This post does not imply or constitute U.S. Government endorsement. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Space Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Anyone who has ever been running late knows how much they trust their phone to get them where they need to go. That trust rests on satellites far beyond view—systems so dependable they fade into the background of daily life. What most people never see is how that information is produced, handled, or checked before it reaches a screen.
Today, satellite data underpins everything from disaster response and aviation routes to global markets, agriculture, and daily navigation.[i] It shapes how people move, trade, communicate, and survive, but its omnipresence is also a weakness; manipulation of satellite data could affect essential services long before anyone notices something is amiss. A single disruption to space services can destabilize power grids, distort stock-market timing, hinder emergency responders when seconds matter, and knock cell-tower networks out of sync. Moreover, disinformation actors do not even need to damage a satellite to be effective; shaking confidence in the data it provides can be enough to alter decisions on the ground. That protection cannot rest on technical safeguards alone. It calls for stronger international standards that treat the integrity of orbital information as a public good, greater transparency from both governments and commercial operators, and shared expectations that uphold accuracy, responsibility, and accountability in space.
The 2022 KA-SAT hack, which disabled satellite modems across Ukraine and parts of Europe at the outset of war, showed how quickly interference in space can cut internet access, disrupt communications, and restrict access to reliable information at a critical moment.[ii] Without timely attribution and transparent communication, disruptions like this leave space for doubt to spread quickly. This emphasizes why protecting orbital veracity, referring to the reliability and integrity of information produced or transmitted by space-based systems, requires not only technical defenses but shared standards, openness, and public accountability. Some analysts note that eroding confidence in satellite data can have effects comparable to disabling the system itself, since users may hesitate to act on information they no longer trust, a dynamic that makes disinformation an increasingly attractive, lower-visibility form of disruption in the expanding space economy.[iii]
Signals travel thousands of miles and pass through systems the public never sees. Images can be delayed, compressed, or selectively released. Because orbital networks are so complex, people may not be able to tell whether a disruption is a routine malfunction or something more intentional. A technical glitch may be inconvenient, but it is usually fixable and limited. Manipulation, by contrast, uses uncertainty itself as a weapon.
New technologies are taking advantage of that uncertainty. Researchers have already shown that “deepfake geography” can generate satellite images that look authentic but are entirely fabricated.[iv] Space-based event data can also be selectively cropped, reframed, or synthetically produced to shape how observers interpret fast-moving crises. Research on hybrid threats, defined as “ potential overt and covert military and nonmilitary actions… to undermine a targeted society and achieve their political goals,”[v] further illustrates how adversaries blend partial truths, manipulated visuals, and signal interference to influence narrative perception rather than relying solely on physical disruption.[vi] In practice, a delayed image can be spun as a cover-up, a faulty signal as incompetence, or uncertainty itself as evidence of wrongdoing. These developments highlight a structural vulnerability: information can now move through space faster than it can be verified on the ground.
More than 80 countries now operate satellites, and nearly all depend on the information they produce through complex, interconnected systems. That complexity creates seams where uncertainty can take hold when disruptions occur, even without clear intent or attribution. In space, confusion can outlast the technical problem itself. Satellite systems are shaped not only by engineering, but by how people interpret, explain, and trust the data they deliver. In 2025, the head of UK Space Command warned that Russian forces “shadow and harass” British satellites on a weekly basis, using jamming and close-approach maneuvers designed to unsettle operators rather than destroy hardware.[vii] In the Strait of Hormuz, falsified ship-location signals were then amplified through state-aligned media to suggest that Western navigation systems were unreliable.[viii] In both cases, the disruption itself was not the only risk. The uncertainty that followed created its own consequences, slowing responses, weakening confidence, and giving misleading narratives room to grow. The deeper issue is not only interference in space, but how thoroughly modern life now depends on information from orbit that few people ever see, question, or fully understand.
As space-based data increasingly shapes decisions on the ground, protecting its reliability becomes a matter of governance, accountability, and public trust. Safeguarding orbital veracity calls for steps such as creating an independent mechanism to validate satellite data during disruptions, developing a rapid cross‑sector protocol for reconciling conflicting space‑based information, and establishing cooperative monitoring arrangements that close the seams where uncertainty can be misused—practical measures that strengthen the resilience of the information environment and ensure the systems people rely on every day remain dependable well into the future. These measures help ensure that the benefits of space remain broadly accessible and widely trusted, without turning the domain into another arena of zero-sum competition.
Space has always invited humanity to think beyond borders and act with a longer view. The information flowing from orbit sustains that shared horizon. Protecting its integrity keeps space oriented toward cooperation rather than coercion. In a world increasingly shaped by both technological power and information vulnerability, safeguarding the reliability of what we see from orbit is about preserving a domain that invites collective imagination, shared responsibility, and the possibility of progress that belongs to everyone.
[i] OECD, The Space Economy in Figures: Responding to Global Challenges (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1787/fa5494aa-en.
[ii] CyberPeace Institute, “Case Study: Viasat Attack,” 2022, https://cyberconflicts.cyberpeaceinstitute.org/law-and-policy/cases/viasat.
[iii] Nate Reese and Chris Nemr, “Beware the Black Hole: Unraveling the Gravity of Disinformation in Space Exploration,” AFCEA International, April 1, 2024, https://www.afcea.org/signal-media/beware-black-hole-unraveling-gravity-disinformation-space-exploration.
[iv] Valentin Meo, “Deepfake Geography: A Novel Detection Method for Identifying Manipulated Satellite Images,” Cartography and Geographic Information Science, November 2025, https://doi.org/10.1080/15230406.2025.2576496.
[v] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit (2021), https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/download/Strategic-Communications-Hybrid-Threats-Toolkit.pdf.
[vi] NATO Library, Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum (2024), https://www.natolibguides.info/hybridwarfare/documents.
[vii] Jessie Hamill-Stewart, “The UK Military Says Russia Targets Its Satellites on a Weekly Basis. What Can Be Done About It?” Space.com, October 2025, https://www.space.com/technology/aerospace/the-uk-military-says-russia-targets-its-satellites-on-a-weekly-basis-what-can-be-done-about-it.
[viii] Tracy Cozzens, “Iran Jams GPS on Ships in Strait of Hormuz,” GPS World, August 2019, https://www.gpsworld.com/iran-jams-gps-on-ships-in-strait-of-hormuz/.