For decades, the transatlantic alliance has rested on two pillars: a deep trade relationship and Europe’s near-total dependency on U.S. military protection. But recent moves from Washington have shaken that foundation. At the 2025 Munich Security Conference, Vice President J.D. Vance declared that the real threat to Europe isn’t Russia but its suppression of far-right parties.[i] Days later, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that if Ukraine fell, the U.S. would not intervene.[ii] Then came Europe’s exclusion from Ukraine peace talks, President Trump’s reference to Europeans as “parasites,”[iii] and a wave of new harmful tariffs.
The response from European leaders has been cautious at best. French President Macron called a summit, German Chancellor Scholz issued a warning, and Italian Prime Minister Meloni invoked mediation and collaboration.[iv] Silence and hesitation have prevailed, reflecting how deeply Europe fears being left alone. Many EU states continue their posture of quiet concession to avoid a rupture with their historical protector, which could be economically painful and frightening for their security.
This is a mistake: If the EU wants to protect its sovereignty and play a serious role on the world stage, it must shed its dependency mindset and reclaim strategic autonomy in trade and defense from its transatlantic partner.
Trade diversification
Europe’s deep economic ties with the United States are both a strength and a strategic liability. In 2023 alone, transatlantic trade in goods and services reached €1.6 trillion (about $1.82 trillion) — a testament to the EU-U.S. scale of interdependence.[v] The U.S. is the largest export market and the second largest import market for the EU. But the relationship is unbalanced. The EU runs a large surplus in goods[vi] yet remains heavily dependent on the U.S. for services, particularly in sectors like tech, IP, and finance. For many member states, over 20% of global exports are to the American market.
This reliance leaves Europe exposed — not just to economic shifts, but also to political ones. As President Trump threatens new tariffs and continues to use trade as leverage, the EU must respond with strategy, not submission.
In the short term, Europe should gradually activate its Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI)[vii]— a legal mechanism allowing retaliatory tariffs and restrictions on services, procurement, and intellectual property. Targeted, proportionate responses to U.S. aggression are not just possible — they are necessary to defend European interests and credibility.
But short-term pushback is not enough. The EU must also reduce its overexposure to U.S. markets by expanding trade ties with other global partners. Finalizing agreements with India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and countries in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) would expand access to fast-growing economies while insulating Europe from electoral volatility in Washington. Reinforcing relationships with Canada, Mexico, and African partners can further enhance Europe’s economic resilience and strategic reach.
Finally, the EU should seize this moment to position itself as the world’s leading advocate for multilateralism and cooperative trade governance. As the U.S. sidelines institutions like the WTO, Europe can rally coalitions, modernize dispute mechanisms, and promote a fairer, more rules-based global system.
This is not about turning away from America. It ensures that Europe’s friendship is no longer confused with dependence. Europe must be respected not just for its market size but for its leadership.
The maturity test of defense
Defense is where Europe’s path to strategic autonomy will either be proven or abandoned. While it is unlikely that Vladimir Putin, weakened by internal unrest and advancing age, could soon launch new large-scale attacks on Europe, relying on that assumption is not a strategy. The real question is not whether war is imminent but whether Europe is prepared to defend itself should a war occur.
For too long, the EU has outsourced hard power to the United States. This dependence may have seemed efficient during the Cold War or even the post-9/11 era, but it is a liability in today’s multipolar world, it is a liability. As the U.S. increasingly signals its fatigue with European security and flirts with isolationism, Europe must prepare to stand alone when necessary.
Hard power matters. It shapes negotiations, signals credibility, and strengthens diplomatic leverage.[viii] If the EU finally commits to building a cohesive and capable defense framework—one that increases spending and incorporates real interoperability, readiness, and industrial coordination—it will no longer enter talks with Washington as the junior partner. It will sit at the table as an equal, able to protect its borders and project stability beyond them.
The choice is not between dependence or escalation. The choice is between strategic maturity and continued vulnerability. Defense is no longer just a NATO issue but a test of the EU’s commitment to its future.
Reimagining US-EU relationship
What I am proposing is not anti-Americanism. The point is not to weaken the EU-U.S. relationship but to mature it.
In any partnership, independence breeds respect. In every partnership, each party needs an independent base of strength to make collaborative decisions. Europe cannot keep asking for permission. It requires the means to say “no” — and be heard. The EU and U.S. have built one of the most successful alliances in modern history. However, for their alliance to survive the pressures of a changing world and the current and future leadership in Washington, it must evolve.
Europe has the tools. Now, it needs the will.
[i] J.D. Vance, “Full Transcript: Vance Speech at the Munich Security Conference,” Foreign Policy, February 18, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/18/vance-speech-munich-full-text-read-transcript-europe/
[ii] Yahoo News, “German Government Refrains from Commenting on US Tariffs,” February 2025, https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-government-refrains-commenting-us-160828877.html
[iii] Financial Times, “Trump Called Europeans ‘Parasites’ in Private Messages, Say U.S. Officials,” February 17, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/96d02345-1079-47d0-b208-1e80bcedf684
[iv] European Commission, “EU Footprint in the U.S.,” Directorate-General for Trade, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-footprint-us/home
[v] ISPI, “Trump e i dazi: l’Europa si prepara,” Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/trump-e-i-dazi-leuropa-si-prepara-199168
[vi] Centre for European Reform, “Trump’s Tariffs: How Should the EU React?” https://www.cer.eu/insights/trumps-tariffs-how-should-eu-react
[vii]Centre for European Reform, “Trump’s Tariffs: How Should the EU React?” https://www.cer.eu/insights/trumps-tariffs-how-should-eu-react
[viii]J.J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Chapter 3: “Wealth and Power” (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001)