP ratio of allies was a central component of Trump’s first administration, it will likely emerge again as he begins his second term. Trump’s history of international diplomacy shows that he holds a strict zero-sum view on bilateral relations.[x] He focuses on trade deficits and monetary contributions to evaluate if an ally is “paying their fair share” or “taking America for a free ride.” Trump’s recent threats of tariffs on Mexican and Canadian goods echo this desire to exact financial costs in exchange for benefits to the U.S.[xi] President Lai’s 2025 defense budget reflects only 2.5% of the nation’s GDP[xii] in military spending, which pales in comparison to Israel’s 4.5%.[xiii] President Lai would do well to surpass the goal of 3% set by his defense ministry’s comptroller bureau chief and muster the political capital to commit to increasing the share to at least 4% in 2026.[xiv] By sending an early and clear signal to Trump that Taiwan is doubling up on its defense, President Lai will create a much stronger foundation for collaboration with the Trump administration.
A country cannot ask allies to sacrifice in the face of an existential military threat if its own defense spending remains at such a paltry figure. Increased funding will not only help bolster asymmetric weapons capabilities (e.g. more naval mines, ASW systems, and SAMs) but also rectify crippling personnel shortages. Given soldiers’ preference to navigate to units like the signal corps, infantry units such as the mechanized infantry and artillery units remain critically undermanned.[xv] This uneven spread of readiness across unit types hampers Taiwan’s ability to repel a maritime invasion and maintain flexible for varying invasion scenarios.
Double Down on the Porcupine
The recommended increase in spending should be directed towards weaponry and strategies that enable a “porcupine strategy.” The “porcupine strategy” calls for Taiwan to wage asymmetric warfare against China’s PLA.[xvi] Like a porcupine defending itself against a much larger enemy with its spikes, this approach aims to make any attempt to invade or seize Taiwanese land as costly as possible, with significant mobile anti-air and anti-ship missiles. While some U.S. advisors have urged Taiwan to pivot from its blend of conventional and asymmetric capabilities to focus more heavily on the latter, successive Taiwanese administrations have expended financial resources into what amounts to white elephant projects for the military. Purchases like M1A2 Abrams tanks and expensive F-16 fighters simply expand conventional capabilities that are less effective in responding to the core concern of repelling amphibious landings.[xvii]
As HKS Student Policy Review (then known as the Kennedy School Review) contributor Nicholas Hanson pointed out in 2020, the conventional weapons systems that Taiwan has sought to buy from the United States – such as fighter jets – are insufficient in the face of the massive conventional forces of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[xviii][xix] Taiwan has continued down this mistaken path, spending the majority (63%) of its U.S. arms budget on resources to build up its traditional rather than asymmetric capabilities during the past two U.S. administrations.[xx] Taiwan should focus instead on procuring naval mines, ASW (anti-submarine warfare), and ASMs (anti-ship missiles) to target the PLA’s amphibious transport vehicles. These would be key weapons in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. Naval mines are a cheaper and more effective method of defending Taiwan and can be strategically placed underwater at short notice. The PLA continues to invest in developing more amphibious assault ships and practicing amphibious landings, heightening the urgency for Taiwan to develop a porcupine strategy that will not only frustrate but potentially deter an outright attack in the first place. As Lai’s party does not have a parliamentary majority, dramatic increases to defense will face extreme – and potentially insurmountable – pushback. At a minimum, Lai can make meaningful changes within the existing budget by rapidly reorienting purchases to embrace a porcupine strategy.
If the United States believes that, given the current gap in military capabilities, a PLA invasion would force Taiwan to surrender within the span of just a few days, any U.S. assistance or actions would be futile. By investing in cheap existing mines, decoy mines, and minelaying systems, however, President Lai can convince Trump that Taiwan can credibly resist long enough to make U.S. assistance worthwhile. Increasing the defense budget would allow Taiwan to greatly increase the cost of an invasion to the PLA and secure the necessary time to rally international support and mobilize foreign assistance. Time is the key resource that Taiwan must gain in an invasion scenario. If Taiwan is not able to resist the PLA for at least several days, U.S. aid and assistance will not be able to make a dent to make a difference on the battlefield.
At a time when America is undergoing a rethink of military interventionism, the era of unconditional, lofty U.S. commitments is an artifact of the past. If Taiwan is serious about its external support from the US – it needs to initiate internal reform.
[i] “The Joint Sword 2024B Exercise.” Global Taiwan Institute, October 2024. https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/the-joint-sword-2024b-exercise/.
[ii] “China Suddenly Building Fleet of Special Barges Suitable for Taiwan Landings.” Naval News, January 2025. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/china-suddenly-building-fleet-of-special-barges-suitable-for-taiwan-landings/#:~:text=China%20is%20building%20at%20least,tanks%20directly%20onto%20Taiwanese%20roads.
[iii] “Xi Says No One Can Stop China’s Reunification with Taiwan.” Reuters, December 31, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-says-no-one-can-stop-chinas-reunification-with-taiwan-2024-12-31/.
[iv] “Why Ukrainians Don’t Believe in War with Russia, Distrust West.” Al Jazeera, February 21, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/why-ukrainians-dont-believe-in-war-with-russia-distrust-west.
[v] “Most Taiwanese Believe China Unlikely to Invade in Coming Five Years, Poll Shows.” Reuters, October 9, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/most-taiwanese-believe-china-unlikely-invade-coming-five-years-poll-shows-2024-10-09/.
[vi] “China-Taiwan Tensions Increase as Military Buildup Continues.” BBC News, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67891869.
[vii] Bloomberg Businessweek. “The Donald Trump Interview Transcript.” Bloomberg, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-trump-interview-transcript/.
[viii] Maizland, Lindsay. “U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?” Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump.
[ix] Gomez, Eric, and Benjamin Giltner. “Breaking Down Taiwan’s Arms Backlog, Part 3: Comparing the Trump and Biden Administrations.” Cato Institute, 2023. https://www.cato.org/blog/breaking-down-taiwans-arms-backlog-part-3-comparing-trump-biden-administrations.
[x] “Space Warfare and Strategic Deterrence.” ScienceDirect, 2019. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438719300171.
[xi] “Trump’s Tariff Policies and Their Global Economic Impact.” NPR, November 25, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/11/25/g-s1-35842/trump-tariffs-threat.
[xii] Sacks, David. “Taiwan’s Latest Defense Budget Risks Falling Further Behind China.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-latest-defense-budget-risks-falling-further-behind-china.
[xiii] Central Intelligence Agency. “Military Expenditures.” The World Factbook. Accessed November 21, 2024. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/military-expenditures/.
[xiv] Lee, Yimou, and Ben Blanchard. “Taiwan Defence Spend to Outpace GDP Growth as China Threat Rises.” Reuters, August 22, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-defence-spend-outpace-gdp-growth-china-threat-rises-2024-08-22/.
[xv] “China’s Threat of Invasion: Conscription and Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell.” Foreign Policy, February 15, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/china-threat-invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/.
[xvi] “Porcupine or Honey Badger? The Overall Defense Concept and Asymmetry in Taiwan’s Defense Strategy.” Global Taiwan Institute, May 2023. https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/05/porcupine-or-honey-badger-the-overall-defense-concept-and-asymmetry-in-taiwans-defense-strategy/.
[xvii] “Taiwan’s First New Tanks in 30 Years: M1A2T Abrams.” Military Watch Magazine, 2024. https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/taiwan-first-new-tanks-30-years-m1a2t-abrams.
[xviii] Hanson, Nicholas. “F-35s Are Not A Magic Weapon: Why Taiwan Should Admit Conventional Military Defeat To Defend Its Sovereignty.” HKS Student Policy Review, 2020. https://studentreview.hks.harvard.edu/f-35s-are-not-a-magic-weapon-why-taiwan-should-admit-conventional-military-defeat-to-defend-its-sovereignty/.
[xix] U.S. Department of Defense. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” U.S. Department of Defense, 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
[xx] “Taiwan’s Urgent Need for Asymmetric Defense.” Cato Institute, 2024. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/taiwans-urgent-need-asymmetric-defense#policy-recommendations-us-security-assistance.