In 1861, at the outset of the American Civil War, a medical doctor and inventor named Richard Jordan Gatling recognized that the vast majority of casualties in the Union Army were not from combat, but from disease. He set out to invent a new piece of technology that would reduce the need for massive formations of human beings in war and, ultimately, make it more humane. His invention, the Gatling Gun, was the first machine gun: a weapon of industrial warfare that did much to give World War I and the other wars of the twentieth century their distinctly inhumane natures.[i] The ways that technology changes warfare are rarely straightforward and do not often match prior predictions. As with Dr. Gatling’s misplaced hopes for his invention, current observers of the Ukraine War are basing policy decisions on misplaced predictions of the future of warfare. In an increasingly dangerous world, the consequences of those policy decisions could be dire.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there has been a wave of speculation in U.S and other media about the rise of new technologies in warfare. However, many policymakers are drawing the wrong conclusions: that due to the rise of robotics, drones, and artificial intelligence, warfare will be radically smaller. Instead, the evidence from Ukraine points to the fact that while technological change is occurring, mass remains an essential component of modern warfare and U.S. national security policy needs to adjust accordingly.
Technology, Warfare, and The Revolution in Military Affairs
History is rich with examples of technological advantage leading to one side’s success over another. However, the role of technology in warfare is usually characterized by adaptations that lead to fleeting moments of comparative advantage before each side adapts and makes the new technology or tactic less effective. Examples include the process by which dogfighting and anti-aircraft developed during World War I after the appearance of the first military airplanes, or the development of increasingly effective anti-tank weapons throughout the twentieth century.
However, much of the discussion about the lessons to be learned from Ukraine has focused on the idea that with the advent of robotics, drones, and AI, war has somehow fundamentally changed.[ii] Larger armies and expensive systems like tanks and jets, are now a thing of the past. Last year General (ret.) Mark Milley, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google, published an article in Foreign Affairs arguing that “future wars will no longer be about who can mass the most people or field the best jets, ships, and tanks. Instead, they will be dominated by increasingly autonomous weapons systems and powerful algorithms.”[iii] Mr. Schmidt, while speaking recently at the Future Investment Initiative in Saudi Arabia, stated that “I read somewhere that the US had thousands and thousands of tanks stored somewhere, Give them away. Buy a drone instead.”[iv] This discourse is leading American policymakers astray and, frankly, does not reflect the reality of what is happening in Ukraine.
What General Milley and Mr. Schmidt are describing might best be described as a Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA.[v][vi] This concept, common in military and historical fields, argues that certain technological changes can cause revolutionary changes in warfare, as opposed to normal cycles of adaptation. There is a good deal of scholarly debate about what might qualify as an RMA, but common examples are the transition from sail to steam-powered navies and the combination of mechanization, radios, and aircraft that allowed German Blitzkrieg to dominate the opening moves of World War II.[vii] The implications of predicting an RMA are huge: being last or even second to an RMA could prove disastrous.[viii] But policymakers should not be too quick to assume that new technology use in Ukraine will prove revolutionary. Instead, one should look closely at what is happening on the ground.
The Ground Truth: Technological Adaptation, Mass, and Mobilization in Ukraine
There is massive and rapid technological adaption happening in Ukraine. But it is incorrect to argue that war has forever changed, or an RMA has occurred. In fact, one can observe adaptation patterns that are common throughout history. Do you remember all the Ukrainian TB-2 Bayraktar propaganda videos[ix] from the opening months of the war? The TB-2 is a medium-sized, Turkish-made drone. The reason you don’t hear much about the Bayraktar anymore is because Russia adapted to its use, making it far less effective.[x] A similar “cat-and-mouse” game has played out around “first-person-view” or FPV drones as each side adapts and counter-adapts.[xi] At the same time, predictions that battlefields will become completely “transparent” due to increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have proven, at least so far, to be wrong. Ukraine was able to achieve near-total surprise in its Kursk offensive in August.[xii] This game of adaptation and counter-adaptation in warfare can be found throughout history and shows how both technology and tactics change and progress over time.
Conversely, the war in Ukraine shows that modern warfare still requires massive amounts of traditional military equipment. On both sides, massive needs for equipment including artillery shells, main battle tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles are a defining factor of the war. Both sides have raced to provide enough conventional equipment to support their respective war efforts. Ukraine remains almost completely reliant on western aid for this equipment and Ukrainian “shell hunger” was a major issue in 2024.[xiii] The supply of American Bradley Fighting Vehicles was key to Ukraine’s offensive and defensive successes.[xiv] While on the Russian side, the Ministry of Defense has moved to massively increase defense production.[xv] In the meantime, the Russian Army has relied on older and older pieces of equipment, refurbishing tanks from the 60s and 70s for frontline service.[xvi] The need for quantity also extends to manpower.
Both sides have displayed an urgent, and ever-growing need for mobilized manpower. Despite having already mobilized hundreds of thousands for the war effort, Ukraine is facing a desperate need for more troops.[xvii] Russia needs manpower so badly that rather than further mobilize their own population, they are relying on thousands of North Korean soldiers.[xviii] Surely some of this is due to the attritional nature that the Russian war in Ukraine has taken on, but this should be seen as a feature, not a bug. Neither side has been able to adapt its way out of massive needs for equipment and people. Russia is exploiting its advantage in the latter.
Implications for U.S. Policymakers
Why, then, are so many American media figures and experts drawn to these conclusions about a future of warfare full of drones and AI, but no people or tanks? Frankly, it is a lot easier to call for tech innovation and defense acquisitions reform than it is to call for massive commitment to the size of U.S. military-industrial might. A realistic assessment would call for a massive investment not only in chips and drones, but also in steel, assembly lines, and shipyards, something that seems far off, given the already strained federal budget. A realistic preparation in manpower would call for a massive expansion in U.S. military size, and the ability to mobilize manpower, something that the U.S. hasn’t seen since the end of the draft. It is far easier, and already a subject of bipartisan agreement, for the U.S. to lead the way in tech. But American leaders should commit to a broader commitment to increasing American industrial might and manpower available for military service, even if it is both fiscally and politically much more difficult.
Some might argue that the war in Ukraine proves that unmanned systems are scalable and that with a few more advances the AI and robotics RMA will prove true. However, it is impossible to predict exactly how or when those advances will occur. Both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces are utilizing unmanned systems at scale, but massive amounts of equipment and mobilizable populations are still important factors in the war.
To be clear, important technological advances in AI and robotics may have profound effects on warfare and, generally, the world. Policies that aim to keep the U.S. a leader in generative AI and advanced microchips are the right policies. Efforts to make the military faster and more agile at fielding drones such as DoD Replicator or the Blue UAS list are good, important steps.[xix][xx] Calls to transform the DoD acquisition systems to make it faster and more adaptable are calls to fix a broken system.[xxi] However, whether technological advancement should be seen as a revolution in the nature of warfare or as the normal course of innovation in war is still an open question. What the Ukraine war is proving is that even in the age of ChatGPT, quadcopters, and Starlink, wars can still be big and still require a lot of people to fight them.
U.S. policymakers need to balance innovation efforts with investments in the defense industrial base and efforts to expand mobilizable manpower. Technology is a tool. In war, it is a means to an end and not an end in of itself. Very rarely do technologies change the very nature of warfare or cause the vaunted Revolution in Military Affairs. Policymakers must prepare for the world we have, not the one we wish for. And policymakers need an industrial and national security policy for the world we have, not the one that Silicon Valley is promising but we have no idea when, or if, it will come.
[i]. Paul Franci Wahl, Donald R. Toppel, The Gatling Gun, (New York: Arco, 1971).
[ii]. Phillips Payson O’Brien, “War Will Never Be This Bulky Again,” The Atlantic, May 26, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-putin-war/638423/.
[iii]. Mark A. Milley, Eric Schmidt, “America Isn’t Ready for the Wars of the Future,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ai-america-ready-wars-future-ukraine-israel-mark-milley-eric-schmidt.
[iv]. Marissa Newman, “Ex-Google CEO Schmidt Urges US Army to Replace Tanks with Drones,” Bloomberg News, October 30, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-30/ex-google-ceo-schmidt-urges-us-army-to-replace-tanks-with-drones.
[v] . For a good history of the usage of “Revolution in Military Affairs” see Jacek Bartosiak, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” Geopolitical Futures, November 25, 2015, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
[vi]. Further complicating matters is that RMA is usually presented in contrast to the concept of a “Military Revolution;” when a military adaptation has the power to transform society at large, the reverse direction of an RMA. The original concept of a Military Revolution was developed by historian Michael Roberts in reference to adaptation made by the Swedish Army of Gustavs Adolphus during the 30 Years War. See Jeremy Black, “The Military Revolution,” Teaching History, no. 52 (1988): 34–36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43257776.
[vii]. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994: 24-31.
[viii]. Ibid.
[ix]. “Bayraktar – Ukrainian War Song,” May 23, 2022 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3FGWPMjl6M&list=RDS3FGWPMjl6M&start_radio=1.
[x]. Kristen D. Thompson, “How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict.
[xi]. Maryna Kulakova, “Ukraine’s FPV Drones Slash Russian Lancet Attacks, Reducing Strikes by 90%,” United24 Media, November 25, 2024, https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraines-fpv-drones-slash-russian-lancet-attacks-reducing-strikes-by-90-3977.
[xii]. Jin Heintz and Andrew Meldrum, “What we know about Ukraine’s surprise push into Russian territory,” AP News, August 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-border-a95d1475daec38067acf010d275c2840.
[xiii]. Stephen Grey, John Shiffman, Allison Martell, “Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine,” Reuters, July 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/.
[xiv]. David Axe, “To Keep Ukraine’s Elite 47th Mechanized Brigade Fighting For 15 Months Straight, The U.S. Sent More Than 300 M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles,” Forbes, September 9, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/09/09/to-keep-ukraines-elite-47th-mechanized-brigade-fighting-for-15-months-straight-the-us-sent-more-than-300-m-2-bradley-fighting-vehicles/.
[xv]. “Russia ramps up arms production as US boosts support for Ukraine,” Reuters, May 1, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-defence-minister-orders-more-weapons-ukraine-operation-2024-05-01/.
[xvi]. David Axe, “Sixty-Year-Old T-62s Are About To Become The Russian Army’s Main Tanks,” Forbes, July 10, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/07/10/sixty-year-old-t-62s-are-about-to-become-the-russian-armys-main-tanks/.
[xvii]. Oleksandr V Danylyuk, “The Current State of Ukrainian Mobilisation and Ways to Boost Recruitment,” Royal United Services institute, August 8, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/current-state-ukrainian-mobilisation-and-ways-boost-recruitment.
[xviii]. Tara Copp, Matthew Lee and Edith M. Lederer, “About 8,000 North Korean troops at Ukraine’s border are expected in combat in days, US says,” AP News, October 31, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-9ee96dc1d4f07ac0813c698e6873f96b.
[xix]. “Replicator,” Defense Innovation Unit, https://www.diu.mil/replicator.
[xx]. “Blue UAS,” UAS Coach, https://uavcoach.com/blue-uas/.
[xxi]. Jake Chapman, “Moving Toward Defense as a Service,” War on the Rocks, November 29, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/11/moving-toward-defense-as-a-service/.