Last October, as the United States geared up for its presidential elections, Kazakhstan experienced a historic moment of its own – a national referendum in which 70% of population voted in favor of constructing its first nuclear power plant since April 1999, the year it decommissioned its last Soviet-era reactor.[i] Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a key supporter of this initiative, sees nuclear energy as a pathway to securing Kazakhstan’s long-term stability and energy independence. Yet a critical question remains: Will this decision bolster the country’s energy sovereignty or will it expose it to new vulnerabilities?
In recent years, Kazakhstan has faced growing power outages. This is due primarily to aging Soviet-era coal power plants that struggle to meet increasing electricity demand, and the previous lack of political will to introduce tangible reforms in the industry. The country’s growing energy consumption, which increased by 4.3% to 120 billion kWh in 2024, doesn’t match with its generating capacities, which reached 117.9 billion kWh last year.[ii] Because of this, Kazakhstan must cover the shortfall by importing electricity from Russia, which is quite costly. Prices are even higher during peak demand spikes, when the difference can be up to five times higher than regular tariffs – 9-10 cents vs 1.5-2 cents.[iii]
The main issue, however, is the country’s energy security. Kazakhstan’s energy system is a contradictory legacy of its Soviet past – centralized in design yet fragmented in execution. For instance, while West Kazakhstan is home to 70% of country’s oil and gas reserves, it remains unconnected to the central national grid, primary due to delays in approving and executing a capital-intensive infrastructure project in an environment where electricity tariffs are too low to ensure a viable return on investment. Another aspect is continuing dependencies on Russian energy system. The same western region of Kazakhstan is still dependent on energy supplies from neighboring country, especially during the peak demand periods, which is a significant national security risk considering the implications of recent geopolitical conflicts in the region.
But, as Kazakhstan is estimated to have an electricity deficit by 2035 of 17.4 billion kWh,[iv] it is necessary to significantly increase energy capacity. The current energy consumption and production gaps signal deeper structural vulnerabilities which require long-term and sustainable solutions. Unfortunately, abundant coal reserves that could last up to 300 years at current consumption rates are not a viable option under global carbon scrutiny and considering the country’s commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Hydropower, another alternative source, is limited due to the country’s dwindling water resources and water dependency on neighboring China and Kyrgyzstan. The erratic nature of renewable energy sources in the absence of storage capabilities creates additional challenges for the national grid. This situation makes nuclear power the most pragmatic and logical solution to meet the economy’s long-term energy needs.
Introducing nuclear power stretches beyond just building reactors and calculating kilowatts. Since its early years of independence, Kazakhstan, located between Russia, China and Western interests in the region, has navigated very tricky landscape. One of the strategic moves of previous political administration in the early 1990s was inviting American, Chinese, European, and Russian companies into the country’s emerging hydrocarbon industry. This ensured that no single power could dominate and dictate the rules of game.[v] The current Kazakh President has a historic opportunity to replicate the strategy with the nuclear industry. Several companies like Korea’s KNHP, Russia’s Rosatom, France’s EDF and China’s CNNC have been already shortlisted. The United States also has a chance to participate through its nuclear champions, like the achievements of the Bechtel-Westinghouse consortium in Poland.[vi]
Through multilateral nuclear diplomacy, Kazakhstan can lock in global superpowers’ commitment to the country’s atomic power industry, whose long-term benefits for the national economy are compelling. For instance, the nuclear plant construction is expected to create around 5,000 jobs, peaking at approximately 10,000 jobs in 2032. Once operational, it will provide at least 2,000 permanent high-skilled jobs.[vii] Nuclear power will also stabilize electricity prices in the long-term by providing a reliable, large-scale baseload power source, which will balance sharp price spikes during shortages. Moving up the nuclear value chain, from current exports of raw uranium to producing nuclear fuel and operating power plants, will trigger industrial modernization, stimulate high-tech manufacturing, development of local engineering and construction capabilities, scientific research and technological advancements. From the geopolitical perspective, the project will leverage Kazakhstan’s commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy technologies and contribute to regional energy stability by potentially supplying surplus energy to Central Asian energy-deficient countries such as Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and others.
However, there are obvious challenges which need to be addressed. First, public skepticism over nuclear energy remains strong, fueled by memories of the hundreds of Soviet nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk in North-Eastern Kazakhstan between 1949 and 1989. Three decades after the last nuclear test, people still suffer from poor health, including notably higher cancer rates. There is also a social stigma stemming from a low level of awareness on nuclear energy and fears associated with possible genetic changes.[viii] Therefore, regular communications on the safety of nuclear technology and use of advanced protocols based on the lessons from Japan’s Fukushima case should address the public’s remaining skepticism. Ensuring transparency and providing feedback should be prioritized to secure initial public trust gained after the referendum.
Second, the public, after seeing the series of coal power plant failures in the last five years, harbor concerns on how the government will be able to manage nuclear power infrastructure. It must be acknowledged that Kazakhstan currently lacks sufficient regulatory capacity given limited prior exposure to nuclear power industry. The recently launched Atomic Energy Committee needs to accumulate respective experience to ensure rigorous regulatory oversight. Empowering the watchdog agency by bringing international experts and building local expertise should be prioritized. The UAE’s approach with Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant – hiring expats while training own people – could be taken as a blueprint.[ix] This and other steps aimed at local capacity building should be reflected in a well-designed and clear government roadmap.
Third, there are open questions about the selection of strategic partners for this project. Partnering with Rosatom, which saw its management sanctioned early this year by the U.S., might cause risk of sanctions spillover. Chinese nuclear technologies, while cost-competitive, have faced scrutiny over lax safety standards.[x] Western nuclear technologies, especially from the U.S. and France, are typically more expensive for emerging countries like Kazakhstan in terms of both construction and compliance costs. Therefore, Kazakhstan, which plans to build at least three nuclear power plants, should strategically diversify its partners depending on technology and safety standards, financing terms, geopolitical alignment and energy security, long-term fuel cycle cooperation, commitments to localization and industrial development. Thus, it would dilute any foreign country’s sway, making sure that no single overseas stakeholder controls the country’s nuclear industry, echoing the previous approach in the country’s oil and gas sector.
Today, Kazakhstan stands at a crossroads. If done right, its nuclear aspirations could fuel its sustainable economic growth, reduce overreliance on regional powers, and cement its position as a true Middle Power.[xi] However, missteps could trigger public backlash and entrench new dependencies. The country’s leadership is expected to approach this important initiative with eyes wide open, committed to transparency, accountability, and strategic planning. If executed wisely, the nuclear project can serve not only as a stable source of energy for the country, but also as a strong pillar of its long-term national sovereignty.
[i] Ruslan Ibraev, Robert Schultz, Anatoly Kuchkovsky, Cooperation between NTI and Kazakhstan to Eliminate Weapons-Usable Material. February 2006. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. https://resources.inmm.org/annual-meeting-proceedings/cooperation-between-nti-and-kazakhstan-eliminate-weapons-usable-material
[ii] Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan: 2024 results and strategic plans for 2025. Official information source of the Prime-Minister of Kazakhstan. Accessed April 3, 2025. https://primeminister.kz/en/news/reviews/ministry-of-energy-of-kazakhstan-2024-results-and-strategic-plans-for-2025n.
[iii] Zhanel Zhazetova, “Kazakhstan paid Russia 100 billion tenge for electricity in 2024”. February 27, 2025. Kursiv. https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-02-27/zhzh-electroenergy100/
[iv] Zhudyz Ramazanova, “Kazakhstan’s Energy Transition: Examining the Role of Nuclear Power”, January 15, 2025, The Hague Research Institute for Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus & Central Asia https://hagueresearch.org/kazakhstans-energy-transition-examining-the-role-of-nuclear-power/
[v] Assel Nussupova, “Tengiz: Behind the Scenes of The Deal of the Century”, April 8, 2023. The Astana Times.
https://www.chevron.com/worldwide/kazakhstan https://astanatimes.com/2023/04/tengiz-behind-the-scenes-of-the-deal-of-the-century/
[vi] New agreement enables continued development of Polish plant. April 2, 2025. World Nuclear News https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/new-agreement-enables-continued-development-of-polish-plant
[vii] Dmitry Pokidayev, “Kazakhstan to Train Workforce for Future Nuclear Power Plants”, Jabuary 8, 2025, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-to-train-workforce-for-future-nuclear-power-plants/?t
[viii] Mukhtar Amanbaiuly, Aigerim Mussabalinova, “Semipalatinsk test site: the legacy of the past, hopes for the future?”, July 8, 2024. Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. https://cabar.asia/en/semipalatinsk-test-site-the-legacy-of-the-past-hopes-for-the-future
[ix] Caroline Peachey, “Developing a nuclear energy workforce in the UAE”, February 4, 2020. NS Energy Business
https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/analysis/nuclear-energy-workforce-uae
[x] Shangwei Liu “Breaking the Cost Escalation Curse of Nuclear Power”, March 10, 2025, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Discussions. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/events/breaking-cost-escalation-curse-nuclear-power
[xi] Barbara Lippert and Hans Meir, “Mittlere Mächte –einflussreiche Akteure in der internationalen Politik,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), January 23, 2024.