


10TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE!

IN MEMORY OF



Julian Samora
1920-1996



HARVARD JOURNAL OF HISPANIC POLICY

Volume 9 • 1995-1996

Feature Articles

After Proposition 187, the Deluge:
Reforming Naturalization Administration
While Making Good Citizens
Louis DeSipio, Ph.D.

Family Employment Status and Labor Market
Outcomes for Teens and Young Adults
Janis Barry Figueroa, Ph.D.

New Directions for Latinos as an Ethnic
Lobby in US Foreign Policy
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Colorado's Community Speaks Out About
School Discipline Legislation That
Impacts the Latino Community
*Georgia Pappas, María Guajardo
Lucero, Ph.D., Elva D. Ahlin, M.A.*

Forum

"The Role of Hispanics in the 1996 Election"

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The *Journal's* mission is to educate and provide leadership that improves the quality of public policies affecting the Latino community. In doing so, the *Journal* hopes to further the economic, social and political empowerment of the Latino community.

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Raul Yzaguirre, President, National Council of La Raza
Michael Jones-Correa (Moderator), Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard
University

Editors' Remarks

In 1985, Volume I of the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* made its appearance, becoming the first published work dedicated to improving public policies that affect the Latino community in the United States. Founded by a small group of motivated Latino students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, this publication was their contribution to the formation of a strong, politically active Latino community. With little time and money, their commitment proved to be the most valuable resource in building the foundation for the *Journal* and initiating a legacy of scholarship and activism.

On the tenth anniversary of the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy*, it has been our honor and privilege to serve as the *Journal's* co-editors. Along with a dedicated staff, we have joined the *Journal* at a special milestone of its life, a time of substantial growth and achievement. These achievements have occurred along many fronts. In our business operations, we now employ a part-time business manager to carry out our daily responsibilities. In our Board relations, we are encouraged that our Executive Advisory Board, now including a former *Journal* co-editor, has initiated independent events in support of the *Journal's* mission. For example, the Board has established an annual fund raising event held in Washington, DC with the last one keynoted by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry G. Cisneros. Finally, and most notably, this year's increase in articles for review and publication has surpassed all previous year's submissions. This achievement brings us great pride. It is a measure of the growing number of scholars interested in our community's development and a sign of the diversity of articles we expect to receive in the years ahead. Past staff and board members of the *Journal* and all of our supporters should take pride in what we have accomplished together. Indeed, the student organization initiated ten years ago has grown beyond our classrooms and into an institution of Hispanic advocacy.

This volume is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Julian Samora. Julian Samora was one of the first Latinos to combine scholarship with activism in an attempt to improve our Latino community. Early in his career, he recognized that the greatest obstacle impeding the development of the Latino community was the lack of institutions that could advocate on our behalf. We pay tribute to his life and work by attempting to fill the void he so insightfully identified years ago.

If one issue has persisted over the last ten years as a great concern to the Latino community, it has been immigration policy. In our first article of Volume 9, Louis DeSipio joins our past authors in addressing this ongoing issue. DeSipio finds that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

fails to adequately serve long term immigrants interested in and qualified for naturalization especially after the passage of Proposition 187 in California. This failure disproportionately burdens Latin American immigrants due to their low rates of naturalization. DeSipio arrives at this conclusion by examining patterns of immigrant naturalization throughout the United States and across ethnic groups. Following his thorough analysis, DeSipio outlines privatization strategies which use community organizations to improve INS operations. For policy makers working in immigration policy, DeSipio's article will help broaden their understanding of immigrant naturalization. Moreover, DeSipio's article is a contribution to the body of literature that provides constructive recommendations to improving INS operations. In the end, DeSipio asks the greater question running throughout his analysis, "what is the cost to the policy of having a growing pool of non-citizens eligible for and interested in citizenship who are unable to achieve their goal?" We believe this cost to be devastating and unmeasurable as attitudes towards government and political participation continue to be passed down one generation to the next.

The author of our next article, Janis Barry Figueroa, picks up the dynamic of family influence on younger generations as she examines its implications for youth employment. Figueroa, focusing on Puerto Rican youth, sets out to test the hypothesis that young people living in New York City exhibit a higher probability of employment if they reside with an employed parent, sibling or other family member. Using regression analysis, Figueroa finds support for this hypothesis. However, she discovers this relationship does not hold for Puerto Rican youth. Figueroa explains this finding by suggesting that Puerto Rican youth rely more heavily on formal institutions such as employment agencies, schools and training programs, rather than their family members' employment status. Figueroa's work represents a significant contribution to our understanding of youth development and employment networks in urban communities. For policy makers, Figueroa's findings will prove critical in developing strategies to improve the employment opportunities of Puerto Rican youth.

In our third article, Michael Jones-Correa, in the Journal's first ever foreign policy piece, writes about "New Directions for Latinos as an Ethnic Lobby in U.S. Foreign Policy." He argues that conditions structuring the foreign policy arena have changed thereby allowing Latinos to overcome their previous difficulties in influencing the foreign policy debate. Jones-Correa states that as a result of new U.S. policies in trade and immigration, the Mexican-American and Cuban-American communities now have the incentive to build a united foreign policy lobby. Jones-Correa provides an excellent framework for policy practitioners seeking to create a more effective Latino voice in foreign policy. Readers will find this article useful not only for its insightful conclusions but also as a guide to identifying current Latino policy makers and organizations involved in foreign policy.

In our last article, Georgia Pappas, María Guajardo Lucero, and Elva Ahlin, present original research on school discipline. The authors analyze how disciplinary policy affects the Latino population in Colorado as a result of the "Safe School Act" enacted by the Colorado General Assembly. They argue that this new expulsion policy is a short-term solution that disproportionately affects Latino and African-American students. They go on to recommend alternative policies that include "culturally competent preventive measures." Policy makers in and outside Colorado will find this article useful in identifying long-term strategies for addressing this important issue of school safety.

Volume 9 concludes with the transcript of the *Journal's* annual Forum Event: "The Role of Hispanics in the 1996 Election." Moderated by Harvard Professor Michael Jones-Correa, our panel represented a cross section of Latino political leaders: Republican and Democrats, federal and local officials, partisans and non-partisans. These officials addressed issues such as voter turn out, Latino participation in the two party system and debate on the question of our political unity. From the cross fire of open discussion rose one point of indisputable common ground — Hispanics will play a critical role in the 1996 elections, if we get out the vote. The panelists arrived at this point by recognizing two facts. First, almost 75 percent of the Hispanic population is concentrated in five states: Texas, California, Florida, New York, and Illinois. Within these states, our presence ranges from 10 percent to a high of 28 percent in both Texas and California. Second, these five states hold 30 percent of all the electoral college votes and represent the five largest electoral college states. Therefore, if the Hispanic community gets out the vote within these five pivotal states, our political power will be leveraged to determine the 1996 Presidential election and the balance of power within Congress.

Our panelists repeatedly stressed, however, that this expectation can only be realized if Hispanics get out the vote. We take their advice to heart and want to echo their concerns. Democracy is not a spontaneous occurrence; people do not rise in mass to sign a petition, cast a vote or voice their opinion. Rather, these actions require us to recognize and follow through on our civic responsibility to our nation and community. In the upcoming 1996 election, we must mobilize our community to vote. Though block-walking and neighborhood organizing greatly helps, we could all make a difference if we simply helped those we know register to vote, offer a drive to the polls, or encourage and support our family members to exercise their political voices.

The staff of the *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* is proud to present Volume 9. This publication is the result of many long and late hours put forth by several individuals. A special thanks goes to the authors for sharing their knowledge and insight with us. Their contributions allow policy makers and advocates to move confidently through complex issues. We would also like to thank our Editorial and Executive Advisory Boards for their continued support

of the *Journal*. Their advice and wisdom continues to enhance the *Journal's* development. In addition, we thank Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman for his support and advocacy and look forward to working with newly-appointed Dean Joseph Nye. Finally and most importantly, the *Journal* staff deserves our heartfelt thanks. The *Journal's* success ultimately rests in their hands. We thank them for their dedication and support. It has been a challenge and pleasure serving as your co-editors. We especially want to thank Lorena Barberia and Chantel Zepeda for their tireless effort in leading the editorial process along with Rick Garcia for managing our business operations. You deserve our greatest thanks.

We measure our success in terms of our readership's satisfaction and growing size. As we continue to develop as an institution, our readership will remain central to defining our objectives and success. We therefore welcome any comments about our publication and encourage all to contribute articles which advance our understanding of public policy issues affecting the Latino community in the United States.

¡Con pensamiento y acción, avanzaremos!

Alex Rodriguez
1996-97

Michael U. Villarreal
1995-96

In Memory of Dr. Julian Samora

On February 2, 1996, the Latino community lost one of its most noted scholars and leaders, Dr. Julian Samora. Dr. Samora, the first Mexican-American to earn a Ph.D. in the fields of sociology and anthropology, was a pioneer in the development of Chicano studies. He was also the founder of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), one of the leading Hispanic organizations in the country.

Dr. Samora was born in Pegosa Springs, Colorado in 1920. Despite the adversity he experienced as a young man and fueled by the fierce pride in his heritage, he received a M.S. degree from the Colorado State University. In 1953, he earned his doctoral degree from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. He taught at Michigan State University and in 1959, received a tenured position as professor of sociology at the University of Notre Dame. At Notre Dame, he directed the Mexican Border Studies Project sponsored by the Ford Foundation until he retired in 1985.

Dr. Samora was a tireless advocate for Latinos. In 1967, he, along with community activists Ernesto Galarza and Herman Gallegos, was recruited by the Ford Foundation to perform a needs assessment of the Mexican-American community. They determined that the biggest obstacle to the advancement of Latinos in the United States was a lack of institutions that could advocate on their behalf. The three men then founded the Southwest Council of La Raza, now known as NCLR.

Early in his career in the field of medical sociology, Dr. Samora established his credibility as a scholar by studying the implications of traditional folk medicine for modern clinical medicine and exploring the correlation between ethnicity and the delivery of health services. Later, he focused on educating the country about U.S. Hispanics through his writings which include The National Study of the Spanish Speaking People for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and La Raza: Forgotten Americans and Mexican-Americans in the Southwest. His book, Los Mojados: The Wet Back Story is considered a classic account of Mexican immigration to the United States. His co-authored book, Gunpowder Justice, exposed the harsh reality behind the myths associated with the Texas Rangers and documented their poor treatment of Mexicans in Texas. He also collaborated on the book, A History of the Mexican-American People.

His legacy includes the Julian Samora Research Institute established in 1989 at Michigan State University. The Institute was formed to continue and expand his pioneering research of Hispanics in the Midwest. According to Dr. Refugio I. Rochin, the Institute's Director, "He was an amazing man who worked hard, demanded quality in the scholarly work of his students, and always gave of himself to make sure everyone learned by sharing. He set a

standard of excellence in his academic/professional life as well as his commitment to and work on behalf of the Latino population which we must strive to emulate.”

Dr. Samora served in many prestigious institutions including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the National Institute of Mental Health and the President’s Commission on Rural Poverty. Among his many awards were the White House Hispanic Heritage Award (1985) and the Mexican Government’s Aguila Azteca (Azteca Eagle) Medal (1991) which he received along with farm labor leader César Chavez.

The Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy joins with the Latino community to commemorate the contributions in public service of Dr. Julian Samora.

After Proposition 187, the Deluge: Reforming Naturalization Administration While Making Good Citizens

Louis DeSipio, Ph.D.

Louis DeSipio, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He received his Ph.D. in Government from the University of Texas at Austin in 1993 and focuses his research on ethnic politics, specifically Latino politics. Currently he is working on his forthcoming book, Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate.

Introduction

Several recent challenges to the status of permanent residents have induced a rapid increase in applications for naturalization nationally (Chebium 1995; Pachon 1995; Sun 1995). These challenges—including California's Proposition 187, the Contract with America, and an administrative requirement to replace aging Immigrant Identification Cards ("green cards")—have created new incentives for immigrants to naturalize. In response to this demand, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is seeking to speed up its processing of applicants. While the INS is experimenting with several innovative ways to meet this increased demand, it has rejected other potentially more effective innovations, such as waving the civics, history, and English tests for certain applicants. In this article, I evaluate the patterns of immigrant naturalization, examine reasons why some immigrants naturalize and others do not, and indicate how INS can respond to this surge in applications. As I will indicate, INS's openness to new strategies of applicant processing has been limited to efforts at privatization. The agency has rejected more far-reaching strategies. Consequently, most potential beneficiaries—long-term immigrants interested in naturalizing—will not see a more responsive bureaucracy.

In order to assess whether INS can go further in its efforts and serve the needs of citizenship applicants, I examine a question that has not been asked over the past two decades. That is, are we as a society incorporating the next generation? This question has two facets. Specifically, what impact would the changes in citizenship processing discussed by the INS have on naturalization? Second, does the available evidence indicate whether immigrants are becoming good citizens? In other words, are increased efforts to naturalize immigrants also making good citizens? The answers to these questions demonstrate that INS will have to do more than privatize naturalization application processing if it is to meet the true levels of demand for U.S. citizenship.

Denizens and Citizens

The rapid increase in immigration to the United States since the 1960s and its changing composition has been extensively analyzed (Borjas 1990; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Lamphere 1992; Bouvier and Grant 1994). Two characteristics of this immigrant flow are particularly notable—levels of immigration are quite high by historical standards and the sending countries are now overwhelmingly Latin American and Asian. The raw number of immigrants entering the United States is near the levels of peak immigration around the turn of the century. Contemporary immigrants come from different parts of the world than previous waves. As late as the 1950s, Europeans made up more than half of all immigrants entering the United States. By the 1980s, Europeans were scarcely more than 10 percent. In their place, Latin American and Asian immigrants made up about 80 percent of immigrants.

The raw number of immigrants entering the United States is near the levels of peak immigration around the turn of the century.

While these characteristics are widely known among scholars and policy makers concerned with immigration policy, a second set of characteristics is less understood: the naturalization patterns of these immigrants. Naturalization offers a measure of formal attachment to the United States that is of great importance. It offers the immigrant a legal status virtually indistinguishable from that of the native-born U.S. citizen. Perhaps of greater importance, it offers a necessary step for the empowerment of immigrant/ethnic communities. Immigrants and their co-ethnics who are citizens (whether by birth or naturalization) comprise a large share of the population in several major metropolitan areas nationwide. The size of the populations offers the likelihood that Latinos and Asians can influence elections under certain circumstances (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996). One of these circumstances is more widespread naturalization.

How Many People Are Eligible to Naturalize?

In 1990, there were 19.8 million foreign-born people counted in the census, making up about 8 percent of the national population. Of these, 11.8 million were not U.S. citizens (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993: Table One). Thus, almost five percent of the country's population consists of denizens (long-term immigrants who are not citizens). By historical standards, these proportions of the foreign-born and the non-citizens are not that high. As late as the 1920s, both of these proportions were twice the current levels. In terms of contemporary immigration, however, they are record highs.

The non-U.S. citizen population includes some who are eligible and others who are ineligible for naturalization. The ineligible include two major populations, one that is steadily moving toward naturalization eligibility—recent immigrants to permanent residence and some beneficiaries of the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 who began the process late and have not yet achieved citizenship eligibility—and another that

Thus, almost five percent of the country's population consists of denizens (long-term immigrants who are not citizens).

does not have so natural a path to U.S. citizenship—the undocumented. These ineligible populations must be removed from the pool to arrive at a more accurate sense of the number of citizenship-eligible persons. When I exclude these ineligible populations, I estimate the number of immigrants eligible for naturalization at between 6.75 and 7.75 million (in mid-1996). In terms of raw numbers, this figure is an historic high, exceeding the previous record during the 1910s. This pool of citizenship-eligible immigrants increases by approximately 700,000 people per year.

Naturalization and Today's Immigrant

After five years of legal residence, immigrants become eligible for naturalization. The formal requirements for naturalization are few. Immigrants must have resided in the United States for five years; be of "good moral character;" be willing to take an oath of allegiance to the United States Constitution; forswear their former loyalties; complete an application; and attend a interview with an INS examiner. They must also have a reading, writing, and speaking knowledge of English (with some exceptions made for older applicants who have lived in the United States for long periods). They must also demonstrate a knowledge of the history and the principles of American government. The statute and administrative regulation mandate that the knowledge be at a basic level that is geared toward the education of the applicant. Most examiners use history and civics questions from a list of 100 possible questions provided by the INS. Applying for naturalization costs \$95.00 today (though INS has attempted to raise the fee several times).

Despite these minimal formal requirements, the application process proves daunting for many immigrants, particularly those from Latin America (International Migration Review 1987; Pachon and DeSipio 1994). Many applicants who obtain the naturalization application or take classes to study for the naturalization requirements do not complete the process. In a recent study of Latino immigrants eligible for citizenship, almost sixty percent had begun to apply in some concrete way, but just 28 percent had successfully naturalized

(Pachon and DeSipio 1994: chapter 7). The reasons lie both with applicants and with the INS. Applicants receive little community-level support for naturalization. Organizations that offer naturalization assistance have trouble keeping up with demand and there is a shortage of such organizations in many immigrant communities (Pachon and DeSipio 1986). As importantly, many immigrants fear the consequences of failing the exam (DeSipio 1996). The INS compounds these concerns by having a decentralized bureaucracy that treats most applicants fairly, but leaves many unsure of what they will face (North 1987).

In a recent study of Latino immigrants eligible for citizenship, almost sixty percent had begun to apply in some concrete way, but just 28 percent had successfully naturalized.

Of the foreign-born people counted in the 1990 census, approximately 41 percent of immigrants had naturalized (see Table One). Immigrants of European origin had the highest rates of naturalization and immigrants of North American and Central American origin had the lowest rates (DeSipio 1995). These naturalization rates reflect different patterns of immigration,

TABLE 1: Naturalization Rates By Region, 1990

<i>Region/ Country</i>	<i>Foreign Born 1990</i>	<i>Raw Naturalization Rate %</i>	<i>Naturalization Rate Among 1980 and Later Immigrants %</i>
Europe	4,016,678	64.7	13.6
Asia	4,979,037	40.8	17.4
Africa	363,819	34.1	15.4
Oceania	104,145	34.0	12.6
North America	8,124,257	29.3	12.5
Caribbean	1,938,348	39.7	15.1
Central America	1,133,978	20.7	9.8
South America	1,037,497	30.8	11.7
Total	19,767,316	40.5	14.4

Note: For more detail on naturalization rates for Latin American and Caribbean countries, see DeSipio (1995): Table 4.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993.

however, and include in the denominator—total foreign-born counted in the 1990 census—different numbers of immigrants who were ineligible to naturalize. Most Europeans, for example, arrived in the United States many years ago while most Latin Americans arrived more recently. Thus, the pools of immigrants from various countries and various regions are not comparable.

In order to compare like groups, Table One presents naturalization rates for immigrants who arrived since 1980 who had naturalized by 1990. This range of naturalization rates is much narrower than for all immigrants. Asians,

TABLE 2: Naturalization Rates For Regions and Countries Providing 5,000 or More Legal Immigrants in 1977.

<i>Region/ Country</i>	<i>Immigrants Admitted 1977</i>	<i>Naturalizations Through 1992</i>	<i>Rate %</i>
Europe	54,868	15,340	28.0
Greece	6,577	2,004	30.5
Italy	5,843	916	15.7
Portugal	6,964	1,622	23.3
United Kingdom	8,982	1,611	17.9
Asia	119,226	67,033	56.2
China	14,421	8,470	58.7
India	15,033	7,705	51.3
Korea	19,824	10,843	54.7
Philippines	31,686	19,415	61.3
Africa	7,713	4,161	53.9
Oceania	2,927	632	21.6
North America	142,313	42,240	29.7
Canada	9,000	1,161	12.9
Mexico	30,967	5,130	16.6
Cuba	57,023	20,522	36.0
Dominican Republic	8,955	1,939	21.7
Jamaica	7,896	3,065	38.8
South America	25,024	9,931	39.7
Colombia	6,138	2,214	36.1
All Countries	352,071	139,337	39.6

Notes: The INS does not collect data on immigrants who subsequently emigrate or who die. As a result, it is not possible to determine how many 1977 immigrants continued to reside in the United States in 1992.

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1994: Table 58.

Africans, and immigrants from the Caribbean show the highest naturalization rates and Central Americans the lowest.

INS cohort data offers an alternative method to assess naturalization propensity. This method has two advantages over using aggregate census data. First, it guarantees that all immigrants are permanent residents. Second, it allows one to compare immigrants who immigrated in the same year. The advantage of these data, however, are offset by two weaknesses that reduce their utility. INS maintains no record of immigrants who subsequently emigrate or die. Further, INS collects only a limited range of individual-level demographic characteristics, such as age and marital status at the time of immigration, or immigration-related variables, such as type of visa and country of origin. Thus, INS data offer no insights into immigrants' experiences in the United States, including basic variables such as income, occupation, and residential patterns.

With these weaknesses in mind, Table Two presents data on 1977 immigrants to the United States who had naturalized by 1992. Again, Asians and Africans, were the most likely to have naturalized with over half of the 1977 immigrants becoming U.S. citizens by 1992. Europeans, North Americans, and the few immigrants from Oceania are at the other extreme. Between 20 and 30 percent of these immigrants had naturalized within fifteen years.

The immigrants with the lowest naturalization rates are from the two countries bordering the United States, Canada and Mexico (DeSipio 1995). Because Mexico is by far the largest source of immigrants to the United States, their low rate of naturalization brings down the average for all immigrants.

Across almost all studies of naturalization, the most significant predictor of the propensity to naturalize other than length of residence is age.

Cohort studies and other analyses based on INS data demonstrate that length of residence is not the only factor that influences naturalization. Two sets of influences supplement this—socioeconomic and demographic factors (such as age, income, education, and occupational status) and acculturation factors (such as source of eligibility for immigrant visa, English-language skills, and attachment to the United States).

Across almost all studies of naturalization, the most significant predictor of the propensity to naturalize other than length of residence is age (Portes and Mozo 1985; Portes and Curtis 1987; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Yang 1994; DeSipio 1996). Older immigrants are more likely to have naturalized. This impact is felt over and above the effect of length of residence. Other influences

positively predict naturalization in some studies but not in others. These include socioeconomic factors such as high median income, white collar employment, professional status, high levels of education, home ownership, young children in the household, being a woman, or being married (Barkan and Khokolov 1980; Portes and Mozo 1985; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Yang 1994; DeSipio 1996). These traits add to factors related to immigration—emigration for political reasons, entrance to the United States as a skilled laborer or refugee, origin in Asia or Africa, immigration from a country distant from the United States, and immigration from an English-speaking country (Portes and Mozo 1985; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Yang 1994). Acculturation factors also play a role—social identification as an American, roots in the United States, residence in areas with non-co-ethnics, positive attitude toward life in the United States, demystification of the naturalization process, increasing attachment to the United States, finding intermediaries to help with the naturalization application, and increasing proficiency with English (García 1981; Alvarez 1987; Portes and Curtis 1987; DeSipio 1996).

Most studies of naturalization propensity have focused on immigrants from Latin America. Studies that rely on INS records are the exception; the analysis possible with INS records, however, is very circumscribed. Analysts who have focused specifically on Latino naturalization have demonstrated a final factor that influences naturalization propensity. Many more immigrants begin the naturalization process than complete it (DeSipio and Pachon 1992; Pachon and DeSipio 1994). Thus, naturalization is not an either-or status. Instead, immigrants can be naturalized, in the process of naturalizing, or not naturalizing. In terms of naturalization propensity, different factors distinguish those who have not begun to naturalize from the naturalized than differ those who have begun from those who have completed the process (DeSipio 1996: chapter five). This naturalization “process” is central for understanding why some immigrants naturalize and others do not.

The Recent Challenges

The incentive structure surrounding naturalization has recently changed. Thus, many of the naturalization propensities identified for past immigrants may also be changing. Both policy and administrative changes account for this. Two policy changes have added incentives to naturalize—California’s

Proposition 187 and the Contract with America change a long-standing pattern in which denizenship (long-term residence as a non-citizen) included most of the rights and benefits of U.S. citizenship.

Proposition 187 and provisions in the Contract with America. Administratively, INS added a third incentive with a requirement to replace all green cards issued before 1980.

Proposition 187 and the Contract with America change a long-standing pattern in which denizenship (long-term residence as a non-citizen) included most of the rights and benefits of U.S. citizenship. The exceptions were important, but few, particularly for those immigrants with five or more years of permanent residence. Citizens rights have traditionally included voting, holding public sector jobs and jobs requiring a security clearance, and receiving full social security benefits upon retirement if living abroad. A narrow set of government entitlement and benefit programs limited reciprocity to citizens. Over the past few years, Congress has limited program eligibility for permanent resident immigrants with fewer than five years of residence by denying access to social welfare programs, particularly for those immigrants who had been sponsored by a U.S. resident or business (National Immigration Law Center 1994: Part Two).

Proposition 187 and the Contract with America change this equation at both practical and symbolic levels. This change is most explicit in the Contract with America which sought to deny federally-financed social welfare benefits to permanent residents. Although the Republican leadership has reversed itself several times, their strategy at this writing is to deny immigrants benefits (though with an increasing range of exceptions). Whatever form legislation takes, the impact of the Contract with America is already being felt in immigrant populations. Where denizenship had once been a status that allowed near complete access to government programs, the certainty of this is now in decline.

Whatever the practical consequences of the Contract with America, Proposition 187, and the green card replacement, they have spurred a newfound intensity of interest in naturalization.

Proposition 187 is more narrowly focused on the undocumented and is limited to California (similar efforts are under way in several states, including Texas and Florida). Its anti-immigrant message, though, could also be heard by permanent residents inside and outside California. It should be noted that the documented and undocumented immigrant populations are not mutually exclusive. Many immigrant households and immigrant families include both documented and undocumented members. The National Latino Immigrant Survey found that one-fifth of Latino immigrant households with long-term legal immigrants also had members without legal status (some of whom were

refugees or were applying for legal status) (Pachon and DeSipio 1994: Table 3.63). Even for those households without undocumented residents, Proposition 187's reporting requirements would undoubtedly increase the sense of distance between denizen and citizen.

The final factor that has spurred the rapid rise in naturalization applications is an administrative requirement of the INS. Concerned about document fraud, the agency has required that all green cards issued prior to 1980 be replaced by 1996 (and every 10 years thereafter). This procedure requires an application (including photos and fingerprints) and a fee of \$75.00. Many immigrants and immigrant advocates have realized that applications for naturalization are not much more costly or bureaucratically difficult.

Whatever the practical consequences of the Contract with America, Proposition 187, and the green card replacement, they have spurred a new-found intensity of interest in naturalization. In 1995, the INS received 1.02 million naturalization applications. The agency expects to receive 1.3 million in 1996 and 900,000 in 1997 (Wade 1995; Farragher 1996). These application levels are considerably higher than the 592,039 applications received in 1994. The most stark example of the surge in applications is a report from the INS's Los Angeles district office. In one month, (January 1995), it received more than 100,000 applications for naturalization. For comparison, the entire INS received 522,298 applications in FY 1993. Of these 1993 applications, the INS was able to process just 314,681. Thus, in just one month, a single office received a volume equalling almost one-third of the national production of two years before. Clearly, this presents an administrative dilemma for the INS. As I will suggest, it also raises a question of public policy—how these immigrants can best be incorporated as U.S. citizens.

Administrative Solutions to Increased Demand for Naturalization

The INS has long struggled to meet demand for naturalization services (North 1987). During the last huge spike in naturalization demand, during World War II, applications languished for up to three years. In the current environment, INS does not have the freedom of a wartime budget to hire more staff. Instead, it is looking to privatize part of the processing responsibilities and has considered, though apparently rejected, waiving some of the naturalization requirements.

The INS has long struggled to meet demand for naturalization services.

INS's efforts to privatize naturalization administration began about eight years ago, but have taken on a new urgency in the past year. The first major effort at privatization was initiated in response to a proposal from the

Educational Testing Service (ETS) and a group of immigrant service organizations. The ETS developed a standardized exam that could be offered through immigrant service agencies to meet the civics, history, and written English requirements. The exam offers several potential benefits for the applicant. They are given two opportunities to pass the exam and failures are not reported to the INS. This procedure reduces the fear that deters some applicants. The ETS exam does not eliminate contact with an INS examiner who still must verify the material on the applications and, in the process, tests for spoken English. This ETS exam is offered nationally in communities with large immigrant populations by community based organizations under contract to INS.

More recent efforts at privatization are more localized. The Los Angeles district office has collaborated with community organizations to conduct exams at community centers. The privatization comes in the form of scheduling. The INS relies on the host community-based organization to schedule interviews. The incentive for the community organization is that applicants interviewed are those whom the organization has worked with in the past. This procedure benefits the INS not only because it saves it from having to schedule the interviews, but also because the connection between the community groups and the applicants reduces the number of no-shows. This privatization has been evaluated for the past year and is likely to be expanded in the future.

In addition, the Los Angeles district office has entered into an innovative agreement with a network of community-based organizations to promote naturalization and to streamline the processing of applications. Here, private organizations receive government funds to perform some of the clerical work formerly done by the INS. Although this program has only recently begun and its scope remains unclear, it seeks to provide government resources to promote naturalization and to develop a prototype for new applicant processing procedures. This process may include electronic filing of applications and expanded community-based citizenship interviews. In the short run, it transfers the responsibility for initially reviewing applications to the community organizations. This innovation stemmed from the inability of the Los Angeles office to process applications in a timely manner. Not only was this office unable to examine applicants, it was unable to even open their mailed applications and clerically review their accuracy.

The Miami district office is working with Cuban American elected officials to process rapidly as many as 16,000 applicants. The Chicago district office has instituted a one-stop naturalization processing center for applicants who wish to proceed immediately with their applications. It has also begun to administer the exam on a group basis and administer practice exams. Finally, it has reduced examiner discretion in question choice. Both Chicago's and Miami's efforts use a self-selection process to speed the applications of immigrants who have few barriers to the award of citizenship.

INS's initial response to the surge in applications was to examine the feasibility of eliminating the knowledge-based requirements for some applicants. These reforms, however, were not implemented. Discussions focused on two classes of immigrants. The first beneficiary would have been the long-term resident elderly, who currently can take the exam in their native language. Under the rejected proposals, these applicants would have been entirely exempted from the history and civics requirements. The second group of beneficiaries would have been naturalization applicants who had completed high school, college, or advanced degrees in the United States. These applicants would have been presumed to have met the history, civics, and history requirements. Upon application, both these groups—the long-term resident elderly and the U.S. educated—would have been awarded citizenship through an

INS administrators feared a backlash from the Republican-led Congress that could have reversed agency initiatives, limited future discretion, and even raised requirement for naturalization.

administrative process that would not have required them to appear before the INS. While these reforms were being considered, INS sought to identify other applicant populations who could receive a purely administrative award of U.S. citizenship.

Despite the agency's interest, it did not choose to implement these reforms. Their reasoning was not statutory; the agency has wide discretion under the nationality laws. Instead, INS administrators feared a backlash from the Republican-led Congress that could have reversed agency initiatives, limited future discretion, and even raised requirement for naturalization. Committees in the House and Senate tentatively scheduled hearings on naturalization for 1996. The difficulties in passing immigration legislation have delayed these efforts to restructure naturalization, but some members have vocally expressed concerns that unqualified immigrants are becoming U.S. citizens.

The naturalization process as it is currently configured excludes many immigrants who are interested and qualified.

This question of what knowledge and attitudes immigrants must have to become U.S. citizens underlies any possible reforms of naturalization administration. In the discussion that follows, I show that fears of unqualified immi-

grants becoming citizens are unfounded. Instead, the naturalization process as it is currently configured excludes many immigrants who are interested and qualified. Thus, effective reform would expand INS's processing capabilities both through expanded privatization and through purely administrative naturalization so that it could serve not just the current surge of applicants but also the larger pool of immigrants who have begun to naturalize but have become discouraged in the process.

Administrative Citizens and Good Citizens

The boom in applicants and INS's efforts to reduce its workload by privatizing and reinterpreting the statutory requirements for naturalization raises two questions. The first is the effectiveness of INS's efforts to speed naturalization processing. The second is whether the new incentives and the new processing strategies assure that the naturalized become good citizens.

I will answer these questions by examining two social science surveys that include large (sub)samples of non-citizens eligible for naturalization—the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) and the National Latino Immigrant Survey (NLIS). The descriptive findings and methodologies of these studies, which each have large samples (3,415 and 1,636, respectively), appear in de la Garza et al. (1992) and Pachon and DeSipio (1994). These two surveys focus on immigrants from Latin America. As a result, the survey findings presented here can not be generalized to all immigrants. As Latino immigrants are the least likely to naturalize, however, their propensity to naturalize can be seen as baseline levels that would be higher among other immigrant populations.

Speeding the Naturalization Process: INS Meets Its Needs, But Not Applicants'

INS's efforts to speed the processing of applicants responds to the demand as the agency sees it. From its perspective, the application process does not begin until an application is filed with the INS. Its effort, then, has been focused on moving these applicants toward a rapid U.S. citizenship. The beneficiaries of these policies are those applicants already in the pool.

If the INS only serves those who apply, then, it misses half of the immigrants who are concretely interested in becoming citizens.

A broader view of the naturalization process, however, emerges from several recent studies. The NLIS finds that almost equal numbers of Latin American immigrants begin the naturalization process and fail to become citizens as begin the process and succeed (Pachon and DeSipio 1994: chapter 6).

The single largest reason applicants offered for failing to pursue their applications was an inability to complete the application form. If the INS only serves those who apply, then, it misses half of the immigrants who are concretely interested in becoming citizens.

The findings of the NLIS are reinforced by a small, but richly informative ethnographic study of 40 recently naturalized Latinos. It found that the naturalization application was submitted at the end of a process of shifting allegiances and life choices that aligned immigrants more with life in the United States than with life in the sending country (Alvarez 1987). Thus, the formal application for naturalization was initiated only after immigrants had informally developed the traits and attachment measured in the exam. Portes and Curtis (1987) also reinforce the notion of naturalization as a process. They find that naturalization is much more likely after immigrants have developed residential and cultural ties to the United States.

Several measures indicate that non-citizens eligible for naturalization and interested in pursuing this goal would make good citizens.

This process of steadily growing immigrant attachment to the United States identified by the NLIS, Alvarez, and Portes and Curtis does not assure that applicants can navigate the administrative component of naturalization. The NLIS indicates that the exam was a relatively small deterrent compared to the application. Among all Latino immigrants eligible to naturalize, twenty percent more obtain the application than file it. Less than one percent of all applicants get to the exam stage and fail it (National Association of Latino Elected Officials 1993: 1-21). Unsuccessful applicants who obtained the form reported that it was too complex. It is a four-page form with a two page supplement containing small print that asks whether the applicant bears "hereditary title to nobility" or whether the applicant served as a concentration camp guard during the Nazi regime. Clearly, the form asks questions written beyond the education level of the average applicant. This obstacle, in effect, makes bureaucratic competence critical for success. Alternatively, it requires that outside assistance be obtained from service organizations.

Denizen Attachment to the United States

This easing of requirements can only be justified if the non-citizens are ready to join the polity and become "good" citizens. Several measures indicate that non-citizens eligible for naturalization and interested in pursuing this goal would make good citizens.

The most straightforward measure of attachment is Latino immigrants' intentions about the course of their lives. Overwhelmingly, the vast majority

indicated that they “presently plan to make the United States their permanent home.” This attachment increased the longer that they lived here. According to the LNPS, 59 percent of immigrants with less than five years of residence intended to remain permanently in the United States but 80 percent of those with 15 to 19 years of residence planned to do so.

Identification with the United States offers a stronger measure of attachment. These data demonstrate a growing sense of political attachment to the United States. Among the most recent immigrants—those non-U.S. citizens with five to nine years of residence—27 percent reported that their primary political attachment was to the United States. This attachment increased to 37 percent among those with 15 to 19 years and 42 percent among non-U.S. citizens resident 30 or more years. Thus, these long-term denizens have rejected U.S. citizenship, yet a strong plurality felt more attached to the United States than to the country of origin.

If all eligible immigrants were to apply for naturalization, it would take close to six years to process applications.

The final attitudinal measure of attachment relates to the importance of U.S. citizenship to immigrants from Latin America. Approximately 80 percent of respondents reported that it was either important or very important to become a U.S. citizen. Recent immigrants were slightly more likely to see U.S. citizenship as important or very important than longer-term immigrants. The respondents who had begun, but not completed the application process identified “participating more fully in American life” as the single most important reason for seeking naturalization (Pachon and DeSipio 1994: Table 7.39).

In sum, these attitudinal measures demonstrate that Latino immigrants eligible for naturalization had decided to live out their lives in the United States. Although the majority had not yet developed a political allegiance to the United States, a surprisingly large share had. It is this type of attachment to the United States that the naturalization exam seeks to measure.

Conclusions

The incentives to naturalize that have developed over the past two years have shown that more immigrants can move themselves into the applicant stream than have in the past. Despite these increases, however, it is unlikely that all of the interested will be able to achieve what 100,000 immigrants were able to do in Los Angeles in January 1995. Even if all eligible immigrants were to apply for naturalization, it would take close to six years to process applications from all of today’s eligible immigrants (and then many more years for INS to respond to their applications).

The explosive increase in naturalization applications forces an issue that has been brewing since immigration began to increase in the 1960s. Specifically, what is the cost to the polity of having a growing pool of non-citizens eligible for and interested in citizenship who are unable to achieve their goal? The consequences could potentially be quite great. The non-citizens are without the political rights that assure that their voices can be heard. To the extent that they voluntarily exclude themselves by not seeking naturalization, the choice is theirs. As I have shown, however, many pursue naturalization but do not succeed. These immigrants over time could come to perceive that they are being denied equal participation and could come to resent the United States.

The changed incentive structure brought about by Proposition 187, the Contract with America, and the green card replacement requirements raises a second and equally important question. Are immigrants seeking naturalization just to remain eligible for government social welfare programs? The survey data reflect that this has not been the goal of immigrants seeking naturalization in the past. Instead, immigrants in these surveys have viewed naturalization as a means to achieve a political voice. Almost 90 percent of Latino immigrants in the NLIS, for example, identified gaining the vote as a very important reason for naturalizing (Pachon and DeSipio 1994: Table 7.38). Yet, if the gap between denizen and citizen is further widened, along the lines of the Contract with America, this may well change. To the degree that we as a society respond in the near future, we will tap immigrants who desire political incorporation.

What is the cost to the polity of having a growing pool of non-citizens eligible for and interested in citizenship who are unable to achieve their goal?

For now, a large number of immigrants (as many as three million if the data on the Latino immigrant population can be accurately extrapolated to the immigrant population as a whole) have tried to naturalize and have been unsuccessful. The pressures of the new applicants for naturalization have forced the INS to reevaluate its administration of the program. This is the perfect opportunity, then, to develop strategies for expanding service not just to applicants, but to the larger pool of naturalization-interested immigrants. After initially showing interest in crafting a comprehensive response, the INS backed away from its most far-reaching proposals.

INS can seize this moment of high immigrant interest in naturalization with several key reforms. First, it should reexamine the feasibility of administrative award of citizenship to classes of applicants who are likely to be able to pass the exam (such as applicants who completed high school or college in

the United States). This policy would speed some awards of citizenship (an agency goal) as well free resources to focus on evaluating the qualifications of individuals with more problematic applications.

Equally importantly, the INS needs to restructure the application form, which proved to be the greatest administrative barrier for applicants. Much of the information requested is required by statute, so Congress would have to participate in this process. Even without Congressional authorization, INS can simplify the language and reduce the volume of information collected about an applicant's family and work history. Finally, it can redesign the form and the wording of the questions to meet the needs and skills of potential applicants.

INS also needs to restructure the naturalization process in a manner that serves immigrant needs broadly. Simply, the entry point has to be simplified to move citizenship-interested immigrants to file their applications. To some extent, the privatization initiatives address this objective. The example of the Los Angeles district office is one model. The INS provided resources to community groups to assist applicants in completing the application. In the process, these community groups reduced INS's clerical and administrative burdens. Effective reform requires an integrated response that not only taps demand, both active and passive, but also assures speedy application processing.

Thus, while it seemed as if the INS was responding to the surge in naturalization applications generated by Proposition 187, the Contract with America, and the green card replacement program, it now appears that the response is not comprehensive and may, in the short-term, worsen the applicant backlog. In the long-run, this failure to meet immigrant needs runs a risk. Where today immigrants have a very positive attitude toward the United States and a desire to join as full members, they may over time come to feel rejected and develop more negative or distant feelings about their adoptive country.

Endnotes

1. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 1995 meetings of the Western Political Science Association. I would like to thank Luis Fraga for his comments on that draft.

2. This estimate relies on two assumptions developed more completely in DeSipio (1996). The first is that the INS's calculation of approximately 3.4 million undocumented immigrants residing in the United States in 1992 is accurate (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1994: Table O). The second is that emigration and mortality reduce the number of immigrants eligible for naturalization by approximately 25 percent before immigrants attain eligibility for naturalization. Some estimates indicate that as many as one-third emigrate (Warren and Kraly 1985), matching the rates for immigrants from the last period of rapid immigration in the first two decades of this century. There are no estimates for immigrant mortality prior to naturalization.

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Family Employment Status and Labor Market Outcomes for Teens and Young Adults

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Introduction

Does living with family members who are not in the labor force have an impact on the chances for employment of teens and young adults? Findings show that unemployed youths rely most frequently on family and friends to generate job contacts or offers. This method of job search is the most widely used among young people because it is the most productive (Holzer, 1988). However, what happens to the job prospects of youths when a significant number of their immediate relatives and friends are out of the labor force entirely? Does a young Puerto Rican or Black worker already facing entry barriers to the labor market become doubly disadvantaged if other household members are out of work and presumably disconnected from conventional job networks?

Does a young Puerto Rican or black worker already facing entry barriers to the labor market become doubly disadvantaged if other household members are out of work and presumably disconnected from conventional job networks?

This paper will test the hypothesis that among Puerto Rican, non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White youths in New York City, residing with an employed parent, sibling, or other family member increases their probability of getting a job. To better understand the causal links between the employment status of the youth and his/her family background characteristics, the

employment status of all family members and specifically, the occupation of the employed parent will be investigated. Research suggests that employment networks for urban youths in low-income households are curtailed by their physical isolation from employment concentrations in increasingly decentralized metropolitan areas (Holzer, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1994). Correspondingly, evidence on social access to employment through informal contacts reveals that minority youths are at a disadvantage because the lower number of employed family members at home affects the quality of information that is provided (O'Regan and Quigley, 1993). A combination of low-skill and educational attainment on the supply-side and a changing industrial structure providing fewer job opportunities for young workers on the demand-side are also implicated in the high rate of minority-youth joblessness (Cain and Finnie, 1990).

Nationally, among all non-Hispanic and Hispanic groups, the incidence of joblessness among Puerto Ricans in 1991-1992 was the highest with Puerto Ricans 16 to 24 years of age experiencing a 20.2 percent rate of unemployment (U.S. Department of Labor, 1992). The first section of this paper reviews the literature on the labor-market experience of Puerto Rican teens and young adults and highlights information on their New York City employment and occupational profile. The second section describes the methodological framework and the data used to estimate the independent roles played by family and by personal and labor-market characteristics in determining labor-force participation for young Puerto Ricans, non-Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites. The last section summarizes the empirical results for male and female teens (ages 16 to 19) and young adults (ages 20 to 24).

Focus on Puerto Rican Teens and Young Adults

Census data for 1980 and 1990 reveal that Puerto Ricans had the highest incidence of poverty of any minority or ethnic group in the United States and Puerto Rican youths were more likely than other Hispanic youths to be living in families with incomes below the poverty line. In 1980, 44% of the Puerto Rican population living on the mainland resided in the New York City metropolitan area. Puerto Ricans in this area were residentially segregated and spatially isolated, which diminished their likelihood of gaining access to spatially-determined resources like education and employment (Bean and Tienda, 1987). Studies show that the labor-market problems of Puerto Rican youths are particularly severe, yet research on this group has been limited due to the unavailability of data sources that could generate samples large enough for reliable inference (Santos, 1985; Fernandez, 1985).

In New York City, the employment problems of young Puerto Ricans were exacerbated by persistently high unemployment and non-participation rates within the Puerto Rican community as a whole during the 1970s. The number of

Puerto Rican families with no one employed increased dramatically between 1970 and 1980 and remained high throughout the 1980s. New York State labor-force participation rates for Puerto Ricans were dramatically lower and unemployment significantly higher in 1980 than rates for Puerto Ricans living in either California or Florida where Hispanics overall fared much better. DeFreitas (1991: 144) argues that the data from this period clearly shows that Puerto Rican workers in New York were disproportionately affected by the decline in entry-level jobs and the polarization of the job structure in New York City.

Research on the determinants of employment using family-background variables as controls indicates that young people from disadvantaged homes are more likely to experience joblessness (Freeman, 1986; Payne, 1987). This is particularly pertinent for young Puerto Ricans living in New York City because of the high rates of poverty and unemployment that have prevailed in their communities during the last 20 years. It is likely that, lacking the contacts that employed relatives could provide, joblessness and unemployment increased among Puerto Rican youths, linking younger and older generations in a common experience of labor-market discouragement and increasing poverty.

A number of possible scenarios suggest themselves, given the employment profiles of Puerto Ricans who lived in New York City during the last two decades and the proven significance of certain background variables on youth labor-market activity. High rates of unmarried motherhood contributed to the low rates of employment found among Puerto Rican women ages 16 to 24, and low employment rates subsequently increased their chances of poverty. The rise in the number of Puerto Rican youths who resided in one-parent (largely female-headed) households in which the mother did not work, or who lived in households in which no one held a job, diminished the effectiveness of community job networks. The overrepresentation of Puerto Rican adults in declining industrial sectors of the New York City economy placed them at a disadvantage in generating employment contacts for the young. The residential segregation of Puerto Ricans in neighborhoods where poverty was concentrated further diminished Puerto Rican youth employment beyond the rate that demand forces would warrant (O'Regan, 1993).

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DeFreitas (1991: 141) reported that the largest white-Hispanic difference in access to private transportation in 1980 was found in New York City, specif-

ically, in Bronx county, which has the largest concentration of Puerto Ricans, fully 73% of Hispanic residents reported they had no access to personal transportation. This indicates that even if jobs were available outside of the city, Puerto Rican workers were stymied in their ability to access them. He also noted that nearly one in three Puerto Rican households in New York State did not have telephone service in 1980, which would certainly impede the ability to make job connections. Ihlanfeldt (1992) found that differential access to jobs (measured in mean commuting time) between whites and Puerto Ricans living in New York City explained roughly 30% of the existing employment-rate gap. The mismatch between the residential location of Puerto Rican youths in New York City and the spatial availability of jobs in the region further weakened the job networks within a youth's family and the community at large.

In New York City, the dropout rate for Hispanics in 1992 was 21.3%, compared to 16.4% for Blacks and 11.9% for Whites (New York City Board of Education, 1994). Persistently high dropout rates complicate the already difficult school-to-work transition for Puerto Rican youths. The labor-force participation rate in 1980 for Hispanic teenagers in New York City was comparatively lowest at 25.9% and their employment/population ratio was the smallest at 19.4% (DeFreitas, 1991: 143). A decline of 38% in the number of entry-level jobs in New York City between 1970 and 1980, along with declining school enrollments, graduation, early marriage and/or pregnancy and increased alternatives in the underground economy have all contributed to the employment problems of young Puerto Rican who live in this area (NCLR, 1994).

Research Method and Data to be Used

The Five Percent 1980 Census Public Use Sample for New York City has been used to create a data set containing information on the determinants of employment for men and women, ages 16 to 19 and 20 to 24, who lived in households where they were the children of the household head. The 1980 Census was chosen to take advantage of the large number of published studies that have used this data to analyze Puerto Rican employment conditions (Melendez, Rodriguez and Barry Figueroa, 1991). The estimations are an indirect test for the existence and importance of family job connections in increasing a youth's employment chances. Three populations were used for the empirical tests: Puerto Ricans, non-Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites. The employment regressions for men and women were estimated separately by race/ethnicity and age. The investigation was restricted to out-of-school teenagers and young adults, for whom the issue of finding a full-time job is presumed to be most pressing. Data were taken directly from the youth's personal record. Replicating in part the methodology of Rees and Grey (1982), I also took information from the relevant record on the parent (householder), siblings (ages 16 to 34) and other related household members

(ages 16 to 34) and merged it with information on the youth's record. In addition to the records of the youth and the parent, up to four additional personal records from the household were read, ensuring that maximum use was made of the available information on siblings and other relatives. Information on the employment status of the parent (e.g., active or inactive), the parent's occupational location, information on the sex, age and employment status of the young person's siblings, as well as the employment and gender status of other relatives in the household were included in the analysis to detect intra-family interactions. Two dependent variables were analyzed: (1) a variable indicating labor-force participation in the survey week and (2) estimated total hours worked by the young person in the previous year (the product of weeks worked per year and hours worked per week in 1979). Findings from both models were similar. Only the significant results from the participation decision are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Teens and young adults who were at work or unemployed were considered to be active members of the labor force.

The explanatory variables can be divided into three categories: family background characteristics, the youth's human-capital characteristics, and local labor-market characteristics. Family background factors include whether the youth was residing in a female-headed household, the level of exogenous income flowing into the household, an indicator of the sex and self-employment status of the householder and whether the family was living below the poverty line. The employment status and occupation of the parent (household head), the employment status of adult male and female relatives and the employment status of younger and older brothers and sisters were factors included in the empirical tests.¹

In the large set of variables measuring the employment status of siblings between the ages of 16 and 34, there are four subsets, for older brother, younger brother, older sister and younger sister. Following the procedure explained in Rees and Grey's study (1982: 462) for each of these subsets, two variables were created to capture the employment status of the sibling (e.g., "younger sister employed" and "younger sister not employed"). By definition the base or omitted variable is "no younger sister living at home." If the young person to whom the independent variables pertain has more than one sibling between the ages of 16 and 34 living at home, then both dummies [sic] in the above younger-sister subset would take the value 1.²

Human-capital characteristics of the youths used in the estimations were: completed years of education, country of birth, English language proficiency and health disability status. Childbearing status was entered as a control in the analysis for young women because of its conventional significance in determining their employment status. Differences in labor-market demand, due to contrasting levels of economic activity across the boroughs of New York City, were captured by the county-specific civilian unemployment rates (i.e., Manhattan, the Bronx) for each population (i.e., the variation in the Puerto

Rican civilian unemployment rate across the boroughs was used in the regression analysis for Puerto Ricans). Appendix A lists and defines the variables used in the analyses for all samples.

Labor Force Participation Results for Men

The data show that Puerto Rican male teens had significantly lower labor force participation rates (at 43%) relative to black and white teens (53% and 68% respectively). Perhaps most striking was the percentage of Puerto Rican teens who lived in poor households and in families where the householder (parent) was not in the labor force. Working parents of Puerto Rican teens were more likely to hold blue-collar jobs, especially those categorized as lower blue-collar. Those Black and Puerto Rican teens who were employed tended to work fewer hours, averaging only 53% of the annual hours worked by white male teens. Education was on average lower for Puerto Rican teens, and work disability and English language problems higher. Teenage Puerto Rican males appeared to be at a labor market disadvantage relative to white teens in particular, facing an average civilian unemployment rate that was almost 1.5 percentage points higher than the rate of the white teen sample (see Appendix B).

Residence in a poor household lowers the probability of employment by 25.1%. Conversely, residing with working parents who hold upper blue-collar jobs increases the probability of employment by 25.6%.

Puerto Rican young adults (ages 20 to 24) also registered fewer years of completed education, higher rates of poor English proficiency and lower rates of labor-force participation than their Black and White counterparts. Only 65% of their parent/householders were in the work force, as compared to 70% and 85% of the parents from the Black and White young-adult samples. Puerto Rican young adult males were also more likely to reside in poor households where there were comparatively fewer numbers of employed family members.

Table 1 presents the coefficients from the probit model for labor-force participation for each of the three groups of young males. The probit model was the preferred functional form as the dependent variable is a binary variable expressed as a linear function of the independent variables. The probit factor in the first row of each table allows one to standardize the coefficients ("DY/DX") and obtain percentage-point estimates associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable.³

Puerto Rican Males, Ages 16-19 Table 1 indicates that only two variables are significant in determining the probability of labor-force participation

for these teens. Residence in a poor household lowers the probability of employment by 25.1%. Conversely, residing with working parents who hold upper blue-collar jobs increases the probability of employment by 25.6%. This finding suggests the possibility that employed parents in the trades are able to identify job opportunities for their sons. Upper blue-collar jobs may be unionized and parental information on apprenticeship openings and connections to these jobs may prove crucial. Note that it is the occupational location of the parent and not the fact that the parent is employed per se that is significant here. Overall, the results for the Puerto Rican male youth sample are of interest because of the lack of significance of other family employment variables, as well as factors such as education and language proficiency that one would expect to affect the employment probabilities of these teens.

Non-Hispanic Black Males, Ages 16-19 Relative to Puerto Rican teens, there is evidence of greater intra-family effects in the Black teen sample. In Table 1, Black teens had a 25.6% increased employment probability if their younger sister was employed, but saw a decrease in probability of 14.4% if their younger sister was not employed. The finding that the non-employment of a younger brother at home significantly increased participation probabilities by 12.3% is unexpected. Each year of additional education raised the probability of employment for these teens by 3.3%.

Overall, the results for the Puerto Rican male youth sample are of interest because of the lack of significance of other family employment variables, as well as factors such as education and language proficiency that one would expect to affect the employment probabilities of these teens.

Non-Hispanic White Males, Ages 16-19 Table 2 reveals that having a younger sister employed increased the probability of employment for this sample by 21.3%, while having an older sister employed increased work probabilities by 39.1%. However, having an older sister who was not employed decreased work probabilities by 18.5%. An additional year of education increased work probabilities by 3.5%. For those young men who cited work disabilities or who lived in poor households, work probabilities were diminished by 28.4% and 21% respectively. Particularly among the White male sample there is evidence of a direct relationship between the employment status of other family members and the probabilities of labor-market entry. This is indicative that the universe of job opportunities open to White male teens is much greater than that for Black and Puerto Rican teens. White teens and their families do not suffer from the racial/ethnic discrimination that limits employment opportunities and job contacts.

Whether the family interactions in the White and Black sample are suggestive of "a common work ethic" within the family, as was suggested by Rees and Grey (1982:464) or of family job networks that aid and support young men entering the labor force cannot be easily determined. If the sibling, relative or parental job-location variables that were significant across the samples are capturing job networks, it is interesting to note that Black and White male teens benefit from contacts provided by their female relatives as well as information from their male relatives. Given the high degree of occupational segregation by gender, this is somewhat surprising. The parental employment variable used in this study does not distinguish the gender of the household head, but in a similar analysis O'Regan and Quigley (1993) found that the presence of a working father has a larger effect on youth employment probabilities than does the presence of a working mother, especially for male youths. The importance of a working household head may therefore be underestimated in the Puerto Rican and Black male samples because of the larger number of female-headed households.

This is indicative that the universe of job opportunities open to white male teens is much greater than that for Black and Puerto Rican teens. White teens and their families do not suffer from the racial/ethnic discrimination that limits employment opportunities and job contacts.

O'Regan and Quigley (1991) also found that working urban youths are more likely to be in an industry or location similar to that of a working parent. Job-matching models suggest that if the price of obtaining information about the parent's job (through direct questioning) is lower than the price of obtaining information about other jobs (through more formal search methods), then we should expect children to be more likely to try their parent's jobs. In tests of association between the occupational location of the parent and that of the working Puerto Rican male teen, a significant, positive association was detected in lower white-collar, upper blue-collar and service occupations. Interestingly, there was no significant association found in the occupational location of black and white teens and their parents.

Puerto Rican Males, Ages 20-24 Table 1 indicates that having a parent in the labor force increased the probability of participation by 12 percentage points for Puerto Rican young-adult males. However, none of the other variables reflecting family employment status were significant. Each additional year of education increased participation by 2.5%. Residence in a poverty-level household diminished job probabilities by 26.5% and a work disability decreased participation by 33%.

TABLE 1: Coefficients of Probit Model for Labor Force Participation of Males, Ages 16-19 and Ages 20-24^a
Dependent Variable=in the Labor force (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Estimation method: Maximum Likelihood

	<i>Puerto Rican</i>		<i>Black</i>		<i>White</i>	
	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>
$f(X \setminus)+$.3877	.3622	.3989	.3386	.3405	.2068
Variable						
Constant	-.313 (.792)	.705 (.702)	-.864 (.700)	.789 (.447)	-.516 (.635)	1.31** (.403)
YEduc	-.015 (.033)	.069** (.027)	.083* (.037)	.024 (.019)	.103** (.032)	.037** (.014)
HHWorks	.011 (.208)	.331* (.169)	.153 (.176)	.102 (.121)	-.067 (.172)	.164 (.096)
Poor	-.647** (.188)	-.732** (.158)	-.176 (.165)	-.585** (.121)	-.619** (.204)	-.845** (.182)
YDisable	-.274 (.293)	-.913** (.200)	-.402 (.258)	-.821** (.146)	-.836** (.300)	-1.08** (.147)
UnempRt	.018 (.045)	-.009 (.037)	.010 (.026)	-.002 (.018)	-.011 (.020)	-.035 (.012)
UBCol	.662* (.315)	.139 (.257)	-.281 (.245)	-.152 (.178)	.224 (.185)	-.197 (.120)
ServOcc	.161 (.232)	-.181 (.182)	-.120 (.173)	.080 (.127)	.043 (.173)	-.246* (.111)
YoBro	.269 (.183)	-.095 (.145)	.309* (.150)	-.038 (.102)	.001 (.168)	-.026 (.107)
OlBroEm	.115 (.644)	.175 (.256)	.570 (.543)	-.065 (.179)	-3.39 (48.3)	.421** (.161)
OlBro	-.199 (.443)	-.178 (.195)	-.136 (.373)	-.031 (.132)	3.73 (48.3)	-.309* (.134)
YoSisEmp	-.240 (.473)	.372 (.287)	.643* (.328)	.154 (.230)	.626* (.294)	-.085 (.157)
OlSisEmp	-.290 (.384)	.073 (.251)	.200 (.263)	.407** (.169)	1.14** (.258)	.160 (.168)
YoSis	.013 (.163)	-.006 (.152)	-.361** (.144)	-.257** (.099)	.077 (.162)	.039 (.109)
OlSis	-.087 (.280)	-.242 (.187)	-.071 (.176)	-.131 (.115)	-.544** (.212)	-.110 (.147)
MRelEmp	4.56 (29.3)	.246 (.770)	-.379 (1.08)	1.28* (.664)	-.138.. (.795)	-4.03 (18.2)

^aVariables included in estimation but not shown in table because of lack of significance include: UWCol, LWCol, YoBroEmp, MRelative, FRelative, FRelEmp, FHHead, MSelfEmp, YBirth, YEnglish, LnExogIn.

N =	368	563	487	1106	663	2244
Log likelihood	226.5	313.6	308.9	617.7	367.3	838.9
Mean of Dependent Variable	.435	.65	.534	.703	.685	.859

+Multiply coefficients by this factor to obtain slopes at variable means

Significance Level

** < .01 * < .05

Non-Hispanic Black Males, Ages 20-24 Indications of “family effects” are evident in Table 1 for Black young-adult males. Having an older sister who was employed increased job participation by 13.8%. Living with a male relative who was employed increased the probability of employment by a very large 43.4%, indicating that job connections may indeed play a role here. However, living with a younger sister who was not in the labor force decreased employment probabilities by 8.7%. Residence in a poverty household and having a work disability decreased the probability of working by 19.8% and 27.7% respectively.

To summarize, an employed head of household had a positive effect on the employment chances of Puerto Rican young-adult males, while the employment status of other family members in the household seemed irrelevant to increased job access.

Non-Hispanic White Males, Ages 20-24 Table 1 shows that relative to those young adults who resided in households where the head was located in a lower blue-collar occupation, those whose parents worked in service occupations were 5.1% less likely to be in the labor force. In the annual hours results (not reported here), the parent’s employment in this occupational category was also significant in lowering the youth’s work hours. This suggests that parents in service jobs were less likely or able to use these networks to get their sons full-time jobs. Having an older brother employed increased participation probabilities by 8.7%, while having an older brother who was not in the labor force diminished these probabilities by 6.3%. Increased years of education had a positive effect on labor-force entry, while residence in a poor household or a work disability diminished employment prospects.

To summarize, an employed head of household had a positive effect on the employment chances of Puerto Rican young-adult males, while the employment status of other family members in the household seemed irrelevant to increased job access. For Black young adults, older, employed sisters and male relatives had a significant employment effect, while for White young adults, it was the employment status of the older brother that was most important. Tests for independence in the occupational location of white householders and young adults revealed a significant positive association in each of the five occupational categories. The association was significant only in the case of lower White-collar jobs among the Black sample and in upper White-collar and service jobs among the Puerto Rican sample. Residence in a poverty-level household negatively affected job entry for all three groups, but the magnitude of this effect was much larger for Puerto Rican young adult males.

Labor Force Participation Results for Women

There are major differences in the mean characteristics of the three groups of teenage women. Only 28% of Puerto Rican female teens surveyed were in the labor force as compared to 34% of Black and 72% of White teens. White teens were more likely to be childless (at 97%) than Puerto Rican and Black teens (76% and 72% respectively). Only 46% of the parents of Puerto Rican teens were active in the labor force, as compared to 63% of the Black parents and 83% of the White parents. Fully half of the Puerto Rican young women lived in households where income was below the poverty line, and the percentage of siblings and other family members not active in the labor force was consistently larger among Puerto Rican families. Puerto Rican teens averaged the lowest number of years of completed education (at 9.73 years) and, relative to the parents of Black and White teens, a higher percentage of all working Puerto Rican parents were located in blue-collar jobs.

Differences between the three female young-adult samples are notable. Puerto Rican women worked 52% of the number of annual hours of White women and 110% of the average number of hours of Black women. Young Puerto Rican and Black women were equally likely to be in the labor force (at 58% and 57% respectively) and education levels were similar, although both groups had lower education levels than White women. Young Puerto Rican women were once again more often located in poor households and households where the parent was not in the labor force. Puerto Rican women were more likely than Black women to be childless (75% versus 62%), but this ratio was still below the percentage of young white women (97%) who did not have children. Puerto Rican young adults consistently resided with fewer siblings who were active in the labor force when compared to the other samples (Appendix C).

Puerto Rican Females, Ages 16-19 Table 2 presents the labor force-participation results for Puerto Rican female teens. Those teens with younger brothers who were employed exhibited a 23.2% increased probability of being in the labor force. Female teens who did not have children were 15.6% more likely to be working. Mainland-born teens had a 15.3% greater probability of working than did island-born teens. Poverty and disability had negative impacts on employment, as did increased levels of household income.

Non-Hispanic Black Females, Ages 16-19 Table 2 shows that Black teens were more likely to have participated in the labor force if they lived with an employed younger brother (28.5%) and did not have children (9.8%). Living with an inactive [sic] female relative decreased employment probabilities by a large 57%, indirectly suggesting that labor force discouragement can run in families.

Non-Hispanic White Females, Ages 16-19 Table 2 indicates that female teens living with employed younger brothers were 19.6% more likely to be

active in the labor force. Those young adults without children had a 27.8% greater probability of holding a job, and each additional year of education raised probabilities by 9.1%. A one-unit increase in the county-level unemployment decreased the probability of being in the labor force by 1.7% for this sample.

The findings for female teens indirectly suggest that employed younger brothers are beneficial in helping to access jobs. Teens who are not parents are consistently more likely to be working. White teens alone are positively rewarded for increased years of education and are negatively affected by changing employment demand as measured by the county-level unemployment rate. Tests for association between the parent's and teen's occupation showed a significant dependence within the White teenage women's sample in upper white-collar, lower white-collar and lower blue-collar jobs. Within the black sample, associations were detected between teens and parents working in lower white-collar and lower blue-collar jobs. The only significant association found within the Puerto Rican sample occurred in lower white-collar occupations.

Puerto Rican Females, Ages 20-24 Table 2 indicates that living in a poor household and having a work disability reduced employment probabilities by 28% and 36% respectively. An additional year of education increased work probabilities by 4.4%, and remaining childless increased the probability of working by 33.7%.

Non-Hispanic Black Females, Ages 20-24 Table 2 indicates that living with an employed older sister increased work prospects by 22.7%. A one-year increase in completed education raised labor-force probability levels by 4.4%. Poverty, disability and motherhood all had the expected effect on the dependent variable.

Non-Hispanic White Females, Ages 20-24 Table 2 reveals that the work decision of these women is significantly affected by the employment status of other family members. Having a parent located in an upper blue-collar occupation increased employment probabilities by 5%. Living with an employed younger brother increased probabilities by 12.5%, whereas living with a younger brother who was out of the labor force decreased employment probabilities by 5.3%. Living with an employed older brother increased participation by 8.8%. Residence with an employed older sister increased participation by 8.5%. A one-unit increase in the county-specific unemployment rate decreased the probabilities of employment by six-tenths of one percent. Other significant variables included exogenous income, poverty, disability status and education.

Overall, the female young-adult findings replicate the consistent pattern of strong family effects, among Whites in particular, but among Blacks as well. Residence in a poor household diminished employment prospects for Puerto Rican young-adult women to a greater degree than was true for Black and White young adults in similar circumstances. Remaining childless had a com-

TABLE 2: Coefficients of Probit Model for Labor Force Participation of Females, Ages 16-19 and Ages 20-24^a
Dependent Variable=in the Labor force (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Estimation method: Maximum Likelihood

	<i>Puerto Rican</i>		<i>Black</i>		<i>White</i>	
	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>
f (X/(I)+ Variable	.2655	.3839	.3605	.3941	.3118	.1824
Constant	-.009 (.937)	-2.15** (.860)	-.568 (.706)	-.429 (.483)	-2.91** (.796)	-.046 (.545)
LnExogIn	-.115** (.045)	-.072 (.044)	-.011 (.042)	-.055 (.031)	-.002 (.044)	-.087* (.044)
YEduc	.053 (.042)	.116** (.033)	.041 (.032)	.114** (.020)	.294** (.045)	.073** (.018)
Poor	-.629** (.239)	-.733** (.190)	-.667** (.181)	-.621** (.126)	-.832** (.242)	-1.30** (.201)
YDisable	-.667 (.437)	-.936** (.272)	-.135 (.309)	-.717** (.184)	-.957* (.455)	-1.49** (.185)
UnempRt	-.051 (.055)	.080 (.048)	-.033 (.029)	-.024 (.018)	-.056** (.021)	-.036** (.014)
YBirth	.578** (.213)	.268 (.151)	-.041 (.199)	-.061 (.119)	.264 (.201)	.179 (.147)
YoBroEmp .	.877* (.437)	-.178 (.378)	.791** (.325)	.392 (.228)	.631* (.276)	.690** (.213)
YoBro	-.413 (.231)	-.109 (.186)	.161 (.157)	-.101 (.107)	-.259 (.164)	-.295** (.112)
OIBroEmp.	.612 (.384)	.088 (.273)	.006 (.264)	.156 (.164)	.210 (.243)	.487** (.172)
OISisEmp	-4.26 (55.2)	.346 (.348)	1.55 (.985)	.576** (.217)	.059 (.576)	.471* (.235)
OISis	.278 (.636)	.075 (.246)	-.782 (.695)	-.081 (.143)	.104 (.478)	-.357 (.204)
FemRel	-3.53 (55.1)	.751 (.554)	-1.58* (.813)	.717 (.515)	3.30 (68.5)	2.97 (39.0)
UBCol	-.085 (.354)	.276 (.302)	-.217 (.347)	-.049 (.204)	-.046 (.206)	.275* (.141)
NoKids	.590** (.235)	.878** (.161)	.273* (.145)	.671** (.090)	.894** (.043)	1.36** (.186)
N=	296	430	486	982	678	1969

^aVariables included in the estimation but not in the table because of lack of significance include: HHWorks, MSelfEmp, FHHead, YEnglish, UWCol, LWCcol, ServOcc, OIBro, YoSis, YoSisEmp, FRelEmp, MRelative, MRelEmp,

Log likelihood 145.3 223.4 278.4 564.3 324.6 636.1
 Mean of Dependent Variable .28 .58 .35 .57 .726 .863

+Multiply coefficients by this factor to obtain slopes at variable means

Significance Level

**< .01 * < .05

paratively larger impact on increasing the job prospects of female Puerto Rican young adults.

Summary

Despite major differences in the significance and strength of the family variables between groups, it is clear that teens and young adults are themselves more likely to work and will generally work longer hours if they reside with family members who are active in the labor force. Of particular interest is the finding that in instances where both the "relative in work force" and "relative not in work force" were significant in determining a youth's employment, the positive impact of having a working sibling or relative always outweighed the negative impact of living with a non-working brother, sister or other relative. If job contacts are indirectly being captured through the family variables, we do not know if siblings, for example, help get jobs for the youth in question, or if our findings capture the individual youth's ability to gain employment for his/her brother or sister. The latter effect may be what is captured by the consistent positive significance of an employed younger brother across the teen and young-adult samples. The results allow us to identify the association between the employment status of family members and the youth, but they do not indicate the direction of causality. The significance of

The diminished ability of Puerto Rican youths to use as job contacts parents and relatives who face their own employment problems forces them to rely more heavily on formal institutions such as employment agencies, schools and training programs.

only two parental variables in the Puerto Rican male samples and the sibling variable in the Puerto Rican female teen sample suggests that networks in these families are limited and contextually specific. On average, the small number of employed Puerto Rican family members will tend to limit the significance of any of the family variables. However, it is notable that family members who are not employed do not negatively affect the labor-market chances of Puerto Rican youths, as was the case in the black and white samples. Thus it appears that whether a Puerto Rican youth resides with an employed family member or with relatives who are not employed is of generally minor importance in determining his or her job prospects.

The diminished ability of Puerto Rican youths to use as job contacts parents and relatives who face their own employment problems forces them to rely more heavily on formal institutions such as employment agencies, schools and training programs. Hernandez (1983) found that public employment agencies were the preferred job-search method among unemployed

young Puerto Rican men and women in 1975-76. Santos (1985) found that in 1978-79, Puerto Rican youths participated in government employment and training programs in proportions exceeding Blacks. However, he found that lower percentages were satisfied with the program and few believed that their involvement had significantly improved their job prospects. In the early 1980s, funding cuts in employment and training programs curtailed Puerto Rican participation significantly (National Puerto Rican Coalition, 1983). More recently, Hispanics have been underrepresented in programs that assist in training and placement (U.S. Department of Labor, 1992).

Greater access to word-of-mouth recruitment systems and continued emphasis on educational and cognitive-skills development can better prepare these young people to engage in effective labor market searches.

Of major concern are the labor-market entry problems of the out-of-school Puerto Rican youth population since early labor-market experiences will determine one's access to on-the-job training and improved future earnings. Garcia and Hurtado (1984), in a rare study in which Hispanic subgroups were identified, found that persistent joblessness over the course of the business cycle from 1973 to 1981 was more problematic for Puerto Rican youths than for other Hispanic and white youths. Farkus, et. al. (1988), in a study that did not distinguish Hispanic subgroups, found that in 1979 inner-city, out-of-school Hispanic young men and women had higher employment rates than inner-city blacks, but significantly lower rates than inner-city whites. Hispanic young women had much lower employment rates than Hispanic males, and the lowest wages among all male and female youths.

In the 1990s, high rates of joblessness and unemployment continue to be a shared experience among Puerto Rican men and women and their working-age children.

Labor-market studies of Hispanic youths are important, but they may provide a misleading picture of the economic situation of Puerto Ricans. Puerto Rican youths were at a greater disadvantage in the labor market than other Hispanics in the 1980s (Santos, 1985; Fernandez, 1985). Concentrated family poverty and ineffective information networks supported the social isolation of Puerto Rican teens and young adults. Therefore, programs that emphasize job connections, mentor groups and other informational aspects of employment can serve as a prescription for improving the employment status of New York City Puerto Rican youths.

Greater access to word-of-mouth recruitment systems and continued emphasis on educational and cognitive-skills development can better prepare these young people to engage in effective labor market searches. However, this study shows that conventional productivity-related factors such as educational attainment and language proficiency are not major factors in determining Puerto Rican youths' employment. Variations in the Puerto Rican unemployment rates across the boroughs of New York also did not explain why some youths had jobs. Living in a poor household, however, played a significant role in determining job-entry decisions for these youths.

The large declines in light-manufacturing employment in New York City between 1970 and 1980, coupled with various forms of discrimination in employment and earnings, meant that Puerto Rican workers confronted a sizeable disadvantage in the labor market. In the 1990s, high rates of joblessness and unemployment continue to be a shared experience among Puerto Rican men and women and their working-age children. This can only have devastating effects on young people, who come to believe that persistent poverty and the attendant ills are inevitable.

Endnotes

1. Youths, siblings, other relatives or the householder who reported being in the labor force (either employed or unemployed) were considered to be active labor-market participants. All others were categorized as being non-participants. Labor-force participants may be referred to as "employed" or "working" in the paper. Non-civilian respondents were excluded.
2. If there are two older sisters who meet the age criterion and one sister is in the labor force and the other is not, both the category "older sister employed" and the category "older sister not employed" will take the value of number 1. With four possible sibling records being included in the analysis, observations for one or more of the siblings within the same age group will appear in the regressions and some of the independent variables may be identical. See Rees and Gray (1982: 462-463).
3. The alternative tobit estimation results using annual hours worked as the dependent variable is available from the author upon request.

APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions

YWorks = 1 if young respondent reported being in the labor force (employed or unemployed during the survey week); 0 otherwise

YAnnHrs = the number of annual hours worked by the young person during 1979 (annual weeks worked in 1979 x hours worked per week in 1979)

LnExogIn = natural logarithm of household income excluding labor earnings of young respondent and any public assistance payments received by the household

Yeduc = number of years of education completed by young respondent

HHWorks = 1 if the head of household (parent) was in the labor force (employed or unemployed) during the survey week; 0 otherwise

MSEmp = 1 if the head of household was male and self-employed; 0 otherwise

FHHead = 1 if the household in which the young respondent resided was female-headed

Poor = 1 if the income of the household was determined by the Census Bureau to be below the cutoff for poverty level income; 0 otherwise

Ydisable = 1 if the young respondent reported having a work or transportation disability; 0 otherwise

Ybirth = 1 if the young respondent was born in the United States; 0 otherwise

UnEmpRt = the civilian unemployment rate for each racial/ethnic group by county location in New York City

Yenglish = 1 if respondent reported poor English proficiency; 0 otherwise

UWColl = 1 if household head (parent) worked in upper white-collar occupations, i.e. professionals, technical, and managerial personnel; 0 otherwise

LWColl = 1 if household head (parent) worked in lower white-collar occupations, i.e., clerical and sales; 0 otherwise

UBColl = 1 if household head (parent) worked in upper blue-collar or craft job; 0 otherwise

LBColl = 1 if household head (parent) worked in lower blue-collar job, i.e. operative and laborer; 0 otherwise

APPENDIX A

Continued

ServOcc = 1 if household head (parent) worked in service job, including private household worker; 0 otherwise

YoBro = 1 if respondent had an inactive, younger brother living at home; 0 otherwise

OIBro = 1 if respondent had an inactive, older brother living at home; 0 otherwise

YoBroEmp = 1 if respondent had an active (employed or unemployed) younger brother living at home; 0 otherwise

OIBroEmp = 1 if respondent had an active (employed or unemployed) older brother living at home; 0 otherwise

YoSis = 1 if respondent had an inactive, younger sister living at home; 0 otherwise

OISis = 1 if respondent had an inactive, older sister living at home; 0 otherwise

YoSisEmp = 1 if respondent had an active (employed or unemployed) younger sister living at home; 0 otherwise

OISisEmp = 1 if respondent had an active (employed or unemployed) older sister living at home; 0 otherwise

Mrelative = 1 if respondent had an inactive male, relative living at home; 0 otherwise

Frelative = 1 if respondent had an inactive, female relative living at home; 0 otherwise

MRelEmp = 1 if respondent had an active (employed or unemployed) male, relative living at home; 0 otherwise

FRelEmp = 1 if respondent had an active (employed or unemployed) female, relative living at home; 0 otherwise

NoKids = *1 if respondent reported no children; 0 otherwise

APPENDIX B
Selected Variable Means for Males, Ages 16-19 and 20-24
(standard deviations)

	<i>Puerto Rican</i>		<i>Black</i>		<i>White</i>	
	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>
YWorks	.435 (.496)	.65 (.477)	.534 (.499)	.703 (.457)	.685 (.465)	.859 (.348)
YAnnHrs	339 (630)	789 (850)	342 (610)	805 (851)	642 (759)	1260 (853)
YEduc	9.55 (2.26)	10.6 (2.35)	10.3 (1.84)	11.5 (2.25)	10.9 (1.73)	12.6 (2.45)
HHWorks	.465 (.499)	.551 (.498)	.684 (.466)	.707 (.455)	.812 (.391)	.797 (.403)
FHHead	.535 (.499)	.421 (.494)	.538 (.499)	.537 (.499)	.211 (.408)	.187 (.39)
Poor	.478 (.5)	.298 (.458)	.333 (.472)	.214 (.411)	.124 (.33)	.041 (.197)
YDisable	.076 (.266)	.098 (.297)	.062 (.241)	.08 (.271)	.033 (.179)	.039 (.193)
UnEmprt	12.6 (1.57)	12.4 (1.65)	12.1 (2.27)	12.1 (2.34)	11.2 (2.67)	11.0 (2.69)
UWColl	.071 (.257)	.052 (.221)	.099 (.298)	.111 (.315)	.181 (.385)	.179 (.383)
LWColl	.09 (.286)	.11 (.313)	.173 (.378)	.202 (.401)	.201 (.401)	.248 (.432)
UBColl	.073 (.261)	.082 (.274)	.097 (.296)	.084 (.278)	.149 (.357)	.156 (.363)
LBColl	.139 (.346)	.165 (.372)	.134 (.34)	.100 (.301)	.163 (.37)	.128 (.335)
ServOcc	.166 (.372)	.211 (.409)	.269 (.444)	.293 (.455)	.177 (.382)	.179 (.383)
YoBroEmp	.033 (.178)	.06 (.238)	.027 (.161)	.043 (.204)	.041 (.198)	.069 (.254)
OIBroEmp	.022 (.146)	.103 (.304)	.025 (.155)	.103 (.304)	.032 (.175)	.141 (.348)
YoSisEmp	.025 (.155)	.064 (.245)	.041 (.199)	.038 (.191)	.068 (.252)	.08 (.272)
OISisEmp	.076 (.266)	.107 (.309)	.086 (.281)	.118 (.323)	.155 (.363)	.15 (.357)
MRelEmp	.016 (.127)	.011 (.103)	.006 (.078)	.012 (.108)	.005 (.067)	.001 (.037)
FRelEmp	.003 (.052)	.014 (.119)	.008 (.09)	.021 (.143)	.002 (.039)	.002 (.047)
n=	368	563	487	1106	663	2244

* All youths live with their parent(s) and are not enrolled in school.
 Source: 1980 5% PUMS for New York City

APPENDIX C
Selected Variable Means for Females, Ages 16-19 and 20-24
(standard deviations)

	<i>Puerto Rican</i>		<i>Black</i>		<i>White</i>	
	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>	<i>16-19</i>	<i>20-24</i>
YWorks	.287 (.453)	.588 (.493)	.35 (.477)	.57 (.495)	.726 (.447)	.863 (.344)
YAnnHrs	219 (518)	711 (839)	232 (521)	648 (817)	773 (791)	1362 (786)
LnExogIn	8.36 (2.39)	8.79 (1.91)	8.8 (1.95)	9.19 (1.64)	9.65 (1.6)	9.88 (1.22)
YEduc	9.74 (2.26)	11.3 (2.47)	10.7 (2.02)	11.9 (2.39)	11.4 (1.54)	12.9 (2.23)
HHWorks	.47 (.5)	.521 (.5)	.636 (.482)	.681 (.466)	.833 (.373)	.818 (.386)
FHHead	.514 (.501)	.472 (.5)	.591 (.492)	.547 (.498)	.199 (.4)	.175 (.38)
Poor	.507 (.501)	.328 (.47)	.375 (.485)	.249 (.432)	.09 (.286)	.038 (.191)
YDisable	.068 (.251)	.088 (.284)	.049 (.217)	.062 (.242)	.022 (.147)	.03 (.169)
YBirth	.696 (.461)	.674 (.469)	.866 (.341)	.82 (.385)	.917 (.276)	.928 (.259)
UnEmpRt	12.7 (1.51)	12.6 (1.45)	12.3 (2.15)	11.9 (2.4)	11 (2.69)	10.9 (2.7)
UWCol	.054 (.227)	.056 (.230)	.086 (.281)	.108 (.311)	.195 (.396)	.197 (.398)
LWCol	.088 (.284)	.086 (.281)	.191 (.394)	.161 (.368)	.207 (.405)	.264 (.441)
UBColl	.071 (.257)	.074 (.263)	.045 (.208)	.066 (.249)	.18 (.384)	.159 (.366)
LBColl	.145 (.353)	.163 (.37)	.107 (.309)	.12 (.325)	.127 (.333)	.124 (.329)
ServOcc	.196 (.398)	.195 (.397)	.292 (.455)	.316 (.465)	.184 (.388)	.158 (.365)
YoBroEmp	.051 (.22)	.044 (.206)	.043 (.204)	.048 (.214)	.075 (.264)	.073 (.261)
OlBroEmp	.098 (.298)	.128 (.334)	.105 (.307)	.145 (.352)	.207 (.405)	.193 (.395)
YoSisEmp	.007 (.082)	.042 (.201)	.017 (.127)	.038 (.191)	.041 (.199)	.077 (.267)
OlSisEmp	.007 (.082)	.086 (.281)	.008 (.090)	.083 (.275)	.033 (.177)	.113 (.316)
MRelEmp	.044 (.205)	.033 (.178)	.004 (.064)	.034 (.18)	.009 (.094)	.011 (.103)
FRelEmp	.003 (.058)	.005 (.068)	.008 (.09)	.009 (.095)	.001 (.038)	.004 (.06)
NoKids	.76 (.428)	.756 (.43)	.72 (.449)	.624 (.485)	.974 (.161)	.969 (.174)
n=	296	430	486	982	678	1969

* All youths live with their parent(s) and are not enrolled in school
 Source: 1980 5% PUMS for New York City

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New Directions for Latinos as an Ethnic Lobby in U.S. Foreign Policy

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Introduction

The conventional wisdom is that Hispanic-Americans² have been a failure in the foreign policy realm. Critics point to the ignominious attempts Hispanics have made at various points to build coalitions to affect U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. These attempts have been regaled for being elitist at best, and at worst, a diversion of precious resources from the Latino community.³ This failure has seemed particularly evident in the light of the experience of other ethnic groups, whose exploits have been described as successful. However, this evaluation of the success or failure of ethnic groups operates under the assumption that ethnic groups are completely autonomous actors, whose motivations and organization take place outside of the policy arena, and who emerge into the policy arena full-blown, as it were,

Latinos do not simply enter the foreign policy process with a set of demands. They are as much acted on, as acting on, other actors and events.

from the brow of Zeus. I propose an alternative explanation of ethnic lobbies, which suggests that ethnic lobbies are largely shaped by the policy process itself, not growing organically out of the soil of ethnic mobilization. Ethnic groups are not fully formed and coherent before they enter into the policy arena, but are also shaped by it, by the opportunities and constraints they encounter, the deliberation and compromises of the policy process, as well as their contact with other political actors.

Latinos do not simply enter the foreign policy process with a set of demands. They are as much acted on, as acting on, other actors and events. They are targeted by the efforts of successive administrations, the congressional leadership, and the governments of their respective countries of origin to shape and prepare them as a lobbying group and to recruit them as representatives of all "Hispanic-Americans." They respond to the opportunities and constraints they see in the broader context of the policy arena. It is as the result of this process of bargaining and lobbying within that broader set of opportunities and constraints that Hispanics are emerging as a lobbying group themselves. Ethnic lobbies exist in a kind of synergistic relationship with other actors in the foreign policy community. Thus, the policy arena itself is a much more crucial and critical locus of action for evaluating the "success" of ethnic lobbying than might first appear.

...conditions structuring the foreign policy debate have changed for Hispanic-Americans, and these changes have created the incentives for new Hispanic coalitions, particularly on two issues: trade and immigration.

I argue in this article that conditions structuring the foreign policy debate have changed for Hispanic-Americans, and these changes have created the incentives for new Hispanic coalitions, particularly on two issues: trade and immigration. Further, I argue that the changes now taking place shaping the context of the foreign policy arena are much more significant for Cuban-Americans and Mexican-Americans than for Puerto Ricans in the U.S. This article, therefore, will focus largely on these first two groups, even if, in the long run, these changes could prove significant in developing a broader Hispanic presence in the foreign policy debate.

These changes taking place are not due primarily to prior mobilization by these ethnic groups or their leadership, but because of their place in the larger context of debates in international relations. What has changed is the position of other actors relative to the position of Mexican and Cuban Americans. The world has moved around them more than they have moved themselves. But this intervention by other actors and events, which has changed the landscape of incentives for Hispanic-American mobilization and cooperation, has created an opportunity for Latino engagement in the foreign policy debate. Some of the Hispanic leadership in the United States is in fact beginning to react to these openings and opportunities by engaging in a second round of institution-building geared toward further involvement in the foreign policy debate.⁴

Conceptions of Ethnic Lobbies

There are a great many disagreements in the literature about how effective ethnic lobbies are, or how threatening they are to U.S. national interests.⁵ But all these various perspectives have one thing in common. They all conceive of interest groups as stepping into the policy arena fully formed, with a clear conception of their interests and goals in mind. In these conceptions, ethnic lobbies coalesce and solidify their positions prior to engaging in the policy process, expressing and arguing for their goals and interests, and competing with other groups. If the system works, sometimes ethnic lobbies win, and sometimes they lose. Regardless, their origin and existence is separate from the policy arena. The assumption is much the same for Hispanics as a lobby. Armando Rendon, in his analysis of Hispanics and foreign policy, writes that "Latinos have begun to assert an increasing interest in foreign affairs. Out of an aroused nationalism has come, inevitably, a mounting interest in world politics."⁶ An interest in foreign affairs is supposedly generated by the internal dynamics of the group, by its increasing awareness of itself as a group. Only having come to this awareness do members of the group then turn their attention to foreign policy.

Part of what makes Hispanics different as a potential lobby is that they are not a national ethnic lobbying group, but rather a regional, or pan-ethnic lobbying group.

Observers often point to the Jewish-American lobby and TransAfrica, the African-American activist coalition which first formed to influence U.S. policy on South Africa, as examples of how successful ethnic lobbies of this kind work.⁷ But these judgments often don't recognize the historical and structural conditions which make the situation of these groups, and for that matter, that of Hispanic-Americans, to a certain extent unique. It often does not make much sense to compare the experiences of these very different groups. Miguel Marquez, Congressman Richardson's foreign affairs legislative assistant recognized as much when asked if in fact there were a model for involvement among other ethnic groups:

Well, I was going to say the Irish. But they are screwed up too, and they don't have the diversity we have. That's a lot of the problem. This is the first time the U.S. has gone through this sort of thing. There's never been a group that's so fragmented among themselves, like Hispanics. Usually, with the Irish, with the Italians there's agreement among themselves, they settle together. With Hispanics there are Nicaraguans, Mexicans, Cubans and more, all of whom speak Spanish, but different dialects of Spanish. There's no comparison.⁸

Part of what makes Hispanics different as a potential lobby is that they are not a national ethnic lobbying group, but rather a regional, or pan-ethnic lobbying group. This has meant that Hispanics have enormous additional complications in reconciling differences and presenting a common agenda. To understand Hispanic-Americans (or for that matter any ethnic group) as a lobbying group and evaluate their "success" or "failure" one must understand something of their history, and the context in which they operate.

A Short History

It is clearly the case that interest in foreign affairs among Hispanic-Americans has historically been weak, and attempts at cooperation on foreign policy have been sporadic. Serious attempts to develop a common foreign policy program did not develop until the 1980s.⁹ But these early attempts ran into significant problems, and on the whole these first groping efforts toward an effective Hispanic presence in the foreign policy debate fell apart after a few short years.

These early attempts followed two paths toward foreign policy lobbying, paths which are still used today. The first was for an established Hispanic-American organization to develop foreign policy positions as part of a broader program of (mostly domestic) policy issues. For example, Mario Bledo, President of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) at the time, initiated a Latin American project in 1983-1984, to address the Reagan administration's policy in Central America and Cuba. He brought people to Washington D.C., sent delegations to Cuba, Mexico, and El Salvador. "He took a lot of shit for this, which may have been deserved. [The Latino community] wasn't prepared for this; LULAC hadn't thought through their mission or their positions. They hadn't prepared or educated their constituencies."¹⁰ The Southwest Voter Registration Project (SWVREP) which began as an organization to register Hispanic voters in the U.S., also began to get involved in Latin American projects in the 1980s. Antonio Gonzalez, coordinator of SWVREP's Latin America program, described the roundabout way their organization became interested in foreign policy issues:

The way we got involved was by testing opinion among Latino voters. We saw a big shift in the early 1980s on U.S. involvement in Central America. We decided we would look more closely at U.S. policy in the region. This led to travel seminars — fact-finding delegations of Latino leaders to Nicaragua and El Salvador. Almost like leadership development trips.... This led to continued involvement after 1990. In 1990 we did election observation in Nicaragua, 1991 in El Salvador, and again in 1994. From 1990 to the present we have done NGO [non-governmental organization] training in El Salvador, and we have generated a dozen new civic action NGOs. We are now doing the same in Nicaragua.¹¹

The Southwest Voter Registration Project is unusual in that its interests in Latin America and U.S. foreign policy have kept evolving and expanding. Most projects born in these early years died fairly quickly. The second path organizations followed in the 1980s was to build an umbrella organization that could serve as a coordinator for member organizations' interests and concerns in foreign affairs. The Hispanic Council on Foreign Relations "was the first attempt to self-consciously design a bi-partisan organization to deliberately influence U.S. foreign policy." Incorporated in 1980, it lasted only five years.¹²

The thin ranks of Hispanic leadership has been a significant problem in the past, but this has been partially alleviated over the last decade with the entry of a new generation of representatives, activists, and community leaders, many of them more interested and aware of the potential for involvement in foreign affairs.

Earlier attempts by Hispanic groups to enter the foreign policy arena were handicapped, some have noted, by three factors: group nationalism, partisanship¹³ and a leadership void.¹⁴ The thin ranks of Hispanic leadership has been a significant problem in the past, but this has been partially alleviated over the last decade with the entry of a new generation of representatives, activists, and community leaders, many of them more interested and aware of the potential for involvement in foreign affairs. The numbers of Hispanics in Congress, for instance, provide some indication of the leadership pool available today that did not exist ten, or even five years ago. There were five Hispanic representatives in 1976, the year the Congressional Hispanic Caucus was founded, nine in 1982, ten through most of the 1980s, and fifteen since 1992.¹⁵ There are now twenty members of the Caucus. The growth of the delegation of Hispanic representatives to Congress illustrates and parallels the expansion of the Latino leadership pool in general. Partisanship is closely related, among Hispanic-Americans, to the group nationalism — Cubans are much more likely to be members of the Republican party than either Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans — and so it is to this that I turn to next.

On the question of group nationalism Leveo Sanchez, the former deputy regional director of the Peace Corps under Carter, noted that "Mejicanos in the U.S. think only of Mexico when we refer to U.S. policy toward Latin America. There is a barrier of culture and language that exists among Mexican-Americans toward involvement with other Latinos. We view ourselves as belonging neither to Mexico nor to the U.S., and because of a lack of ability to speak Spanish and often English, we shy away from situations where we have to mix with other Latinos."¹⁶ On Cuban Americans, Rendon notes that the

major 'foreign' concern of Cuban Americans is their homeland, their relatives and friends there, its future, and their desire to return. It is perhaps too much of a simplification to suggest that this is the overriding factor in Cuban attitudes toward international affairs, but it certainly colors all questions of U.S. involvement in Latin America. Cuban Americans, in short, are opposed to the renewal of ties with Cuba.¹⁷

Puerto Ricans in the United States have their own agenda, and are closely allied with organized labor. Many of the Puerto Rican leadership came up through the ranks of labor, or are heavily dependent on its support.

Both Cuban and Mexican-American interests are shaped by their collective experiences, and both groups seem absorbed by their respective histories.

Puerto Ricans are in another boat altogether. Since capital investment from the U.S. mainland is assured by corporate tax rebate packages, Puerto Rico has paid less attention to developing economic ties with its Caribbean and Latin American neighbors, and more to trying to resolve the eternal dilemma of its political status. Since 1953, when they first voted to become a Commonwealth, Puerto Ricans have been deeply divided on this issue. In the 1984 gubernatorial election 48% indicated support for the commonwealth, 45% for statehood, and 4% for independence. These percentages were substantively unchanged in an

The importance of labor to Puerto Rican politics in the U.S. explains a lot about the reluctance of the Puerto Rican leadership to get involved in foreign policy issues, particularly trade issues like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was strongly opposed by U.S. labor unions.

official plebiscite eight years later. As a result of their uncertain status, Puerto Ricans have remained turned inward, with little involvement in broader foreign policy debates. Puerto Ricans in the United States have their own agenda, and are closely allied with organized labor. Many of the Puerto Rican leadership came up through the ranks of labor, or are heavily dependent on its support. The importance of labor to Puerto Rican politics in the U.S., particularly in the mid-west and north-east where Puerto Ricans are concentrated, explains a lot about the reluctance of the Puerto Rican leadership to get involved in foreign policy issues, particularly trade issues like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was strongly opposed by U.S. labor unions.¹⁸

The common perception, then, is that “Cubans are interested only in Cuba, Mexican-Americans only in immigration, and Puerto Ricans are interested only in economic development, issues that affect their own survival.”¹⁹ Each group is interested only in protecting its own interests, and these interests have, in the past, tended to be primarily domestic in nature.

There is an internal tension in Latino organizations about whether to cover issues in the U.S. only. Some feel that problems in the U.S. are overwhelming enough, and there are not enough resources to go around. Problems of poverty, migration, welfare, civil rights, etc. Others have a more holistic approach — seeing the link between foreign policy and domestic issues, especially with immigration. At times of crisis, like the *contras* in Nicaragua in the 1980s, and NAFTA in the 1990s, more organizations become involved, but not on an everyday basis. Now some organizations are beginning to see the need to deal with these issues on an everyday basis, but they still are not perceived as being at the heart of their mission, and it is unlikely they ever will be.²⁰

But if Latinos have historically been apathetic in the foreign policy arena it is because they have never had the incentives ... I argue that they have been given the incentives, and the opportunity, with the introduction of hemispheric trade as a foreign policy issue, and with the changing national mood on immigration.

Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican Americans have historically been absorbed in their own domestic concerns rather than paying attention to foreign policy. Attempts to bridge differences at the elite level have largely failed. As a group, Latinos are perceived as being largely absent from foreign policy debates.

But if Latinos have historically been apathetic in the foreign policy arena it is because they have never had the incentives to build a true Hispanic coalition developing a coherent policy addressing foreign policy issues. I argue that they have been given the incentives, and the opportunity, with the introduction of hemispheric trade as a foreign policy issue, and with the changing national mood on immigration. With the inclusion of Hispanic-Americans in these two debates, the incentive structure may now favor Hispanic involvement in foreign policy. What has changed, then, and what indicates some promise for the future of Hispanic-American involvement in the foreign policy debate, is a shift in the context which sets the constraints and promises incentives for Hispanic-American involvement, and around which mobilization for foreign policy issues is based. Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican Americans are still bent on acting out of self-interest. The

difference is that their views of what is in their self-interest may well be changing, encouraging them to take another look at the possibility for pan-ethnic Hispanic coalitions in foreign policy.

In short, in the 1984 battle over immigration, the Mexican-American coalition was widely perceived as being instrumental in blocking the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform Act in the U.S. House of Representatives.

THE MEXICAN CASE

On-Going And Increasing Concern Over Immigration Policy

Immigration re-surfaced as a significant issue for the Mexican-American leadership only relatively recently, since the late 1970s.²¹ Since then, of course, immigration has been one of the few policy areas where there has been significant agreement on the course of action among Mexican-American policy makers. Through the early 70s immigration was a relatively low-key issue for Mexican-Americans. In fact, there was little reason for it to be at the forefront of an Hispanic agenda: changes in immigration law since 1965 had made legal immigration to the U.S. far less onerous for many Latin Americans, and advances in civil rights legislation had made it unnecessary for Mexican-Americans to adopt a defensive assimilationist stance.

This began to change by the early 1970s, accelerated by the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment. Employer sanctions to punish employers of illegal immigrants were first introduced into the House Judiciary committee in 1972. As Ayon and Montoya note, from 1977 to 1986 major Mexican-American civil rights organizations, together with elected officials and activists, were able to join in opposing attempts to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill. They played a significant role in shaping the debate, blocking more restrictionist reforms, in particular employer sanctions making it illegal to hire undocumented workers, which they felt would have a detrimental effect on Hispanic employment opportunities as a whole. In short, in the 1984 battle over immigration, the Mexican-American coalition was widely perceived as being instrumental in blocking the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform Act in the U.S. House of Representatives.²²

This victory, however, was only temporary. In 1986, however, when the next immigration bill came to a vote, the Mexican-American coalition was split. They had gained some significant concessions. Employer sanctions stayed in the bill, but was tempered by two controversial legalization programs. The first applied to illegal residents who had been in the U.S. since January 1, 1982, and the second was a special program for agricultural

workers. There were safeguards “designed to prevent employment discrimination against foreign-looking and foreign-sounding citizens and legal aliens,” and existing prohibitions against employment discrimination were expanded to prohibit discrimination on the basis of citizenship status.²³ The vote in the House of Representatives for the Simpson-Rodino bill was 230-166. Members of the Hispanic Caucus were divided in their votes. In the final vote for the bill, five Latino members voted in favor, six against. The bill was signed into law by President Reagan as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.²⁴

By the 1980s immigration had become one of the primary issues for the Mexican-American political leadership, so much so that they, in some respects, stood out in front of their constituents on this issue.²⁵ Not only this, but the immigration debate within the Mexican-American community has taken on increasingly international tones. Anti-immigrant sentiment is seen more and more as a foreign policy issue as well as a domestic problem. This feeling accelerated with the passage of Proposition 187 in California, which targeted illegal immigrants (many of them Mexican) and barred them from receiving any kind of state benefits, including education and health services. Proposition 187 has galvanized the Mexican-American community on the immigration issue, as well as bringing them into closer cooperation with the Mexican government.

The Mexican government has not been silent on the immigration issue either. As the anti-immigration backlash has spread, from initial proposals to limit illegal immigration to calls to cut off legal residents from welfare and other government benefits, to demands to lower the ceiling of legal immigration itself, statements from Mexican officials have become increasingly sharp. During the Summit of the Americas Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo spoke out vehemently against California’s Proposition 187, and in recent meetings between U.S. and Mexican officials, Mexico’s foreign minister, Jose Angel Gurria, expressed the “utmost concern” about growing intolerance among Americans toward Mexicans.²⁶ The Mexican government continues to decry the rise of an anti-immigrant backlash in the United States, on the one hand, raising diplomatic objections to American legislation tightening conditions for immigrants, and on the other hand, vehemently protesting discriminatory incidents targeting Mexican nationals in the U.S.²⁷

Increasing Interest in Trade Policy

As the Bush administration pushed its vision of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the issue initially attracted relatively little comment from the Hispanic community. Mexican-American interest in the accord developed slowly. Neither the Bush administration nor the succeeding Clinton administration felt they could ignore the Mexican-American community on the trade issue, and Hispanics were perceived as an important

symbolic constituency, but it wasn't clear what role they would play. As the debate progressed, however, Mexican-American legislators held out their votes for additional concessions from the new Clinton administration, and Mexican-Americans business and community leaders were increasingly active as they became the focus of a strong lobbying effort put forward by the Mexican government.

Talk of some kind of tariff reduction agreement with Mexico was already being floated by the mid-1980s, and was actively supported by some Hispanic congressmen, notably Rep. Bill Richardson, Democrat of New Mexico. In a 1985 article in the journal *Foreign Policy*, he called for a "Free-Trade Co-Production Zone" for the U.S./Mexico border area, and wanted these two neighboring countries to "establish a bank to make economic development loans, and to extend financial and technical assistance in Mexico and the border region of the US. to any cooperative organization or private business." Bill Richardson would become one of the strongest supporters of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in Congress.²⁸

By the time, therefore, the Bush administration proposed "fast track" authorization for the North American Free Trade Agreement there was already a discussion under way within the Mexican-American community on the merits of a trade agreement with Mexico. Some Hispanic business and community leaders were actively involved early on in the NAFTA debates, sending bi-partisan delegations of up to two hundred people to Washington D.C. to meet with the Bush administration and with Congressional leaders to express their support for the agreement.²⁹ In addition, the trade agreement had its supporters among the Hispanic delegation in Congress, notably, again, Bill Richardson.³⁰ However, with the change of administrations in 1993, and the final push to approve the trade agreement, the key figures became those who were wavering for or against.

In the final days before the agreement was passed, the Clinton administration was increasingly desperate to find the votes to pass the agreement. The Republicans under Gingrich had said they would provide 100 votes in favor of the agreement, but no more. This left the administration to try and drum up the rest. It seemed as if the vote would be very close, probably within 15 to 25 votes. Congressman Torres (Democrat, California) had organized a group of dissidents (most of whom were not Hispanic) to hold out for concessions from the administration. By keeping the group together, and offering their votes to the administration as a bloc, Torres was able to receive in return the administration's backing on six of the nine conditions he had wanted added to the treaty, including a solid commitment for funding for the North American Development Bank.³¹

Trade with Mexico following NAFTA has increased exponentially since the treaty went into effect. The U.S. now has \$50 billion dollars in exports to

Mexico. This has created some powerful regional interests in favor of trade with Mexico, and improved ties with that country. Nearly half of all exports to Mexico, for instance, originate in Texas, and three-quarters at least passing through Texas on the way to Mexico.³² Their experience with NAFTA has also made some Mexican-American leaders more assertive in demanding a place at the table. For example, prior to the Summit of the Americas meeting in December of 1994, Latinos were only consulted haphazardly. Some Latino leaders made a point of trying to correct this oversight:

First we talked with the administration. Most of the initial discussions [we weren't even invited]. If they did talk with Latinos they talked with Cubans, even though Miami, Cuba, and Castro were supposedly not on the agenda. Torres asked how much input would the Latino community have? The initial response from Clinton's office was lukewarm. Someone high-up in the administration responded "Why should Latinos be involved?" Congressman Torres responded, "Would you have a summit on Africa without inviting African-Americans? Would you have a summit on the Middle East without consulting Jewish Americans?" After that we worked with the administration.³³

If a Mexican-American interest in foreign affairs develops, the real shift will be seen to have occurred after the introduction of NAFTA. Perry Shankle, country director for Mexico at the U.S. State Department noted for instance that during the two years he was desk officer, from 1985-1987, Mexican-Americans had almost no contact with his office. Meetings of the Mexican-American delegation in Congress with Mexican officials, for their part, "were ordinarily limited to an exchange of views on current conditions in Mexico with no particular spin to the sessions."³⁴ As late as 1988, in a poll of 796 Hispanic leaders asking them to list the major issues confronting the Mexican-American community, international issues were not mentioned at all.³⁵ This began to change only with NAFTA.

Increasing Mexican ties to Mexican-Americans

Several authors have pointed out that not only has there been involvement on the part of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans on the specific issues of immigration and trade, but that to some extent these interventions are symptomatic of the broader range of contacts occurring between the two societies, at the formal and informal levels. This kind of contact is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Mexico's relations with the Mexican and Mexican-American community in the U.S. have historically been somewhat difficult. Through the 1970s there was a strong, continuing prejudice against Mexicans who had left the country for the United States. Rodolfo de la Garza has argued that this prejudice explains much of the weakness of ties between the two communities. He

notes that Mexico historically has had a fairly constant flow of emigration to its neighbor to the north, and this emigration runs counter to Mexico's founding revolutionary mythology. Mexican society, he states,

must find ways to explain this continuously high emigration. At the official level this involves never acknowledging internal government responsibility for the conditions that force Mexican workers to leave. At the private level individual citizens, especially among the middle and upper classes assert (falsely) that those who leave represent Mexico's worst: the illiterate, the lazy, the irresponsible. Since there are presumably no good reasons to leave Mexico, it is reasonable to look down on those who do; it is a short step from there to looking with disdain on the entire Mexican-American origin of the United States.³⁶

De la Garza also relates the view of an undocumented Mexican worker living in the U.S.

[I] started to learn a little bit about the U.S., especially about the *pochos*, the Mexican-Americans who live around here. To me a *poch* was kind of dumb, because they didn't try to advance themselves. ... If a person is born in Mexico the Mexican-Americans laughs at you and calls you a dumb person because you come from a dumb country. There is a lot of discord, you see. We don't look like brothers. We are not united. We don't feel the brotherhood.³⁷

However, since the 1970s the Mexican government has shed some of its traditionally hostile attitude towards Mexican emigrants abroad, acting more forcefully to protect their interests, and indeed, shifting its perspective and seeing them as a resource rather than a liability.

The first official contacts between the Mexican government and the Mexican-American community began in the late 1970s under the Portillo Administration in Mexico. More formal cooperation was first proposed during a meeting in 1979 between various representatives of the National Forum of Hispanic Organizations and then-President of Mexico José Lopez Portillo. As a result, the U.S. Mexican Commission was established in 1980 by ten members of the Forum (itself an umbrella group of more than seventy national Latino non-profit agencies). The Commission was meant to encourage social, cultural, and educational activities between Hispanics in the United States and the Mexican government.³⁸ It represented the first effort at collaboration between U.S. Hispanic groups and a Latin American government.³⁹

Before his election in 1988, Salinas met with Mexican American leaders and promised he would create a "mixed commission" if elected as president.⁴⁰ After he was elected, the Salinas administration began putting a number of programs into effect to strengthen ties with Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the United States, through both the Foreign and Interior Ministries. The Interior Ministry programs, Barrera notes, mostly involved cultural and

information exchanges; they didn't have a political or foreign policy aspect to them.⁴¹ The Mexican consulates and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations (specifically the Directorate General of Mexican Communities Abroad) were given the mission to coordinate efforts by the state governments in Mexico to identify community leaders in the United States and cultivate long-term relationships. During 1990 and 1991, for example, the governors of the states of Zacatecas, Chihuahua, Jalisco, Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Baja California visited Los Angeles (most of them more than once) to meet with their respective "colonias." Communities of people from Oaxaca, Durango, Michoacan, and Colima living in California were also working at this time to establish relationships with the governments of their home states.⁴²

These efforts helped lay the groundwork for the massive Mexican lobbying effort that began with NAFTA. Beginning in January 1991, the Salinas administration in Mexico began assembling a team of lobbyists for the purpose of influencing the Congressional vote on the extension of 'fast track' authority to negotiate NAFTA. Denise Dresser points out that in February of 1990, Mexico had 27 lobbying contracts registered with the U.S. Department of Justice. By November of 1991, there were 71. "It was the first time," Dresser notes, "that Mexico had launched a new policy towards the U.S. from within the U.S."⁴³

The Mexican government deliberately and systematically courted Mexican-American opinion all through the NAFTA campaign, building up networks and organizations that have continued beyond the trade debate. As Dresser points out,

Mexican officials have realized that to obtain massive U.S. investment and political support, it will be necessary to court U.S. business and society at large. As a result, Mexico's diplomatic efforts — by government and opposition alike — have been extended to include agricultural producers, industrialists, and financiers, the Mexican-American business community, labor leaders, grass-roots movements, environmentalists, intellectuals, and journalists.⁴⁴

During the NAFTA debate, the Mexican government flew entire delegations of Mexican-American leaders to Mexico City for briefings, preparing them for their role as advocates for NAFTA.⁴⁵

Mexican involvement with the Mexican-American community in the U.S. has continued on after the NAFTA debate. Karen Escalante, acting director of the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) noted that:

contacts with Mexico so far have all been initiated by the Mexicans. For years the Mexican government didn't give a hoot about Hispanics in the U.S. This has changed over the past few years, partly as a strategy for NAFTA; so that NAFTA would have a better chance of passing. In the last few years I've met with several [Mexican] departmental leaders. I met with

Colosio when he was still the education secretary; and I met with foreign minister Fernando Solana, and with [President] Cedillo not long ago. The Mexican government also sponsors Aztec Awards for prominent Latino leaders. NALEO and other groups are on Mexican mailing lists—they send us clippings and press releases. They are also active on the immigration issue, particularly in California — [the Mexican government] vociferously disagrees with proposed legislation to curtail illegal immigration.⁴⁶

Although the Mexican/Mexican-American relationship has not developed without some friction, there is a clear trajectory toward increased mutual involvement.

Contacts have also been formalized through organizations like the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation, half composed of high-level Mexican officials, and half of leaders of U.S. organizations. The Foundation is funded by private Mexican companies and U.S. foundations.⁴⁷ In addition, the Secretariat of Foreign Relations has upgraded its contacts with the Mexican community in the United States with the formation in 1990 of the Directorate General of Mexican Communities Abroad. The Directorate has acted mostly as an ombudsman, bringing about agreements and contacts that might not otherwise have happened. For example, Gonzalez Gutierrez points out that the Directorate recently convinced the main Mexican Chamber of Commerce to sign agreements of cooperation with the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce to foster trade and initiate joint ventures between people of Mexican origin on both sides of the border.⁴⁸ Although the Mexican/Mexican-American relationship has not developed without some friction, there is a clear trajectory toward increased mutual involvement.⁴⁹

THE CUBAN CASE

On-Going And Increasing Interest In Trade Links With Latin America

While the primary focus of a very politicized (and very vocal) segment of the Cuban American population has been to reverse Fidel Castro's ascension to power, it is clear that the majority of Miami's Cuban-American business class has found other ways to occupy their time, primarily in trade. "Cubans have been trading with the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America... for many, many years. Perhaps this was because of their ties to other Cubans who left Cuba as well, and settled in other countries in the area. ... They are not new to this."⁵⁰ In large part due to influx of Cubans in the 1960s, in the last three decades Miami has gone from being a provincial resort town to a major international trade and communications hub.

Miami now has the number one international cargo airport in the U.S., surpassing New York City's JFK airport (and number six in the world). Twenty-nine million passengers travel through Miami International Airport as well, making it the second most transited airport in the U.S. Miami's seaport has grown exponentially as well. Since 1989 cargo traffic at the port has gone up by 62%, from 3.2 million tons to 5.2 million tons. Carmen Lunetta, director of the port, estimated that cargo shipments through the port would increase 8% in 1994, largely due to increasing trade with Latin America, which accounts for 71% of the Port's business. The principle feature of Miami's trade infrastructure is its Free Trade Zone, the largest privately owned and operated zone in the U.S., with \$11 billion in trade.⁵¹ Like Miami's port, the Free Trade Zone does over 70% of its trade with Latin America. Clients can move goods in and out of the zone without paying any duties as long as the place of origin, and the destination, remain foreign. This means that Miami has also become an increasingly important locus for the trans-shipment of trade, with goods stored or assembled in Miami before being moved elsewhere.

A hemispheric trade pact, unlike NAFTA, would have a significant impact on Miami's economy. NAFTA had a relatively small effect on Miami, and by extension, on Cuban Americans.

Miami's business elite have spent more than two decades preparing for the way for Miami's role as a regional trade and business center. For instance, Miami has been hosting the annual Trade Fair of the Americas since 1975, when 390 Latin bankers came to the city as the guests of 15 American banks to discuss issues of inter-American trade and finance. That same year Miami's then-mayor Mauricio Ferré led a group of 130 businessmen on a tour of South America to promote trade ties, and build up a constituency for the trade fair. The first fair was held in 1978, co-sponsored by the Organization of American States, and featured manufactured goods from 15 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. By 1981 there were 24 countries participating. After the 1980 riots in Miami, the city sent Miami's Vice Mayor Armando Lacasa to Argentina to meet with the mayors of every capital city in Central and South America present at a gathering there, to reassure them of the city's investment climate.⁵² Through the 1980s Miami continued its aggressive outreach efforts to court Latin American business to the region. Latin American Chambers of Commerce, for example, have been invited for a yearly annual meeting in Miami every September. At first there were only four or five countries represented, but now there are representatives from all over Latin America.⁵³ In 1992, the Beacon Council, Dade County's primary economic development organization, continued Miami's outreach through its "Americas Campaign," marketing Miami as the business capital of the Americas.⁵⁴

TABLE 1: Miami's Leading Trade Partners in 1994: Imports

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Value</i>
1	Domin. Repub.	\$ 1,073
2	Colombia	\$ 883
3	Japan	\$ 668
4	Costa Rica	\$ 621
5	Honduras	\$ 613
6	Venezuela	\$ 535
7	Guatemala	\$ 524
8	China (Mainland)	\$ 507
9	Italy	\$ 475
10	Brazil	\$ 467
Total of Top 10		\$ 6,366
Rest of the World		\$ 5,346
Total Import Trade		\$ 11,710

Source: Beacon Council, *Miami Business Profile 1995*

Miami's Cubans have profited by their association with this trade boom with Latin America. They have invested heavily in the banking, construction, and import/export businesses closely linked to Miami's role as a regional trade center.⁵⁵

Increasing Interest in Trade Policy

In part because of Miami's role in U.S./Latin American trade, the city was chosen to be the site of the recent hemispheric conference, the Summit of the Americas. The meeting of 34 heads of state from all the Americas took place in December 1994. At the conference, President Clinton supported the concept of a "Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area" (WHFTA), which had initially been put forward by President Bush in 1990. The WHFTA would comprise a number of free trade agreements that would link all the Americas.⁵⁶

A hemispheric trade pact, unlike NAFTA, would have a significant impact on Miami's economy. NAFTA had a relatively small effect on Miami, and by

TABLE 2: Miami's Leading Trade Partners in 1994: Exports

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Value</i>
1	Brazil	\$ 2,221
2	Colombia	\$ 2,151
3	Argentina	\$ 1,696
4	Venezuela	\$ 1,515
5	Domin. Repub.	\$ 1,354
6	Chile	\$ 838
7	Costa Rica	\$ 762
8	Paraguay	\$ 627
9	Guatemala	\$ 620
10	Panama	\$ 613
Total of Top 10		\$12,397
Rest of the World		\$ 7,071
Total Export Trade		\$19,468

Source: Beacon Council, *Miami Business Profile 1995*

Miami has much more at stake in ensuring expanding trade with Latin America than other U.S. regional economies do, and by extension, Miami's Cuban community, which is deeply immersed in the regions import/export economy, has a compelling interest in Miami's Latin American trade as well.

extension, on Cuban Americans.⁵⁷ Unlike Texan and Gulf ports, new levels of trade with Mexico had, by 1994, as yet to impact Miami's trade patterns. director of Miami's port noted that "We haven't yet seen a shift in trade that we can pinpoint to NAFTA or other trade agreements, but we do have some major carriers looking for barge service from Miami to Mexico."⁵⁸ A trade agreement with the rest of the hemisphere, however, would benefit Miami enormously.

An extended set of trade agreements with the rest of Latin America would not have that large an impact on the United States in general. The main reason, analysts note, is that the economies of Latin America are not that large relative to the U.S. Excluding Mexico, the combined gross domestic product of Latin America was approximately \$800 billion in 1991. \$528 billion of that amount, or 77%, was accounted for by just two countries, Brazil and Argentina. Every other nation in the region has a GDP of less than \$100 billion. As Ahearn points out, Chile, which is first in line to negotiate a free trade agreement with the U.S., had a GDP in 1991 of only \$31 billion.⁵⁹ Second, the percentage of U.S. trade to and from Latin America (excluding Mexico) is relatively small relative to total trade flows the U.S. has worldwide. Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 6% of U.S. imports in 1993 and for 9% of U.S. exports. Mexico alone accounted for an additional 7% of U.S. imports and 9% of U.S. exports.

But this is not true of Miami. As I note in table 2, the top ten destinations for Miami's exports are all in Latin America. Latin America accounts for eight out of ten of Miami's top importing partners as well.

Brazil, which is the nineteenth largest trading partner for the United States as a whole, ranked first last year as a market for Miami's exports, and tenth in the list of Miami's import partners. In short, Miami has much more at stake in ensuring expanding trade with Latin America than other U.S. regional economies do, and by extension, Miami's Cuban community, which is deeply immersed in the regions import/export economy, has a compelling interest in Miami's Latin American trade as well.⁶⁰

The Rise of Immigration as an Issue

Immigration has never been a key issue for Cuban Americans — until the fall of 1994. Up until this time, Cubans who reached the United States were considered refugees, not immigrants. Because they were supposedly “fleeing Communism” Cubans were given special consideration, and were exempt from the immigration debates that surfaced in Congress in the 1970s and have continued unabated ever since. Cuban Americans were able to safely ignore one of the most incendiary issues for other Hispanics in the United States, because they were exempt from many of the effects of U.S. immigration policy.

This began to change with the Mariel boat lift in 1980, when 125,000 Cuban refugees left en masse, floating on a rag-tag fleet to the shores of Florida. The size of the migration was a shock to Florida's citizens. The migration was poorer, less well educated, and more racially mixed than previous migrations, countering popular perceptions (and Cuban American self-perceptions) of what Cubans were like. The presence of several hundred Cuban criminals released into the flow of migrants by Cuban officials certainly did not help public relations either. The Mariel refugee flow ended in a couple of months, leaving the state of Florida, relief agencies, and the

Cuban community to cope with absorbing the enormous number of arrivals. Mariel, however, seemed unique — a one-shot deal. Emigration from Cuba returned to its regulated outlet — flights from Havana to Miami — agreed on by the U.S. and Cuban governments.

The situation shifted drastically, however, with the disintegration of the Eastern bloc. The cutoff of Soviet aid to Cuba meant Cuba had to go through a drastic economic readjustment. The resulting slowdown of the Cuban economy made many Cubans restless, and ready to look for other alternatives. The clearest alternative was escape to the United States. In May 1994, groups of asylum-seekers began to arrive in the U.S. by boat. Thousands took to the sea in whatever craft they could, to make their way to Florida. It seemed as if Mariel would only be a mere shadow of this new migration.

For the first time since Castro took power in Cuba, however, an American administration rejected the long-standing policy of unconditional acceptance of Cuban migrants. On August 19, President Clinton ended the 28 year old open-door policy to Cuban refugees and ordered the U.S. Coast Guard to pick up Cuban refugees at sea, and detain them, first at Guantanamo Bay, and then in camps in Panama and elsewhere. In September of 1994, following direct negotiations, the U.S. reached a preliminary agreement with the Cuban government to halt the flow of migrants from Cuba's coasts, in return for allowing 20,000 Cubans to leave by normal channels. The Clinton Administration officially announced on May 2, 1995 that it was ending the thirty-year policy that had allowed Cubans free entry into the United States. Henceforth, they said, Cubans would be treated much the same as immigrants from other countries. Any Cubans found at sea would be forcibly repatriated by the U.S. Coast Guard back to Cuba. The 21,000 Cuban refugees held in camps would be allowed to come to the United States.

The priority of current U.S. policy is clearly to contain large-scale Cuban population flows. Anne Patterson, the current Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, noted on her way to conduct additional talks with her Cuban counterparts that one of the main objectives of the U.S.-Cuban accords was to prevent a mass exodus of illegal Cuban refugees of the kind witnessed in the summer of 1994,⁶¹ or as Attorney General Janet Reno put it in a similar statement "another uncontrolled and dangerous outflow from Cuba."⁶²

...a sizable number of Cuban Americans are willing to see the question of Cubans leaving the island, and of the status of Cuban-Americans in the U.S. as an immigration question, not as a refugee issue. However, it also seems unlikely that concern over Cuba's emigrants will be muted any time soon.

As might have been expected, these policies have provoked a fierce reaction from a significant section of the Cuban American community. Protesters have held boycotts, rallies, and marches to signal what they think of the Clinton Administration's new policies. They blocked the road to Miami's port, and briefly closed down some of Miami's freeways. Cuban-Americans held a "general strike" which mostly affected the predominantly Cuban neighborhoods of Hialeah and Little Havana.⁶³ But the sentiments held by the protesters were by no means universally shared, even within the Cuban American community. For instance, at one meeting of the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce's Cuba Committee, at which they discussed the approach they should take to the protests then going on in the city, the ten members of the group were evenly divided. As one participant put it, "Half of us were embarrassed, half thought we have to go to the streets to get some respect. We all feel the situation very strongly, but what we can do effectively is very little."⁶⁴ The *Miami Herald* conducted a survey in mid-May of 1995 which indicated that large percentages of black, white, and non-Cuban Hispanics all thought the policy to curb Cuban immigration was a fair one. Surprisingly, 45% of Cubans surveyed also thought Cuban migration should be curbed, and 56% thought Cuban refugees should be treated the same as Haitian or other migrants.⁶⁵

What these events seem to indicate is that a sizable number of Cuban Americans are willing to see the question of Cubans leaving the island, and of the status of Cuban-Americans in the U.S. as an immigration question, not as a refugee issue. However, it also seems unlikely that concern over Cuba's emigrants will be muted any time soon. And given the increasingly negative climate for immigration questions in the country as whole, the venue for this concern may shift, together with the shift in the administration's policy, from refugee policy to immigration policy.⁶⁶

Discussion

Trade and immigration are the twin issues which Mexican- and Cuban-Americans now share in common. Mexican-Americans, with a long-standing interest in immigration issues,⁶⁷ now appear to be more involved in trade issues as well, largely as the result of NAFTA and the Mexican government's continued interest and involvement with the Mexican-American community in the United States. Cuban-Americans, for their part, having heavily invested in trade with Latin America over the last three decades, are eager to see U.S. trade agreements extended to the rest of the hemisphere. In addition, recent changes in U.S. policy toward Cuban refugees, together with the deteriorating climate even for legal aliens in this country may lead to a full-scale re-evaluation of the Cuban-American position on immigration.

Both trade and immigration are likely to continue as issues, and likely to continue to provide incentives for Mexican-Americans and Cubans to build coalitions. On trade, for instance, McLarty notes that "Latin America purchased \$92 billion in U.S. goods last year. In comparison the European Union purchased \$103 billion." He also points out that from 1987 through 1993, U.S. exports to Latin America grew at an average annual rate of 21%, twice the rate of American exports to the European Union.⁶⁸ Trade with Latin America is only likely to increase, both in absolute size and in relative importance. This trend will disproportionately affect Hispanic-Americans, both because they are residing in states through which much of the this trade is conducted, and because they are directly or indirectly participating in this trade themselves. Immigration is likely to remain an issue for the foreseeable future, in part because economic disruption and population pressure in developing nations show no signs of abating, and in part because the era of relatively liberal immigration restrictions which began in 1965 seems to be coming to an end. Both these issues then, are likely to remain to remain on the agenda for Hispanic-Americans well into the foreseeable future.

Both trade and immigration are likely to continue as issues, and likely to continue to provide incentives for Mexican-Americans and Cubans to build coalitions.

Up until recently it has always been the case that (and one of the reasons that previous attempts to organize a pan-ethnic lobbying group have failed) there was insufficient agreement on substantive issues. There was only a weak commitment to symbolic unity, and a wishy-washy commitment to any kind of common lobbying effort on substantive issues. But this has changed. The introduction of trade and immigration as major issues in the foreign policy debate, and the attempt by both U.S. political actors and the Mexican government to bring Hispanics into these debates has the potential to shift the prevailing equilibrium.

Problems and Complications

There are, however, several complications that could throw a wrench into the development of a stronger Hispanic presence in foreign policy. These complications are most evident in the obstacles encountered by the erosion of support for foreign aid, skepticism about the current administration's trade policy, the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment, and the continuation of engrained patterns of behavior among Latino groups in the U.S.

The introduction of trade and immigration as major issues in the foreign policy debate, and the attempt by both U.S. political actors and the Mexican government to bring Hispanics into these debates has the potential to shift the prevailing equilibrium.

First of all, the United States seems to be entering into a period of confusion in its foreign policy, if not a period of outright isolationism. With the end of the Cold War, it seems that most Americans are content to assign a relatively low priority to foreign policy; the overwhelming concern is social issues. Only 11.5% of those questioned in a 1994 Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) survey, for example rated foreign policy as a concern at all, the lowest percentage since 1978.⁶⁹ The first- and second-ranked foreign policy problems mentioned by respondents were that the U.S. is getting involved in the affairs of other countries at all (19%) and that we are sending too much foreign aid to other countries (16%).⁷⁰ Perhaps as a result, significant percentages of those surveyed would like to see cuts in military aid (64% of those polled) and economic programs (49% of those surveyed) to nations abroad.⁷¹

These attitudes all point to the decay of any consensus for an activist foreign policy, particularly a foreign policy towards Latin America. On the issue of aid, for instance, respondents in the CFR poll would have liked to cut aid to Latin America by 25%.⁷² This in spite of the fact that U.S., though it was the leading aid provider to the region only a few years ago, is now surpassed by Japan. In 1993 Japanese aid to the region totaled \$734 million; U.S. aid was \$623 million.⁷³ This in an area the United States has always regarded as its back yard, as it were; its natural partners for security and trade. The only bright light is that a significant number of Americans recognize that the U.S. does have at least one vital interest in Latin America — Mexico. 76% of the public sees a vital U.S. interest in Mexico (up from 63% in 1990), as do 98% of all policy leaders (compared with 94% in 1990).⁷⁴ Asked to rank their positive feelings for other nations, respondents ranked Mexico fourth.⁷⁵ The general eclipse of foreign policy as an issue, and the waning of support for foreign interventions of any sort, may put a damper on any Hispanic-American foreign policy project. But the worsening of the general atmosphere around foreign policy need not be a deterrence to an organized ethnic lobby.

The only bright light is that a significant number of Americans recognize that the U.S. does have at least one vital interest in Latin America — Mexico.

Second, in spite of the Clinton administration's commitment to extending trade pacts to include the rest of the hemisphere, the growing trade imbalance the U.S. has with Mexico, and trouble with the Mexican economy, may sour any such attempts.⁷⁶ The possibility of building stronger cross-border alliances between Hispanics and the Mexican government and NGOs may be derailed along with the prospects of an extended hemispheric trade pact. The trade imbalance in Mexico's favor has accelerated since the peso devaluation in December of 1994. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was \$448 million for the last quarter of 1994 and jumped to \$2.1 billion for the first two months of 1995.⁷⁷ Second, the \$20 billion credit package extended by the Clinton Administration to help Mexico surmount the economic crisis touched off by the collapse of the peso in late 1994 may also have negative repercussions. Members of both parties in Congress have been expressing skepticism about the wisdom of entering into additional trade pacts or agreements that would impose additional formal or informal obligations on the U.S. (read: additional costs), without at least asking for reciprocal obligations in return (particularly in the areas of labor and the environment).⁷⁸ The general mood of the Congress seems increasingly isolationist. The general fear is that these kinds of trade agreements trap the U.S. in unhappy relationships. This fear was pointedly expressed by Clinton's Undersecretary of Commerce Jeffrey Garten: "We are married to Mexico with no chance of a divorce."⁷⁹

The general eclipse of foreign policy as an issue, and the waning of support for foreign interventions of any sort, may put a damper on any Hispanic-American foreign policy project. But the worsening of the general atmosphere around foreign policy need not be a deterrence to an organized ethnic lobby.

On the other hand, regardless of whether or not the United States decides to press for the expansion of hemispheric trade agreements, it is already clear that Latin America has resolved to do so on its own, with or without the United States. The trade agreement between Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, Mercosur, has significantly raised the amount of commerce among the three partners, doubling trade in the last five years.⁸⁰ There are negotiations under way to extend the pact north and west. The Andean pact has also undergone a revival in the last few years. As a result, many countries in the region have already dismantled numerous barriers to trade, either unilaterally or in conjunction with their regional trading partners. These developments may well encourage the development of Hispanic-American trade lobby regardless of the direction of U.S. trade policy.

Third, as I noted earlier, the climate on immigration has deteriorated significantly. Recently, a New York Times/CBS poll elicited the highest negative response ever to the question of whether immigration levels should be kept at current levels or decreased. 61% favored a decrease as opposed to 49% as recently as 1986, 42% in 1977 and 33% in 1965.⁸¹ This is only one in a series of polls which have tracked Americans' disenchantment with the newest wave of immigration.⁸² Respondents are not necessarily unhappy with immigration in principle, or even with individual immigrants,⁸³ but with what immigrants have come to represent. A Newsweek poll in 1993 indicated, for instance, that 60% of Americans see current levels of immigration as a bad thing, while 59% simultaneously believe that immigration in the past was good. 59% say that 'many' immigrants wind up on welfare, and only 20% think America is a melting pot.⁸⁴ U.S. News and World Report writes of "a kind of xenophobic fever spreading" — certainly hyperbolic language, but also indicative of the rising level of anxiety.⁸⁵

This concern about immigration extends to foreign policy as well. In 1990, only 1% of those polled listed immigration as a major foreign policy problem. In 1994, 12% did so. 72% of the public believes that "large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States" represents a possible critical threat to the United States in the next ten years. The public's views of Cuba and Haiti in particular have melded together with their concern over immigration. These countries receive far more attention (and negative attention at that) than other Caribbean or Latin American countries, even countries with which the U.S. has more trade and investment.⁸⁶

Politicians have also discovered immigration as an issue. Both Republicans and Democrats "want to see and be seen at, a get-tough effort to control immigration." In California, Governor Pete Wilson has called for a constitutional amendment to deny citizenship to the American-born children of illegal immigrants, which is currently guaranteed by law.⁸⁷ The California legislature approved several bills in 1993 to discourage illegal immigration to the state⁸⁸ and in 1994 passed Proposition 187 denying illegal immigrants access to state services. At the national level, Senator Alan K. Simpson, Republican of Wyoming, and Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas introduced legislation in 1995 to cut the number of legal immigrants into the United States, which is rapidly moving through Congress, and a group of twelve Republicans and two Democrats has proposed a Constitutional amendment that would deny citizenship to the American-born children of illegal immigrants.⁸⁹ Even President Clinton has joined what seems to be the new consensus, announcing, together with a proposal to spend an additional \$172.5 million to bolster the Border Patrol and crack down on visa fraud and phony asylum cases, that "We must not — we will not — surrender our borders to those who wish to exploit our history of compassion and justice."⁹⁰

There is a possibility that American xenophobia will reach such a high pitch that it will be difficult for Hispanic-Americans to mobilize on this issue at all without drawing censure. However, at the moment this seems unlikely. A merely negative environment may have the perverse effect of making Hispanic-Americans actually more involved in political life. The INS reports, for example, that applications for citizenship have increased dramatically since Proposition 187 passed in California and since Congress began debating welfare and other cuts for foreign-born legal residents in the United States. In the nine months from September 1994 to June 1995 nearly 715,000 people applied for citizenship, an increase of 78% over the corresponding period a year earlier. In part this is due to the undocumented aliens granted amnesty as part of the 1986 immigration reform law who are now eligible for citizenship. But it is also, in large part, due to fear.⁹¹ The increasingly negative tone of the public debate on immigration in the United States, may simply provide an added incentive for Hispanic-Americans to mobilize on the issue.

Fourth and last, there is still the risk of the persistence of old ways of thinking. It isn't clear yet if new patterns of thinking, and just as important, of cooperation, have truly been established among Hispanic-Americans. There is a significant minority of highly politicized Cuban-Americans, for instance, who persist in seeing foreign affairs through the single prism of Castro's Cuba. The Cuban American National Foundation, for example, is lobbying Congress to put into law a formal demand for reparations for private property seized in the 1960 Cuban revolution, and to allow business tax breaks for American companies investing in a post-Castro Cuba.⁹² There are also still a significant number of Mexican-Americans who believe that foreign policy should lie outside the purview of Mexican-American organizations. Eduardo Petion, for example, is lobbying Congress to put into law a formal demand for reparad, for instance, that LULAC has been very active in combating anti-immigrant sentiment in California.

But we are running out of money and will. [Some] feel they are acting for the benefit of Latin American citizens, paying from the pockets of people who are not going to be affected. Yes, we are all affected, but Hispanic citizens are not going to be directly affected.... These efforts sap a lot of our dues which might be more effectively used for issues facing Hispanics in this country.⁹³

The consciousness that there may in fact be a common platform of interests on foreign policy issues, primarily between Cuban-Americans and Mexican-Americans, and particularly around trade and immigration policy, is still only nascent. The awareness of this common interest, like all new-borns, is still vulnerable to setbacks and reversals.

None of these complications is fatal to an attempt to build an Hispanic-American lobby on foreign policy issues, except perhaps the last. There are

some positive signs, however, which indicate that there are at the very least a renewed will among Latino leaders to experiment with common involvement in the foreign policy arena.

Post-NAFTA Initiatives

Since the passage of NAFTA in 1993 there has been a revival of interest, at least among the Hispanic leadership, in foreign policy issues touching on the Latino community. This interest has arisen, in large part, due to the changed conditions in U.S. foreign policy affecting Latinos in this country. Antonio Gonzalez of the Southwest Voter Registration Project noted that

By the late 1980s positions were still fuzzy, there was no coherent position. But there was a consensus developing by 1989 that Latinos should, in fact, be players. This position, which was not controversial in 1989, had been very controversial in 1984. People who had said 'Take care of business at home first' or 'This isn't a Chicano issue' were now increasingly willing to take a look at some of these concerns. [The reason] this was so self-evident now, was because of NAFTA.⁹⁴

By 1991, even the groups most reluctant to get involved in foreign affairs, like the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and National Council of La Raza (NCLR), were racing to get involved in NAFTA. The important thing is that this interest in trade and other hemispheric issues has continued well beyond the NAFTA debate.

For instance, a group of Hispanic leaders and activists made sure they were present at the Summit of the Americas in December of 1994. They organized a temporary umbrella group, the "Latino Coalition" to represent a "broad coalition of Latinos united in recognition of the strong ties and mutual interests that bind the Latino community in the United States with nations of Latin America." Congressman Torres, one of the Alliance's backers, noted that "the Latino Alliance will advance specific positions regarding Inter-American relations, especially on trade, sustainable development, foreign aid, democracy, human rights, and migration issues." The communiqué released at the Summit included CARECEN (Central American Refugee Center), the Cuban American Committee Research and Educational Fund, El Rescate, League of United Latin American Citizens, Midwest/Northwest Voter Registration Education Project, National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, the National Council of La Raza, National Puerto Rican Forum, Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, the Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers and the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project. The following members of Congress were at least passively supportive: Xavier Becerra, Kika de la Garza, Robert Menendez, Bill Richardson, Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Lucille Roybal-Allard and Esteban Torres.⁹⁵ The only drawback was that the Latino Alliance was late in coming together, and was therefore seen as a marginal player. In fact,

several of their members complained to the press that they had been ignored by summit organizers.

The future of Hispanic foreign policy lies in the unlikely coalition between Cuban-Americans and Mexican-Americans. This finding runs counter to expectations that Mexican-Americans would find their "natural" partners in foreign affairs with Puerto Ricans in the United States, with whom they share a stronger ideological affinity.

More encouraging, there is once again a concerted effort to create a permanent Hispanic umbrella group to address foreign policy issues on an on-going basis. The key player in this campaign to create this new organization, the Hispanic Council on International Relations, has been Raul Yzaguirre, of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR). Beginning in the fall of 1994, he began assembling a bi-partisan group of about thirty Hispanic leaders including elected officials, policy makers, academics and businessmen. There is an internal debate at the moment among the group's new members about whether the organization should be designed as advocacy or lobby group, or as a discussion group, "to get Hispanic involved in international affairs issues, and to promote the participation of Hispanics."⁹⁶ If it took the latter position, it would model itself more directly on the Council on Foreign Relations, and "serve as a forum for roundtables and discussions. It would play an educational role in the community, airing opinions and points of view, rather than take positions that might polarize the community."⁹⁷ The fear is that taking positions could generate controversies and enmities among participants, as well as stir up trouble with their grass-roots constituencies. The rather unfortunate likelihood is that the Hispanic Council on International Relations will take a position only when the group's consensus is nearly unanimous, that is to say will take positions which are almost entirely uncontroversial, and hence, forgettable.

...it is important to emphasize once again that the shifts in immigration and trade issues provide only the possibility, not the inevitability, of a common platform for Latinos in the foreign policy arena.

Nonetheless, the revived interest in this kind of umbrella group, and the kind of Latino coalition that it represents, probably has a better chance of succeeding today than it has at any time in the past. The possibility of success is largely due to the changed circumstances in the context of U.S. policy.

Conclusion

In this article I have illustrated the manner by which changes in the foreign policy arena have the potential to forge the interests and concerns of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups do not simply enter the foreign policy arena with pre-fabricated interests in hand; instead their interests are shaped by the changing contours of the foreign policy debate itself. In particular, the likelihood is that shifts in U.S. trade and immigration policies have created long-term interests for Cuban- and Mexican-Americans in these areas, and that these interests will persist over the long term. The future of Hispanic foreign policy lies in the unlikely coalition between Cuban-Americans and Mexican-Americans. This finding runs counter to expectations that Mexican-Americans would find their "natural" partners in foreign affairs with Puerto Ricans in the United States, with whom they share a stronger ideological affinity. However, neither ideological affinity nor the symbolic unity of "Hispanic" pan-ethnicity by themselves can provide Hispanic-Americans with the firm foundation for the coalition-building needed to address policy issues. If coalitions occur they will be built on the scaffolding of common interests, and merely smoothed over by symbolic unity. Common symbolic ties by themselves are unlikely to carry Latinos very far.⁹⁸

In closing, it is important to emphasize once again that the shifts in immigration and trade issues provide only the possibility, not the inevitability, of a common platform for Latinos in the foreign policy arena. Changing structural conditions represent, at best, an opening for concerted action, but does not guarantee the action itself. For this possibility to be realized, at least three things must occur:

- Hispanic policy groups themselves must realize that a shift in their interests has occurred and that new structural possibilities exist for coalition formation. To say that the momentum of U.S. policy has created the context for an Hispanic presence in the foreign policy debate is not to say that such a presence is assured. Much depends on the elite execution of plans for coalition building among the different national groups and organizations already involved in policy issues.

Hispanic policy groups themselves must realize that a shift in their interests has occurred and that new structural possibilities exist for coalition formation.

- There must be active attempts to engage Mexican and Cuban Americans in a constructive discourse around the possibilities of common agenda involving trade and immigration issues, without gainsaying the right of

each group to proceed on its own agendas in other spheres. That is to say, a common agenda must build on the interests that these groups have in common. Trying to build coalitions based on symbolic unity, or trying to extend fragile coalitions beyond issues on which there exists some consensus is likely, given the historical experience, to result in failure.

- For any coalition-building attempt to succeed over the long run, Latino policy makers must have the support of actors outside the immediate policy community. Cuban and Mexican American business leaders, in particular, have an interest in seeing that trade issues move to the forefront of the agenda, and they should be actively recruited for their support. Broader Latino support on immigration issues will be facilitated if, as current trends indicate, legal immigrants are targeted along with illegal immigrants in the current anti-immigrant backlash. This would bridge many of the potential divisions not only between Mexican and Cuban Americans, but also between generations in these communities, who in other circumstances, might have differing views on the question of immigration.

Favorable structural conditions for ethnic involvement in foreign policy may be necessary, but are not sufficient. Whatever the structural conditions, the work of ethnic coalition-building in the foreign policy arena still depends on the actions of individuals and groups.

APPENDIX A: International Trade Trends: Miami Customs District: Exports

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Change</i>
1989	10,430	-
1990	11,187	7.3%
1991	13,377	19.6%
1992	16,031	19.8%
1993	17,113	6.7%
1994	19,468	13.8%

Source: Beacon Council, *Miami Business Profile 1995*

APPENDIX B: International Trade Trends: Miami Customs District: Imports

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Change</i>
1989	6,961	-
1990	7,957	14.3%
1991	8,262	3.8%
1992	9,635	16.6%
1993	10,780	11.9%
1994	11,710	8.0%

Source: Beacon Council, *Miami Business Profile 1995*

Endnotes

1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Inter-American Dialogue and the 1995 American Political Science Association meeting. Special thanks to Rodolfo de la Garza for his very helpful comments.
2. A note on terminology. "Hispanic" is used by the Census Bureau and most mainstream sources to describe the population of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or some other Spanish origin (de Pinal and de Naves 1990). This paper uses the term "Latino"—the term currently in vogue—and "Hispanic" interchangeably. See Chapter 2 in Marín and VanOss Marín 1991 for a further discussion.
3. de la Garza et al. 1995; de la Garza et al. 1987; and de la Garza et al. 1982: 115-129.
4. The argument for this paper is based on interviews with fourteen Hispanic community leaders and policy makers I conducted in the fall of 1994 and spring of 1995. I have placed these interviews in the context of an analytic overview drawing on academic, journalistic, and policy sources.
5. Ahari 1987; Halley 1985; Watanabe 1984; and Glazer and Moynihan 1975.
6. Rendon 1988: 441.
7. For example Carmen Delgado Votaw, National Council of Puerto Rican Women; Interview, March 27, 1995; and Eduardo Pena, former president of LULAC; Interview, March 27, 1995.
8. Miguel Marquez, Foreign Affairs Legislative Assistant, Congressman Richardson's Office; Interview, March 30, 1995. See also Barrera 1988: 31.
9. Even the Congressional Hispanic Caucus did not make its first trip to Latin America until 1984, eight years after its founding (Richardson 1985: 30).
10. Antonio Gonzalez, Southwest Voter Registration Project; Interview, March 27, 1995.
11. Ibid.
12. Ayon and Anzaldúa Montoya 1988: 136; for an overview of this organizational effort in the 1980s see Torres 1990.
13. This is the factor that Ayon and Anzaldúa Montoya focus on. Ibid.
14. Richardson 1985: 31-32.
15. The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) estimated that in 1986 there were 3,202 Latinos holding elected office, an increase of 300% from 1973. The numbers have only increased since then.

16. Leveo Sanchez, interview; in Rendon 1988: 445.
17. Rendon 1988: 452.
18. Gonzalez Interview, op. cit. March 27, 1995.
19. Delgado-Votaw, Interview, op cit. March 27, 1995. For an academic take on this argument see Rodolfo de la Garza 1995.
20. Mary Jo Marion, National Council of La Raza; Interview, September 6, 1994.
21. Although, there have been questions raised about how representative their view actually is. See for example, Skerry 1993: 304-308. Sierra gives a mixed view of the issue: it seems clear that the Mexican-American elite are ahead of their constituents on issues like employer sanctions, legalization, and immigration, but (depending on the state) substantial majorities of Mexican-Americans back the general positions their elected leaders advocate. This is most true on questions of legalization programs, and least true of employer sanctions (Sierra 1987). De la Garza et al point out that there may be a similar split in the views of Mexican-born and U.S.-born Mexican-Americans in the U.S. (de la Garza et al. 1991: 379-387).
22. Ayon and Anzaldúa Montoya 1988: 130. For another view of the Mexican-American role, see Miller 1985: 49-71, especially 64 and following.
23. Bean et al. 1989: 25-27.
24. Sierra 1987: 53.
25. See Rodolfo de la Garza "Chicano Elite Perceptions of the Undocumented Worker: An Empirical Analysis" (Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies; University of California, San Diego, 1981) cited in Skerry 1993: 304.
26. Andres Oppenheimer and Christopher Marquis "Summit's Peak: Free Trade Zone, Alaska to Argentina" December 11, 1994 *Miami Herald*; "Mexico Troubled by U.S. Stance" May 16, 1995 Associated Press.
27. See for example, "Mexico's PRI Slams U.S. Over Immigration Measures" Reuters, February 14, 1996 and "Mexico Slams United States on Immigrant Treatment" Reuters, April 16, 1996.
28. Richardson 1985: 35.
29. Gonzalez Gutierrez 1993: 226.
30. Marquez interview, op cit. March 30, 1995.
31. Gonzalez interview, op cit. March 27, 1995. See also Albert Jacquez, Legislative Assistant, Congressman Torres; Interview, April 15, 1995.
32. Not surprisingly, Texas politicians, even in the Republican party, are strongly pro-trade, and careful to stay off the Republican band-wagon. See the editorial by Governor George Bush (R-Texas) *New York Times* August 20, 1995.

33. Jacquez interview, op cit. April 15, 1995.
34. Barrera 1988: 25-26.
35. Based on a poll by Harry Pachón for the National Council of La Raza. See their 1988 report titled "Hispanic Political Agenda." Cited in Barrera 1988: 34.
36. de la Garza 1985: 97.
37. de la Garza 1985: 96-97.
38. Rendon 1988: 456. The ten organizations comprising the U.S. Hispanic-Mexican Commission were the American GI Forum, ASPIRA, IMAGE, LULAC, MALDEF, the Mexican-American Women's National Association, the National Association of Farmworker Organizations, NCLR, National Forum of Hispanic Organizations, and Project Ser. Gonzalez Gutierrez places the beginning of serious Mexican/Mexican-American contact earlier, during the Echeverria Administration in the early 1970s, and says that both the Secretariat of Labor and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations were involved in coordinating a Hispanic Commission (Comisión Mixta de Enlace) formed by several Mexican-American organizations to institutionalize dialogue with the Mexican government. However, the work of this commission must have been both infrequent and low-key. Gonzalez Gutierrez 1993: 230.
39. Eduardo Peña, who was then President of the League of United Latin American Citizens, also met with Lopez Portillo in the 1970s to talk about the lack of support among Mexican-Americans for U.S.-Mexico issues. They talked, he said, about how to establish an ethnic lobby in the U.S. similar to the Jewish lobby for Israel. Peña, interview, op cit. March 27, 1995.
40. Reported in *El Mexicano*, Tijuana, Baja California April 8, 1988. Cited in Barrera 1988: 5.
41. See, for example, the "Programa de acercamiento del gobierno de Mexico con la comunidad Mexico-Norteamericana" (Mexico, D.F.: Consejo Nacional de Población, July 1987). The program was drafted in Mexico's Secretariat of the Interior, and given to CONAPO, a subsidiary of the Secretariat, to carry out. Barrera 1988: 16.
42. Gonzalez Gutierrez 1993: 229.
43. Dresser 1993: 93-94.
44. Dresser 1993: 92.
45. See Arturo Santamaria Gomez "Chicano Lobby, Indocumentados, y el TLC" *La Jornada*, 12 May, 1991; cited Dresser 1993: 102.

46. Karen Escalente, Acting Director of the National Association for Latino Elected Officials; Interview, September 12, 1994.

47. Mary Jo Marion, National Council of La Raza; Interview, September 6, 1994.

48. Gonzalez Gutierrez 1993: 231-232.

49. There has been friction on a number of fronts: some Mexican-Americans, for instance, have been critical of the slow pace toward an opening of the political system to opposing views in Mexico. In both the 1988 and 1994 Mexico Presidential campaigns the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) was successful in capturing the allegiance of much of the ex-patriate Mexican community in California. Recently there has been a push by first-generation Mexican immigrants for Mexico to recognize dual nationality, allowing them to adopt an American citizenship without losing their rights as Mexicans. In theory, the Mexican government has acquiesced. See the Associated Press November 19, 1995.

50. Maria Elena Toriano, Commission on Public Diplomacy; Interview, April 3, 1995.

51. Lynne H. Roberts "Infrastructure: The Ports of Miami" *U.S./Latin American Trade* December 1994.

52. Herbert Burkholz "The Latinization of Miami" September 21, 1980 *The New York Times* p. 46.

53. Toriano interview, op cit. April 3, 1995.

54. "Beacon Council Meeting Explores Dade's Future" September 29, 1994. *Miami Herald*.

55. Cuban-American businesses involved in trade are most heavily represented through two organizations: the Latin Chamber of Commerce (La Cámara de Comercio de las Américas), and the Asociación de Exportadores. Toriano, interview, op cit. April 3, 1995.

56. In fact, before the Summit, the Clinton administration had asked for "fast-track" authority from Congress to negotiate free trade agreements. The President had requested a seven year open-ended grant of authority that could be used flexibly to negotiate multilateral, bilateral, or regional agreements. Ahearn 1994.

57. Although the Cuban-American business community, on the whole, was favorable to NAFTA. The Mexican ambassador to the U.S. flew to NAFTA to lobby the Cuban community, and explain the benefits of NAFTA, and the Mexican government sponsored trips from Miami to Mexico so Cuban-American businessmen could learn about NAFTA from the Mexican point of view. Toriano interview, op cit. April 3, 1995.

58. *Miami Herald*, September 29, 1994.

59. Ahearn 1994.
60. Toriano interview, op cit. April 3, 1995.
61. "Senior U.S. Official in Cuba for Immigration Talks" July 19, 1995 Reuters.
62. "U.S. Policy Shifts, Lets in Cubans from Guantanamo" May 2, 1995 Reuters.
63. Jose de Cordoba "U.S. Policy on Cuba Has Exiles in Miami Hungry for Change — Clinton Decision to Send Back Boat People Has Sparked Fasts and Traffic Jams" June 2, 1995 *Wall Street Journal*.
64. Ibid.
65. "Cuban-Americans Ease Strike Plans" May 15, 1995 Reuters. The *Herald's* survey randomly selected 92 non-Hispanic white respondents, 100 non-Cuban Hispanic respondents and 249 Cuban-Americans. The sample is not proportional to the actual composition of Miami's population, which is roughly one third non-Hispanic white, one third non-Hispanic black, and one third Hispanic.
66. Maria Elena Toriano pointed out, for instance, that there is increasing concern among older Cuban-Americans about Republican proposals for cuts in social benefits to legal aliens residing in the U.S. Many first-generation Cubans would be affected by these cuts. Toriano interview, op cit. April 3, 1995.
67. Ayon and Anzaldua Montoya 1988 p. 130.
68. Thomas F. McLarty, Counselor to the President, "The Americas: Hemispheric Free Trade Is Still A Priority" May 26, 1995 *Wall Street Journal* editorial.
69. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1995: 11.
70. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1995: 14.
71. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1995: 12. Indeed, foreign aid outlays have already declined from 2.5% of the federal budget to 1.2% in the last ten years. Steven Greenhouse "Foreign Aid and GOP: Deep Cuts, Selectively" *New York Times* December 21, 1994. Polls show that the public overestimates the amount spent on foreign aid by fifteen to twenty times the actual amount. Barbara Crosette "Foreign Aid Budget: Quick, How Much? Wrong" *New York Times News Service* February 27, 1995.
72. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1994: 31.
73. Robert S. Greenberger "As Congress Sharpens Knives to Cut Foreign Aid, Critics Warn of Damage to U.S. Policy Making" *Wall Street Journal* May 18, 1995.

74. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1994: 8.
75. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1994: 20.
76. McLarty editorial, op cit. May 26, 1995.
77. "Mexico Troubled by U.S. Stance" May 16, 1995 Associated Press.
78. Bob Davis "The Outlook: Free Trade Is Headed for More Hot Debate" April 17, 1995 *Wall Street Journal*. See also: Diego Ribadeneira "Trade Zone for Americas in Jeopardy" February 19, 1995 *Boston Globe*.
79. Tim Carrington "Ties to Mexico Are Becoming Burden for U.S. — Neighbor's Economic Mess Dam Earlier Promise of Regional Integration" *Wall Street Journal* March 9, 1995.
80. Brazilian trade with Argentina is running five times 1990 levels. Overall, intra-Latin American trade has grown to 25% of the region's total trade, up from 10% a decade ago. James Brooke "More Open Latin Borders Mirror an Opening of Markets" *New York Times* July 4, 1995.
81. Seth Davis, "Poll Finds Tide of Immigration Brings Hostility" *New York Times* June 27, 1993 p. 1; also Tony Freemantle, "Anti-Immigrant Sentiment Rises; Impact a Matter of Debate" *The Houston Chronicle*, July 4, 1993 p. 1.
82. Any number of recent polls have shown similar findings. See for instance the Gallup poll in 1994 cited in Richard L. Berke "Politicians Discovering an Issue: Immigration" *New York Times* March 8, 1994. The Empire State Survey in 1993 indicated that a majority of New Yorkers believed relations between immigrants and natives were tense (second only to black-white relations) and that there were too many immigrants in the city; Rob Polner, "Us and Them: Poll Shows Harsh Divisions Over Race and Immigration" *New York Newsday* October 25, 1993 p. 7.
83. In a 1993 *New York Times*/CBS poll 67% said newcomers to their neighborhood would be welcomed, about the same percentage which gave that answer in 1968; Adams, op cit. June 27, 1993 p. 1. Nationwide, however, in a *Newsweek* poll 36% of respondents thought recent immigrants had burdened their communities (31% thought immigrants made a contribution to the community, and 33% thought immigrants were not an issue). Of those who said there had been a recent surge of immigration into their communities, opinions were even worse: 54% said that immigrants had hurt their communities, and 36% said immigrants had a negative effect on public schools. ("Americans Divided on Immigrants" UPI wire March 30, 1996). See also Deborah Sontag, "Across the U.S., Immigrants Find the Land of Resentment" *New York Times* December 11, 1992 p. A1, B4.
84. Tom Morgenthau et al. "America: Still a Melting Pot?" *Newsweek* August 9, 1993, pp. 16+.

85. Penny Loeb et al. "To Make a Nation" *U.S. News and World Report* October 4, 1993.
86. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1994: 27.
87. Berke, op cit. March 8, 1994.
88. The four bills, backed by the Federation for American Immigration Reform, an anti-immigrant lobbying organization, deny drivers' licenses to illegal immigrants, prohibit local sanctuary ordinances, ease the deportation of prisoners, and block government job placement to undocumented residents. See Patrick J. McDonnell et al. "FAIR at Forefront of Push to Reduce Immigration," *Los Angeles Times*, November 24, 1993, p. A1.
89. Robert Pear "House GOP Moves to Cut Immigration" *New York Times* June 22, 1995; Berke, op. cit. March 8, 1994; and Deborah Sontag "Calls to Restrict Immigration Come From Many Quarters" *New York Times* December 13, 1992 "Week in Review" p. 5. Cokie Roberts noted that "What is happening is that there's ... an amendment on every single bill that's coming up saying that none of the money in that legislation can go to illegal aliens" ("This Week With David Brinkley," July 25, 1993).
90. Tom Morgenthau et al. "America: Still a Melting Pot?" *Newsweek* August 9, 1993, p. 16+. Clinton echoes a previous statement made by Ronald Reagan, almost word for word.
91. Seth Mydans "The Latest Boom: It's Citizenship" *New York Times* August 11, 1995 A12. See also "INS Wants More Funds as Citizenship Applications Surge" Reuters April 11, 1995.
92. Frank Greve "U.S. Policy Subject to Ethnic Spin" *Philadelphia Inquirer* August 20, 1995 A8.
93. Peña, interview op cit. March 27, 1995. Indeed, LULAC at times has been supportive of restrictions on illegal immigration to the U.S.
94. Gonzalez Interview op cit. March 27, 1995. See also Marquez interview op cit. March 30, 1995.
95. Latino Alliance Press Release, Summit of the Americas, Miami, December 1994.
96. Mary Jo Marion, National Council of La Raza; Interview; September 15, 1994; and Delgado-Votaw Interview, op cit. March 27, 1995.
97. Marion Interview, op cit. September 15, 1994.
98. Ayon and Anzaldúa Montoya 1988: 136. See also "Latinos, Global Change and American Foreign Policy" Report of a New American Global Dialogue Conference, sponsored by the Stanley Foundation and the Tomás Rivera Center, October 7-9, 1994.

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Colorado's Community Speaks Out About School Discipline Legislation That Impacts the Latino Community

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Introduction

The dynamics of our society are changing. As the population increases, there are more single parent families, more poverty; and, society is becoming more multicultural. Latinos are the largest ethnic-minority population in Colorado with a projected 1995 population of 511,000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994, March). Latinos account for 13 percent of the state's total population and, next to the Asian community, is the fastest growing ethnic-minority group in the state. In Colorado there has been an increase in the proportion of Latino families maintained by single women from 19 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1990. The dropout rate of Latinos in Colorado improved slightly in the past decade, from 51 percent in 1980 to 42 percent in 1990. However, the number of Latino families living in poverty increased 59 percent in 10 years from 14,416 to 22,859 families. In 1980, 18 percent of Latino families lived in poverty, jumping to 23 percent in 1990 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992, September, 1983, June). At the center of these societal changes, schools must continue to provide equal education to all children and position themselves to accommodate the changing needs of students.

One of the social changes schools are facing involve disciplinary issues. Violence has increased in U.S. public schools over the last five years, according to a nationwide survey of school administrators (Boothe, Bradley, and Flick, 1993). Nearly half (46%) of school executives surveyed reported the number of violent acts by students has grown substantially. The concern over providing a safe learning environment was the impetus in Colorado for legislation dubbed the "Safe School Act."

One of the social changes schools are facing involve disciplinary issues.

In Colorado, school discipline measures varied from classroom to classroom, school to school, and district to district. In an effort to standardize school discipline policies, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 93-1093 in April 1993. This Bill calls for mandatory expulsion of students for use or possession of a deadly weapon, the sale of a drug or controlled substance, robbery, or assault. Expulsion is also mandatory if a student is declared to be a "habitually disruptive student." "Habitually disruptive student" is defined by the law as "...a child who caused a disruption in school activities or events more than five times during the school year."

While the purpose of this law was to create a safe school environment, one concern was that it did not allow for exceptions due to special circumstances or take into account the factors that led to the disruptive behavior and how that behavior could have been prevented. Another concern was the highly subjective aspect of defining disruptive behavior, which can vary with each school administrator. Also, there was no consideration to reward schools for preventive measures or for pursuing alternative schooling for the expelled student. A literature review revealed several articles that discussed the extent and possible causes of violence in the schools in addition to strategies to reduce violence in schools (Glazer, 1992; Natale, 1994; Pereira, 1994), but no literature was found that discussed the experiences of students who had been expelled and their parents' perceptions. The issues of race and ethnicity were mentioned in only a few of the articles but usually in the context of Whites and minorities or Whites and African Americans (Boothe, 1993; Farrell, Jr., 1984; Williams, 1989). A literature review of school safety and discipline issues, conducted in August 1994, did not reveal articles relating to the Latino community.

Rationale For Study

Every student has the right to learn in an environment which is safe, conducive to the learning process, and free from unnecessary disruption. Violent or illegal activities should not be tolerated in the schools. Yet, there

are several concerns relating to how HB 93-1093 will impact Latino families in Colorado: 1) Latino students would be disproportionately affected; 2) there would be an increase in the number of Latino students expelled; 3) there would be fewer educational alternatives for expelled Latino students as compared to White students; and, 4) due process for Latinos may be compromised.

Latino Students Disproportionately Affected

A disproportionate number of Latino students are expelled in Colorado. Although Latinos accounted for 17 percent of Colorado's student population, 33 percent of expelled students and 26 percent of suspended students were Latino during the 1993-94 school year (Colorado Department of Education, 1995, August, 1994, April) (Table 1).

The passage of HB 93-1093 was an attempt to standardize the rules of school discipline, but weighed heavily on students who had not committed any crime and had not physically harmed anyone. The identification of disruptive behavior is subjective, thus it may be possible for Latino students to accumulate the maximum of five "disruptions" more easily because of prejudice, discrimination, or lack of cultural competency on the part of school officials (e.g., principal, vice-principals, counselors). Farrell, Jr. (1984) cites studies

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that have indicated teachers and administrators in desegregated schools use disciplinary measures against African American students when communication and understanding would have been more appropriate and effective. He revealed that there have been instances where teachers are encouraged, either overtly or covertly, to closely monitor ethnic minority student's behavior at school. He posits that the discretionary aspects of disciplinary practices, coupled with cultural differences of ethnic minority students and their teachers, explain the racial disparity in disciplinary measures.

Increase in Expulsions Since Passage of Legislation

Passage of HB 93-1093 simplified the process of expelling students from school, accounting for an increase in expulsions. An analysis of 11 school districts in the Denver Metropolitan area demonstrates that 8 districts reported

TABLE 1: Student Enrollments, Expulsions, and Suspensions in Colorado

	<i>Fall 1993 Enrollment</i>	<i>1993-94 Expulsions</i>	<i>1993-94 Suspensions</i>
White	74%	52%	56%
Latino	17%	33%	26%
African American	5%	11%	15%
Asian	3%	2%	1%
Native American	1%	2%	1%

Source: Colorado Department of Education, 1994.

TABLE 2: School District Student Enrollments and Expulsions in the Denver Metropolitan Area

<i>School District</i>	<i>Enrollment Sept.-June 1992-93</i>	<i>Expulsions Sept.-Feb. 1993-94</i>	
Jefferson County	82,760	5	137
Cherry Creek	33,343	9	19
Boulder	24,085	0	13
Douglas County	17,803	2	7
Littleton	15,770	8	7
Westminster	11,335	20	27
Commerce City	6,346	6	12
Mapleton	4,836	0	0
Englewood	4,533	9	8
Brighton	4,182	1	6
Sheridan	1,928	6	10

Source: Bingham, Janet. (1994, March 6) "Policies on Ousting Students Vary." The Denver Post.

an increase in expulsions between the 1992-93 school year (before HB 93-1093 went into effect) and 1993-94 (after HB 93-1093 went into effect) (The Denver Post, 1994) (Table 2).

Studies have revealed that expulsions and suspensions tend to accelerate the dropout process. In a longitudinal study of high school students, 41 percent of sophomores who dropped out of school had disciplinary problems, 31 percent had been suspended or placed on probation (Dupper, 1994; Ekstron, Goertz, Pollack, & Rock, 1993). The dropout rate of Latinos in Colorado is relatively high; 42 percent of Latinos, 25 years old and over, do

not have a high school diploma or equivalency (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992). A higher number of Latino students being expelled without educational alternatives may lead to more Latinos in Colorado dropping out of school.

Lack of Educational Alternatives

Educational alternatives for expelled students are limited in Colorado. Students can be expelled for up to one year with no alternative placement. Students expelled from one district can apply to another, but other districts are not required to accept them. If parents cannot afford private schools, provide home schooling, or afford transportation costs to another school district, students may be expelled with no educational alternative available.

A higher number of Latino students being expelled without educational alternatives may lead to more Latinos in Colorado dropping out of school.

In general, Colorado's Latino families cannot afford private schooling or tutoring. The median income of Latino households is \$21,000, 30 percent less than the state's median household income of \$30,000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992). Due to limited financial resources, expelled Latino students automatically have fewer educational alternatives.

Due Process

Finally, under HB 93-1093, each school district is required to adopt a written conduct and discipline code that must be distributed to each student and posted in each public school in the district. The conduct and discipline code must include general policies and procedures that afford due process of law when imposing disciplinary actions, including suspension, expulsion, or denial of admission, as well as identify the responsibilities pertaining to students, legal guardians, schools, and school districts. After the third disruption, and before a child can be declared a "habitually disruptive student," a remedial discipline plan must be developed for that child in accordance with the conduct and discipline code of the school district. While the legislation required school districts to provide a written conduct and discipline code to parents, each school district fulfilled this requirement differently. Due to lower literacy levels of the Latino community and a higher use of Spanish — in Colorado 16 percent of Latinos do not speak English "very well" (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992) — Latino parents may not be experiencing due process if information is not provided in a comprehensible fashion.

Methodology

In response to these concerns, the Latin American Research and Service Agency (LARASA) conducted a descriptive study to determine the effects of HB 93-1093 on the expelled or suspended student and their family. During the summer of 1994, 100 individuals impacted by discipline issues were interviewed. Persons interviewed were located in the Denver metropolitan area and in rural school districts located along the front range corridor of the state. Survey participants included: 31 expelled/suspended students, 32 parents of expelled/suspended students, 13 community leaders in education, and 24 non-expelled/suspended students. Also, 20 school districts were surveyed regarding the districts' written discipline policies.

Student/parent survey. Personal interviews were conducted with 31 students who had been expelled or suspended from a Colorado public school between fall 1993 and spring 1994, and 32 parents of expelled or suspended students. Within a family, the student and parent(s) were interviewed separately to develop case profiles of their experiences with the discipline process, to determine their knowledge of HB 93-1093 and discipline codes in their school district, and to learn the impact expulsions/suspensions had on the family.

To protect the families right to privacy, expelled or suspended students and their parents were not initially contacted directly. Four outreach strategies were utilized. First, school administrators were asked to forward letters from LARASA inviting students who had been expelled and/or suspended during the 1993-94 school year, and their parents, to participate in the study. Second, families were solicited by sending a statewide press release to newspapers and radio stations in Colorado. Third, bilingual flyers were circulated among various community centers, churches, and family resource centers. Fourth, an article was published in LARASA's newsletter which has a circulation of 5,200. Bilingual interviews were arranged when persons called LARASA expressing interest in participating in the study. All of the contacts resulted from the last three outreach strategies.

Nearly two-thirds of the parents were ethnic minority; over half were Latino. Fifty-nine percent (n=19) of the parents identified their ethnicity as Latino, 28 percent (n=9) identified as White, six percent (n=2) as African American, and six percent (n=2) as Native American. One-third of the parents spoke Spanish at home.

Two-thirds of the expelled/suspended students were ethnic minority with over half self-identifying as Latino. Sixty-one percent (n=19) of expelled/suspended students identified their ethnicity as Latino, 26 percent (n=8) identified as White, seven percent (n=2) as African American, three percent (n=1) as Asian American and three percent (n=1) as Native American. Twenty-nine percent (n=9) of the students spoke a language other than English at home.

When parents and students identified ethnically, endorsement of the following ethnic terms, "Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Latino, and Hispanic" were categorized under the heading of "Latino." According to the 1990 census, in Colorado the Latino subgroup most commonly endorsed was Mexican American (66%) followed by Spanish (21%).

Survey of community leaders in education. Personal interviews were conducted in the Metro Denver area with 13 community leaders regarding expulsions and suspensions, focusing on assumptions, philosophies, and suggestions for improving the educational experience for all students. Participants included two key legislators, two school board members, three school superintendents, one former, and three current school principals, and two Denver Public School administrators. Participants consisted of six males and seven females. Six of the participants were White, three were Latino, two were African American, one was Asian, and one was Native American. Participants responded to 12 open-ended questions during personal interviews that were approximately 30 minutes to an hour in length.

Student focus groups. A total of 24 students were interviewed in three focus groups, including White, African American, and Latino students. All focus group students were English speaking. The students were interviewed to assess the perceptions of non-expelled students about expulsions and suspensions as disciplinary measures in public schools. The focus group discussions centered on the student's knowledge of the "safe school" law and the expulsion/suspension policy being implemented at their schools, their opinions concerning the overall effectiveness of expelling or suspending students, along with their recommendations for alternative disciplinary actions.

Members in the first focus group were participants in a Denver "Weed and Seed Program" that was initiated during the Bush administration, as a partial solution to the problem of juvenile delinquency. This group of eight participants consisted of seven males and one female, ranging in age from 10 to 16 years. Seven of the youth were African American, one youth was White.

The second focus group of six participants, three male and three female students, were involved in the Fenix program, a youth mentorship program at Mi Casa Resource Center for Women in Denver. All participants were Latino.

Members of the third focus group were living at a Denver residential child care facility for emotionally disturbed teenage girls. The ten participants ranged from 14 to 18 years of age. All but two of the youth were White, the other two youth were Latinas.

In focus group discussions, approximately one hour in length, participants responded spontaneously to the same fifteen, open-ended questions.

School district survey. During the summer of 1994, LARASA contacted 20 school districts throughout Colorado to obtain copies of the districts' written discipline policies. The ten urban and ten rural districts that were selected provided a diverse racial and ethnic composition and varied in economic status.

Results

Results of the study are presented in four sections. First, a review of the expulsion process is presented. Parents report on the discipline process, information provided by the school, and amount of follow-up conducted by the school. Second, parents and educational community leaders report on their concerns and endorsement of the effects of HB 93-1093. Third, educational community leaders and students report on the fairness of the expulsion process to ethnic minority students. Fourth, educational community leaders and students report on whether expulsions create a safer learning environment. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the educational system.

...none of the 20 school districts contacted provided a discipline code in Spanish, although some were located in counties with a high percentage of Latinos.

Review of the Expulsion Process

Written Conduct and Discipline Code. A review of discipline policies requested from school districts revealed that some of the policies provided to parents were written using legal terminology, other districts had not prepared a written discipline code at that time, and none of the 20 school districts contacted provided a discipline code in Spanish, although some were located in counties with a high percentage of Latinos.

Some parents interviewed did not remember receiving a written explanation of their school's discipline policies, and others did not understand the policies they received. Twenty-eight percent (n=9) of the parents were informed of the school's discipline policies after the expulsion/suspension (Table 3).

Sixty-three percent (n=20) of the parents reported they received a written explanation of their school's policies regarding discipline for the school year. Of parents who received a written policy, 55 percent (n=11) reported they received the school policy information before their child was dismissed from school and 30 percent (n=6) reported they did not understand the policy or understood only some of it (Table 3).

TABLE 3: Results from LARASA School Discipline Study in Denver

Received a written explanation of the school's policy regarding expulsions/suspensions for the past year		
	<u>N=32</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	20	62.5%
No	9	28.1%
Don't know/not sure	3	9.4%
A written explanation of the school's suspension/expulsion policy was received...		
	<u>n=20</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Before the student was expelled/suspended	11	55.0%
After the student was expelled/suspended	9	45.0%
Extent policy was understood		
	<u>n=20</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Did not understand it	1	5.0%
Understood some of it	5	25.0%
Understood most of it	14	70.0%
Did not read the policy	--	--
Policy was not understood as written because... (multiple responses, n=6)		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
It was written in a language that the parent did not speak and understand	2	33.3%
The wording was too complicated	3	50.0%
The wording was too vague	3	50.0%
Other	1	16.7%
School officials met with the parent(s) to explain the newly adopted policy from HB 93-1093		
	<u>N=32</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	15	46.8%
No	15	46.8%
Don't know/not sure	2	6.3%
The new policy was explained to the parent(s)...		
	<u>n=15</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Before the student was expelled/suspended	6	40.0%
After the student was expelled/suspended	9	60.0%

Forty-seven percent (n=15) of the parents reported school officials met with them to explain the newly adopted policies (from HB 93-1093). An equal percentage of parents (47%) reported school officials did not meet with them. Of the parents who reported that school officials met with them to explain their policies on expulsions/suspensions, 60 percent (n=9) said the policy was explained after the child was expelled/suspended (Table 3).

Interaction With School Staff. Most of the parents did not find school officials helpful before or after the expulsion/suspension process. Some parents were offered “no counseling, no conference, and no warning” and the emphasis was “completely on discipline, rather than help.” Parents said they did not know their child was having problems until the child came home from school with a note or parents received a call from the school notifying them their child was suspended or expelled.

Eighty-one percent (n=21) of the parents reported they were not notified about their child’s school problems in time to possibly prevent the student from getting expelled/suspended.

Parents expected the school to communicate with them, however, some of the community educational leaders interviewed reported that they expected the parents to keep close contact with the school to learn how their child was doing. Parents complained that school policies were inconsistent and the “rules kept changing” regarding their child. Parents also expressed frustration that no services were offered to help them after their child was dismissed from school. Once the student was out of school, the school often had no further contact with the parent(s).

One parent said he/she tried to work with the school and get help for his/her son but even the counselor had to enforce the “if he did it he’s out” policy imposed by HB 93-1093. There was no talking or compromise. Another parent reported that the counselors at school were in charge of getting the students and parents to sign behavior contracts but did not provide counseling. Findings demonstrate:

- Eighty-one percent (n=21) of the parents reported they were not notified about their child’s school problems in time to possibly prevent the student from getting expelled/suspended.
- Fifty-six percent (n=18) of the parents reported school officials were not helpful in resolving their child’s problems that led up to the expulsion/suspension. Thirty-four percent (n=11) of the parents reported school officials were somewhat helpful, and nine percent (n=3) reported school officials were helpful in resolving their child’s expulsion/suspension.
- Seventy-two percent (n=23) of the parents reported school officials were not helpful after the expulsion/suspension. Six percent (n=2) of the parents reported school officials were somewhat helpful, and 22 percent (n=7) reported school officials were helpful after the expulsion or suspension.

A few of the parents reported that they did get help from the school. Nine percent (n=3) of the parents who reported school officials were helpful during the expulsion/suspension process shared the following:

- Teachers allowed the students to call them with homework questions.
- The school documented and provided a history of the student's needs and progress that helped get the student into a special program at an alternative school.
- Teachers helped the student "finish the year on a positive note" by keeping the student's problems confidential.
- The student was referred to a program that would help with school work.
- The principal recommended to other school officials that the student be suspended rather than expelled.
- Counseling was provided.
- School officials met with the parents to explain procedures and alternatives available to the student.

Summary. Although HB 93-1093 provided guidelines for due process, many parents indicated they did not understand their schools' discipline policies or did not receive a written policy. In addition, the majority of parents did not feel the remedial discipline plan being offered to them, if offered at all, was helpful in resolving their child's problem. The parents who were most frustrated were those who believed their child was treated unfairly by educators during the discipline process, those who turned to the school for help with their child's behavioral problem and that help wasn't available to them, and those parents who could not afford alternative education once their child was expelled.

Educating Children: Effects of House Bill 93-1093

There were two prevailing streams of thought endorsed by community leaders in education and parents concerning House Bill 93-1093. One view was that the law provided the framework to eliminate disruptive students from the school setting so that teachers could focus on students who were "in school to learn." The assumption was that schools were in the business of education and did not have the resources to address the behavioral problems of students. The opposing view embraced the sentiment that there was potential for students to be "over-expelled." Respondents concerned about the effects of HB 93-1093 believed that it would add to the dropout problem because it did not provide alternative education provisions for expelled students.

Concerns About HB 93-1093

Community leaders in education expressed the concern that HB 93-1093 removes students from an educational setting, thereby forfeiting educational

opportunities. Both community leaders and parents were concerned about the potential for abusing the new law. One participant stated that teachers can use this law to "get rid of" students instead of helping them with their behavioral needs. The concern was that HB 93-1093 supports quick action and judgment instead of understanding. One community leader replied that before disciplinary action is taken, the school administrator must look at the whole story and what the specific circumstances were, otherwise, there is the danger that students can be "over-expelled." Parents concurred that the "safe school" law had been abused and that some school districts were taking advantage of the law. Parents believed that the law was used to expel students who were not wanted at the school and that it targeted minority students while favoritism was being shown for other students.

Some parents and community leaders also agreed that an increase in expulsions will lead to an increase in dropouts. Parents were concerned that a year was too long for a child to be out of school and it was unlikely they would return to school because they would enjoy their freedom. A community leader in education stated, "We are creating another class of drop-outs. A major challenge is to get those students into an educational environment where they can be helped to succeed. Something needs to be done for these students before they are entirely lost to the system. That effort needs to evolve from the public schools but the problems of these students far exceed the resources of public schools."

Parents felt that even if the law does provide a safe school environment, students would still be getting dismissed from school with nothing to occupy their time and that could possibly lead to criminal activity, particularly in families where the parents worked during the day. Parents believed that an increase in student expulsions or suspensions would lead to more students getting involved in drugs and gangs.

Parents were also concerned that laws for automatic school dismissal did allow for individual judgment by the school official. They believed that expulsion and suspension decisions must be individualized so blanket judgments were not made that automatically threw students "out and away." They believed that some students were capable of changing but have problems with peers or in the home and need help.

Support of HB 93-1093

Community leaders in education who supported HB 93-1093 believed the law provides a framework for discipline. They stated that HB 93-1093 allows schools to maintain a safe and orderly environment by providing the framework to control student behavior in school. Their perception was that this legislation would enable schools to deal with students who are disruptive, who are in attendance for no other reason but to disrupt and intimidate others, and in many cases to injure and even kill other students. They believed that "good students in attendance" will know that they are going to be protected.

Parents and educational community leaders agreed that school should be a safe environment for children and that when a student breaks the rules, the students should be held accountable, but that is where the agreement ended.

Supporters of HB 93-1093 believed that the “safe school” law was one way for educational systems to provide a safe learning environment. They believed that, through HB 93-1093, society had sent a strong message that disruptive behavior and violence should not be part of the schools. The philosophy was students can’t learn if they feel threatened and that the law was necessary in cases where weapons were brought to school with the intent to hurt somebody. A parent captured the sentiment that students must have a safe environment where they can be comfortable by stating “If they are going to fear that someone has a gun in their backpack, they are going to be non-productive in school.”

Community leaders in education who supported HB 93-1093 expressed that by allowing educators to dismiss disruptive students, more time and energy can be devoted to education. They believed that by suspending and expelling students who are a threat to the school community or who are chronically disruptive, allows teachers and students to devote their time and energy to education, rather than to other problems.

Summary. Our study found that there are varying perceptions about the effects of HB 93-1093. Parents and educational community leaders agreed that school should be a safe environment for children and that when a student breaks the rules, the students should be held accountable, but that is where the agreement ended. Parents did not want their child dismissed from school unless the situation was extreme. If the student had to be removed from school, then parents wanted an alternative source of schooling. Community leaders perceived HB 93-1093 as a vehicle for creating safe schools.

Fairness of the Expulsion Process to Ethnic Minority Students

In an effort to learn why a disproportionate number of ethnic minority students were expelled and suspended in Colorado, community leaders in education and student focus groups were asked about the fairness of the expulsion process to students of color. Some community leaders believed that, ideally, race or ethnicity was not an issue when rules were violated. They expressed that as educators they did their best to be consistent in how the rules were enforced. Other community leaders in education and students, however, believed there was a double standard in how students were disciplined. They have witnessed situations where ethnic minority students were more likely

than White students to be disciplined for the same incident. They expressed that the expulsion process was unfair if the school administrator perceived students as trouble makers because of their past records.

Process Unfair to Ethnic Minority Students

Community leaders who agreed the expulsion process was unfair to ethnic minority students believed double standards exist. One community leader replied "I have heard too many stories about one child doing one thing and a racial minority child doing it and the racial minority child was expelled. I think sometimes principals are afraid of alienating White families for fear they will leave the school." "White flight" has been a concern in the Denver Public School (DPS) district when in 1973 DPS was court-ordered to bus students in an effort to desegregate schools. Between 1973 and 1990 White student enrollment in DPS dropped from 55 percent to 34 percent (Pappas, 1992).

Community leaders and focus group students both discussed the unfairness of labeling students as trouble makers. Participants reported that if a student is perceived as a trouble maker without cause, then the discipline policy is no longer fair. Focus group students believed that teachers talk to each other about problem students they had in the past. Students perceived that once a student is labeled as a trouble maker or is suspected of being a gang member, they are then "singled out" and do not have a chance of being treated fairly, particularly if they are ethnic minority.

Focus group students also cited examples of unfairness due to ethnic favoritism, inconsistent policy implementation, and stereotyping. One African American student felt there was ethnic favoritism at his school because Latino counselors showed favoritism by providing more help to Latino students than to African American students. Other students reported that some schools are stricter than others, and school administrators already have their mind made up to expel certain students regardless of the circumstances. Students also stated that it seemed like some teachers have the attitude that Latinos and African Americans don't come to school to learn but to "goof off." One community leader explained stereotyping as a lack of cultural awareness. The community leader stated that "Teachers come from different backgrounds and cultures which do not mirror the students in their classrooms, particularly in the inner-city schools. Out of their own cultural ignorance, teachers are not capable of relating to these students and therefore label them as uncooperative or stupid."

Educational community leaders also expressed that the expulsion process was unfair to ethnic minority students because, as a group, they tend to have fewer resources. They believed that students who get expelled in general have fewer family resources, fewer financial resources and less community support than others.

Process Fair to Ethnic Minority Students

The only argument provided by community leaders who stated that the expulsion process was fair to ethnic minority students was that the same standards were set for all students regardless of race or ethnicity. They believe

Participants describe double standards and ethnic favoritism as factors that support the expulsion process as discriminatory.

that if standards were set for everyone to follow, than race cannot be used as a discriminating factor. The philosophy behind this thinking was that if a student breaks the rules, then they have to suffer the consequences and not feel that they can fall back on race as an issue. One community leader captured this sentiment by stating "We try to make all students aware of our expectations and do our best to be consistent and fair in how we enforce them." No focus group student perceived the expulsion process as fair to ethnic minority students.

Summary. Some educational community leaders held an idealistic view regarding the fairness of the expulsion process to ethnic minority students. The reality for students was that they experienced discrimination, labeling, and stereotyping. These different views also held true regarding the safety of schools which was the premise for HB 93-1093. Participants describe double standards and ethnic favoritism as factors that support the expulsion process as discriminatory.

Do Expulsions Create a Safer Environment Conducive to Learning?

The purpose of HB 93-1093 was to create a safer educational environment that would be conducive to learning. However, views on education held by focus group students directly opposed those of conservative community leaders to the extent that the community leaders appeared "out of touch" with how the students view the world around them.

Community leaders in education, who believed that expelling students creates a safer school environment, expressed that students needed to take more responsibility, not only for their actions, but for the climate of the school.

Community leaders in education and focus group students, who did not agree that expulsions create a safer learning environment, expressed that a disruptive classroom environment emerged from the teacher's inability to

address the different behaviors created from a mixture of cultures in the classroom. This difference in culture was exemplified by student's comments that "school was not any safer than real life" and that wanting to create a safe learning environment was "just an excuse to dismiss certain students."

Expulsions Do Not Create a Safer Learning Environment

Community leaders in education, who believed that expulsions do not create a safer learning environment, felt that expulsion occurred when students were mislabeled as disruptive but not necessarily endangering the safety of others. One community leader stated "The teachers today want the typical 'standard' student who will be quiet and learn and follow the teachers rules. Therefore when you get a mixture of cultures and backgrounds in the classroom, the teacher does not know how to deal with these different students then tend to label them as 'disruptive.' These are the ones who are eventually expelled from school." School expulsion was perceived as a short-term, partial solution to safety; while expulsions address an immediate concern, other action may need to be taken to resolve discipline issues. One educational community leader stated, "I have not seen the climate of the classroom change when different children are removed. Expulsions are a mechanism used by the educational system that does not want to deal with the 'problem' any longer."

Focus group students also agreed that classrooms are already safe. They noted that a student doesn't get shot or stabbed in class, therefore it is already safe. The students also pointed out that sometimes an expelled student will sneak into school to be with friends or to finish a fight. Therefore, focus group students felt that expulsions were just an excuse to say "bad" students keep other students from learning and if a student wants to learn "no one can stop them from learning."

Expulsions Create a Safer Learning Environment

The argument provided by community leaders in education, who believed expulsions create a safer learning environment, felt that expulsion "removes the disruption." They believed that students rely on staff to provide safety in the classroom and that if students feel threatened, then no one would attend. They stated that children cannot learn when their environment is not safe and removing a student from the premises who is selling drugs, assaulting others, or carrying a weapon to school makes it safer. No focus group students thought expulsions would create a safer learning environment.

Summary. The focus group students and more liberal educational community leaders have different concerns about safety and discipline than community leaders in education who support HB 93-1093. Community leaders in education who support HB 93-1093 believe the only responsibility of the school is to teach and the easiest way to do that is to remove disruptive

students from the educational setting. However, students and more liberal educational community leaders, who do not view schools as unsafe environments, would prefer a school climate that is more caring and focuses on long-term solutions to discipline issues. Parents, students and community leaders in education all agreed that specific preventive and alternative measures could be taken regarding expulsion and suspension and provided several policy recommendations for educators.

Effectively educating students in the twenty-first century will go beyond teaching out of a textbook and disciplining students must also go beyond traditional punishment.

Discussion and Policy Recommendations

Current and projected social and economic conditions of the Latino community such as increased poverty and a high dropout rate impacts how educational systems function. Effectively educating students in the twenty-first century will go beyond teaching out of a textbook and disciplining students must also go beyond traditional punishment. Students who are at-risk of being expelled from school can be put on the track to success if the right support systems are in place. A community leader in education summed up the difficulty of resolving discipline issues by saying, "I think this is a very complicated issue. I think the community and school agencies really need to get together to solve these dilemmas, because it's not just a school problem anymore, it is involving everyone."

Educational community leaders, parents, and students provided diverse recommendations focusing on prevention and alternative policies that address disciplinary issues in school. The spirit of these recommendations is reflected in this statement made by a community leader in education, "Many people feel, 'the heck with them, get them out of here — we don't need them.' Whereas, in fact, we do need the talents of many of these kids. We should work on making them positive role models instead of angry at society. They deserve a chance." To give students a chance, policy recommendations include providing alternatives for expelled students, improving the system of due process, addressing early prevention, requiring multicultural training for educators, offering counseling services and focusing on classroom structure.

Alternatives for Expelled Students

A concern of parents was that their child who had been expelled from school would get into more trouble if left alone at home with nothing constructive to do. Parents were also concerned that their child would fall behind academically, making it difficult or impossible to catch up and that the child would lose interest in school altogether and drop out of school. Parents

do not want schools to give up on their child. A focus group student offered a compassionate plea when stating, "There needs to be some way to help kids who want to get back into school to get an education. There are those who don't want to go to school, but some students just make a mistake."

One recommendation for students who have been expelled from school is to provide affordable educational alternatives for students so that they may continue their schooling either at home or at another school after the expulsion. This is especially important for low-income families who cannot afford tutors or private schooling. Students need to be able to either complete their courses or at least maintain their academic work so when they re-enter school they are not so far behind. Another alternative for students dismissed from school is to arrange employment opportunities where students can earn money and also have a positive job experience with the goal of bringing them back in the regular educational system or to a vocational center. In addition, the student can be rewarded for holding a job by offering academic credit toward graduation for employment experience.

Due Process

Some parents expressed frustration with the disciplinary process prior to and after their child's expulsion or suspension. At the beginning of the school year, all policies need to be explained very clearly and simply in the language the parent and student is most comfortable speaking and/or reading. In Colorado, written policies should automatically be provided in Spanish. In addition, parents expressed that they want more advanced notification from the school so the parent, school official, and student can work together to find a solution to pending problems. When disciplinary action is taken against a student, the student and parents should clearly understand the parameter of the expulsion and suspension process. Some parents would benefit from an advocate, a neutral person who can help the family understand the discipline process, ask the right questions, and understand what can be done to prevent the expulsion.

Students indicated that they expect school officials to be more understanding of their personal situations that may be at the root of their unacceptable behavior. In addition, concern was expressed that students are labeled because of who they associate with or if a sibling had disciplinary problems. It is recommended that school officials be cognizant of evaluating the students' behavior on an individual basis and discipline the student based on the individual situation.

Alternative Discipline Measures

Parents and students expressed a need for schools to rely on expulsion and suspension only as a last resort disciplinary action but to first utilize alternative discipline measures. Suggestions from parents, students and

community leaders in education included suspending students from school activities or assigning in-school punishments that are constructive, supervised, and with mandatory counseling. Another alternative to expulsion

Expelled kids have nothing to do all day and when you live in a neighborhood like I do, you do stuff that shouldn't be done.

and suspension is to require students to do community service work in school or the community with specified number of hours to be worked, and done in a formal manner with professional supervision. The premise behind community service work is that performing constructive work may allow the student to contribute and be of value, although the work is being done as a disciplinary measure. This would provide discipline for the student, and concurrently allow the student to be of service to the community. Providing alternative disciplinary action to expulsion also addresses the concern of having unsupervised youth outside the school system, perhaps being tempted into more trouble. As one focus group student said, "Expelled kids have nothing to do all day and when you live in a neighborhood like I do, you do stuff that shouldn't be done."

Early Prevention

Many of the expelled/suspended students interviewed had a history of discipline problems at school. Eighty-five percent of parents reported their child had been suspended for the first time in either elementary or middle school (grades 1 through 8). Half (52%) of parents reported their child's first expulsion occurred in middle school (grades 6 through 8). This is an indication that certain students were having trouble in their early school years and that being dismissed from school in earlier years may not have been an effective form of discipline. However, there are opportunities for intervention and prevention measures to be taken during different stages of academic life. For example, it is important to support early childhood education programs so that all children may have a stronger academic foundation. It has been determined that high quality early childhood programs have a long-term positive impact on the student's school performance and social behavior (Phlegar, 1987).

Parent Leadership Training

Parents play an important role in addressing school discipline issues, therefore, the relationship between parents and public school officials needs to be strengthened. One of the common concerns from community leaders in education was the lack of school involvement by parents with children who

were having problems in school. Yet, parents indicated that they were not comfortable with or knowledgeable about negotiating through the educational system. Parent leadership training may be an effective strategy for addressing these issues. For example, schools can work together with community based organizations to provide culturally competent leadership training to familiarize parents with how to work within the educational system in elementary, middle, and high school. Schools need to be supportive of parents who do not understand how the system works, how to communicate with the school administrator, counselor, teachers and to identify problems and work them through before a situation gets to a point of crisis. Sometimes providing a translator will be necessary.

In addition, schools need to encourage parents to participate in meaningful school activities. Encouraging Latino parents to get involved in school may take a different strategy than with non-Latino parents. For example, Amigos de la Comunidad, a successful parent leadership program at a predominately Latino Denver elementary school has a community walk at the beginning of each school year. Teachers, other school staff, and community volunteers visit homes with school supplies as a way to convey to parents they are welcome and to encourage school involvement. Approximately half (42%) of Colorado's Latino population, 25 years old and over, did not complete high school. The premise of Amigo's de la Comunidad's programs is that if these adults had negative experiences in the education system as students, it will be difficult for them to walk into the school building and get involved in their child's education without special efforts to make them feel welcome.

Multicultural Training for Educators

To better understand the Latino and other ethnic cultures, it is recommended that educators at all levels (e.g., administration, faculty, and staff) be required to participate in multicultural training. Teachers and school administrators need to be culturally competent in addressing the needs of an ethnically and racially diverse student population. The Denver public school system uses a family resource concept to develop cultural competency of its staff by sponsoring workshops with the involvement of community organizations. Family resource schools sponsor workshops for teachers and staff on poverty issues, community awareness, parental involvement, conflict management and developing family support activities to increase awareness of how staff can support families.

Through multicultural training, teachers will learn to recognize, evaluate, and intervene with disruptive students. Focus group students shared that disruptive students are looking to educators to "really care," to empathize with them, to talk to them about their problems, to learn what might be behind their errant behavior, and to help solve these problems. Students

reported that at-risk students need to have a significant adult in their lives to talk things out before they get caught up in a cycle of trouble. Instead of labeling kids as “bad,” the teachers should work hardest with disruptive students. Cultural competency also includes the need for improved communication. To ensure better communication with Latino students and parents it may be necessary to hire more Spanish speaking teachers, counselors, and other staff who have direct contact with students in addition to utilizing bilingual mentors.

Instead of labeling kids as “bad,” the teachers should work hardest with disruptive students.

Teachers should be rewarded for their effort to be culturally competent and the extra effort it takes to work with disruptive students. School systems could establish a merit-based salary system for teachers to ensure that caring, good job performance, and cultural competence are rewarded.

Counseling and Support Services

One of the complaints made about HB 93-1093 was that it offered a quick, short-term solution but didn't address the underlying causes to discipline problems. Schools, working in conjunction with community organizations, can utilize several of the preventive measures identified below to help address a students' behavior before it escalates to the point where the student is removed from school.

- Provide counseling services to the student and parents. The parents surveyed recognized that their children were having problems but did not know what to do to help their child. One of five parents interviewed (21.9%, n=7) had sought out parent counseling services in the past five years.
- Offer conflict resolution training for teachers and parents, and require it of all students. Include behavior modification in the schools for disruptive students with the help of a professional counselor.
- Provide comprehensive and realistic drug abuse awareness education. Offer intervention and treatment for students with a substance abuse problem. Eleven percent of students expelled in the Colorado public school system were expelled for selling drugs (Colorado Department of Education, 1995, August).
- Guidance centers need to accommodate parents who work, especially single parents, by remaining open into the evening and administrators should be available for phone calls on weekends. Schools should understand that the typical 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. school day may not accommodate or meet the needs of families when parents work.

- A social worker is needed in every school. Social workers and nurses in the schools could help principals and teachers identify students who are having trouble. Psychology and social-work student interns from local colleges could donate their time in schools as part of their training.
- Establish support groups for students with behavior problems.
- Establish mentor programs for disruptive students. Ensure that the mentors are ethnically and linguistically diverse.

It is important to recognize that schools cannot provide all these services alone but must help parents and students utilize existing culturally competent services in their community.

Classroom Structure

During a discussion of teaching styles in one of the focus group sessions, a student burst into tears when she revealed that she never got good grades until she had a teacher who cared about her and had a creative teaching style. Up until that time in her schooling, she didn't believe she could be an achieving student. Focus group students indicated they enjoyed classes and had respect for teachers who made learning fun by doing "hands-on" activities or provided other stimulation rather than just talking at the student. It was also noted that it is important for teachers to make the student feel he/she can do good work. It is recommended that students be taught according to their interests in a meaningful way which is realistic and related to their lives.

In addition, smaller classrooms would help academically at-risk students who need more individual attention. When the classroom is overcrowded, the teacher does not have the time needed to give one-on-one attention to a student who is academically at-risk, "so they end up just having to put them out so that they can try to manage the rest of the kids" according to a community leader in education. Even at the elementary school level teachers struggle in large classes to pay adequate attention to their students, and teachers in middle and high school may see 150 to 200 students a day (Ascher, 1994).

Another recommendation is to integrate into the regular school programs a blend of advanced academic instruction with occupational instruction and experience, so that, in the words of a community leader in education, "kids don't feel like they've got to leave to get what it is that they really are looking for. If there is a balance between those kind of creative things that have a way of getting a child's interest, maybe it could help them to get through their core subjects." In addition extra-curricular activities and other programs particularly in elementary and middle school may help keep a students' interested in their academic instruction.

Conclusion

House Bill 93-1093 allows educators to remove disruptive students from the school setting but there is an increasing group of children who are not getting educated. In Colorado, Latino and African American children are disproportionately affected by the discipline process. Society needs to be concerned about what it would mean if these children do not complete high school or even worse, end up in the criminal justice system. If these children's problems are not addressed and they become detached from the educational system then we risk losing future teachers, scientists, doctors, and engineers. Each student that is educated will increase this nation's productivity. Expelled students are the people who will be contributing to the federal, state and local tax base and supporting a growing elderly population. The average annual cost of educating a student in Colorado is approximately \$4,300 a year (Colorado Department of Education, 1993, March). The average cost of incarcerating an adult in Colorado is approximately \$21,000 a year (State of Colorado, 1995). It makes good business sense to appropriate dollars toward culturally competent preventive measures that involve parents, schools, students, businesses, and the community.

The average annual cost of educating a student in Colorado is approximately \$4,300 a year. The average cost of incarcerating an adult in Colorado is approximately \$21,000 a year.

Each year since 1993 when HB 93-1093 was enacted, legislation has been proposed to provide alternative schools for expelled students, only to be defeated. To date in the 1996 Colorado legislative session, \$500,000 has been approved to be awarded to schools and groups that will provide alternative education programs. This is a step in the right legislative direction to counteract the negative effects of HB 93-1093. If expulsions were effective as a discipline measure, discipline problems in school would be decreasing, but the problem continues. Most of the expelled students interviewed had been expelled or suspended in the past and continued to have discipline problems because the solution to the problem was not adequately addressed. Expulsions are a short-term solution to a long-term problem.

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FORUM

THE ROLE OF HISPANICS IN THE 1996 ELECTION

March 17, 1996

The ARCO Forum Of Public Affairs, Kennedy School

Presented by the Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy. Co-sponsored by the Institute of Politics at the Kennedy School of Government.

The Honorable Esteban Torres, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-CA)

Antonio Gonzalez, President, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project

Ramona Martinez, Member, City Council, Denver, CO and Democratic Candidate for U.S. Senate

Antonio Monroig, Chairman, Republican National Hispanic Assembly

Raul Yzaguirre, President, National Council of La Raza

Michael Jones-Correa (Moderator), Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University

Michael Jones-Correa: Thank you all for coming here tonight. We have the honor to have with us a tremendous panel to talk about the 1996 elections, and Latinos and the role that they will play. There are now about 25 million Latinos in the United States, 10 percent of the national population, and for the last 25 years Latinos have been playing a greater and greater role in politics.

The question is, what will we do now? That's the question we'll have our panelists try to answer or at least give their views and experiences tonight. We have with us tonight five speakers; Antonio Gonzalez, who's currently the president of the Southwest Voter Registration Project and the Southwest Voter Research Institute, with which he has worked since 1984. The Southwest Voter Project is a non partisan, non profit organization, designed to encourage Latino participation in politics.

We also have with us Councilwoman Ramona Martinez of Denver. She's been active in city and regional politics since 1974. This is her third term in the Denver City Council. She served twice as the President of the City Council, and is currently a candidate for the United States Senate.

We also have with us Antonio Monroig. He's been active in the Republican National Hispanic Assembly, both as co-chairman and as General Counsel, and in the New Progressive Party in Puerto Rico. He was also Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 1981 to 1986.

Also with us is Representative Esteban Torres, who was appointed Ambassador to UNESCO in 1976, and has been representing the 34th Congressional District since 1982.

Finally, we have with us Raul Yzaguiere, who has been President of the National Council La Raza for many years. As you all know, NCLR is the largest constituency based national Hispanic organization and the leading Latino think tank in Washington, D.C....

We'd like you to welcome our panelists tonight. Please give them a warm welcome.

[Applause.]

I'll be your moderator. I'm Professor Michael Jones-Correa, and after the panelists speak each for five to seven minutes, then we'll have questions, where you all can grill our panel. Our first speaker for tonight will be Congressman Esteban Torres.

Esteban Torres: Thank you very much. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen for your warm welcome. Thank you for being here tonight. I'm enthused about the size of the crowd. It shows that you're interested in what we represent, what views we'll have tonight. I hope that we can satisfy some of those inquiries.

I think we're here at a very crucial time in the history of our country. I think that the events that are taking place in America today, and events taking place on the world scene, are critical to the future of our community. As a member of Congress, coming from the Latino community, I see a particular role that I can play as we begin to grapple with the issues of where we stand in the spectrum of American politics.

We all know that a great Cold War has ended. It has made tremendous shifts in the politics and the geopolitics of nations. We know that regionally there are many, many challenges that are before us. A Latino summit was held not too long ago to deal with the questions of economic and social integration of the hemisphere. This country has set about a new policy of trade, as it adopted the North American Free Trade Agreement. We are seeing in current

days the polemics of politics as they take place in the Caribbean, the U.S. vis-a-vis Cuba. We've seen the demise, if you will, of dictatorships in Central America, in the rest of the Americas. We're seeing some rather dynamic developments in our neighbor to the south, Mexico. And the turmoil that country goes through in its economic and political process. We're seeing uprisings in Mexico, and how those will play upon the Mexican leadership in the future of the country, and all of that is having an effect on us, on the United States, on the southwest.

It'll have an effect on us because it will temper the immigration policies that our country has to begin to look at, as our country becomes more retrenched in anti immigrant polemics and feelings. There is a feeling out there that the Southern Hemisphere is inundating the United States. That we no longer control our borders, therefore, cannot control our social mores to some degree. That Latinos from across the border are inundating our school systems and our social systems, and that they're having an effect on the American economy, on American workers.

All of these aspects obviously mean that as elected officials, community leaders, you, as students, and future policy makers, have to begin to take a clear view of the defining process of what and how you're going to partake.

...[W]e've not been the kind of community that raises tremendous political funds. I think we're changing. I think we're understanding that you need to have some economic clout to back up the campaigns of individuals who will represent us.

What are we going to do as a community as we face the not too far from now Presidential election? Where will we fall in that particular aspect? What will we do? How will we be able to promote, coalesce, move those voters that think like some of us think towards the two political parties that will vie against each other?

I'm a Democrat. I have to make that know from the very beginning here to you. I'm for the reelection of the president. I am for pursuing the policies that his administration has set forth. They are not all complete. I don't agree with everything, but I think that we have to begin to play the role where some of the things that the Clinton Administration doesn't want to do, where they say, "No." We can make them say, "Yes."

I think that's to the degree that we have to then concentrate on the body politic. How will we as Latinos in the United States formulate our political strategies from one perspective of late, and I think with any kind of political

campaign you need financing to make sure that you're able to elect the people that represent our community.

Heretofore, we've not been the kind of community that raises tremendous political funds. I think we're changing. I think we're understanding that you need to have some economic clout to back up the campaigns of individuals who will represent us in the United States Congress, and in the House and in the Senate and eventually in other appointed positions.

Therefore, we need to restructure Hispanic PAC USA into a national entity with large scale funding to promote the candidacies of qualified candidates, Latinas and Latinos across this country. I think we need to break down to regional levels to do that. But it's the one way we can affect the body politic in the United States, make our sentiments known, elect our people to the House, to the governing bodies, so that we can bring about the kinds of objectives that as a community have fought so hard for so many years to try to attempt. Thank you.

Antonio Gonzalez: Thank you. Buenas Noches. Let me cut right to the chase. I don't want to bury my lead. I want to take you to November 6th, 1996 and tell you what will be the post election analysis as far as Latino participation in the '96 elections.

I'll tell you now what I'll be saying on November 6th, because I'm so certain of it. What I'm going to say on November 6th, 1996 is that the Latino electorate will have broken every record in political participation in its history.

Since 1976 we have been the fastest growing group in the country in terms of registration and voting. We have expressed a massive movement towards political participation, more than tripling the number of elected officials. We had only about 1,300 in 1976. We will break 5,000 in 1996.

Latinos will have over six million registered voters, and nearly five million of them will have voted. Latinos will have elected hundreds of new elected officials, and it will be over 5,000 in terms of elected officials in the country. Latinos will have increased by over 25 percent their participation over 1992, far outpacing the increase in national participation.

In November, 1996 Latinos will have, for the first time in history, broken through and taken Congressional seats in mid decade. Something that has never been done before. Congressional, new seats are normally taken in the first one or two terms after the 10 year redistricting.

All those things Latinos will do. We are absolutely certain of it. There are many factors that go into this. Let me tell you why we'll do those things. First off, it's important to understand that Latinos have been increasing at a record breaking level their political participation for 20 years. Since 1976 we have been the fastest growing group in the country in terms of registration and voting. We have expressed a massive movement towards political participation, more than tripling the number of elected officials. We had only about 1,300 in 1976. We will break 5,000 in 1996.

Proposition 187 created tremendous anger and passion in the Latino community. So that you have great numbers of new citizens coming through the process.

We had about two and a half million registered voters in 1976. We will break five million in 1996. We had about three and a half million registered voters in 1976; we will break six and a half million in 1996. These things have been happening because of a general movement towards participation. Generally speaking, Latinos are the contrarian group in American politics. While most groups are dropping out, Latinos are dropping in.

Latinos, because of our immigrant heritage want to be part of the American system, and in fact, often have to kick the door down to get in. That has been happening; that will continue to happen, but there are other factors that are involved that are speeding up and broadening that giant parade towards power, if you will. What are they?

First off, there is a backlash against the backlash against Latinos in the United States. That is the movement against immigrants. Proposition 187, and in many of the cute things that are being done in Congress, unfortunately, and not by gentlemen like this (referring to Torres), but by others have [has] created tremendous anger and passion in the Latino community. So that you have great numbers of new citizens coming through the process [...] now, where we had lagged as a people in that area before. Huge numbers. In Los Angeles County for example over a hundred thousand per year are becoming new citizens. These are basically Mexicanos and Central Americans.

We expect there to be a very close election in states where Latinos are concentrated. Latinos tend to be concentrated in 10 key states. They are not as spread out as other ethnic groups. Those states include mega states like Florida, Texas, New York, California, Illinois and other key states that will be very much in play like Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, New Jersey and your own Massachusetts.

Moreover, these hot elections, these close elections, will be in play at every level. No matter what anybody says, this Presidential race is going to

be a squeaker. It will be very close. You heard it here. And Latinos will be a very important factor in it.

Moreover, these will be very contested races at the Congressional level. So that, for example, in a place like Texas, which no matter what, is going to go Republican at the Presidential level, at the Congressional level will be hotly, hotly contested between the Democrats and Republicans.

Third, there will be very hot races at the state legislative level. This is increasingly important because, why? In the year 2000, there will be another redistricting and the Voting Rights Act will not be in play in the same way that it is now because of recent Supreme Court decisions. Therefore organizing for more, and better Congressional and state legislative districts in the year 2000 means that one has to organize and contest at the state legislative level in 1996 and 1998.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there will be many hot issues that will keep the passion high in the Latino community such as the question of immigration and immigrant rights in the nation. Remember, about 40 percent of all Latinos are foreign born, 40 percent conservatively. This means immigration will be a great interest in our community's voter participation in the Presidential election.

Other questions like Affirmative Action will be debated in key states as well. Even the budget issue, which was not resolved, will drag on. And contained within the budget issue are key elements that are important to Latinos because they deal with questions of the social safety net; questions of education, questions of welfare, questions of Medicaid, which are important to our community, which tends to be working middle class, working class and poor.

So you put all that together finally and that is why we think we will break every record in 1996 and our influence will be at a level that it has never been before. Thank you.

Ramona Martinez: Well, it is indeed my pleasure to be here this evening, and I want to tell you, Antonio, I think you're certainly right. I think we're going to make a lot of strides in the 1996 election, and I hope I'm one of them. As most of you know, I am running for the United States Senate; the first time a Latina from the State of Colorado has ever attempted to run for the United States Senate.

But I want to take a few minutes this evening to tell you a little bit about what I've been doing and why I have determined that Latinos and Latinas in 1996 will definitely play a very strong role in the future of our country.

About six days ago I stood on the steps of the state capitol in the City and County of Denver. There was a group of young students that were there.

They were protesting because the State of Colorado will have an initiative similar to Proposition 187 on the ballot in November. They were concerned that they would not have the same educational opportunities if that in fact happens.

Well, I was there with them because I truly believe that a local elected official should be at those types of functions to let the folks know that you care about them. And not only that; you also believe in what they're doing—Equal opportunity for everybody in this country.

But when I got up to make my remarks to these young people, I said, "You know, you can be here and you can protest and you can protest. But if you're not registered and you don't vote you can't complain." And they listened to me and I said, "I want you to go back to your universities and I want you to start thinking about how many of you are registered and how many of you have voted in the past." Because there's nothing more important in 1996 than to register and vote. That was my message to them that day.

...[W]hen you run for national office there are no Latinos that you can pick out of this catalog of political consultants. There are no Latinos that you can look at for national media consultants. And there are no Latinos that you can look at for fund raising.

This Saturday, I was at a function at Kaiser Permanente Latino Association, an association that decided they needed to organize Latinos in this huge HMO and create for them a voice. I also spoke to them and my message was basically the same. If they didn't get involved in their local organization and they didn't start at a grass root level and they didn't go out and register to vote and participate in what is now probably one of the most unpopular, I think, professions in the country, and that's politics and elected office, that we will never ever have our true voices at the table.

And I have found that in this campaign and going across the State of Colorado as we have—and I want to point out a young man that is with me this evening, because he will be able to write his own ticket once I'm elected. And that's my campaign manager, John Soto, Jr. John, raise your hand.

I want to bring that up because I think it's important for you to know that, when you run for national office [...] and you run for United States Senate, there are no Latinos that you can pick out of this catalog of political consultants. There are no Latinos that you can look at for [...] media consultants, national media consultants. And there are no Latinos that you can look at for fund raising.

I was very disappointed to find out that there wasn't any Latinos in the catalog that the Women's Campaign Fund has out there; Emily's List and all the national women organizations, who, by the way, are supporting me. They didn't have the names of Latinos in those books. But I wanted my campaign to reflect who I am. And that's the Latina, that's the Councilwoman, that's the mother, the grandmother, the businesswoman and the local elected official. We have that in our campaign.

By the way, I'm the oldest one in the whole office. Everybody else may be under 30. The reason I wanted to do that is because I think that running for a national office has to be more than just you winning. When I became the first president of City Council in 1991, I said—and I was the first Latina to ever be elected to the Denver City Council as President—I said, "My goal is not to be the first, but to make sure I'm not the last."

And today Debbie Ortega sits as the President of City Council. And the last five years on the City Council the leadership has been run by a Latina woman. Five years. And I'm still trying to figure out how the guy snuck in one year. But we got rid of him after the first year. Because the goal was to make sure Debbie Ortega was the next President.

That's what my campaign and my involvement in the political process has always been about. We have to open those doors. But we can't do it alone. As Congressman Torres mentioned in his remarks, our economy and our ability to raise money for these races is going to be more important than ever. Because when I got into the race, they looked at me and said, "She can't raise money. She's a Latina, she's a woman. For God sakes, how is she ever going to win?"

Well, you can. You can raise money. You have to change your style a little bit, but it's possible. I found that you can raise money once you establish your credibility as a candidate, credibility measured by the amount of people that support you and an increase in your polls, as mine have in this race.

But there is no question that in order for me to win or for any Latino or Latina in this country to win in 1996 there will have to be a tremendous voter registration drive and also get out to vote drive in order for our people to get to the polls.

I have heard over and over again in this campaign from other groups that have supported my candidacy that, "Ramona, you have an uphill battle because your people don't vote." "Ramona, you have an uphill battle because they don't know how to dig in their pockets." And finally, the men certainly don't support the women.

I think to this point we are proving them wrong. I think in 1996 with your involvement and your participation we will certainly prove that the

Latinos in this country will have a voice and will have a strong presence in the United States Senate and in the Congress. Thank you.

Antonio Monroig: Buenas noches. I feel very good being in such good company of such distinguished colleagues, many who have been friends for many years. And because I attended the Kennedy School of Government in an executive program in 1978. On the last night our group had a farewell party and it was held in this same room, which had not yet been inaugurated, because they had not finished the building. So it's a little emotional coming back to be a speaker here, even though throughout the years I have come back many times to visit.

I wish Mr. Gonzalez' predictions were true. But I am not as optimistic. Just perusing the voting and registration in the election for November, 1994, I have seen some very disturbing numbers. In the general population 62 percent of eligible persons are registered. In the Hispanic community, unfortunately, from 62 that falls to only 30 percent. Out of 17,000,000 eligible Hispanics, only 5.2 million are registered.

I then look at the general population in 1994. Of those registered, 44 percent in the general population voted, while only 19 percent in the Hispanic community vote. Those numbers are very disturbing. I agree very much with Ms. Martinez that our big task is to register our people, and they have to vote.

In democracy those that stay home don't count. The ones that count are the ones that go to the poll, express their opinions. On the positive side, yes, we happen to be in the states with big electoral votes, California, Florida, New York, Texas, Illinois, and that's very important; it gives us some leverage.

But still, I think that to carry the Latino agenda, we have to get our people registered, and we have to get them to vote. I think that the Hispanic community, politically suffers because of an identification problem. The Congress of the United States with all its wisdom defines individuals as white, black, and then a group called Hispanic. However, most "Hispanics" that were born in the country don't call themselves Hispanic. In addition, "Hispanics" come from different parts of the country, and we have different interests.

For example, the big three groups: the Mexican-American community, the Puerto Rican community, and the Cuban-American community, have very different policy concerns. It's very difficult to speak with one voice. For the Mexican Americans immigration is a big issue. For the Cubans it's foreign policy. For the Puerto Ricans it's the status of Puerto Rico.

Probably Puerto Ricans on the immigration issue will tend to fall in a different position than the Mexican-Americans in California, because we in Puerto Rico are being overrun by illegal immigrants coming from the Dominican Republic.

So we have the problem that we face different issues in our different communities. Proof of this is that the Hispanic community never has had a leader that speaks for all. For example, the Black community had Martin Luther King.

An example of this fractured leadership was the Congressional passage of NAFTA, where the Hispanic members of Congress voted on both sides of the issue. Some Hispanics followed the unions; they get a lot of support from the unionized vote. Others were on the border, but ended up for NAFTA. While, the Cubans voted against NAFTA, even though they're mostly Republican, and most of the Republican party voted for NAFTA.

...[I]t is good that we have a presence in both political parties. As a result of this we are not taken for granted by one party, and ignored by the other party.

In fact, NAFTA passed because of the Republican party; most Democrats voted against it. But the two Republicans in Congress voted against NAFTA, because they're Cuban Americans. Since Mexico has been friendly to Fidel Castro, they wanted to get at Fidel Castro so they voted against NAFTA. By the way, I favor NAFTA very strongly.

I think that the 21st century if we get registered, and we vote can be the century of the Hispanics, as has been mentioned here before. In population size, we will be the largest minority group, but this will not suffice if we continue exhibit the smallest voter turnout. We will not realize the that corresponds to our size, if we don't express ourselves at the polls.

The Hispanic community generally has been very supportive of the Democratic party, but there are signs that this is changing. For example, in the recent election in New York, Rudolph Giuliani received a sizable portion of the Hispanic vote in New York City.

When I served as Assistant Secretary of HUD, in 1981, there was one Republican Hispanic Congressman, Manuel Luhan. Today there are three. And their presence is growing. Many Hispanics moving out of the central cities, second generation, more educated, higher income, and suburban, are beginning to register as Republicans. This holds true for the Puerto Rican migration to Orlando, Florida. This group is registering about 65 to 70 percent Republican.

I think it is good that we have a presence in both political parties. As a result of this we are not taken for granted by one party, and ignored by the other party. I think that we have to be in both parties so that we influence the party in power at all times. I think that's very important.

I look forward to having good representation at the national conventions. We have to get our people involved, attend those conventions, get elected delegates, and participate in the programs of the parties, register, register, register and get out the vote. Thank you.

Raul Yzaguirre: Muchas gracias. Thank you for the invitation, and thank all of you for being interested in this topic. It's good to be back in the forum. It's good to be back in these walls. I'm very grateful to the preceding panelists, because the good part of being the last speaker is that you have a chance to join some of these issues and bring them together.

I think we have an issue on the floor and that is whether we're a fractious, divided, separated community or whether we are in fact, a political force that can exercise some power. The downside, of course, to Antonio's paradigm of being able to have influence on both parties, is that you can cancel each other out, and therefore, neutralize your votes.

I guess I want to talk about that issue by sharing with you an epiphany that I had here at Harvard in '89. If you will remember back in '89, the hot topic at that time was the breakup of the Soviet Union. I was a fellow here. As you may know, one of the privileges that you have being a fellow at the Institute of Politics is that you get to invite whomever you want for lunch, and they are obligated to come and have lunch with you every Thursday at noon.

At that time, we were fortunate enough to have with us at Harvard the person who was advising President Bush on the breakup of the Soviet Union. He came down, and we had a nice chat. My study group and I wanted to understand what was happening in the Soviet Union, and something about the ethnic breakup, and the ethnic tensions. We asked him some questions, and he proceeded to tell us a little story.

Before I tell you the story, let me tell you another story that I grew up with. Because then they'll make some sense to you. I grew up with a story about the "crabs." Antonio and Esteban, I'm sure know the story of the "crabs." Ramona may also know this story, though your much younger, so maybe you don't.

We have different ways of saying it, but supposedly Lyndon Baines Johnson was barbecuing one day, and somebody asked him about the Mexican vote in the State of Texas.

LBJ's guest said, "Well Mexican-American's are almost a third of the population, aren't you afraid that they're going to rise up and take on the establishment." LBJ turned around to him and said "Listen I don't worry about the Mexicans. See that tub of crabs over there? You notice I don't put a lid on top of that tub. And you know why I don't need to put a lid on it? Because there is no way they are going to get out. The minute one of them gets on top of another just about at the point that they're reaching to get out, some other one will reach up and bring him down."

So that was the crab story that we all grew up hearing. You're all nodding your heads. You know that you've heard this story. And there was enough of the truth as Antonio has indicated, to kind of make us a little bit uneasy.

Okay, back to our IOP guest: when this fellow came to Harvard and told me about what was happening in the Soviet Union, he told me a story of his own. He said, "Let me tell you about the joke in the Soviet Union. There's a joke in the Soviet Union about a fairy godmother, and the fairy godmother goes to a Frenchman, and says to the Frenchman, 'I'm your fairy godmother, you have one wish. What would you like?' The Frenchman says, 'I want a chateau on the Mediterranean.' So the fairy godmother says, 'Phoom! You got it.' The fairy godmother then asks an Englishman the same question. The Englishman says, 'I want a castle.' So the fairy godmother says 'Phoom! You got a castle.' So then she goes to a Russian peasant, and she says, 'I'm your fairy godmother, what do you want?' The peasant says, 'You know, my neighbor has a goat. I don't have a goat. Kill my neighbor's goat.'"

I said, wait a minute, didn't I hear that story before? Isn't that kind of like the crab story?

The very following day, the guy who used to occupy my office came by to visit me. He had been a previous fellow, and he happened to have been the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Delaware, and also Chinese. During his visit he told me "I'm so admiring of you Latinos, because you've got it together. We Chinese, the minute one of us makes it ahead, somebody grabs and pulls him down." I said to myself where did I hear that story before?

The epiphany that I had was that I realized at that very moment that we were not talking about a Latino trait, we were not talking about a Russian trait, we were not talking about a Chinese trait. What we're talking about is the same phenomena that happens with any oppressed community.

The only way you get beyond that is to begin to have a sense of power, because when you feel downtrodden, the thing that's most threatening is for somebody else getting ahead of you. Instead of feeling empowered, you feel a sense of being left behind. This is something that I think we all need to understand.

Now, you see everything that both Antonios said is true. It depends on what space of time you're talking about and where you're at. However, it's not just important to understand the truth. It's also important to understand the facts behind the truth.

First of all, let's get rid of the notion that there's something genetic or culturally wrong with being Latino. The fact of the matter is that in Puerto Rico Antonio, as you know, you get 95 or 97 percent of the people on election day to come out and vote. That means that there's nothing culturally inhibiting us from voting. I was monitoring the Mexican elections during the last presidential

election. People walked 30, 40, 50 miles to come out to vote. We would be proud to have the voting turnout in the United States that Mexico had.

There's nothing about being Mexican, being Puerto Rican, being Cuban, being anything that makes us not vote.

What keeps us from not voting? There's no mystery about it. There's really no mystery about it. Who doesn't vote in this country? The poor don't vote. We have the lowest per capita income. Who doesn't vote in this country? The uneducated don't vote. We have the lowest educational attainment of any group in this country. The young don't vote. We're the youngest group in this country. On and on and on.

Also the other reality is that traditionally—although I think it's changing—and Antonio Gonzales indicated this to you, we, as immigrants, used to not naturalize. We had the lowest naturalization rate of most people. But you know what? It is exactly the same naturalization rate as the other contiguous country: Canada.

There's nothing about being Anglo Saxon presumably that keeps you from wanting to naturalize. But there's something about coming from a contiguous country that keeps you from being naturalized, and it doesn't have anything to do with being Mexican, or Latino.

In sum, it is not culture that influences voting rates. Therefore, we shouldn't begin to self flagellate, and blame ourselves or blame the victim for the crime. I think we become much more empowered when recognize this because these are not intractable realities. We're not always going to be poor. We're not always going to be young, and I'm the living proof of that.

The other question is, is there such a thing as a Latino community? It's important to understand the nuances and the differences, but it's also important to understand that there are things that bring us together.

The fact of the matter is that the polls show almost unanimity in the Latino community along certain issues. In support for civil rights, we are all united. For bilingual education, there exists more support in the conservative Republican Cuban American community than there is in the Puerto Rican so-called liberal Democratic community. For Affirmative Action in business, there is more support found in the conservative Republican Hispanic community than there is in the rest of the Latino community. Bilingual education, language, citizenship, immigration, civil rights: these issues have been identified by pollsters as very unifying.

Another area of common ground is found in the media. Everywhere I go, interest and concerns rise, when I point to the fact that only one percent of the images on television are Hispanic, and that we're now portrayed more negatively than any other group in this country. We went from three percent in the '50's to one percent now. That gets people angry, and it gets them excited, and it gets them united.

What is also real is that, of course, regional minorities are now becoming a national minority. There simply weren't Puerto Ricans in California. But now you go to San Jose, California and you find 70,000 Puerto Ricans. At one time, there weren't Mexican-Americans in Florida. Now you go to Homestead (Florida), and you find tens of thousands; 40, 50, 60, a hundred thousand Mexican-Americans in the southeast.

When you turn on the television or read through a newspaper, all our policies, all our discussions, all our debates, everything has been characterized in a black-white paradigm. This has caused an enormous disservice to legitimate discussions about issues, about race relations, and about ethnic relations.

At one time, you didn't see Mexican-Americans in New York City, now you got 300 to 400 thousand Mexican-Americans living in the City of New York. This change in population has made us much more of a united community. I've been around this country and found as strong similarities between Puerto Ricans from the Bronx as Mexican-American from East LA. Differences we once attributed to ethnic subgroups are, in fact, expressions of our geographic reality.

Here's a second point, Ashkenazic Jews didn't think Sephardic Jews were real Jews. But, something happened. The Sicilians never thought that they were Italians, and the northern Italian never thought they were never Italians. But, something happened. What happened? Group persecution.

What happened to the Jews? The holocaust. What happened with Italians? They got defamed by the media; they were all tagged as Mafioso's. All of a sudden there became an Italian identity that previously did not exist.

Regardless of what we think of our differences, there are bigots out there who can't tell the difference between a Puerto Rican and a Dominican. So to bigots, we're all Spics. Let's understand that. So that reality is going to manifest itself and it's going to make a difference.

Let me just end by sharing with you a couple of other thoughts. When you turn on the television or read through a newspaper, all our policies, all our discussions, all our debates, everything has been characterized in a black-white paradigm. This has caused an enormous disservice to legitimate discussions about issues, about race relations, and about ethnic relations. Changing demographics are so compelling, this has to end. I will end with an optimistic view of our future.

Listen, I got it from the horse's mouth, I talked to the folks in the Presidential political campaigns, they understand very clearly that the Latino vote may well decide the election of the President of the United States in 1996. Thank you.

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