Data has emerged as one of the critical new battlegrounds for national security. Rising tensions between the United States and China have expanded what is considered sensitive technology and data. This growing securitization of data across industries — from electric vehicles to academic research and social media — marks a new phase in the technology decoupling between Beijing and Washington. The downward turn between the two strategic rivals risks becoming a slippery slope into an even less connected, more paranoid world.
The relationship between the U.S. and China is arguably the most important and defining one of this century. Yet, the two countries operate in almost two entirely different information ecosystems. Beijing has walled off the Chinese public from platforms used by the rest of the world, prompting necessary domestic alternatives: Baidu instead of Google; Alibaba instead of Amazon; WeChat instead of Facebook; RED instead of Instagram; Douyin instead of TikTok. The impact of this digital isolation has been amplified in recent years by Beijing’s efforts to tightly interlink data security with national security, as well as reduced people-to-people and business exchanges from the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions. In the U.S., growing suspicion of China has led to increasingly aggressive efforts to excise Chinese technology and capital from its supply chain. People from the two countries are farther apart than ever.
In China, leader Xi Jinping himself has made explicit the importance of safeguarding data security. In 2017, the Chinese government implemented a sweeping cybersecurity law, which was followed by the slow evolution of a data security regime.[i] One key driver has been Beijing’s push towards technological self-sufficiency amid an increasingly complex international environment, described by Xi as “great changes unseen in a century.”[ii] These efforts accelerated in 2018 when the US launched a trade war with China[iii] and intensified restrictions on Chinese telecommunications providers Huawei and ZTE on cybersecurity grounds[iv]. , The U.S.’s actions only heightened China’s cybersecurity concerns. In 2022, the Chinese government issued a directive to “Delete A,” or Delete America, requiring state-owned enterprises in critical sectors to replace foreign software in their IT systems by 2027.[v] Chinese state-owned companies and agencies have reportedly swapped out Apple’s iPhones for Chinese-made phones[vi]and blocked use of Intel and AMD chips in government computers.[vii]
Xi’s focus on national security — intended to mitigate threats to the Communist Party’s rule — has played a major role in shaping China’s data policies. The country has become increasingly insular, enforcing strict control over its information ecosystem through rampant censorship behind the “Great Firewall” and under Xi’s extraterritorial concept of “cyber sovereignty.”[viii] This emphasis on security has had a particularly notable impact on the private sector, with the country’s cybersecurity overseer flexing its power in 2021 by derailing Chinese ride-hailing giant Didi Global’s attempt to go public in the U.S., ultimately giving the cyber agency the power to vet Chinese overseas listings.[ix], [x] For firms like Didi, the concern may have been that their mass troves of data could reveal telling details about the comings and goings of government or party officials. In recent years, Beijing has tightened its dragnet to police data domestically and to aggressively restrict foreign access to a range of databases, including academic research, financial information, and even weather-related data[xi],[xii]
From the U.S. side, the issue of data security has been more narrowly focused on countries considered to be strategic adversaries like China. As the bipartisan consensus has hardened on China as a strategic adversary, the U.S. has made a conscious effort to restrict the use of Chinese technology. This effort began in earnest in 2018 when the U.S. took steps to bar 5G technology from Chinese providers due to fears about spying and their potential links to the Chinese Communist Party and military.[xiii], [xiv] The perceived threat of Chinese spying has included Chinese-built subway cars,[xv] Chinese cranes at US ports, remote-sensing cars from China, Chinese-origin e-commerce apps like Temu and Shein,[xvi] and the AI platform DeepSeek.[xvii] The most prominent example has been attempts to ban the popular social media app TikTok, owned by the Beijing-based company ByteDance, over its ability to influence public opinion in the US and the large amount of American data it collects.[xviii]
While the U.S. remains an open internet and society — in stark contrast to China — there has been a belligerent campaign in recent years targeting the security threats posed by a range of Chinese-made products. Cybersecurity risks from apps like TikTok and critical infrastructure are well-founded, but fears of Chinese home appliances, like air fryers,[xix] being used for spying are far more tenuous. These fears have been driven by the hawkish mainstream political consensus on China, Beijing’s more assertive and competitive global role, and a more robust threat of Chinese hacking.[xx] Despite the absence of national data privacy laws, former President Joe Biden signed an executive order last year to curb the large-scale transfer of sensitive personal data to “countries of concern” like China.[xxi]
Under President Trump’s second administration, many concerns about data have been muddled by a relentless stream of disruptive policies and actions. Access to TikTok was restored despite a Supreme Court ruling upholding a law that would ban the app if did not divest;[xxii] Trump officials appeared to ignore basic data security guidelines by discussing attack plans on the commercial app Signal;[xxiii] the Department of Government Efficiency was offered access to the private data of millions of Americans without their consent;[xxiv] and the White House blacklisted dozens more Chinese companies for their apparent involvement in developing advanced AI.[xxv] It is unclear how Trump’s team will move forward from here.
While reshoring core technologies to the U.S. will serve national security concerns, the administration should consider alternatives to blanket bans on foreign tech. The government should work to strengthen data privacy and cybersecurity for American data – not just against Chinese actors. To do so, the U.S. should pass comprehensive federal data privacy legislation that governs how private companies collect, use, and share consumer data, to standardize the patchwork of state and local laws.[xxvi] The government should reinforce robust cybersecurity standards and incident reporting for government agencies and critical infrastructure providers, including in public transport, finance, health, energy, and telecommunications sectors. Another important step would be to increase public education of cybersecurity risks from social media and other platforms.
As the U.S. and China adopt more aggressive data strategies under the backdrop of rising tensions, it is essential that they apply these policies more judiciously. China’s approach has sought to root out internal and external threats through iron-fisted control over information flows, hurting the country’s private sector and connectivity with the rest of the world, as well as its citizens’ access to data. Meanwhile, the U.S. risks inadvertently hurting American innovation if its broad-brush restrictions on Chinese technology fail to clearly distinguish genuine cybersecurity threats from different types of data and platforms while neglecting broader protections for public data. Neither approach is productive. Both countries risk undermining their own technological competitiveness while fueling greater instability. The securitization of data deepens mistrust between the major powers, accelerates technological decoupling, and raises the risk of greater conflict.
[i] Lauren Maranto, “Who Benefits from China’s Cybersecurity Laws? | New Perspectives on Asia,” CSIS, June 25, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/who-benefits-chinas-cybersecurity-laws.
[ii] Emily Jin, “A Policymaker’s Guide to China’s Technology Security Strategy,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, February 18, 2025, https://itif.org/publications/2025/02/18/a-policymakers-guide-to-chinas-technology-security-strategy/.
[iii] “How Did the 2018 U.S.-China Trade War Affect China’s Exporters?” Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, April 15, 2023, https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/how-did-2018-us-china-trade-war-affect-chinas-exporters.
[iv] Raymond Zhong, Paul Mozur, and Jack Nicas, “Huawei and ZTE Hit Hard as U.S. Moves Against Chinese Tech Firms,” The New York Times, April 17, 2018, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/technology/huawei-trade-war.html.
[v] Liza Lin, “China Intensifies Push to ‘Delete America’ From Its Technology,” The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-technology-software-delete-america-2b8ea89f.
[vi] “China’s Apple iPhone Ban Accelerates Across State Firms, Government,” Bloomberg, December 17, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-15/china-s-apple-iphone-ban-accelerates-across-state-firms-government.
[vii] Ryan McMorrow, Nian Liu, and Qianer Liu, “China Blocks Use of Intel and AMD Chips in Government Computers,” Financial Times, March 24, 2024, sec. Technology sector, https://www.ft.com/content/7bf0f79b-dea7-49fa-8253-f678d5acd64a.
[viii] Kalpana Pandey, “Chinese Notion of Cyber Sovereignty: Building an Alternate Digital Order,” Observer Research Foundation, August 20, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinese-notion-of-cyber-sovereignty-building-an-alternate-digital-order.
[ix] Sarah Zheng and Josh Xiao, “Secretive China Agency Backtracks on Aggressive Policies After $1 Trillion Rout,” Bloomberg, July 17, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-18/china-regulator-overseeing-ai-overseas-ipos-relaxes-policies-to-promote-growth.
[x] Evelyn Cheng, “Some U.S.-listed Chinese stocks will need Beijing’s approval to stay public in other overseas markets,” CNBC, February 19, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/19/us-listed-chinese-companies-need-beijings-approval-for-secondary-listings.html
[xi] Julie Zhu and Xie Yu, “China’s Top Financial Data Provider Restricts Offshore Access Due to New Rules,” Reuters, May 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/chinas-top-financial-data-provider-restricts-offshore-access-due-new-rules-2023-05-04/.
[xii] “China’s Spy Agency Sees Threats Everywhere in Data Security Push,” Bloomberg, February 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-21/china-s-spy-agency-sees-threats-everywhere-in-data-security-push.
[xiii] Noah Berman, Lindsay Maizland, and Andrew Chatzky, “Is China’s Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security?” Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-huawei-threat-us-national-security.
[xiv] “U.S. Restrictions on Huawei Technologies: National Security, Foreign Policy, and Economic Interests,” U.S. Congress, January 5, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47012.
[xv] Ana Swanson, “Fearing ‘Spy Trains,’ Congress May Ban a Chinese Maker of Subway Cars,” The New York Times, September 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/business/chinese-train-national-security.html.
[xvi] Sarah Zheng and Josh Xiao, “TikTok, Tesla Are Just the Start of US-China Clash Over Big Data,” Bloomberg, April 29, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-29/from-tesla-to-tiktok-rising-us-china-tensions-focus-on-data-security.
[xvii] Kelsey Cosgrove and Emma Vlamis, “Nvidia Probed over How Its Chips May Have Been Obtained by DeepSeek, Which US Lawmakers Accused of Spying for China,” Business Insider, April 16, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/lawmakers-deepseek-spying-china-nvidia-probed-chips-2025-4.
[xviii] Sapna Maheshwari and Amanda Holpuch, “Why TikTok Is Facing a U.S. Ban, and What Could Happen Next,” The New York Times, April 24, 2025, sec. Technology https://www.nytimes.com/article/tiktok-ban.html.
[xix] “Frying or Spying? These Air Fryers May Be Harvesting Your Data, Experts Say,” ABC7, December 27, 2024, https://abc7news.com/post/certain-air-fryers-app-connected-appliances-are-harvesting-user-data-experts-say/15712826/.
[xx]“Chinese Hackers Are Getting Bigger, Better and Stealthier,” The Economist, March 25, 2025, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/03/25/chinese-hackers-are-getting-bigger-better-and-stealthier.
[xxi] Hope Anderson, Cristina Brayton-Lewis, Farhad Jalinous, F. Paul Pittman, Ian Saccomanno, Earl Comstock, and John Timmons, “New Executive Order Seeks to Protect Americans’ Sensitive Personal Data,” White & Case, March 4, 2024, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/new-executive-order-seeks-protect-americans-sensitive-personal-data.
[xxii] Clare Duffy and David Goldman, “TikTok Is Back Online after Trump Pledged to Restore It,” CNN Business, January 20, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/19/tech/tiktok-ban/index.html.
[xxiii] Steve Holland, Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “Trump Stands behind Hegseth after Attack Plans Shared in Second Signal Chat,” Reuters, April 21, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-stands-behind-hegseth-after-attack-plans-shared-second-signal-chat-white-2025-04-21/.
[xxiv] Hannah Natanson, Jeremy Roebuck, and Rachel Siegel, “Justice Dept. Agrees to Let DOGE Access Sensitive Immigration Case Data,” The Washington Post, April 21, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2025/04/21/doge-ecas-justice-immigration-courts-trump/.
[xxv] Anniek Bao, “U.S. Blacklists over 50 Chinese Companies in Bid to Curb Beijing’s AI, Chip Capabilities,” CNBC, March 26, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/26/us-blacklists-50-chinese-companies-in-bid-to-curb-beijings-ai-chip-capabilities.html.
[xxvi] “47 States Have Weak or Nonexistent Consumer Data Privacy Laws,” Security.org, May 6, 2025, https://www.security.org/resources/digital-privacy-legislation-by-state/.