Since President Trump returned to the Oval Office in January 2025, the relationship between the United States and Europe has been in free fall. Any respite experienced during the Biden administration has rapidly given way to seismic fractures on a range of issues, most saliently President Trump’s clear unwillingness for the US to continue underpinning European security. This position was reinforced beyond doubt by the exclusion of all European stakeholders (including Ukraine) from US negotiations with Russia on their illegal occupation of Ukraine.
The fractious and uncertain nature of current US diplomacy has caused consternation worldwide, prompting many to hark back to a time when US global leadership was assured, intrinsically altruistic, and bound inextricably with European interests. However, this view of history is simplistic and distorted by rose-tinted nostalgia. Since its ascendancy to global power status in the 1940s, the US has sustained inherent contradictions in its position as “Leader of the Free World,” feeling little compunction in pushing aside or directly challenging international norms and concerns to further its national interest.
As Europe grapples with how to deal with an increasingly erratic and isolationist America, it is important for national leaders to remember that US foreign policy has always retained an essence of “America First”. Of course, the US has not been alone in this realist approach to international engagement; European nations have also frequently prioritized sovereign strategic interest over an unquestioning alignment to US foreign policy. Yet, despite frequent divergences in the past eight decades, the transatlantic relationship has endured; that this may once again transpire should give European leaders some cautious optimism for the future.
Historical Divergence in European and US Foreign Policy
Since ending a self-imposed doctrine of isolationism in 1941, the US has enthusiastically embraced its role as global superpower, directly financing European reconstruction through the Marshall Plan and creating the international institutions that underpin global cooperation today. Many of these institutions are still primarily funded by the US, at considerable cost to the domestic taxpayer.[i]
Despite this incontrovertible commitment to international cooperation, the US regularly takes decisions against the global consensus. Under the doctrine of foreign interventionism, the US has undertaken numerous military operations in the face of vocal opposition from even its closest allies. Escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 was opposed by the UK and France, and did not receive UN Security Council approval.[ii] Similarly, the invasion of Panama in 1989 was opposed by key allies in Europe and Latin America, including Mexico and Brazil.[iii] Perhaps most famously, having failed to secure UN approval for a military invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US did so anyway, an action described at the time by the UN Secretary-General as “not in conformity with the UN Charter” and “illegal.”[iv] French and German opposition to the US invasion of Iraq was so hostile that popular commentary at the time described the row as “one of the worst transatlantic crises of the entire post-World War II period.”[v]
Of course, many of these interventions were conducted as part of a broader strategic effort to advance US security interests, most prominently the ‘Domino Theory’, under which intervention was deemed necessary to prevent the global expansion of communism,[vi] as well as the more recent ‘Global War on Terror’.[vii] To provide balance, it is therefore interesting to also consider instances where the US has conducted military operations that did not suit their direct national security interest, but instead were aimed at promoting democracy or preventing human suffering. There are several military operations that would appear to fit these criteria, including in Haiti (1994) and the US-led NATO interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011). The inherent complexity of US foreign policy renders ascribing a single causal factor to such interventions impossible, however it is clear that humanitarian concerns were a primary driver of US involvement, noting the impending massacre of Benghazi civilians by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi,[viii] and the ongoing violence being perpetrated against ethnic Albanians by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.[ix]
The US has also maintained a selective approach to compliance with international institutions outside of the military context. Despite an official position of unwavering commitment, the US frequently ignores the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations. The US does not formally recognize the International Criminal Court, being one of only seven countries to vote against its founding treaty in 1998 (alongside China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen).[x] The US is a regular dissenter on the UN Security Council, at times utilizing its veto power under dubious circumstances, such as resolutions against South Africa’s apartheid regime (1986-1988).[xi] The US is also notoriously slippery on international climate change initiatives and remains the only country to have never ratified the Kyoto Protocol.[xii]
In addition, despite being the largest funder of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the US does not automatically accept UNHCR-recognized refugees or ensure that domestic migration policies comply with their guidance. Such non-compliance was demonstrated with Title 42, a border policy recently implemented under both Republican and Democrat administrations.[xiii] There is also a long history of US skepticism on international refugee coordination; President Truman refused to sign the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, citing concerns regarding the loss of US sovereignty.[xiv] To note, Europe is also not fully compliant on this issue; whilst the Common European Asylum System is aligned closely with UNHCR policies, recent EU decisions to conduct asylum processing in Türkiye have drawn criticism for allegedly contravening established UN guidelines.[xv]
Looking Forwards: What Can Europe Learn?
A difficult challenge lies ahead, as Europe attempts to navigate between maintaining both a positive relationship with the Trump Administration and a commitment to long-held principles of international cooperation. In addition to national security, potential flashpoints include disagreements over trade, climate change, and migration. As European leaders scramble to make sense of this rapidly shifting geopolitical foundation, it may be useful to consider lessons from previous US-European foreign policy divergence.
One important lesson is that divergence is not necessarily fatal to a strong relationship, even if the disagreement is both public and pronounced. The UK refused to provide military support to US efforts in Vietnam, despite British Prime Minister Wilson sustaining intense personal pressure from President Johnson.[xvi] Yet the “Special Relationship” endured, rebounding remarkably under Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s. But even this assertion masks important historical nuance; President Reagan was extremely reticent about Thatcher’s decision to launch a military operation to take back the Falkland Islands in 1982, only directing US diplomatic support for the UK after a personal intervention by Thatcher.[xvii]
The US has also proven willing to tolerate friction on specific issues if the broader relationship is deemed to be of strategic importance. For example, Türkiye remains a member of NATO despite pronounced disagreement with the US on several policy issues. Examples of such disagreements include Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system and the US support for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the Syrian civil war.[xviii]
Strategic disagreement was tolerated even at the height of the Cold War, with clear divergence between the German and US approach to Russia throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Germany opted to pursue an “Ostpolitik” strategy of rapprochement, contrasting with the hardline containment strategy favored by the US. Tension followed between President Nixon and Chancellor Brandt (which resulted in CIA wiretapping of Brand’s advisors), as well as between President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt several years later.[xix] However, these tensions all but dissipated after the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent German reunification in 1990 (although the US remained presciently concerned about the impact of deepening German reliance on Russian energy supplies).
Of course, there are limits to how far Europe can unilaterally advance their interests when these are misaligned with US interests. Europe simply lacks the military or economic firepower to pursue foreign policy objectives in the face of US apathy or opposition. This was demonstrated even back in the 1950s, when the UK, France, and Israel undertook a military invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, seeking to return the Suez Canal to their control after it was nationalized by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser. However, after facing severe diplomatic and economic pressure from the Eisenhower administration, the UK and France had no choice but to withdraw from the Peninsula and accept Egyptian control of the Suez Canal.[xx]
Domestic opinion on US foreign policy is also subject to change, with subsequent swings in official US policy. This has been demonstrated most recently with regards to US involvement in international efforts on climate change; after President Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement in 2016, President Biden rejoined the initiative in 2020 whilst simultaneously launching an immense fiscal package aimed at financing the domestic clean energy transition through the Inflation Reduction Act.[xxi]
Conclusion: Paradigm Shift or Temporary Divergence?
It may be that the transatlantic relationship is in the midst of a fundamental paradigm shift, mandating an irrevocable push by European leaders towards continental self-sufficiency. President Trump’s Liberation Day has bolstered this argument, with the suite of ‘reciprocal tariffs’ making no accommodation for traditional allies, including those that run goods trade deficits with the US (such as the UK and Australia).[xxii][xxiii] In addition, Vice President JD Vance’s admonishment of European democracy at the Munich Security Conference,[xxiv] the private characterization of perceived European freeloading in the Red Sea as “pathetic” by Defense Secretary Hegseth,[xxv] and President Trump’s continued assertion of the US intent to ultimately control Greenland,[xxvi] have combined to underscore a collective sense that current US antipathy towards Europe is deep-seated and enduring.This friction is likely to worsen in the coming months, with proposed retaliatory tariffs announced by the EU, and continued uncertainty on the progress of US-Russia negotiations on the future of the Ukraine conflict.
However, the historical record also shows that the anticipated permanent separation of strategic interests is not a foregone conclusion. This article has highlighted multiple examples in modern history that demonstrate that European and US interests can diverge significantly, without lasting harm to the transatlantic relationship. As such, Europe would be wise to consider a measured approach to its long-term relationship with the US. For example, the EU’s decision to delay imposing reciprocal tariffs in response to President Trump’s Liberation Day has proven judicious, in light of the subsequent 90-day suspension, and has opened up opportunities for European leaders, most notably Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, to renew engagement with the Trump Administration on a proposed EU-US free trade agreement. Most pertinently, the emergence of China as a rival global superpower is also likely to continue to shape US international engagement in unpredictable ways.[xxvii] As the world continues to transition from uni- to multipolarity, this will add a further layer of complexity to European strategic engagement, and it may be prudent to avoid committing to long-term strategic upheaval based solely on the actions of one US presidential administration.
[i] Congressional Research Service (September 2014). “The United Nations System: Frequently Asked Questions.” https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47715
[ii] Christian Ostermann (January 2025). “Western Europe and the Vietnam War.” The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War, Chapter 13. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-history-of-the-vietnam-war/western-europe-and-the-vietnam-war/
[iii] James Brooke (December 1989). “Fighting in Panama: Latin America; U.S. Denounced by Nations Touchy About Intervention.” The New York Times, Section A, Page 24 https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/21/world/fighting-panama-latin-america-us-denounced-nations-touchy-about-intervention.html
[iv] British Broadcasting Service (September 2004). “Iraq war illegal, says Annan.” BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm
[v] Philip Gordon (February 2003). “The Crisis in the Alliance.” Brookings Research. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/
[vi] Peter Leeson and Andrea Dean (June 2009). “The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation.” American Journal of Political Science, Volume 3 Issue 53. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00385.x
[vii] US Department of State [Archived] (November 2001). “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days.” https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm
[viii] Shadi Hamid (April 2016). “Everyone says the Libya intervention was a failure. They’re wrong.” Brookings Commentary. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/
[ix] United States State Department Report (December 1999). “Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting”. https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html
[x] Presidential Executive Order (February 2025). Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/
[xi] United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (Accessed February 2025). UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables. https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick
[xii] Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz, and Guri Bang (December 2010). “Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives”. European Journal of International Relations, Volume 18 Issue 1. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066110380964
[xiii] Harvard Law Review Notes (March 2018). “American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need for Harmony in the Face of a Refugee Crisis.” Harvard Law Review, Volume 131 Issue 5. https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-131/american-courts-and-the-u-n-high-commissioner-for-refugees-a-need-for-harmony-in-the-face-of-a-refugee-crisis/
[xiv] US Citizenship and Immigration Services (Accessed February 2025). “Immigration and Naturalization Service Refugee Law and Policy Timeline, 1891-2003.” https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/stories-from-the-archives/refugee-timeline
[xv] Refugees International (November 2024). “EU Leaders Should Uphold Right to Asylum in Europe.” https://www.refugeesinternational.org/advocacy-letters/eu-leaders-should-uphold-right-to-asylum-in-europe/
[xvi] Stephen Dyson (December 2007). “Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why Did Britain Stay Out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?” Political Psychology, Volume 28 Issue 6. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00598.x
[xvii] Department of State Office of the Historian (Accessed February 2025). “Crisis in the South Atlantic: The Reagan Administration and the Anglo-Argentine War of 1982. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/south-atlantic
[xviii] Congressional Research Service (September 2024). “Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations.” https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44000
[xix] Willy Brandt Online Biography (Accessed February 2025). “Securing peace and overcoming walls – Ostpolitik and policy on Germany 1955–1989.” https://www.willy-brandt-biography.com/politics/ostpolitik/
[xx] Department of State Office of the Historian (Accessed February 2025). “Milestones: The Suez Crisis, 1956.” http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez
[xxi] Department of the Treasury (October 2023). “Fact Sheet: How the Inflation Reduction Act’s Tax Incentives Are Ensuring All Americans Benefit from the Growth of the Clean Energy Economy.” https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1830
[xxii] Economics Observatory (April 2025). “Newsletter: Liberation Day.”https://www.economicsobservatory.com/liberation-day
[xxiii] Office of the United States Trade Representative (Accessed April 2025). “Fact Sheet: Australia”https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/australia
[xxiv] Christina Lu (February 2025). “Transcript: The Speech That Stunned Europe”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/18/vance-speech-munich-full-text-read-transcript-europe/
[xxv] Jeffrey Goldberg & Shane Harris (March 2025). “Here are the Attack Plans that Trump’s Advisers shared on Signal.” The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/03/signal-group-chat-attack-plans-hegseth-goldberg/682176/
[xxvi] Tom Nichols (April 2025). “Take Trump Seriously About Greenland.” The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/04/trump-greenland-ally-war/682306/
[xxvii] Scott Kennedy (January 2024). “US-China Relations in 2024: Managing Competition without Conflict.” Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-china-relations-2024-managing-competition-without-conflict