In August 2023, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo started nursing a cough.[i] In prior weeks, polluted air in Jakarta had painted the sky gray and reduced visibility. The concentration of PM 2.5 pollutants had averaged 140 parts per million (ppm), more than 25 times the World Health Organization’s threshold of 5 ppm.
During the rest of the year, PM 2.5 concentration hovers over 50 ppm year-round, inhaled by 11 million inhabitants of Jakarta and 31 million of the metropolitan area. Air pollution causes over 10,000 deaths and 5000 hospitalizations in Jakarta, amounting to an economic cost of more than USD 2.9 billion per year.[ii]
Two years after a 2021 Supreme Court ruling found his government negligent and now experiencing the personal costs of the crisis, Widodo directed his ministers to act.[iii][iv] He convened a ministerial taskforce to combat air pollution and vested significant responsibility in Luhut Pandjaitan, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment (Marves).[v] Reporting to Pandjaitan, Deputy Minister of Infrastructure and Transportation, Rachmat Kaimuddin began to explore ways to address the crisis within his mandate. I spent several weeks in 2024 embedded with Kaimuddin’s office. Informing much of this analysis, I interviewed experts in the Indonesian government, civil society, and academia to understand the continuing air pollution crisis, including the competing incentives of different stakeholders and paths to resolution.
Jakarta’s air pollution has multiple root causes, ranging from local power plants to outdoor burning, and Kaimuddin’s office sought to identify the highest return-on-investment policies. They identified Indonesia’s fuel quality as a crucial problem.[vi] High sulfur fuel leads to vehicular emissions that oxidize in the air and give rise to pollutants and particulate matter.[vii] However, even this seemingly ‘obvious’ initiative to improve fuel quality became mired in complex webs of incentives and interests, rooted in Indonesia’s long running fuel subsidy. Widodo left office in October 2024, and the future of Jakarta’s air pollution crisis continues to look bleak.
Indonesia is the world’s fourth largest country, home to over 270 million people. Since gaining independence in 1945, Indonesia has undergone significant economic transformations, initially driven by oil exports through the 1970s. Oil production started falling in the 1990s due to a lack of exploration and investment in reserves.[viii] The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 severely impacted the economy, causing a contraction in GDP of 13.1% in 1998 and exacerbating poverty.[ix] Since 2004, Indonesia has been a net oil importer.[x] In recent years, despite achieving an average annual growth rate of 5%, Indonesia continues to grapple with a poverty rate of 9.4% (2021), concentrated in the agricultural sector.[xi] The country’s current per capita GDP is $4,256 and economic policies are invested in escaping the “middle-income trap.”[xii]
Indonesia is rich in natural resources, which remain controlled by state monopolies. It is the world’s largest coal exporter, exporting 76% of its annual output, controlled by the state-owned enterprise (SOE), PLN.[xiii] Another SOE, Pertamina, controls the majority of oil exploration, imports, and distribution in Indonesia.
Jakarta’s rapid growth and urbanization, combined with Indonesia’s historically vast and cheap coal and oil reserves have led to persistent air pollution in the city over the last several decades. In 2023, the city observed daily PM 2.5 levels of 40-50 ppm for extended periods.[xiv] Sources of PM 2.5 include vehicle exhaust, industrial emissions, construction dust, and aerosols formed by atmospheric reactions.[xv]
PM 2.5 particles penetrate the respiratory tract, reaching the lungs and entering the bloodstream. Chronic exposure to PM 2.5 can lead to respiratory and heart diseases and increase mortality. In 2010 alone, there were 5.5 million cases of air pollution related illness, leading to over USD $3.7 billion in direct health costs.[xvi] Air pollution is estimated to lead to 1,264 disability adjusted life years (i.e. years lost due to premature death, ill-health or disability per 100,000 people).[xvii]
While the magnitude of Jakarta’s air pollution problem is well established, its sources are hard to measure, muddying the task of prioritizing interventions to target root causes. Research points to some broad combination of road transport, power plants, and industries. [xviii] Due to differences in emission inventory, source apportionment studies, and the seasonality of pollution, “there is no consensus in the public on what causes the air pollution,” noted Mohammed Zeki, a policy specialist at ClimateWorks Foundation.[xix]
Private transportation is a particularly serious year-round source of pollution. Metro Jakarta sprawls over 2,600 square miles of Java and limited last mile connectivity forces its 32 million inhabitants to use private transportation. Tailpipe emissions account for 32-41% of emissions, rising to 57% in the dry season.[xx]
In 2023, there were over 23 million registered vehicles in Central Jakarta, with over 80% being two wheelers. These vehicles consume 25.9 million liters of fuel every day, totaling 10 billion liters / year.[xxi] Most of this fuel has sulfur content exceeding 500 ppm. After combustion, this sulfur contributes to the formation of PM 2.5 in the atmosphere and corrodes the car engine. Indonesia’s outdated 1996 Euro 2 standard is far behind the global average and peer countries.[xxii] For instance, India and China moved to the 50 ppm Euro 4 standard in 2017.[xxiii][xxiv]
Emissions standards and fuel quality
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from RAC Drive, OTO[xxv][xxvi]
Emissions standards for light vehicles across countries
Source: Author’s calculations based on compiled data from government sources[xxvii]
The cost of fuel in Indonesia does not reflect market prices, let alone the cost of externalities. Long-running subsidies keep the cost of fuel below the market price, leading to unscrupulous consumption and incentivizing the continued use of combustion engines.[xxviii] In 2024, the prevailing price of subsidized petrol, Pertalite, was IDR 10,000 / liter.[xxix] These prices are comparable to those in Russia and Saudi Arabia, which, unlike Indonesia, are oil exporters.[xxx]
Consumer cost of fuel in key economies
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Trading Economics[xxxi]
In addition to vehicles, 22 coal-fired power plants contribute up to 31% of PM 2.5 emissions.[xxxii], [xxxiii] Despite promises of a green transition, Indonesia has been slow in phasing out coal plants and is adding new coal capacity.[xxxiv]., [xxxv] Katherine Hassan from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) noted that making vehicles cleaner by replacing combustion engines with electric power will only shift emissions.[xxxvi] Instead, “the transition should be accompanied with a focus on a cleaner grid.” Commentators also note that links between politicians and the coal industry lead to conflicts of interest that hinder any interventions that reduce coal’s profitability.[xxxvii]
The energy sector receives significant subsidies from the government through SOE monopolies. The 2024 budget set aside USD 7.2 billion for fuel and USD 4.7 billion for electricity subsidies, accounting for more than 10% of the budget and outpacing spending on education and health.[xxxviii], [xxxix] Fluctuating oil prices contribute to volatility – in 2022, the subsidy expenditure was revised from USD 10 to 34 billion due to rising prices.[xl]
Indonesian consumers pay a fixed, subsidized price for all fuel. In June 2024, the subsidized variant of petrol (Pertalite) cost IDR 10,000 / liter (USD 0.60) and diesel (Biosolar) cost IDR 6,800 / liter (USD 0.42). [xli] While subsidized Biosolar is restricted to use only by industrial trucks, subsidized Pertalite is universal and accounts for 80% of consumption.[xlii] In Q1 2024, according to Marves estimates, the government spent approximately IDR 1,500 / liter in subsidies for Pertalite and IDR 4,900 / liter for Biosolar.[xliii] When oil prices are high, the government can end up subsidizing more than half the value of oil to reach the target price.[xliv]
The subsidy system dates to independence in 1949 when Indonesia had significant oil reserves and met its demand domestically.[xlv] Since the 1990s however, domestic production has been falling while demand has been rising, increasing imports. The pro-cyclical nature of the subsidy results in large bills during periods of economic crisis, which have precipitated reforms in the system but also brought down governments.[xlvi] Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the government increased the prices of petrol by 71% and diesel by 60%. Subsequent public unrest led to the resignation of President Suharto after 32 years in power.[xlvii]
In 2004 Indonesia transitioned from being a net oil exporter to an importer, exacerbating the fiscal burden to subsidize imported fuel.[xlviii] The policy of setting a target price for fuel, instead of a fixed subsidy amount, means inflation and price volatility regularly pressure the government to change the subsidy structure every few years. In 2014, Joko Widodo came to power on a platform of a complete overhaul of the subsidy that would link domestic prices to the global oil market and remove price controls. But rising global prices caused him to taper the plan to remove the subsidy only on premium petrol and cap the diesel subsidy.[xlix]
In political rhetoric, fuel subsidies are linked to social protection. In 2004, President Yudhoyono rolled out extensive social assistance programs to stave discontentment from reforms that doubled the price of fuel and decreased the budget deficit by USD 10 billion. In 2014, President Widodo had to match his fuel reforms with an IDR 200,000 monthly cash transfer to 15 million households.[l]
This rhetoric of social protection does not match the reality of the subsidy, which is universal for petrol consumers and thus economically regressive. Four wheelers, largely owned by upper-class households, consume more fuel despite comprising a small share of vehicles. In 2014, the World Bank found that more than half of the subsidy goes to the richest 25% of households, while only 20% accrued to the poorest 25%.[li]
Successive administrations at the city, provincial, and national levels have attempted to tackle Jakarta’s air pollution problem with limited success. In 2003, the city introduced a “three-in-one” traffic policy mandating vehicles in select zones to carry at least three passengers. Ririn Radiawati Kusama of Clean Air Asia highlighted that the policy was discontinued soon after due to the “emergence of touts who’d get into the cars at intersections to help the driver not be charged for a violation.”[lii] This law was replaced by an “odd-even” rule which restricted the use of vehicles based on the last digit in the license plate. While this policy led to an 8% decrease in congestion in the short-run, its efficacy has been challenged due to the non-regulation of two-wheelers.[liii] Further, “rich people simply bought additional cars or switched their license plates,” noted Kusama.[liv]
In 2017, the government mandated that all vehicles in Jakarta meet Euro 4 emissions standards. However, the available fuel still falls in the high-sulfur Euro 2 standard which corrodes engines over time ultimately resulting in dirty tailpipe emissions.
Civil society actors observe that the issue has been marked by a lack of commitment by the government, despite lawsuits and recurring controversies. “The pollution board doesn’t have sufficient budget to run widespread tests on polluting cars,” noted Kusama.[lv] Further, political rhetoric often puts the blame back on citizens, instead of driving reforms to address the root causes, observed Hassan. [lvi]
The multiplicity of stakeholders makes coordinated policy actions particularly difficult. Key actors like the city and national governments, Pertamina, PLN, etc. have operated in silos, leading to inconsistent execution.[lvii] SOEs face conflicting incentives – Pertamina has both a ‘public service obligation’ to increase social welfare while also having a mandate to remain profitable.[lviii]
Given these conflicting incentives, identifying the most impactful interventions is challenging. The range of sources illustrated by studies indicates there is no single culprit for air pollution in Jakarta. To prioritize across interventions the Marves team considered back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit calculations and feasibility. They were also under a time constraint – February to October 2024 was a unique window of opportunity, marking the eight months between the 2024 election and the inauguration of new President Prabowo Subianto. The Marves team hoped that the outgoing President Widodo would be more willing to take risks given he was not up for re-election.
Quickly, fuel quality reforms emerged as the most feasible intervention to tackle air pollution. Regulating plant emissions would require stricter emissions standards and stronger apparatus for monitoring and penalties. Further, shutting down plants was not an option as “the near-term costs will be too much,” said Kaimuddin.[lix] Reducing the number of cars on the road and expanding public transit would require significant behavioral change and large, long-term capital investments. The government was already expanding financial incentives to switch to EVs but replacing all vehicles would take over a decade based on Marves estimates.[lx]
In contrast, improving fuel quality by reducing sulfur to meet Euro 4 standards would require only point intervention through Pertamina’s procurement and refinery facilities. Internal calculations by different stakeholders such as Pertamina and the Ministry of Energy yielded varying estimates on the cost of the intervention, due to differences in consideration of capital expenditure, logistical costs, etc.[lxi] However, they all indicated a less a then 5% increase in the final price of Pertalite.[lxii]
Improving fuel quality was further complicated by subsidies and conflicting incentives across Pertamina, the public, and the government. To create fiscal space to finance improvements, the office proposed scaling back existing subsidies, to both clean up tailpipe emissions while allowing consumer fuel to reflect its true cost. Initial proposals suggested limiting subsidized fuel consumption to only four-wheel vehicles, moving 42% of the petrol-powered vehicle fleet to non-subsidized oil. According to internal estimates, this could reduce the subsidy budget by up to 10% while increasing the fuel quality. [lxiii]
In the decentralized administrative setup of Indonesia, implementing the subsidy reform required a Presidential Decree by outgoing President Widodo.[lxiv] The decree will give policymakers the authority to make any other requisite changes. But requesting such a decree required buy-in from the Coordinating Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Energy.
The fuel subsidy system had brought down many leaders before and there remained significant political wariness for the solution, despite evidence on the regressiveness of the existing policy.[lxv]
Over the eight-month policy window, Marves convened meetings with stakeholders to improve the palatability of the policy changes: the government committed to reimbursing Pertamina for additional costs for refining, funds for which would be raised from the rationalization of the subsidy. A draft of the technical regulation was prepared, only pending approval from the President.
Despite the significant progress already made towards fuel quality reforms, political exigencies took priority during the final months of Widodo’s term. In August 2024, Widodo reshuffled his cabinet to facilitate the transition to his successor Prabowo.[lxvi] The Minister of Energy was replaced by a Prabowo loyalist, resetting the progress made on the fuel quality reform. Scrutiny of and protests against the government also increased in the run-up to the swearing of the new President, further reducing the risk appetite of the administration.[lxvii] The window for regulation on sensitive topics like fuel subsidies disappeared.
While the people of Jakarta continue pursuing private solutions to the public problem by adopting masks and air purifiers and minimizing time outdoors, ultimately the “government is the main stakeholder who needs to be the catalyst of the air pollution issue,” noted Kusama.[lxviii] Large state monopolies, combined with weak regulatory apparatus and skewed political incentives create a complex tangle of issues that make even obvious solutions to the air pollution problem untenable. The new government has been reported to be working on an overhaul of the subsidy system, though little information has been made public.[lxix] Without aligning incentives across the system, any the success of any reforms will largely be dictated by the tug of war between financial and political pressures.
[i] Koh Ewe, “Indonesia Targets Air Pollution as President Starts Coughing,” TIME, accessed June 8, 2024, https://time.com/6305644/indonesia-air-pollution-jakarta-smog-jokowi-cough/.
[ii] Syuhada, Ginanjar, Adhadian Akbar, Donny Hardiawan, Vivian Pun, Adi Darmawan, Sri Hayyu Alynda Heryati, Adiatma Yudistira Manogar Siregar, et al. 2023. “Impacts of Air Pollution on Health and Cost of Illness in Jakarta, Indonesia.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 20 (4): 2916. https://doi.org/10.3390/IJERPH20042916/S1.
[iii] Amy Sood, “Jakarta Pollution Lawsuit: Residents Win Battle for Clean Air against Indonesian Government,” CNN, accessed June 8, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/16/asia/jakarta-citizen-lawsuit-air-pollution-intl-hnk/index.html.
[iv] Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State Documents & Translation, “President Jokowi Unveils Directives Regarding Air Quality in Greater Jakarta,” Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, August 14, 2023, https://setkab.go.id/en/president-jokowi-unveils-directives-regarding-air-quality-in-greater-jakarta/.
[v] The Jakarta Post, “President Tasks Luhut with Coordinating Pollution-Mitigation Efforts – Jakarta,” accessed June 8, 2024, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/08/30/president-tasks-luhut-with-coordinating-pollution-mitigation-efforts.html.
[vi] Rachmat Kaimuddin and Giotama Lokanta (Marves) in conversation with author, June 2024
[vii] Zheng Wan et al., “Influence of Sulfur Emission Control Areas on Particulate Matter Emission: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis,” Marine Policy 130 (August 1, 2021): 104584, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104584.
[viii] “Crude Oil Indonesia – Production & Consumption – Analysis & Report | Indonesia Investments,” accessed March 9, 2025, https://www.indonesia-investments.com/business/commodities/crude-oil/item267.
[ix] “World Bank Open Data,” World Bank Open Data, accessed March 14, 2025, https://data.worldbank.org.
[x] “Indonesia Rejoining OPEC despite Being a Net Importer of Petroleum – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=23352.
[xi] World Bank, “Poverty and Inequality Platform,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://pip.worldbank.org/country-profiles/IDN.
[xii] Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, “Indonesia Harus Keluar Dari Ancaman Middle Income Trap,” accessed June 11, 2024, https://setkab.go.id/indonesia-harus-keluar-dari-ancaman-middle-income-trap/.
[xiii] “Indonesia – Countries & Regions,” International Energy Agency, accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.iea.org/countries/indonesia/coal.
[xiv] “Toward Clean Air Jakarta: Improving Air Quality In Jakarta in the Near- and Long-Term,” Vital Strategies, 2023, https://www.vitalstrategies.org/resources/toward-clean-air-jakarta-improving-air-quality-in-jakarta-in-the-near-and-long-term/.
[xv] Vital Strategies, 2023
[xvi] Vital Strategies, 2023
[xvii] Vital Strategies, 2023
[xviii] Vital Strategies, 2023
[xix] Muhammed Zeki (ClimateWorks) in conversation with author, June 2024
[xx] “Identifying the Main Sources of Air Pollution in Jakarta: A Source Apportionment Study,” Vital Strategies, 2022, https://www.vitalstrategies.org/resources/identifying-the-main-sources-of-air-pollution-in-jakarta-a-source-apportionment-study/.
[xxi] Vital Strategies, 2022
[xxii] “Six Countries Move Up in Top 100 Ranking on Gasoline Sulfur Limits,” Stratas Advisors, accessed March 9, 2025, https://www.stratasadvisors.com/insights/six-countries-move-up-in-top-100-ranking-on-gasoline-sulfur-limits/06222023.
[xxiii] “Emission Standards: India,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://dieselnet.com/standards/in/.
[xxiv] “Emission Standards: China: Cars and Light Trucks,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://dieselnet.com/standards/cn/ld.php.
[xxv] “Latest Fuel Price in Jakarta Selatan 14 March 2025,” Oto, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.oto.com/en/harga-bbm
[xxvi] “Euro 1 to Euro 7 – Vehicle Emissions Standards | RAC Drive,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.rac.co.uk/drive/advice/emissions/euro-emissions-standards/.
[xxvii] “European Emission Standards,” in Wikipedia, February 27, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=European_emission_standards&oldid=1277921347.
[xxviii] David Braithwaite and Alexander Chandra, “Indonesia’s Fuel Subsidies: Action Plan for Reform,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2012, https://www.iisd.org/publications/report/indonesias-fuel-subsidies-action-plan-reform
[xxix] “Pertamina: Price of Non-Subsidised Fuel Decreases in Early 2024 – Tanahair.Net,” accessed March 9, 2025, https://tanahair.net/pertamina-price-of-non-subsidised-fuel-decreases-in-early-2024/.
[xxx] “Gasoline Prices – Countries – List,” Trading Economics, accessed July 15, 2024, https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gasoline-prices.
[xxxi] “Gasoline Prices – Countries – List,” Trading Economics, accessed July 15, 2024, https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gasoline-prices.
[xxxii] Vital Strategies, 2022.
[xxxiii] Lauri Myllyvirta, “Work From Home (WFH) and Other Gimmicks Cannot Clear Jakarta’s Air,” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, August 25, 2023, https://energyandcleanair.org/work-from-home-wfh-and-other-gimmicks-cannot-clear-jakartas-air/.
[xxxiv] “Indonesia Country Climate and Development Report,” World Bank, accessed July 15, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/indonesia-country-climate-and-development-report.
[xxxv] Hans Nicholas Jong, “Captive to Coal: Indonesia to Burn Even More Fossil Fuel for Green Tech,” Mongabay Environmental News, August 10, 2023, https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/captive-to-coal-indonesia-to-burn-even-more-fossil-fuel-for-green-tech/.
[xxxvi] Katherine Hassan (Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air) interviewed by author, July 2024
[xxxvii] Julia Simon, “Despite Billions to Get off Coal, Why Is Indonesia Still Building New Coal Plants?,” NPR, February 5, 2023, sec. Climate, https://www.npr.org/2023/02/05/1152823939/despite-billions-to-get-off-coal-why-is-indonesia-still-building-new-coal-plants.
[xxxviii] “Indonesia: Pricing Reforms, Social Assistance, and the Importance of Perceptions | The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform,” accessed June 20, 2024, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e018a16e-93a2-5e0b-b973-c6798f5d9a32/content.
[xxxix] antaranews.com, “Government Targets 2024 Energy Subsidies at Rp186.9 Trillion,” Antara News, January 16, 2024, https://en.antaranews.com/news/303117/government-targets-2024-energy-subsidies-at-rp1869-trillion.
[xl] “Indonesia Pumps Additional $24 Bln into Energy Subsidies | Reuters,” accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-govt-asks-parliament-24-bln-additional-energy-subsidies-2022-05-19/.
[xli] Galen Erickson, “Indonesia’s Fossil Fuel Subsidies Threaten Its Energy Transition,” April 28, 2024, accessed June 11, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/indonesias-fossil-fuel-subsidies-threaten-its-energy-transition/.
[xlii] “Konsumsi Pertalite Capai 23 Juta KL, Paling Banyak Digunakan Masyarakat,” accessed March 9, 2025, https://migas.esdm.go.id/post/read/konsumsi-pertalite-capai-23-juta-kl-paling-banyak-digunakan-masyarakat.
[xliii] Giotama Lokanta (Marves) interviewed by author, June 2024
[xliv] P. T. Pertamina (Persero), “High World Oil Prices, Pertamina Keeps Fuel & LPG Stocks Sufficient | Pertamina,” accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.pertamina.com/en/news-room/news-release/high-world-oil-prices-pertamina-keeps-fuel-and-lpg-stocks-sufficient
[xlv] Galen Erickson, 2024
[xlvi] “Indonesia’s Steady Progress in Tackling Fossil Fuel Subsidies – News,” International Energy Agency, December 27, 2016, https://www.iea.org/news/indonesias-steady-progress-in-tackling-fossil-fuel-subsidies.
[xlvii] UNEP, “Durability as a Measure of Success: An Analysis of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform in Indonesia,” 2016, https://www.cbd.int/doc/case-studies/inc/cs-inc-indonesia-fuel.pdf.
[xlviii] UNEP, 2016.
[xlix] “Jakarta’s Fuel Subsidy Reform to Deliver Mixed Results,” Emerald Expert Briefings oxan-db, no. oxan-db (January 1, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1108/OXAN-DB195764.
[l] “Economic Reform in Jokowi’s Indonesia | East Asia Forum,” May 20, 2015, https://eastasiaforum.org/2015/05/20/economic-reform-in-jokowis-indonesia/.
[li] “Indonesia: Pricing Reforms, Social Assistance, and the Importance of Perceptions | The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform.”
[lii] Ririn Radiawati Kusama (Clean Air Asia) interviewed by author, June 2024
[liii] Eko Prasojo and Afwan Abdi Salam, “DKI Jakarta’s Odd-Even Transportation Policy Formulation from The Perspective of Evidence Based Policy,” Policy & Governance Review 6, no. 1 (February 9, 2022): 40, https://doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v6i1.439.
[liv] Kusama, 2024
[lv] Kusama, 2024
[lvi] Hassan, 2024
[lvii] Gabriela Inchauste and David G. Victor, The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1007-7.
[lviii] P. T. Pertamina (Persero), “Company Overview | Pertamina,” accessed March 9, 2025, https://www.pertamina.com/en/www.pertamina.com.
[lix] Rachmat Kaimuddin (Marves) interviewed by author, July 2024
[lx] Kaimuddin, 2024
[lxi] Lokanta, 2024
[lxii] Lokanta, 2024
[lxiii] Lokanta, 2024
[lxiv] Ajoy Datta, Harry Jones, Vita Febriany, Dan Harris, Rika Kumala Dewi, Leni Wild and John Young “The Political Economy of Policy-Making in Indonesia,” Overseas Development Institute, December 2011
[lxv] Aditya Hadi, “Indonesian Government’s Plan to Restrict Subsidised Fuel Sales Is Necessary, but Risky,” accessed March 14, 2025, https://asianews.network/indonesian-governments-plan-to-restrict-subsidised-fuel-sales-is-necessary-but-risky/.
[lxvi] Radhiyaa Indra, “BREAKING: Jokowi Removes PDI-P Ministers in Latest Reshuffle – Politics,” accessed February 19, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/08/19/breaking-jokowi-removes-pdi-p-ministers-in-latest-reshuffle.html.
[lxvii] “Photos: Protests in Indonesia as Parliament Delays Change to Election Law,” Al Jazeera, accessed February 19, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/8/22/protests-across-indonesia-as-parliament-delays-change-to-election-law.
[lxviii] Kusama, 2024
[lxix] The Jakarta Post, “Bahlil Unveils New Fuel Subsidy Scheme – Society,” The Jakarta Post, accessed March 14, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/11/29/bahlil-unveils-new-fuel-subsidy-scheme.html.