

Volume 3, 1988-1989

COMMENTARY

Clara Rodriguez

FORUM

The Hon. Xavier Suarez

Willie Velasquez

Harry Pachon

Maria Berriozabal

Frank del Olmo



# JOURNAL OF HISPANIC POLICY

FEATURE INTERVIEW

Gloria Molina

POLICY PERSPECTIVE

Ruth Thomas

FEATURE ARTICLES

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## DEDICATION

*William C. Velasquez*  
1944–1988

### “Of Kings and Leaders”

They all came. From L.A. and Boston, from Philadelphia and Phoenix. There were leaders from the past, leaders of the present, and leaders of the future. There were mayors and governors, would-be mayors and would-be governors. They sat in wooden benches. They knelt on tiled floors.

Throughout the service, babies cried. At first, annoying, but later, one realized that this would be music to Willie’s ears. He did, after all, dedicate his life to their future.

A cynic questioned T.V. cameras in a church. They seemed to grow more appropriate—the celebration of this requiem should be shared. Our bodies were swollen with emotion. I prayed that they not sing “De Colores” for fear of a grotesque display of love. We *machos* are not paid to display.

This was another well organized Southwest Voter event. Ocanas was ushering. Sookiasian was advancing for the next President. Meza passed out bloodred carnations. It was as it should be.

The bell began to toll. I thought of a distant conversation. Willie discussing the concept of leadership. The notion that some men believe their station in life is theirs because of divine Providence. These were the “kings.” Some sat in Congress, others in various and sundry elective offices. Whatever one thought of these “kings”—like or dislike, respect or disdain—one had to contend with their political personas. In Willie’s world there was also the “leader.” The man (or woman) who maintained his position in the community by virtue of his continuing hard work—his respect for and love of the people he served. Those were the people Willie sought out. He nurtured their friendship. He was rewarded with their success.

William C. Velasquez is gone now. Having achieved the ultimate, he was both king and leader. He loved and was loved.

—Richard Hernandez  
Houston, Texas  
1988

### “Keep His Light Burning”

God sent us Willie for just a little while. A humble man of integrity with an unassuming style. He sent to us this fighter, with a very caring heart. To plan, to work, to think and set a fire burning, that never more will part.

God gave him courage and a glorious wit, a mind full of ideas and many goals to meet. Devotion to family and love for his people; in the pool of complacency, he made a powerful ripple. His work days were long, his commitment, without end. The common man mattered. His will never bent. His word was like gold, one of a kind. He set this world thinking, with that inquiring mind.

He loved his country, as he knew it so well. *Mejicanos* helped make it so, their story he'd tell. He wanted opportunity to be equal for all. "*Su voto es su voz*," he said, to make us stand tall.

For those who pay tributes, there is only one that can count. We shall KEEP HIS LIGHT BURNING so that Willie's "*voz*" will thunder, as *Mejicanos* mount.

*Gracias hermano*, you left your indelible mark. Your light shines brightly, illuminating the dark. We hold it up with honor—your ideals, to uphold. Your struggle, your dream—your life. . . you lived it so bold!

—Frank Herrera, Jr.  
San Antonio, Texas  
1988

The work of Willie Velasquez and the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project changed the political posture of Hispanics in the United States.

Their work will continue to open doors for all Americans.

—Henry G. Cisneros  
Mayor of San Antonio  
1988

*The Journal of Hispanic Policy* is a publication committed to the task of bringing issues that affect the Hispanic community in the U.S. to a national forum for contemplation, discussion and debate. We shared that commitment with Willie Velasquez while he was alive; we continue to share that commitment with those who would follow in his steps.

During our Forum event in the winter of 1988, entitled "Hispanics in the Political Process: A Growing Influence," Mr. Velasquez stated "What you're really seeing here is the entrance of a large group of people—who, for many years, did not participate in the electoral process—entering *into* that electoral process. . . You're seeing a transition from powerlessness to power." His statement was met with the applause and overwhelming enthusiasm of Harvard's Hispanic students present at the event. Empowerment. It gave us a vision of what could be—with the essential diligence, discipline and organization—for Hispanic America in the very near future; it ignited in us that "fire" that Herrera mentioned above. A year later, that fire drives us to achieve our utmost potential for *la causa*, for our families, and for ourselves. It is a fire that enables us to persevere under trial, to press on in the face of adversity, to succeed in our endeavors—and in our hearts. It is a fire that sets our minds aflame with new ideas for helping those in need—be they Hispanic or otherwise—and new methods for implementing those ideas. "We are seeing in Hispanic politics a realignment based on ideas, not race," Mr. Velasquez stated in 1982. We share that same conviction; we share that same dream; and we strive to realize the goals and objectives we have set for ourselves and our respective communities.

It is to the memory of the man who inspired us that cold winter night in March at Harvard's School of Government that we, most appropriately, dedicate this volume.



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## EDITOR'S REMARKS

In 1985, the *Journal of Hispanic Policy* was introduced under the title of the *Journal of Hispanic Politics*. The *Journal* was conceived and is published entirely by Hispanic graduate students of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

In our introductory issue, the founding editor, Henry A.J. Ramos, introduced the *Journal's* primary goals. First among these goals is the development of the *Journal* as a nonpartisan, authoritative, scholarly information source—innovative, responsive and practical—on the U.S. Hispanic community's political, social and economic development. The *Journal* serves as a forum for both the presentation of new policy ideas and techniques, and the analysis and debate of existing ones. Articles are solicited from academics and graduate students, elected and appointed officials and representatives of business, labor and community interests. Article selection is intended to provide a well-balanced publication which appeals to a broad national audience of both Hispanic and non-Hispanic readers.

A second goal of the *Journal* is to facilitate consensus and cooperation among the individual groups which comprise the U.S. Hispanic community. The term "Hispanic" is used broadly to include U.S. residents of Spanish origin or descent who classify themselves in one of several specific categories listed on U.S. census questionnaires. These categories include: "Mexican," "Puerto Rican," "Cuban," or "other Spanish/Hispanic" origin (such as Central or South American). While we acknowledge that the range of ideologies and concerns of all Hispanic subgroups is individually and collectively as diverse as any other segment of society, we also believe the *Journal* is one way to emphasize shared concerns and overcome past differences.

A third goal is to provide and maintain the *Journal's* organizational structure in order to ensure quality and facilitate stability, as one class of students graduates, and another class enters. The constant influx of staff members provides the *Journal* with an opportunity to utilize fresh perspectives and ideas, while Executive and Editorial Advisory Boards of established Hispanic community and academic leaders encourage community-mindedness and continuity in each successive *Journal* issue.

Our final and most important goal is to provide a financial base which ensures the *Journal's* viability. The *Journal* has received funding support from a variety of individuals and institutions which have made this third issue a reality. The *Journal* has also benefitted from generous in-kind assistance provided by the Center for Business and Government/Public Policy and Corporate Management Program and the Institute of Politics (IOP)/Forum Administration. This assistance alone, however, will not sustain our efforts. We are currently seeking additional funding from public and private sources. If you or your organization concur with the *Journal's* goals, please demonstrate

your support with a contribution to our efforts.

The introductory issue of the *Journal* was well received and inspired considerable response from a broad range of readers. The feedback received resulted in several changes in the *Journal's* presentation and format. One particularly noticeable change is the *Journal's* name: the *Journal of Hispanic Politics* became the *Journal of Hispanic Policy* for Volume II. The name change reflects an effort to emphasize our nonpartisan commitment to the presentation of analysis and ideas on issues and governance in both public and private sectors.

Besides the name change, the second volume also introduced a new format for the *Journal*. The staff for Volume III continued with this revised format and put our energies into recruiting particularly interesting speakers and writers for this issue. We spent a great deal of time thinking about what issues we wanted this volume to address. As the Hispanic graduate students of the Kennedy School of Government, we represent diverse ethnicities from across the country: *Cubanos* from Florida, *Mexicanos* from California, the Southwest and Chicago, and *Puertoriquenos* from New York City. We came together to decide what issues and policy questions were pressing in our respective regional communities and in our larger national Hispanic community. Volume III is the result of our many discussions.

During the initial stages of development, the Presidential elections were fast approaching, and we were compelled to take a look at Hispanics in the political process. With financial assistance and logistical support from the Institute of Politics, we were able to invite five prominent Hispanics from across the country to join us in a discussion in the ARCO Forum for Public Affairs at the Kennedy School entitled, "Hispanics in the Political Process: A Growing Influence." Our impressive panel included: Xavier Suarez, Mayor of Miami (KSG '75); Councilwoman Maria Berriozabal of San Antonio; Dr. Harry Pachon, Executive Director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials; and the late Willie Velasquez (IOP Fellow '81) Director of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project. The moderator for the event was Frank del Olmo, columnist for the *Los Angeles Times* and 1987-88 Nieman Fellow.

We brought this group together because we felt they represented the different spheres of involvement in the political process—the politician, the academician and the practitioner. Each panelist presented their thoughts on the evening's topic and then were given time to rebut remarks made by fellow panelists and answer questions from the audience. The Forum section of Volume III includes the remarks of that night transcribed and edited. Due to financial constraints, we could not include the question-and-answer portion of the event in the *Journal*; nevertheless, we believe the excitement and the insights of that evening come through the statements of that evening.

This issue's Interview section features a prominent and controversial figure in Hispanic politics: Los Angeles City Councilwoman Gloria Molina, who shared her thoughts on leadership, education and the political process. We are honored to have had the opportunity to speak with her on these issues.

The Commentary section presents Dr. Clara Rodriguez, Associate Professor at Fordham University, on the topic of "Puerto Ricans and the Circular Migration Thesis." The Commentary section provides policy-makers and community leaders the opportunity to voice their opinions and viewpoints on a topic of particular concern to the Hispanic community. We welcome Dr. Rodriguez' challenging thoughts on this issue.

The Policy Perspective section features Dr. Ruth Thomas, Chairperson of

the New Jersey State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education, on "The Single Exit Criterion: A New Jersey Conflict over Bilingual Education Policy." The goal of this section is to give a policy practitioner room in which to comment about a policy question with which he or she has had first-hand experience. Ms. Thomas' experience with and insight into the development of criteria by which to determine when a bilingual student is ready for the mainstream classroom make her an excellent speaker on this topic.

In our Feature Articles section we have selected four articles which speak to a variety of issues. The initial feature article in this issue of the *Journal* is by Dr. Louis Freedberg, on the impact that Hispanic leadership has had on the public education system. Dr. Freedberg interviewed Hispanic superintendents of schools from across the country and presents their stories in this insightful article.

The second article is a look at Hispanic political representation and strategy, by Dr. Arturo Martinez from Western New Mexico University. Dr. Martinez shows how Hispanics have made political gains through single-member redistricting.

Our third article is by Dr. Mary Romero, Assistant Dean of Yale College and a lecturer in their Women's Studies Program, on the question of reverse discrimination. Dr. Romero applies a rigorous statistical test to the question of reverse discrimination, specifically as applied to Mexican Americans. Her article exposes the unfounded claims that minorities and women are succeeding because of their "minority status."

[Our fourth and final feature article is by Roberto Rey, a joint-degree graduate student at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Tufts Medical School. Mr. Rey's article is an expansive piece on Hispanics and health care. He investigates the many facets of health care and how they relate to the needs of the Hispanic community. We are extremely proud to include this quality student paper in Volume III and encourage students from public policy schools from across the country to consider submitting articles for upcoming issues.]

We think the third issue of the *Journal* will inspire discussion on the many timely and important topics it addresses. The *Journal* is a reflection of Hispanic graduate students at Harvard, and we realize our perspectives may be different from the Hispanic populace at large. Accordingly, we welcome and encourage any comments and/or suggestions from our readership.

Finally, before we encourage you to read on, we must acknowledge, with much regret, the recent loss of a very special person to the Hispanic community. Not long after the Forum event in the spring of 1988, we received a call from the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project with the grave news that Willie Velasquez was dying. Less than a month earlier, we had seen this vibrant, intelligent man speak at the Kennedy School of Government about what he knew best: Hispanics in the political process. We all looked at the sky and wondered why, and how we—the Hispanic community—were ever going to recover from the loss. Perhaps no other individual knew more about Hispanic voting patterns and the organizational strategies needed to ensure Hispanic representation than Willie. At our Forum event, Frank del Olmo introduced Willie by saying "If journalists are skeptics—and even cynics sometimes—they do tend to respect people that get things done, as opposed to people who talk a lot. . . you come to respect people that can accomplish things, and this man certainly has." In a world of five-second soundbites and blown-dry politicians, Willie Velasquez served the Hispanic community in particular and the American public in general as a most refreshing and

sincere public servant and role model. We are truly going to miss this man who truly got things done. For all Willie Velasquez has given to the American community, we dedicate this issue to his memory.

Kimura Flores  
Editor, 1988

Luis J. Martinez  
Editor, 1989

March, 1989

# COMMENTARY

## PUERTO RICANS AND THE CIRCULAR MIGRATION THESIS

**Clara E. Rodriguez, Ph.D.**

Clara Rodríguez grew up in the South Bronx and earned her Ph.D. in sociology from Washington University. Formerly a dean at Fordham University, she spent 1988 as a visiting scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is presently Associate Professor of Sociology at Fordham. Professor Rodríguez is the author of numerous articles on the status of Puerto Ricans in the United States and is currently working on research supported by the Rockefeller Foundation.

### REAGANOMICS AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

For a time, the thrust of the Reagan Administration was to downplay minority issues. Minorities were replaced by other statistical aggregates when discussing policy. Instead of Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos and Native American Indians (these terms have a peculiar sixties ring about them) we discussed policy for the teenage pregnancy problem or for female heads of household.

There is something to be said for this approach, for the basic problems go beyond particular racial and ethnic groups. This should be clearly acknowledged: the problems are not just associated with particular racial or ethnic groups. The downside of this approach, however, is that the particular, generally more adverse, situations of these groups are ignored. Thus, the significantly higher and more intense poverty and worse labor force situations of Puerto Rican female heads of households, as compared with all female heads of households, are not generally addressed.

This thrust of the Administration to downplay racial and ethnic minorities as a special factor in policy was so successful that it resulted in the redefinition of the term "special interest groups." Formerly used to refer to professional or industrial groups that were wealthy enough to employ well-heeled lobbyists to represent their interests, the term has come to refer to low-income racial and ethnic minorities. When a foundation official commented that the era of special interest groups was over, he meant that Blacks, Puerto Ricans, other Hispanics and Native American Indians could no longer expect to receive funding for their "special interest groups." Racial and ethnic groups had come to be seen as "special interest groups"; they could "legitimately" be ignored. Their interests were not the interests of the rest.

## THE PUERTO RICAN SITUATION

None of these "new" special interest groups (i.e., the racial or ethnic groups) has done particularly well since the sixties. But Puerto Ricans were especially vulnerable to the negative effects of Reaganomics. This group was the *only* group to experience a *drop* in real family income between 1970 and 1980 and to show a steadily increasing concentration in the lowest income quartile. Blacks, Mexicans, other Hispanics and Native American Indians did not fare as badly (Tienda and Jensen, 1987). Nationwide, the income gap between Puerto Ricans and non-Hispanic whites actually widened between 1970 and 1980. In New York City, regardless of how income is measured (i.e., whether median, mean, family, or household income), Puerto Rican income in New York City has been about half that of whites (Rodriguez, ND). Puerto Ricans also have falling labor force participation, high unemployment, and poverty (Bean and Tienda, 1988). This is despite the fact that Puerto Ricans often register a slight educational advantage over Mexicans and that Puerto Ricans are taught English in Puerto Rico (See, for example, Tienda and Lii, 1987).

This has come as a surprise. As citizens of the United States, often with military experience, with established communities in the United States that predate the Second World War, and coming from a democratic and stable country, it was expected that Puerto Ricans would have an easier row to hoe than previous immigrant groups. It was to be just a matter of time before they would get their just rewards.

These outcomes have caught the attention of the mass media. As study upon study has "discovered" that this group is not doing very well as measured by socioeconomic indicators (Bean & Tienda, 1988; Tienda & Lii, 1987; Tienda & Jensen, 1986; Rosenberg, 1987), the media has begun paying more attention to "the problem of Puerto Ricans." As a recent Op Ed piece in *The New York Times* pointed out: "While no minority groups have fared particularly well in the 1980's, none has fallen quite so far as Puerto Ricans. They are working less and their real incomes have sagged badly, and the number of Puerto Ricans on welfare rolls has skyrocketed (8/28/87, p. A31)."

### A NEW RATIONALE

Along with this recent "discovery" has come a new rationale for the "lack of progress of Puerto Ricans": the circulating migration thesis. The thesis is that the "back and forth" migration between Puerto Rico and the United States has hindered the progress of Puerto Ricans in the United States. It is argued that this *vaiven* (going and coming) phenomena has prevented Puerto Ricans from developing the "commitment" necessary to make it in the United States. As the same *New York Times* article stated: "Puerto Ricans have suffered disproportionately with the decline of inner-city manufacturing in the Northeast. But what separates them from other inner-city minority groups is their circular migration between the island and the United States, which severely disrupts families and schooling, leading inevitably to a loss of income (Tienda & Diaz, 8/28/87, p. A31)." These authors subsequently clarified their views



(*The New York Times*, 10/10/87) and stated that circulating migration exacerbated economic and social problems, but it was the drastically reduced job opportunities in northeastern cities that might provide the key to explaining the declining economic status of Puerto Ricans.

Despite this clarification, the circulating migration thesis has received wide attention in the mainstream print media. First, *The Wall Street Journal* (1/23/86, p. 1) moaned that "As [Puerto Rican] children were shuttled back and forth between cultures, they became outsiders in both places" with consequent low educational and income attainment. Lester Thurow echoed the thesis in *The Los Angeles Times* (3/16/86, Section IV) when he stated that the Puerto Rican problem was due to the fact that Puerto Ricans were unwilling to make the sacrifices that previous immigrant groups had made. How do we know they lack commitment? Because they kept going back and forth. A more recent article in *The New York Times* (6/5/87, p. 81) asserted that the "continuing relationship with Puerto Rico has left many uncommitted to life here, damaged the family support structure and created an identity crisis." The *New York Times* Op Ed piece argued that "Such circular migration can be disastrous for Puerto Rican families, employment and income (Tienda & Diaz, 8/28/87, p. A31)." These articles in the English-language press and similar pronouncements by public officials have thrust into the public mind, and molded into conventional wisdom, the circulating migration thesis.

Despite this steady stream of references to circular migration, there is precious little data to substantiate the thesis. What data exists? In Puerto Rico, the Planning Board regularly collects data on passenger traffic between Puerto Rico and the United States. However, this data does not indicate what proportion of this traffic is leaving Puerto Rico for an extended stay, i.e., what proportion are migrating to the United States or what proportion of the arrivals from the United States to Puerto Rico are return migrants. In the United States, no data are collected to track migration from or to Puerto Rico.

The Census also does not provide information or data on this phenomena. It collects migration data on immigrants but not on American citizens. Puerto Ricans, as American citizens, are therefore not asked when they entered the country on the census questionnaires. The only census item that gives some indication of mobility from Puerto Rico asks where the person was living five years earlier. It indicates that less than 5 percent of the Puerto Ricans living in New York City in 1979 were living in Puerto Rico five years earlier. This does not seem to be indicative of a large volume of movement. Shouldn't more facts be in before focusing on this as a major explanation for the worsening socioeconomic position of Puerto Ricans in the United States?

The lack of data and research is not the only weakness of the circulating migration rationale. It is based on a reverse causality. It assumes that because Puerto Ricans are always migrating they are never progressing. It is more likely that Puerto Ricans migrate *because* they are not progressing. In simplest terms, it may be that Puerto Ricans leave because they have lost a job and not that they lose a job because they leave. Indeed, Puerto Rico's Planning Board has found that the majority of migrants from the island were unemployed before they migrated to the United States (Junta de Planificacion, 1986). In addition, the rationale ignores the historical fact that at the time of greatest two-way migration, during the '40s and '50s, the Puerto Rican community was in a better economic position than it is today (Falcon, 1987).

Another problem with this thesis is that it frames the debate and blames

the victims. "Circular migration" is ostensibly within individual control or choice. Thus, the argument goes: because Puerto Ricans have developed these circular migration patterns, they can't progress. This claim ignores the colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. It is this relationship that has been the root cause for the large migrations of Puerto Ricans to the United States (Bonilla & Campos, 1981; Bonilla, 1985; History Task Force, 1979). By focusing on individual decisions to migrate, the thesis ignores the larger factors which affect these decisions to migrate. In the case of Puerto Rico, the impact of economic dependency, citizenship, common currency, easy transportation, military service and bilingualism are great because of the relationship that exists between the island and the continent.

The circular migration explanation not only blames the victims, but it also requires a solution that is unworkable. It would seem from this argument that if Puerto Ricans stopped moving back and forth all the time, they would be better off. Given that the U.S. government has yet to control the movements of citizens within its borders, what can it do to deal with this problem? Should the government apply the Simpson-Rodino Immigration Act to Puerto Ricans? Alternatively, what can the government of Puerto Rico do? Given the fact that Puerto Rico does not have control over who immigrates to and emigrates from Puerto Rico (the U.S. retains that control), it can do very little. So the argument provides for very little solution – except, of course, the solution that Puerto Ricans just stay put and not seek economic betterment elsewhere.

Another problem with the thesis is that mobility is apparently good for some but not for others. As the Institute for Puerto Rican Policy pointed out: "It is perhaps ironic that this focus on Puerto Rican 'circular migration', if applied to other groups, would lead one to describe them as 'more cosmopolitan' as a result or, simply, as "commuters". . . [while] the time-honored American value of geographic mobility becomes, all of a sudden, dysfunctional when it comes to low-income Puerto Ricans." After all, jet-setters and European financial elites often fly from one continent to another. Does that limit their financial success? What does that imply about their ability to fit into either society?

A quick dissection of the circular migration excuse has shown it to be not only intellectually vacuous but politically dangerous. There is little data or research, the rationale has its causality reversed, and it is vintage victim-blaming. Like all victim-blaming, the circular migration view ignores the big picture. Lastly, it frames a problem so that it has no solution: now, once again Puerto Ricans can be ignored.

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# FORUM

## HISPANICS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS: A GROWING INFLUENCE

March 2, 1988

*The ARCO Forum, Institute of Politics, Harvard University*

Xavier Suarez, Mayor of Miami, Florida  
Dr. Harry Pachon, Executive Director, NALEO  
Willie Velasquez, the late Executive Director, SVREP;  
Councilwoman Maria Berriozabal, San Antonio, Texas;  
Frank del Olmo, *Los Angeles Times* (moderator)

Co-Sponsored by the *Journal of Hispanic Policy*

**Dean Graham T. Allison:** Let me say a very warm word of welcome to you here at the Forum of the John F. Kennedy School of Government tonight, especially for this discussion of "Hispanics in the Political Process: A Growing Influence." This Forum is being sponsored not only by the Kennedy School Institute of Politics but by the school's student-organized *Journal of Hispanic Policy*, and we're very pleased that they've exerted such initiative in putting this evening together.

I think we're all aware of the growing influence of the Hispanic community in American politics, but I think we'll find interesting points of difference, I hope tonight, in the panel, between folks like Mayor Xavier Suarez and our favorite councilwoman from San Antonio, Maria Berriozabal, on the one hand, as against people who tell us how far there is to go, especially Willie Velasquez and Harry Pachon. So before I turn things over to them, I'd like to say just one very special word of welcome to a Public Policy graduate of this school whom we are most especially proud of, and whom I was happy to have as a student fifteen years ago—indeed, some of his classmates are here tonight as well—but whom we are very proud of as an example of what this school hopes to be about, is trying to be about, in our emphasis on elected politics. Xavier, or "X" as he was known when he was here in his prior incarnation, is a good example for Public Policy students here tonight, that there is life after the Public Policy Program, even in elective politics. I think that the kind of leadership that he's been exercising in Miami, in getting the job, but

most importantly in doing the job, is a good example for what we hope to see replicated more generally in the school. So to moderate our panel and introduce our panelists, let me turn things over to our moderator.

**del Olmo:** Thank you, Dean Allison. I'm Frank del Olmo. I'm an editorial writer and columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*, who's been blessed this year with the opportunity to attend Harvard as a Nieman Fellow. Missing Los Angeles terribly, especially now as we're nearing the end of winter, but nevertheless finding it incredibly stimulating. I've been asked—I've been given the honor, actually—by the folks at the *Journal of Hispanic Policy* and here at the Kennedy School to moderate what I expect to be a very stimulating panel. I'm going to begin very quickly with just a few introductory remarks, because as I warned them, when you bring on an editorial writer as your moderator, you run the risk of editorial comment. It goes with the territory, as I think Willie Loman said in the classic play. My comment will be very brief, but I hope it will stimulate some comment from our panelists. If not, I'll keep asking questions until I get a rise out of them.

The title of the panel, as I noticed on the poster outside, is "Hispanics in the Political Process: A Growing Influence." My only comment would be that there's one point missing as far as proper English syntax goes, and that's a question mark at the end of the title. I am not surprised, having taken a couple of classes here at the Kennedy School, including one with Dean Allison last semester, that there are a lot of folks around here who sort of look on journalists as cynics. I prefer to think of us as skeptics. And in that regard, I tend to look at the issue of Latinos in the political process in a somewhat skeptical fashion, especially when I hear people start talking about them as a growing influence in the political process. Frankly, I'm not convinced that that point has yet been reached, and, frankly, I have enough doubts on various points, which I won't bother to go into, as to whether it can be reached. But I will leave that to our panelists to address and I will leave it at that. But as I sit here, I'll try to be as polite as I can, and as constructive as I can as a moderator, but also very, very skeptical about this whole thing. I must also add, finally, as tribute to our very distinguished panel, that I know two of them quite well, having had a chance to report on them, and have a great deal of respect for them in that regard. The other two I know by reputation, and their reputations, Mayor Suarez's and Councilwoman Berriozabal's, precede them and are very distinguished reputations, so it's a pleasure for me to join them here.

So let me get right into it. Our first panelist is Dr. Harry Pachon. Dr. Pachon is the Executive Director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. He is currently serving as the Kennon Professor of Politics at Pitzer College, out in Claremont/Pomona (out in the smog belt outside of Los Angeles, which I know so well). He is the distinguished author of at least two major works on Latino politics in the United States: *Hispanics in the United States* and *Mexican Americans*, both of which were published by Prentice Hall. He has been the Executive Director of NALEO for the past three years, and has been particularly important in their current drive to increase the citizenship among the Latino population in the United States. It is, from my personal point of view, the most fundamental issue facing, certainly, Mexican Americans, getting them to become citizens. Prior to working for NALEO, however, Dr. Pachon learned his way around American politics. He served

for four years as a staff member of the Appropriations Committee in Congress and was the Chief of Staff for Edward R. Roybal of California, who's been on Capitol Hill now for, what, 24 years now. He'll be there until I run against him, I think. But anyway, we'll talk about that later. Dr. Harry Pachon.

**Pachon:** Thank you, Frank, for such a gracious introduction. It's truly a pleasure to be here and to have been asked to share some thoughts on Hispanic politics in 1988, with so many honored guests and so many distinguished speakers here on the panel. I think, however, before I address the issue of Hispanic politics in '88, it's important to discuss two political myths that surround our community at the present time. Myths are like stereotypes. They belie the complexity of reality. Unfortunately, believing these myths in our community has political and strategic consequences for the political future, and influences how the general society perceives the Hispanic community. And I think the first myth that we most often encounter—those of us who are involved in Latino politics—is that Hispanic political power—and excuse me for saying this—is still at the stage of potential. We've all heard versions of this. As recently as three weeks ago, the *New York City Tribune* ran its political analysis of the 1988 Hispanic vote under the banner "Votes of 20 Million Hispanics Called a Sleeping Giant." A "Sleeping Giant"; imagine the image this conveys. A community that is about to wake up from its afternoon *siesta*, and if we look at American politics, that is the image that surrounds the Hispanic community. Yet, the facts present a different picture. There are now over 3000 elected officials in the United States of Hispanic background, alongside the over 6000 black elected officials. There are *one-and-one-half* times as many Hispanic elected officials in California as there are of any other minority group. There are 7 times as many Hispanic elected officials in the state of Texas as any minority group. The number of Hispanic elected officials has doubled in the space of a decade and this doubling is particularly significant, because if you look at Hispanic political organizational history, we're really looking at a community that got its start in 1968. One of our oldest political organizations, LULAC, can trace its history all the way back to 1928. But compare the NAACP and the Urban League, with founding dates of 1914 and 1912. So we're talking about a community that's just recently come into the political picture. In two years, between 1984 and 1986, the size of the potential Hispanic electorate grew by 25%. That is ten times the growth of the electorate as a whole. This growth in electoral power was already demonstrated in 1986 elections, and, based on the actual vote—based on the CPS analysis of those who voted in 1986—it took only 10% of the Puerto Rican Latino vote in New York City to make a 1 point difference in the election. If 10% of the Puerto Rican vote defected from one candidate to another, it would make a 1% difference in that candidate's plurality. In Texas, something like 6% of the Hispanic population would make a 1 point difference. A presidential or a statewide candidate in California, again, only has to reach about 6 or 7 percent to receive that one percentage point. Based on figures like this, the myth of the "Sleeping Giant" is seen for what it is. That is, that images need to change. Hispanic political power is simply not potential, but it is an emerging reality. Hispanic political gains are real, the Hispanic vote is real, it is no longer necessary to speak of *mañana*, but we do with what we have today. Yet we have to be cautious in the Hispanic community, because there is another myth that can trap us who are involved in political activity. This myth, unfortunately, we as Hispanics

want to believe – again, many of you have heard it and it goes something like this: Given the spectacular growth of the Hispanic community between 1970 and 1980 (the Hispanic community grew by about 62%) there is a hidden electorate out there, a hidden electoral force. All we have to do, as community organizers or as people involved in the civic arena, is to reach that hidden electorate. And this myth is persuasive. Eleven percent of all the adults in New York State are Puerto Rican-Hispanic. In New Jersey, this figure is 7.4 percent. In California, nearly 20% of the adult population is Latino. However, this figure has to be tempered with something else: forty percent of our community in 1980 was below voting age. Even though in 1988, the Hispanic community's average age has increased (it's now 24 years), consider the implication of being the youngest age group in American society today. Disproportionate numbers of Hispanics are in precisely those age ranges that vote the least, 18 to 24 years. We know this because as a country, we were not able to get voting participation during the 1960's when large numbers of people turned 18. As we know, electoral strategies in the '60's and '70's foundered on this very obstacle. Besides youth, however, there's another obstacle that is present in the Hispanic community. And that factor is invisible, and by and large has no counterpart in the Black community, that the Hispanic community is most often compared to, insofar as electoral politics are concerned. This factor is U.S. citizenship. The national media tends to look at Hispanics – and, I have to say this – and so do many academic social scientists – as either being native-born citizens or illegal aliens. And perhaps this is fed by the evening news reports of all the illegal aliens coming across in Tijuana, and I think that all of you have seen the afternoon news clips of them slipping over the fence, the image of the illegal Mexican immigrant, or the illegal Dominican immigrant. The reality is that there's a third group out there, and this third group is neither native born, nor illegal alien. This group numbers close to 4 million. One out of every three Hispanic adults fits into this category. And that category is legal resident immigrants. In New York, the state closest to us here in terms of large Hispanic population, adjacent to or contiguous with every Puerto Rican community, there is a Latin American enclave. In New York City, it's Puerto Ricans; it's Dominicans in Manhattan, it's Colombians in Queens; in New Jersey, it's Cubans; in Los Angeles, it's Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, and, of course, the largest immigrant group, Mexican immigrants in the Southwest. While Puerto Ricans are all U.S. citizens by birth, 40% of the Hispanics in New York State are of other Latin American countries, and that means that 1 out of every 3 adult Latinos in this country, cannot vote, cannot serve on grand juries, cannot work in the police departments or the Federal government. And this large body of non-citizens, legal aliens, and – I have to keep on saying this, because so often we get the two confused – illegal vs. legal aliens, explains why 52% of all Hispanics who did not vote in 1986 gave as their reason, "non-citizenship." In comparison, only 3% of the Black population and only 3% of the Anglo population gave "non-citizenship" as a reason for not voting.

In the presidential elections, there will be nearly as many Hispanics who can't vote due to non-citizenship as there will be Hispanic registered voters in the United States. Let's keep this clearly in mind next time we find ourselves being swayed by the myth that our large numbers should automatically and unequivocally be linked to voters going to the polls.



Yet the political future is bright. As our community's youth matures, they will become increasingly involved in politics. Every two years, for example, in the decade of the 1980's, a cohort of over 200,000 potential new voters enters voting age years. More and more Latin Americans are becoming U.S. citizens. If citizenship drives, now at the experimental stage, become successful, we will see thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Hispanics becoming citizens over the next ten years. And there's something curious about naturalized citizens: they tend to vote more, according to the evidence that is available, than their cohorts of the same socio-economic status. But there are tremendous problems for the Hispanic community in this regard, because there are no stand-alone, off the shelf models for U.S. citizenship campaigns. We are just beginning to realize the magnitude of the task ahead for us in the Hispanic community. There are issues to be addressed, insofar as citizenship campaigns are concerned. How, for example, do we make the benefits of U.S. citizenship readily transmittable to immigrants who are already working legally here in the States and have no real idea of the benefits that they gain by becoming citizens? Especially because there are no models present throughout the nation. How do we overcome the perceived and sometimes very real fear of the federal agency in charge of naturalization, the INS? How do we overcome the abuses that are made by anonymous INS bureaucrats who have the nerve to ask such questions – and I've been looking forward to addressing these questions to you, because of Harvard and its great reputation and its student body. Let me ask you four questions that we've heard insofar as the INS citizenship exam is concerned. And see how many of you could answer any of these four questions, or all of these four questions.

- How many pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock?
- What is the governor of California's wife's first name?
- What is Governor Cuomo's wife's first name?
- And finally, and perhaps the most absurd of all,
- Who won the 1966 World Series?

And usually in the audience, we have someone who can answer that.  
[laughter]

The citizenship exam, ladies and gentlemen, is the closest equivalent we have to the literacy tests of yesteryear. Every year, over 140,000 citizenship applicants are rejected. And the sad thing about it is that we do not know for what reason, or what country they are from. Are, for example, Mexican and Dominican immigrants rejected at higher rates than Irish and Italian immigrants? We don't know now, but we will know in the next six months, if a Senate-sponsored amendment that we've worked on has some effect.

For the present, however, we have to combat blind acceptance of myths that simplistically portray the Hispanic community. We have to consider the implications that the political gains that the Latino community has made in the past ten years have come about when 50% of the Hispanic community in this country has not been enfranchised to vote. From this perspective, we see that the Hispanic community has done much in the political arena. Much more, obviously, remains to be done. In 1988, the last Presidential election of this decade, perhaps we can take this forum to objectively analyze the Latino community's impact on the national election. If it's a close election, in my opinion, the Latinos are going to have the capability of truly being the swing vote. Based on the statistics that I gave you earlier, which are based on the 1986

and 1984 census data, we see that in California, if it's a close election (and I guess the only model recently for a close election would be the 1976 election between Ford and Carter), we see that in California there was a 1.7% difference and in Texas there was a 3.1% difference in the vote. All it would take in the Hispanic community to impact on these numbers – in California, it would be something like 10% of the Hispanic population voting one way – to actually have an impact on that election. And in Texas, it would take about 11% of the vote, based on some extrapolations from the 1976 data.

This is speculation, however, and what we do know is that in 1984, according to the different polls taken by my colleague up here on the panel, we do know that Hispanics constituted something like 12 to 16 percent of the Democratic vote in California. They constituted 4 to 6 percent of the Republican vote in California. In Texas, 23 to 27 percent of the Democratic vote was attributable to the Hispanic population. Now in that election, in 1984, it didn't make a difference. As we know, Ronald Reagan swept California by over 16 percent and Texas by over 27 percent. Yet, if it's a close election, it might be a different story.

How will the Presidential candidates address these issues? I, like you, am looking forward to seeing how my fellow panelists address this particular topic. I would say that after a couple of years of observing Presidential elections, too often Presidential candidates engage in "*fiesta politics*" where they wear hats and eat a burrito and wear a *serape* and go into the community. Will they, for example, address the substantive public policy issues that the Hispanic community faces? What are these issues? We know that when we poll Hispanic elected officials, we get such topics as access to higher education, high high school dropout rates, drug abuse. Domestic issues are paramount and they cross-cut Cuban American, Mexican American and Puerto Rican elected officials.

In 1988 we are going to have a chance, a week from now on Super Tuesday, to see if it's *fiesta politics* as usual, or if there are going to be other public policy issues that are being made relevant to the Hispanic community by the Presidential candidates. Thank you very much. [Applause]

**del Olmo:** Thank you very much, Harry for a very good start on the presentations. The answers to your questions, by the way, are Mrs. Gloria Deukmejian, the Baltimore Orioles and more than the Indians wanted. [Laughter] I remember that '66 series because Sandy Koufax really let me down, but that's another story.

Our next panelist is another old friend, Mr. Willie Velasquez, the Executive Director and the founder of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project. If journalists are skeptics – and even cynics sometimes – they do tend to respect people that get things done, as opposed to people that talk a lot. You cover people that talk a lot, you cover enough press conferences and hear things that go in one ear and out the other real fast, but you come to respect people that can accomplish things, and this man certainly has. He's run more than 960 – probably getting towards 1,000 now – voter registration campaigns in different American cities, as well as American Indian reservations in 6 Southwestern states, in the years that the SWVREP has been operating as a non-profit foundation. He's had a remarkable effect in Texas. Even in California, as resistant as it can be to political change sometimes. I will always remember one of the great compliments paid to Willie was when a national newsmagazine did a story about him and his earlier work in Texas. It

said that in Texas, he's the one Latino that the Anglo establishment hates to see coming into town. [laughter] I suspect it's still that way. His organization has since gone beyond voter registration to do some remarkably good research that Harry quoted—I quote it regularly—on Latino voting patterns in the United States. I'm sure he will have something stimulating to say, as he usually does. Mr. Willie Velasquez. [applause]

**Velasquez:** Thank you, Frank. I think a good way to begin is to talk about a report the Census Bureau did that was quite large, larger than most on politics. It was about registration and turnout in the United States from 1972 to 1974. And it sort of answered an interesting question, at least for me anyway. The interesting question was: During this period of time, what was the fastest-growing group, that didn't register to vote in this country? I think that were we to be in San Antonio last Sunday, where we're training 15 towns—and we had about 75 people—the leaders from these towns, because we were beginning the registration drives for the May city council elections in Texas. And almost all of them felt that the ones that were registering the least, the ones that weren't participating in the American electoral process, were the Mexicans.

Then I would ask, "Why is it that Mexicans don't register to vote?" So then some people would say, "Well, it's because of education." They'll even quote some of the stuff from *Across the Tracks* (1966), that Arthur Rubel wrote; when I was going to college, that was one of the texts that we used. And Rubel would say there were three or four good reasons. One, they're an atomized society—they don't work together, so they can't have a registration drive. Two, they come from a country that doesn't have a long history that's profound in terms of strong democratic [traditions]. Three, he said, they're a combination of Spaniards and Indians, so what do you expect from those kind? [laughter] Finally, he posited that it may be that Mexicans may be the first race to never integrate themselves into the American democratic process. Around that mouthful of stuff that Rubel said, many other things have come out—that we don't care, that it gets too complicated and all this sort of stuff. And then I say, The Census Bureau said that Mexicans are the fastest growing in registration in the United States. Well then that means that we aren't that atomistic, that we work together quite well, and you combine a Mexican, an Indian and a Spaniard and everything turns the other way around.

That gets people to thinking. Well then, how is it that Mexicans are the fastest growing group when for a hundred and some odd years, at least since 1848, they didn't register and vote in this country? Well I say that Mexicans always wanted to register and vote. They always *wanted* to participate. They were ashamed when they didn't register and vote, and they felt bad about it. But I'm going to tell you something. Put yourself in the position of a typical rural South Texas county, Medina county: 42% Mexicano, adjacent to San Antonio, so it's not so isolated—it's close to San Antonio, anyway. [laughter] Medina County. The Mexicans there had never won an election. Why? Well, because we don't register and we don't vote and we don't cooperate and we don't work well together, and all that. Maybe true, maybe true. But—I'd like to point out something: that county had not redistricted since 1896. It had a whole tradition of where Mexicans ought to live and where Blacks ought to live. They drew the lines, and you weren't supposed to change and you weren't supposed to move and no Mexican had ever won. Ever. Now, put yourself

in the shoes of those people living there. We started working there intensively in 1980, although we had worked there before. But think about it: since 1896 to 1980, 84 years in a row, never winning an election. If you're a Mexican, you're going to get depressed about the political process, if for 84 years in a row, you lose, right? And you're 42% of the population. And then you say, "Why?" Because we can't work together. Because we're atomized. Because. . . and all that stuff. The problem was not that the Mexicans didn't want to register and vote. The problem was that there was outrageous gerrymandering. They couldn't win. They had the at-large election scheme. They had racial gerrymandering, malapportionment. There were a series of lawsuits. The last one was settled last week. The school board, city council, county commission. The first election held after all these lawsuits, the Mexicans won. Well, who cares, really, if you were only talking about one county? But, ladies and gentlemen, the first 66 counties in a row that we looked at, throughout the Southwest, were all gerrymandered against Mexicans. We didn't find one county gerrymandered *for* Mexicans. See? Sixty-six to 0 is beyond the range of statistical probability. [laughter] There's something going on.

Well, you fix the election system. You make it conform to the American constitution and you see a remarkable change. You see what I think has happened many times before in this country, when an immigrant group comes in and starts. "Well," you say, "that's very persuasive, but I'm still a little skeptical"—I'm sort of paraphrasing Frank here—"from '72 to '76 Mexicans actually went backwards in gross numbers registered to vote." From '76 to '80, we were the leaders in the rest of the country. A 20% increase in registration, from a low base, but the rest of the country grew something like 9%, something like that. Then from '80 to '84, we grew 27% and the rest of the country 11%. I think that from '84 to '88, it'll continue. In fact it'll probably continue for a generation. What you're really seeing here is the entrance of a large group of people who, for many years, did not participate in the electoral process, entering into the electoral process. What you are seeing here is a transition of a very large group of people—the Census Bureau's latest update says 18,097,000—that's a lot. These people are entering into the American political process. You're seeing a transition from powerlessness to power. So there, that settles it. Because now the whole discussion's gotta change. [applause]. I think that's an old discussion. Now we've gotta talk about the new discussion. The new discussion is "What's going to be our contribution? What's going to be the difference between having a Mexican in there who doesn't get anything done and an Anglo who doesn't get anything done?" [laughter]. There's no difference! Why get involved? Why sue? Why do all of this stuff if nothing happens? The idea is then, that we ought to look, a little bit, at this transition. We ought to continue the suits. I think that they're crucial. We're now up to 86 lawsuits. We've won 85. We're in court on appeal on the 86th and I think we're going to win that one. That's gotta continue. The registration drives gotta continue. The studies gotta continue. But now we have got to think, what is this really, for Mexicanos? What is this really all about? Is it getting more Mexicanos—the numbers—just in the Southwest? (1974: 1,566 elected officials in 5 Southwestern states) We hand-counted them all. There was a guy by the name of Moreno in California who's not a Mexican, and there was a guy by the name of Dutchover in West Texas who was a Mexican. So we had to count these things very carefully. But in 1974, 1,566 elected officials. In 1984, 2861, an increase of 82%. Well, the point then is, "What is it that we're going to contribute?" I think that that's the question now that Mexicans ask.

And I go back to the time when Mexicans once were great. I go back to the time when—1519, 1521—an indigenous people here did do something. And if you look at the chronicles, you will see that they put a lot of emphasis on education. They put a lot of emphasis on justice. And they put a lot of emphasis on high standards for the people that they appointed to run their tribal government. Well, I feel very strongly that that's what the Mexican electorate is now demanding. I think that the Mexican electorate is going to say the following: "All right, it's brilliant, terrific that we got 2,861 elected officials. But I know a few that we ought to get rid of." And we ought to say, "You know, we don't need 2 or 3 more. It's not crucial. What we gotta do is get rid of those that aren't measuring up to the high standards." And we gotta be firm about that. Because what's got to be the Mexican contribution has got to be high standards. When you ask people, when you ask the Mexican electorate about the school problem, you know [to Pachon] you were talking about the issues. And we polled 100,000 people—the electorate is saying "We want jobs and we want schools." But it's insightful to look at the follow-up questions and focus group discussions on the question of schools. The Mexicans are saying the schools aren't teaching; the kids aren't learning. If the student doesn't learn, he ought to be flunked, and if the teacher doesn't teach, he ought to be fired. I think that we now have to start thinking about that kind of thinking among the Mexican electorate. As a matter of fact, I feel that the measure of our success is going to be how diligent we are about paying attention to the voter, who, I feel very strongly, wants high standards. I don't think it's a question then, so much, of continuing what we've done in the past. I think that is going to go on. I think the question now is how do we answer the question, "What's the proper exercise of political power? What is it that we Mexicans are going to contribute?" And I think the answer is going to be around standards. Those politicians, I think, that really understand this question, and really lay it out in a way that's easily understood by the electorate are going to be the ones who are going to lead us into that time when we actually do have political power.

So in a way, I agree with you and I disagree with you. I agree that we don't really have power and we're transitioning, but it's clear that there is something there. Thank you. [applause]

**del Olmo:** Anything you say, Willie. [laughter] Our next panelist is a member of the San Antonio, Texas, city council—one of my two or three favorite cities in this whole wonderful country of ours. Councilwoman Maria Berriozabal has big shoes to fill in her seat; her predecessor, in the seat she now holds—covering downtown San Antonio and part of the West Side—is now the mayor of San Antonio, Henry Cisneros. She is currently serving her fourth term as a member of the Council. She received her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Texas at San Antonio—and to tell you how far back I go in San Antonio, I remember when that campus wasn't there. And I wouldn't be surprised if, somewhere down the line, people aren't thinking about her or someone like her, as a possible successor to Mayor Cisneros, if he moves on, and I suspect he will. Councilwoman Maria Berriozabal. [applause]

**Berriozabal:** I just asked Willie Velasquez if he voted for me. And he did. Willie Velasquez is my constituent.

I'm very honored, Dean, and students, faculty, and friends of this school. As I sat here and listened to Harry and Frank and Willie, and maybe anticipated the remarks of the Mayor of Miami, I thought of the best approach I could take in talking to you this evening. And I think I'm going to put my little notes aside because Willie inspired me to say some other things.

I don't know how many Mexican American female elected officials you've ever had here, Dean. [laughter] I venture to say, not very many. [applause] We are a small number; we could have at least twenty more sessions like this, with at least one, but not very many numbers. One thing I like to hear in an introduction of myself—and if it's not there, I talk about it—is the fact that when I got elected to the San Antonio City Council in 1981, I was the first Hispanic-Mexican American-Latina-Chicana elected to the city council, in a city that is over 250 years old, that was Mexico before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. There had never been a Mexican American woman elected in a city that is over 52% Hispanic. And I think that is a great honor, when I hear it in an introduction. However, my question is always "What took so long?" So what I would like to address—and I was asked to talk about this—are my feelings and my thoughts about a Mexican American woman serving in elected office. I am very proud of that public trust, because of the people whom I represent. Willie was going back hundreds of years of the history of Hispanic people. We are a people who has contributed long, who has contributed with dignity, who, in WW II, was decorated far more than any other group, far beyond our numbers in the population. Our young men fought and died in Vietnam. Our families forged—with their sweat and with their hands—large parts of this country with their labor. I represent *una comunidad de dignidad*, a community of dignity, a community of honor. And to have people vote and say, "Maria, we trust you to represent us at that Council" is a very honorable thing.

And my question—as we read reports like the one that the Southwest Research Institute just did, announcing that there are more poor Hispanics in the United States now than in the past—when we hear statistics like Harry's (that we don't have political power and the clout that we could have, and Frank stated that too), when we hear from Willie that we should have expectations of ourselves as public officials—the question that comes to me is "Where is the pool of people whom we're going to groom, nurture and educate? Where are the future public policy-makers, particularly those in public elective office?" Right now, the way things are, they are not going to be coming out of Harvard. We have some—Mayor Suarez, Mayor Cisneros—two, at least that I know of, who are serving exemplarily in this country. And I think there's more where those came from. But the large numbers in universities, such as Harvard, are not there. Where are the future leaders?

I would like to address the pool of women as leaders, because that's what I'm an authority on, because that's what I am. There are, right now, thousands of women, *Hispanas*. There are some in the audience. We all come from *la misma mata*—the same plant—this community of dignity. Mexican American women have been leaders in their community from the time of Cortez. Mexican women in their society, after the conquest, continued to create community. Women in Texas and California and elsewhere have worked with their families and in their communities to organize and to represent their families.

*La mujer Hispana*—the Hispanic woman—has a long history of community service. When I first got elected in 1981, a reporter asked me "What's happening, that Mexican American women are now beginning to be involved in

politics?" And the answer was, and is, "Mexican American women, Hispanic women, have been involved in this thing called 'politics' as part of our history!" What is politics? What have these women been doing? Where is this pool that I'm talking about? Where is this pool right now? They are working in churches, they are working the schools, they are the mothers and sisters and aunts and cousins of some of you here who are Hispanics, some of you who are here studying. They are working in government, they are in education and business and they are leaders in the community. And we are very good leaders. Let me tell you why. We have an affinity that is the most powerful affinity with our community. When you are the mother and the sister and the wife of that *familia*, the power is incredible. And when you are a leader in the community, you have power. We learned in Washington, in October of this last year, when Mayor Cisneros convened the Hispanic Agenda for 1988, that one thing Cubans and Puerto Ricans and Mexicans and Nicaraguenses—all of us—had in common, and we could coalesce around was *la familia*. How is public policy going to affect the family? That's the most important component of any group, and particularly Hispanics. We look at the problems that we are experiencing right now; they are global problems. Maria's constituents have problems that are not Hispanic problems. Hispanics are not problems; we can bring the solutions to problems, if we're understood. The problems are housing; the way that our cities are growing with large numbers of minorities, be they Hispanic or Black or Asian, living in the urban centers, in the inner cities, and the cities sprawling, and the question is "What happens to those who stay behind?" Another problem is a second class educational system, as well as lack of opportunity; the inability of our bright young people to get scholarships or assistance to go to universities like this one. The problems are in child care. As more and more women are raising their children by themselves, child care becomes very important. Health: our water, is our water clean? Energy: in San Antonio, we own 28% of a nuclear power plant that many of us have been fighting for 7 years. This is a gross inefficiency. And the poor pay, too.

Problems in my San Antonio districts are those suffered by growing numbers of refugees who come from Mexico and Central America. The problems are lack of shelter—a need faced by growing numbers of Hispanics, not just refugees—lack of medical attention and a lack of understanding in the minds of most Americans on why these people are coming from other countries to our neighborhoods. So it is that Hispanics are facing a myriad of problems which must be solved if our country is going to be strong and safe. Solving the problems our community faces is not important simply because they are *our* problems; solving these major issues is important precisely because the safety and strength of a country is at stake. When one looks at current demographic trends, one finds that the Hispanic population is growing; and when one looks at the characteristics of Hispanics, one finds that the population is young. In the year 2000, A.D., a significant number of entrants into the labor force will be minorities and women. It is very important that now—when a large segment of the minority population is young and female—we properly educate our future workers and leaders.

So I go back where I started. It is important to focus on the Hispanic population as a *hope* and source of strength for this country. That is why we need to look at this potential pool of leaders—Hispanic leaders. And again I look at Latinas as a very significant pool for leadership. We need more of our women in positions of influence. But we must learn to *see* this leadership. We must

learn to value the type of leadership skills, values and commitment which women bring into the public arena. We must learn to appreciate what is beginning to be called "community competence." This describes that ability a person possesses who is able to communicate, represent, collaborate and serve the people because the person comes from the community. *Hispanas* can do this very well. Those abilities must be valued as precious community resources—abilities which enable empowerment. But what I want to tell you today is that society in general must develop the ability to see and value these attributes. If we do not value these abilities, it is our Hispanic people who will be the losers. If we, as a people, do not learn how to properly develop the skills of all our men *and* women, all of us will lose. Thank you. [applause]

**del Olmo:** Thank you very much, Councilwoman Berriozabal. Our final panelist has already been introduced to a great extent by Dean Allison; I just wanted to add a couple of his achievements that I was able to dig up, with the help of a fellow Nieman who's from the *Miami Herald* [laughter]. I think he will find them flattering, because *this* man has a very high regard for Mayor Suarez.

Mayor Suarez is now serving his second term as the Mayor of Miami, Florida. He was re-elected last year with 63% of the vote, which any politician will tell you is pretty darn good. He's a native of Las Vias, Cuba, raised significantly, I think, in Washington, D.C. He returned to Miami a few years ago after having attended Harvard, where he received his Master's degree, (as Dean Allison mentioned). Another thing I suspect he's fairly proud of, is the fact that he received his Bachelor's degree in engineering from Villanova University a few years before that. This wasn't all that easy—engineering degrees aren't that easy to come by, but especially not when you're a pretty good basketball player—as he is, and was. The reason I remember that is that he was at Villanova in 1979 when my alma mater, UCLA, beat them in the NCAA finals [laughter]. The distinguished Mayor of Miami, Florida, Xavier Suarez.

**Suarez:** Thanks for that wonderful introduction. We had planned a little basketball with my former roommates. It just didn't work out, and it's just as well—it would have been very embarrassing to Flash Wiley, I think, to have to come out on the basketball court again. So many people around the room are so familiar to me. I'm happy to be back in these old haunting places, and to be able to say something—although so many things that you have said have pre-empted what I could possibly say. I love the line about "fiesta politics." We've had a lot of Presidential candidates come down to Miami lately, and they all try to say "Viva Cuba Libre!" [laughter] I wonder if they're talking about rum and Coke.

Miami's own ethnicity is of a very special character, perhaps because we only have three basic ethnic groups. You know, in other cities, it seems like there's 20 or 40, so many identifiable groups. In Miami, it's always the three: the Blacks, the Hispanics, and the Anglos—and it's portrayed by the media as if we're always at war. And of course, I don't believe that we are. But the fact that it's three—somebody at the Kennedy School ought to do an analysis, Dean, as to why three—it's so identifiable all the time. As opposed to—you feel more natural if you have 15 or 20 ethnic communities throughout the city. And it is a significant one, and an interesting one. The two so-called "minorities," in the city of Miami make up 80% of the voting electorate—so



much for “minorities”—the Blacks are traditionally liberal in my city, and Democrat, and the Cubans, which make up 80% of our population of Hispanics, (which now adds up to a whole city—800,000 people), are traditionally Republican and conservative—which is one good reason why I’m independent [laughter].

But many people have tried to define us in the last year. Many books have been written about Miami—David Reef, T.D. Alman, Joan Didion—I don’t know how many others. The soul of Miami’s Cuban Americans in particular, sort of eludes everyone. Of the three books, I recommend only T.D. Alman’s book, by the way, and it’s a great book—*Miami: The City of the Future*. But we do have something—and now I’m speaking of myself as a Hispanic, and within that, as Cuban American. Yes, in foreign policy, definitely conservative, if conservative means interventionist—the U.S. more active *vis à vis* what we consider to be freedom movements—freedom fighters. In fact, Frank, you’d be interested to know that in Miami, we always avoid saying that someone is from the Left. When we introduce them, one way the emcee gets around it is to say, “On my right” and introduce the people on the right. And then he says “And on your right” and then you introduce the rest of the group. Works out real well [laughter].

But in domestic policy—and that’s where the stereotypes come in and the ones that I particularly resent and have been unfair to my community and my particular ethnic group—the idea that we’re conservative in domestic policy is not at all the case. In fact, we don’t have a tradition of *laissez faire* we don’t have a tradition of the Supreme Court invalidating economic legislation to get a country out of the Depression. We don’t have the feeling the government should stay out of certain areas. We feel—and it’s part of our tradition—that the government should get into whatever areas are necessary to guarantee fundamental human rights. And we understand that to include a decent standard of living. This is one of the reasons I made it part of my platform in—actually in 1979, ’81, ’83, ’85, and ’87—it took me a while to get elected [laughter]. I made a part of my platform to create and build affordable housing in the city of Miami, while my opponents were saying “Well, it’s not really a traditional municipal concern; the County is the one receiving the federal HUD funds—in fact, they are the agency and the entity that is designated to receive HUD funds.” And I said, “No, but the city of Miami can also do it—we can get money from Community Development Block Grants, we’ll get it from concessions that we’ll extract from developers.” I finally—when I was elected—proposed a linkage ordinance in the city of Miami. And my legal staff told me that it was illegal, unconstitutional, immoral and improper, until I found them the one you have here. I used the Massachusetts statute as a defense of my proposal. And my supposedly more liberal opponents were saying to keep the city out of those endeavors, and it didn’t work—they didn’t get elected, in addition to the fact that they were a lot shorter—but we won’t get into that today. Actually, I have a line about that. My opponent in the runoff in 1985 was a very fine Cuban American banker who spent \$1.2 million to try to defeat me. And we had to stand at podiums like this and he was very short. At the end of my presentation I would raise the microphone so that he would have to bring it all the way down [laughter]. That’s not true, but it’s a great story. He just sent me a set of china for City Hall, because the last time he came to visit, we had coffee in styrofoam cups.

Someone characterized, on Spanish radio the other day, as, supposedly, one of the most conservative radio commentators—said, “You know, we Cubans are very much in favor of Reagan in foreign policy matters and we’re very much like Martin Luther King in domestic policy matters.” And that anyone would even combine those two figures might seem quite interesting to you, but I think there’s a lot of truth to that, and I want to emphasize again that we avoid the stereotypes. Our city had a lot of what you talked about, Willie. We had a lot of what you mentioned was important to do—I mean, we had Hispanics elected to public office, we had Cubans elected to public office who weren’t very good people in government. And maybe because Cubans are very self-confident people, we just threw the bums out. In fact, I was involved in throwing out as many as three already. And one mayor, who was not Cuban but was Hispanic. And no qualms about the fact that they were Hispanic.

I have to tell you one story about this. I was involved in a runoff in 1981, which I lost, against a fellow who’s named Dmitri Perez. And I was still trying to feel my way around Miami politics and particularly Hispanic politics. I had to debate against him on Spanish radio. The moderator said, “Mr. Perez, would you explain what you would do about the Solid Waste Department of the City of Miami?” And he said, “Yes, I will do that in a second. However, before I do that, I have to say something about my opponent. I want to tell you that he went to a very liberal university—he went to Harvard.” And he went on and on. I was sitting there, trying to figure out how to get around that. So when it was my turn, he asked me about the Solid Waste Department. I said, “I’m going to get to that, but I’d like to answer my opponent’s remark about Harvard, and say that if he was admitted tomorrow to take a course in Advanced Dominoes at Harvard, why, he’d get on a rocket and go up there.” [applause] So I thought I’d won that. But he didn’t even wait until my answer was complete. He said, “Well there you have it, there you have it. He made fun of what is practically the Cuban national game, dominoes. Next he’ll make fun of the palm tree and cigars, and *guayaveras* and everything that we hold dear.” [laughter] I had no comeback. I lost that election by 0.6% and asked for a recount and they denied it.

But in ‘85, I was finally in a runoff in a mayoral race in which we had many, many debates—I think I talked about that the last time I was here. I think in Miami the media does as much to highlight what the candidates have to offer as any city, which makes it easier for someone with less money, and that helped me out a great deal. We had many debates in two languages. I remember calling my headquarters, and saying, “When are the debates?” We have one week in Miami—between the primary and the runoff between the two top candidates. They’re non-partisan elections. The headquarters said, “You’ll be very happy to hear that on Saturday you’re on the air live on Channel 10”—that’s one of the network stations. “On Sunday night, you’re on the air live on Channel 7; on Monday you’re on the air live on Channel 4, Channel 23 for an hour, and Channel 51 for an hour. Those last two are in Spanish. Plus, Channel 6 one hour taped and about fifteen radio debates.” All that in three days. And that helped a great deal.

But in that ‘85 runoff, my opponent was also a Cuban American—the first time. By the way, also an Independent. So either one that would have won would have been a first for Miami—an Independent mayor and a Cuban American mayor. And in Hispanic precincts, I had won in some areas, as high as 85% of the vote. I sat around and tried to understand how I could get 85%

against a Cuban American – and against Maurice Ferré, a Puerto Rican-born, not Cuban American – in the same districts; I would not get anywhere near that much. And even this year, when I beat Ferré again, I did not do nearly as well.

What is it, what was it, that would explain to me about the voters and the voting patterns of the people in those communities that would not accept Vidal and that would accept me, and that Maurice Ferré actually did better among Cuban American voters there? And I finally concluded, Maria, that it was what I call the “family vote.” The family vote is an interesting phenomenon. The grandparent identifies with Xavier Suarez. I don’t know that I can explain it to you – they all think that I’m their grandson and I maintain that image. I tell them that we are related. [laughter] There are six provinces in Cuba, and I’ve convinced everyone that I’m from all six of them. The younger crowd – because of basketball and because I’m younger, obviously, than the opponent – identify with me. And the middle aged group – that’s the tough one for me. What I concluded was that the grandparents and the young kids who lived together – because the households are very large (Miami’s household income for Hispanics is just about in excess of what it is for the Anglo community. Of course, the households are a lot larger; you wouldn’t believe how many people live in them) but they communicate with each other and they want to vote as a bloc – an interesting phenomenon. And the young people and the grandparents convince the parents, “We want to vote for Suarez, we like Xavier” – you always go by the first name. Whichever way, they convince each other and they want to vote as a bloc. No one wants to say, “Well, I’m going to vote differently. I like Masvidal.”

And, in fact, that leads me to what really is a more profound definition of what we’re all about, and – that is what’s already been defined by Maria – what our ethnicity is all about, the clear understanding that we want to preserve certain values, of which the single most important one is the family. I could say many things about that and obviously that would be a whole topic for another discussion.

I do want to say something about the upcoming election, because I was asked to mention something about the presidency. One of the visions that I had that scared me about one of the candidates whom I was, at one point, considering endorsing – and it’s not your candidate. . . [Dean Allison: “Then I don’t want to hear about it.”] [laughter] At some point, even though the fellow expressed a great deal of interest in me, came to my office, and certainly was a viable candidate – still is – that already says something, with all the carnage that we’ve had in this election. I kept thinking that, at some point after the election, I was going to call the White House and say, “This is the Mayor of Miami, and I’d like to speak to the President” and they were going to say, “Yeah, I remember that guy; there was a mayor someplace down there in South Florida. I can’t remember his name exactly, and I certainly can’t pronounce it. But he kind of knew something about some things. Not the dumbest guy in the world.” And it would be just a difficult problem of recall affinity.

I think that the presidential candidate that is going to win this election, and I’ll come flat out and say it, is going to have to show some affinity to the Hispanic culture and the Hispanic community throughout the United States. Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cubans are the three principal groups. We may differ on some other things, but cultural affinity – the fact that the Spanish is important to us, that we don’t want to give up on it. In Miami, of course,

we have a critical mass – we have 800,000 people that speak the language, and a lot of people complain that we speak it too often in places like crowded elevators and so on, the usual stories. And it's true, and we can improve and all of that – though, by the way, I want to tell you that a survey that was done of Miamians by *Tropic*, the magazine of the very fine *Miami Herald*, and I say that for the Nieman Fellow: ninety-eight percent of the Hispanic Americans in Dade County wanted their kids to speak perfect English, and only 94% of non-Hispanics felt this way. It was an interesting statistic. We have a certain reverence for the language.

But I do think the key states in this election are going to be California and Texas and Florida; and they have large Hispanic populations, a lot of times not represented numerically by the numbers of citizens or residents. We have the same problem, Harry, of lack of registration. We have one problem that affects us – a lot of people are not legal. Some others just do not want to serve on juries, etc. Those three states are going to be key in the election, probably not in the primaries because Hispanics are basically in one party. And I do want to add that the approach has been bipartisan, as opposed to the Black leadership. There's been a lot of talk among Hispanics – and I know Henry feels very strongly about this – to try to keep a bipartisan approach. I believe that, in that sense, if it was a Bush vs. Gephardt race, I think that Gephardt would be in a great deal of trouble in the Hispanic area. If the election were, for example, between [to Dean Allison] your candidate and Bush, or anyone else, I think there you'd see some problems for the Republican candidate. Dukakis' fluency in Spanish is known, and I'm sure he will figure out a way to make it even more known in the upcoming months, and I think that you might find that among those three states, the decision will be made as to the next President of the United States. Anyone who doesn't show that affinity, one way or another, for Hispanic culture, for the Spanish language, for the right of people to speak another language and to maintain it, culturally, in a city, and in a metropolitan area, and in the country as a whole, is going to be the deciding factor in the Presidential race. Thank you very much.

# FEATURE INTERVIEW:

## LOS ANGELES CITY COUNCILWOMAN

### GLORIA MOLINA

Gloria Molina became the first Hispanic female ever elected to the Los Angeles City Council on February 2, 1987. Previously, she served as a California State Assemblywoman for the 56th district in East Los Angeles (first elected in 1982). *JHP* interviewed Molina on her election to the Council, her role in local Los Angeles politics and her future political aspirations.

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My experiences at Harvard University, in Washington, D.C., and working at every governmental level would not lessen the nervousness I would experience in interviewing L.A. City Councilwoman Gloria Molina. I am usually not intimidated by the titles people hold, so my anxiousness really intrigued me. Why did interviewing Gloria Molina feel like such an immense challenge to me? Was it because she was the first Latina in the California State Legislature, and then on the Los Angeles City Council? No, I have worked with many people in prestigious positions of authority and have never felt the pressure that I was feeling now. Was it because of my awareness of all the defense mechanisms Gloria had built up to protect herself from less-than-friendly male counterparts and the press that made me uneasy? No, Gloria is from my hometown of Pico Rivera, and she should feel more familiar to me than many other people I have met who hold positions of authority. I realized that my apprehension had nothing to do with feeling intimidated by Gloria's authority status. I was simply worried that my limited abilities would not be adequate in relaying the concerns of an individual who has demonstrated such exceptional leadership in the last half-decade.

Upon entering the Councilwoman's office, it was not her own situation that occupied Molina's mind but my own. My cold and my faulty recording tape were both of concern to Gloria—who offered me coffee and a better quality recording tape of her own. After two and a half hours with the Councilwoman, I had not only received wonderful hospitality, and an inspiring interview, but also a new repository for my hopes. While Gloria Molina herself may be currently dissatisfied with our political system today, she truly gives her community a distinct sense of hope that the system can—and will—be changed into something that we can all believe in.

**Donna Guerrero**  
MPA 1988

**JHP:** How do you define the role of government, and where did Gloria Molina fit into that definition in 1982?

**Molina:** I got involved in the political process hoping that my direct involvement would provide accountability both ways. My background had been one of being outside of the political system—as a young person, as a member of a family that comes from Mexico, as an activist, and as a critic of some of the programs that the government operated within my own community. Now I was going to have an opportunity to participate in the real inner-workings of government, instead of just being a critic and an outsider. Our community—Hispanics, and particularly Latinas—has been excluded from being decision-makers for a long time. Consequently, the decisions that are made do not have our particular perspective woven into many of the solutions that the public policy process presents. I needed to run to represent that interest.

The other issue, of course, for me was the empowerment issue. A selective group of people were not really trying to bring new people into the political process. They were, instead, creating a system that was very selective with who was allowed to participate in that political network. They made those decisions as to who would run and who would get all of the resources that were available in that particular area. Here was an opportunity where a Hispanic would probably be elected and the selection process was being very exclusionary. I felt that it was too controlled—so controlled that the real voice of the people was not coming through; that was the second reason why I felt I had to run.

Finally, another reason that was very important to me was to continue an overall agenda to try and get women elected in various areas to affect public policy and be involved in the political process. Latinas had never really broken into that process. We held elected local offices and school board positions, but we really had not made it in sufficient numbers yet. Here in California, we had never made it to the state legislature—one of the top constitutional offices in the state—and, certainly, had never been in Congress. We needed to break that barrier. I wanted to show that a Latina could get elected and, more importantly, that a Latina could serve well in representing a constituency in government.

All of these reasons brought about my decision to run, and that is where I think I fit into the process in 1982. Unfortunately, the political process has not changed that dramatically. We are still in that minority position, and we are still struggling for all of those same kinds of goals.

**JHP:** When you describe the process as “exclusionary” and set up to be very “selective,” what do you mean and why do you think it is so?

**Molina:** What happened at that point of time, in that seat, in that area, there was a group of people who had clearly decided who would run. If there was no challenge to that individual, then that person was going to be elected, and, it was clearly not me. When I challenged that controlling group, there was a lot of criticism of me—of my being disruptive to Hispanic unity, of my being disruptive to an agenda that was supposed to be moving forward to the benefit of the community, and that I was creating a lot of infighting. All of those “disrupting loyalty” accusations were being directed at me in 1982. “You’re not a player, you’re not serving.” And yet, I felt that the system they were creating was a very stifling kind of situation for new leadership, for new ideas. That’s what I was accused of anyhow: for really bucking the system.

Because it had not been a system that was being responsive to my community, I felt it needed to be pointed out, regularly. What we had was a group of people who had so bought into the system that they, too, began making excuses as to why this community and this district was not getting the kind of benefits that other districts get. I think that is a very detrimental situation. It could happen anywhere. As they say, "it's old Chicago-style politics," and I sure hated it happening in my community.

**JHP:** How do you define your constituency?

**Molina:** My constituency is probably defined differently than it is for most state legislators or councilpersons. My first constituency, which is my most important constituency, is the people who reside within my political jurisdiction. That is, the people who are voters and residents of that area. I use the word "residents" because there are many people in my district who are not voters. Whether they are undocumented or are not full citizens, they still have a real stake in that community.

The second constituency is Hispanics overall. Being a Latina and having that awareness, particularly after serving in D.C., I have clearly seen that we need to have Latina leaders. Because I have a sense of responsibility to those issues, the Hispanic community becomes a constituency as well.

I also feel that my constituency is women. Women who are interested in making sure that *all* women are going to have the broadest of opportunities available to them at all times.

**JHP:** In co-founding *Comision Femenil*, you showed your interest in pursuing women's issues. How are you continuing that involvement?

**Molina:** There needed to be a mechanism, a coalition in which women would be able to find a support group to help them venture out and challenge the system at every level. Whether it be education, the arts, business, or politics, there would be a support mechanism. *Comision* became an opportunity for us to build our skills in those areas and to have that support mechanism there. The organization was very, very important to me because I really think it started focusing on issues that have been ignored by many people. In particular, when Latinos would get together at that time and talk about political priorities and agendas, they always promoted the interests of the men in our community. Our organization held them accountable to their agendas, and made sure that women were included in that process. With the feminist community at that time, whenever they addressed issues of women, they never really addressed issues of Latinas. They were not attentive to that particular point of view or input. Our organization did that as well. It had an accountability mechanism for those very important agendas that were just emerging at that time.

I would like to set up a political mechanism that would be sort of a *Comision*; however, on clear political terms. Its purpose would be to try to get more women elected by helping them raise money and develop skills in that area. Now I go out and organize as many mechanisms as I can, whether it be voter registration or developing coalitions to elect other women.

**JHP:** You often use the phrase “the good of the community” to identify those issues that you feel deserve your support. How do you determine what is good for the community?

**Molina:** You have to go out and listen to what people are saying. Many times they do not know how the system works – but they have the solution. If you listen to them and incorporate their interests, you can really understand what their priorities are. In particular, the Hispanic community has been defined by everyone but us. I mean, they do studies on it, journalists and politicians, and everyone wants to point to us and say, “These are what their priorities are.” For the longest time our only voice was Cesar Chavez. So that, consequently, what Cesar said were the Hispanic “priorities.” Many times it was a couple of politicians that were key leaders saying, “These are the priorities of the Hispanic community.” But very little has ever been done to listen to the people. So I try as much as I can to listen to people. I am very concerned about constituent concerns. I try to create and follow an agenda that is set up by my constituents. That is how I run my office now, and I always want to pursue that as my first priority.

In addition, you also have to interject yourself in a leadership role. When, many times, the community needs assistance and direction, I have no problem in trying to challenge the community as well. That is what leadership is about: going out there, when the community is so set on something, and presenting new and creative ideas. Sometimes that is not the popular sentiment of the community. But I think the issues can be clearly defined by your constituents – going out there, being with them, listening to what their concerns are, debating with them, and challenging them. They are very, very articulate when it comes to knowing what is best for them in their community and probably 99% of the time they are correct as to what should be done.

**JHP:** What injustice do you feel was corrected by changing the prison placement issue to a Hispanic rights issue?

**Molina:** The issue brings to the surface many of the past inequities of government. When the issue of a state prison was first brought to the state legislature, it was brought in on the fact that Los Angeles – being a very large county – does not have a state prison. In the sense of everybody sharing the burden and the responsibility of siting a state prison, L.A. County *should* have a state prison. I have no problem with that concept. But when it came to L.A. County, if you look at where prisons and correctional facilities are located, you will find that all of them are located on the East side. Seventy-five percent of all County jail inmates are now in East Los Angeles. Also, at that time I found that a new Federal prison was going to be constructed – also located in East Los Angeles.

It was very clear to me at that time – and I think to my community – that for the longest time we have been a dumping ground for those unwanted projects. Every freeway crosses our district; in our area there has been a tremendous amount of displacement as far as housing is concerned. The prison issue needed to become a political agenda item for the Hispanic community. I needed to raise it to that level so that people understood the kind of



injustice this was. That is, it is political people that make these determinations and these decisions. It is the same political people that have the decision-making authority and responsibility to alleviate all the other kinds of problems that they have created by their political decisions. And they don't do it. They ignore it. They claim they don't have the resources. When we say, "Here is an opportunity to correct a wrong from the past," it falls on deaf ears.

I think that kind of accountability is important in the overall Hispanic agenda. When we talk about justice issues and equity issues, we need to talk about political issues as well. This is not just a local impact issue; it deals with the larger issue of Hispanic politics and how the political system deals with a local community of this type. I am sure that the state prison issue is only one of many local issues being dealt with in this way, and not just in East Los Angeles.

**JHP:** During your campaign for Los Angeles City Council, your stand on development was made a major factor. Where do you fall on this issue?

**Molina:** My position has always been that the community has to participate in its development or redevelopment. They should have input as to what kind of surrounding or environment they want. So I have never been a pro-development person. I have never been an anti-development person. I consider myself to be a planned-development person. In some areas, I will oppose development if it is not going to benefit the community. In other areas, I will promote development when I see that it is going to be beneficial to the community.

**JHP:** Would this go along with the slow development initiative?

**Molina:** I think so. I think, if anyone, I would be more associated with the slow-development cause, in that with slow development, people want it to be a much more thoughtful process than it has been in the past.

**JHP:** You said that your symbolic vote against the recent bill to help the homeless was intended to send a strong signal that the council should do more for the homeless. How do you intend to follow-up on this issue and press for more aid?

**Molina:** We should put teeth behind our programs. We should not just be paying lip service, and saying, "Oh, look what we are doing for the homeless." When, if you really look at it, it is not much. I think that our city has been throwing money into this problem and has not really been addressing it comprehensively. That is why I did not support it. And that is why I am going to try and present solutions that have worked in other cities.

**JHP:** How do you expect your move to the L.A. City Council to make you a more effective policy-maker?

**Molina:** I feel I can be more directly involved as a policy-maker because the system is so much closer to local scrutiny than the state legislature was. I get more scrutiny by the press at the local level. I get more scrutiny from my constituents—and I enjoy that. It gives me an opportunity to be forthright

about many of the issues that are not clouded in partisan-kind of rhetoric, or partisan-kind of power moves. Like the issue I took on with the homeless. Everybody says, "How are you going to be able to handle the fact that you voted against the homeless policy?" I respond by saying that anyone who has any knowledge of what is going on with homeless problems in this city is not going to look at my position as being anti-homeless. It is probably going to be looked at as being *supportive* of a homeless policy in this city, because *this* proposal is not *it*.

**JHP:** How does your move from the state assembly to the Los Angeles City Council fit into your strategy of being elected to Congress?

**Molina:** It is clear to me that, being in the state legislature and now being on the city council, there is a dramatic difference as far as my own personal agenda is concerned. That is, trying to see that people have more of a sense of empowerment—that their voice and their vote is important and can have an impact for them—is more meaningful at the city level. In a Congressional seat, I wonder whether I would have an opportunity to present that kind of impact to a constituency.

I think it is still a tremendous priority for me, still, to see a woman, a Hispanic woman, elected to Congress. There has never been one and that has been a voice that has not been present in the Congressional debate. I think it would be a very, very important breakthrough, not only for our community but for Congress as well. They need to have that particular perspective because that perspective has not been there. But I am not sure that I will be the one that will be elected.

**JHP:** So, by creating a Hispanic agenda as one of your priorities, you feel you can be more effective at the local level?

**Molina:** People in my community need to feel the government works for them. Many times, when you are in the state legislature—or even the U.S. Congress—constituents feel such a distance between them and any impact or change. At a local level, they can, dramatically, see change right in front of them. I think that creates that feeling and sense of empowerment which, in the long run, is going to be so beneficial. Because the more of us that are registered to vote, the more of us that get involved in the political process, the more likely that larger public policy will include our interests in its eventual formulation. It is something that has not been there in the past.

**JHP:** How do you expect to survive in politics without finding allies or nurturing partnerships?

**Molina:** I have always believed in coalitions and developing allies, but I have never felt that I always have to compromise my position in order to formulate those allies and get that "colleague" kind of support. If, in fact, I wanted to participate in the political process, which I do, I have always said that it has to be on *my* terms.

We have a tendency to be so involved, as politicians, in our own rhetoric, we think we are presenting these great solutions for problems in our communities; but the reality is that we are not. There is not the kind of challenging leadership in politics, overall, today that is really wrestling with the major

issues of the country, or even locally. I believe in developing allies on issues and in moving forward, not just compromising myself for some partisan rationale or for some power rationale. A position should be based on an issue rationale. So I develop my coalitions and my alliances with individuals depending on what the issues are. People in my community have tolerated "politics as usual" and the bottom line is that they have not benefitted from "politics as usual," because "politics as usual" usually does not address their issues.

**JHP:** Do you feel that council members may be forcing you into the role of "confronter" for some reason?

**Molina:** Many times they do force that kind of situation on me, but it is not only their doing. It is my own doing—it is the system's doing. I think it is a system, right now, that needs to have that happening to it. Take the homeless issue, for example. I decided it is bad and I do not like the way it is happening, but I am not going to get involved with it. I sat on the council for eight or nine months before I would say anything about it. And it just gets so bad, I am forced to. No one else will so, consequently, I have to say something because it is just intolerable. I keep finding myself in those kinds of situations. I just think it is by virtue of its absence, I kind of fill a vacuum. I do not particularly like being confrontational. Many people think that I enjoy that. I do enjoy my independence, but I do not enjoy having to confront people. I just don't like trading in or compromising to a level where we present no solutions at all.

**JHP:** Do you think your tendency to "go against the grain" of people's expectations makes you a good leader?

**Molina:** I think that really is what leadership—if leadership is about anything—is about: creating and challenging the political system for the benefit of people overall. And even though it is a minority position, what's wrong with that? That voice also needs to be heard and it needs to be addressed. In the political system in my lifetime, Hispanics are always going to be a minority, and I know that. So I am going to have very unique kinds of problems to address that are with my constituency, and they are not going to be popular issues. Consequently, I am always going to be subjected to raising them at the political level. Hopefully, within my community, people are going to say, "She is raising our issues. She deserves our following." If that makes me a leader, then I am a leader. I guess that *is* my tendency, to go against the grain. But then again, I don't know if it is against the grain of peoples' expectations. Expectations created by whom? Not my community's expectations; I think I fit right into their expectations. I may not fit into political expectations, but I didn't run for them. I ran for my district.

**JHP:** Many of your political activities, including your decisions to run for the state assembly and the city council, have resulted in the creation of social tension. How do you analyze this tension with regard to the improvement of your policy-making capabilities?

**Molina:** If it is tension at all, it was tension that was there. All I did was bring a focus to it. When I decided to challenge, in 1982, a very, very exclusive system, there were many people who felt like I did—that the system was overpowering many of the things that needed to be said in our community. I only raised these sentiments to a level of public dialogue and debate that was different than before. Before, there was no opportunity to discuss this because those in power had full reign of what was going on. I think that was also the case when I ran for the city council. There was that same sentiment. All my council race did was raise it to a level of debate and discussion. I hope, if nothing else, I created a mechanism where people can see that you can challenge the political system. It does not have to be status quo. It does not have to be the so-called “old boys” kind of network. Women and new ideas and creative new people can challenge the system. They can challenge *me* and hold *me* accountable, just as much as I am going to hold other people accountable.

I hope that my election in 1982, as well as my city council election, brought in the voice of those people that have been told, for the longest time, that they did not have a stake in the process. I hope it brought in the voice of those that were not even given an opportunity to make the kind of changes that are needed. I have been told that this has been the case. People feel much more confident out there. There has been more of an interest. Now they can speak to someone and know that their issue is going to be addressed.

The media has always looked at me as the one who is challenging the political system. Very frankly, it can be looked upon that the political system is challenging me. When I was in Boston three years ago, I had the opportunity to take that walk called the Freedom Trail. I was there alone, waiting for my flight home, so I decided to take this walk. And walking through all of those cemeteries, I could feel the history of our country all around me. You know, it occurred to me that here lie the men we call the “fathers of our country.” What we keep forgetting is that those men were revolutionaries. So tension has been around for a very long time. It took revolutionaries to create our present system of democracy. And now, in this same system, we try and pin a little medal on people and keep them quiet. So something is apparently not working right.

**JHP:** When the Hispanic political leadership defined a passive role for you, you were convinced that this was a maladjusted role for a woman to play. How did you go about rallying support for the role of female facilitator that you chose instead?

**Molina:** While the Hispanic political leadership wanted to have a woman involved in the political process, they wanted someone who was going to be quiet and follow what they had donned as the agenda. I very quickly decided this is not the role I should be playing, nor should any other woman have to play this role. As much as they claim they are not sexist, just by virtue of how they exclude women when they carry out their agendas and programs clearly shows that they themselves are creating these barriers, whether they claim to be sexist or not. I also said that it was not enough for me to just go in and gripe about it. I had to go in there and challenge them on their own terms. I had to work twice as hard as they did, in order to be just as equal. I knew that I had to be much more effective than they were, in order to put

together a strategy and a campaign. I had to put together a support mechanism, and I had to take the risk.

It was a mighty challenge in 1982, and it has been an ongoing challenge—not just for me but, I find, for most women who challenge anything that is traditional. If I had not won, I think I would have set women back years. I would have been looked upon as someone about whom to say, “Look what she did. She created all this unrest in the community. She tried to buck the system—she couldn’t do it.”

I must tell you, it wasn’t anything I thought of overnight either. It was planned, it took an awful lot of work, and it was a very, very well-defined strategy.

**JHP:** How have the accusations that you an isolationist hurt your position among women’s groups and feminist groups?

**Molina:** Being accused of being an isolationist has hurt me more in the political power structures, the political party, the Democratic party, local political organizations and the labor movement. But with women, they understand very clearly the kind of positions that I have taken. Women’s issues and the priorities of women have not always been popular issues. Women, and particularly feminist organizations, understand being on the outside.

**JHP:** What I am talking about, specifically, is that you did lose some support in your recent campaign from some of the female activists that have been closest to you. Do you feel that it was because of this isolationist image?

**Molina:** There were a few women who were with me in 1982 who decided not to support me during the L.A. City Council campaign. They felt that I needed to be a person that would play along with the leadership of the state assembly because there might be some residual benefit to them. I felt that the minimum benefit to them was too minimal to compromise myself on the larger issues, for instance, the prison issue. The leadership within the state legislature decided that it was easier to isolate me and accuse me of not being a party loyalist than to address my concerns and present alternatives to some of the issues that I raised. Unfortunately, some of the key women that supported me in 1982 fell into that trap—buying into the scenario that “if you don’t play along, then you are never going to be able to really do anything for us [women] in the future.”

I was really surprised when I read an article that included some of the quotes as to why these few women were not supporting me. One of them said, “She’s too independent.” What does that mean? I think it is pretty good to be independent. And some of them said that not playing along is going to mean less for us. That is not the case. My community has never been a priority for the powers in Sacramento, or anywhere else in the political process. When you look at all of those quotes, none of them equate support for Latina issues with support for feminist issues. When you talk to all of the women’s organizations and the Latina leadership who did endorse me, they say, very clearly, that those accusations do not hold water when it comes to the issues. Being accused of being an isolationist by Willie Brown in the state legislature does not make or break you, as far as being a leader on various issues.

**JHP:** Do you feel that undue attention has been focused on you personally?

**Molina:** Oh, absolutely.

**JHP:** How do you intend to redirect this focus away from you personally, and back to the problem of barriers that confront all women?

**Molina:** I always have to try and get the attention focused down into what I am doing and what kind of commitment I have made in my community. I am not there to be used as a political gadfly for anyone. I am there first to represent the interests of my constituencies. Even during all the accusations while I was in the state legislature, or even when I was running in my last campaign for the L.A. City Council, I don't think anyone can say that I did not represent the interests of my district and of my community. I did not just become "that Chicano in the state legislature," and only addressed Chicano issues. I did not just become "that feminist in the legislature," or just "that Hispanic leader."

**JHP:** What would you like to leave behind from your career in government and what are your aspirations?

**Molina:** When I leave government service, my goal is that people are going to feel that, through electing me and having me as their representative, there was truly a mechanism to have a voice in what was going on. People are going to feel they have a real stake in government. Our [Hispanic] community has been excluded from the political process for generations and generations. I hope that, if nothing else, I am going to open up that situation for them. I am hoping that, after I finish, people are going to say, "She really listened to our concerns; she really cared about what was going on. She presented solutions and really got *me* involved. I really feel I can make a difference now." I think that would be wonderful.

**JHP:** Are there any other issues that you would like to strongly impact?

**Molina:** There is much political lip service that is provided for housing; but when you really look at the issue, you know that affordable housing is not being built for people. The economic issue of housing is not being properly addressed. To me, trying to figure out the effect of development and future development can create solutions in that regard. How can we look at development at a local level, whether it be commercial or housing, to create that component of affordable housing? How is that going to affect the job market? How can we complement all future development that we are looking at, ensuring our community their fair share of the jobs that are going to be coming about from that kind of development? Creating that complement of the whole jobs/housing situation and making it work hand in hand with economic development is, to me, one of the most critical issues to address here in the City of Los Angeles. It is going to be one of the toughest issues, and there are very few people that have ever really wrestled with it.

**JHP:** Is there anything else that you would like to add?

**Molina:** I think that it is very important to know that, within our communities everywhere, there are people like myself that really feel that the system needs to be challenged in order to be changed. It is important that challenging the system is looked upon not in a negative sense but in a positive sense. Those challenges to a political system keep the system more accountable and more effective for people. People like myself should never be looked upon as a "troublemaker" or "someone who just didn't fit in" or anything like that. I think those are all positive kinds of things that will make the system more effective for all of us. I hope that I am looked upon, not as a creator of social tension, but someone who is challenging the system in order to make it more effective—and better.





# POLICY PERSPECTIVE

## THE SINGLE EXIT CRITERION: A NEW JERSEY CONFLICT OVER BILINGUAL EDUCATION POLICY

**Ruth Anne Thomas**

Dr. Ruth Anne Thomas was chairperson of the 1987-88 State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education, and a member of the Coordinating Council of the Hispanic Association for Higher Education of New Jersey. She was a Peace Corps volunteer in Colombia from 1971 to 1975.

In New Jersey, bilingual education policies affect nearly 36,000 Limited English Proficient (LEP) students, including more than 23,000 Hispanics.<sup>1</sup> This article includes, from the perspective of the State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education, an account of events and an analysis of the issues surrounding the "single exit criterion," which has been the dominant educational issue among the Hispanic community and bilingual educators since December, 1986. At that time, the State Department of Education revealed to the Advisory Committee, and to districts with bilingual or English as a second language programs, its proposal to amend a section of the *State Administrative Code*: to change from multiple criteria to a single criterion for determining when a bilingual student is ready for the mainstream classroom. The multiple criteria stipulated in the Code include "documentation of the pupil's academic work in English," as well as an English language proficiency test. The proposed exit criterion is a single score on a language proficiency test. That is, all LEP students who score above a cutoff score (yet to be determined) would be placed in mainstream classrooms, with no consideration of their academic performance.

Protests were vigorous and voluminous. Forty-four people testified at the State Board of Education's first public hearing on the matter on May 20, 1987-40 against the single exit criterion and only four in favor of it. Opponents included representatives of the Advisory Committee, the New Jersey Education Association, the New Jersey School Board's Association, the Educational Testing Service, the Hispanic Association for Higher Education, the Puerto Rican Congress of New Jersey, and the New Jersey TESOL/Bilingual Education Association; a student representing ASPIRA; members of several local boards of education; teachers and administrators from various bilingual and

ESL programs; faculty members from several colleges. A bus load of students from Newark came to cheer the opponents. The four supporters of the single exit criterion were district superintendents and one supervisor, who had all been called at the last minute by Department officials.<sup>2</sup> It was a noisy and emotionally-charged hearing, divided into two sections because of the number of people.

The Department received an undetermined number of letters from districts and the public against the single criterion prior to the official comment period. The official comment period began after the proposed amendments were published in the *New Jersey Register* in June, 1987. Officially, 24 comments were received, all opposing the single exit criterion.<sup>3</sup> Bilingual and ESL specialists within the Department also oppose it. The Bilingual Office Manager resigned in the midst of the controversy after 14 years with the Department. Eighteen months elapsed before a new manager was hired in December.

Despite overwhelming opposition, the State Board of Education unanimously approved the single exit criterion amendments on November 4, 1987. The new exit policy was to have been implemented in September, 1988. After the new rule was published, two suits were filed against it in the Appellate Division of the state Superior Court: one by the Union City Board of Education joined by the New Jersey Education Association and several other local boards and organizations; the second by Alfred Slocum, New Jersey Public Advocate. The Public Advocate is appointed by the governor and charged by state law to cast a watchful eye on how public policies might adversely affect certain sectors of the population.<sup>4</sup> He was urged by the Advisory Committee, the Puerto Rican Congress of New Jersey and several individuals to file the suit. Union City requested a stay, which was granted on March 10, 1988, meaning that the single exit criterion could not be implemented in September, 1988 as had been planned.

Opposition to the single criterion burgeoned out of both substantive concerns for the children affected and procedural irregularities. Opponents argue that available language proficiency tests are far too easy to indicate whether a bilingual student has sufficient command of English for academic success in the mainstream classroom. Easing the exit requirements would mean forcing thousands of students prematurely into all-English classes, thereby violating their right to equal educational opportunity. Procedurally, the Department of Education failed to provide to the public a reasonable rationale for the sudden shift from educationally sound multiple criteria to a simple language proficiency test. These issues will be examined to a greater extent, but first it is important to understand the legal and political context in which the single exit criterion has been proposed and debated.

## LEGAL BACKGROUND

Four major documents apply to the implementation of educational programs for limited English proficient students: the *New Jersey Bilingual Education Act*, of 1975<sup>5</sup>; the *Thorough and Efficient Education Act*, also of 1975<sup>6</sup>; Title Six of the *State Administrative Code*<sup>7</sup>; and the state Department of Education *Guidelines*, which interpret the Code and contain the specific procedures

which districts are to follow in implementing bilingual and ESL programs.<sup>8</sup> Distinction among these documents is important for an analysis of New Jersey's bilingual education entry and exit policies.

The *Thorough and Efficient* law guarantees every student in New Jersey schools a sound education and also obligates the state to provide an amount of funding per LEP student to local districts to support a bilingual or ESL program. The *Bilingual Education Act* provides a comprehensive framework for bilingual programs. It guarantees that when twenty or more limited English-speaking students from the same native language are in a district, they are entitled to instruction in all subject areas in their native language and in English, for a period of three years. That law consigns to the Commissioner of Education, with consent of the State Board, the obligation to identify all LEP students in the state. The Bilingual Act also provides for the establishment of the State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education, with members to be appointed by the Commissioner of Education and the Chancellor of Higher Education. The Commissioner and the Chancellor appoint a variety of teachers and administrators from local bilingual and ESL programs, local board members, higher education representatives and knowledgeable lay persons. The legislature apparently did not foresee that committee members appointed by the Commissioner might turn out to be his adversaries on a major policy issue.

Title Six of the *Administrative Code* is enacted or revised by vote of the State Board of Education. It establishes that districts with ten or more LEP students from any native language background must be provided with English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. The Code must be consistent with all laws, but may be more specific than the law. It is the major vehicle by which the Commissioner of Education, appointed by the governor, makes policy changes. For example, although the law states that three years of dual language instruction is the minimum to which an LEP student is entitled, in 1980 the Code was amended to obligate districts to exit children when they met the established exit criteria. This amendment was intended to show clearly that New Jersey's bilingual programs were transitional and not for maintenance of the native language. The same section of the Code provided for the Department to establish guidelines for "a review process that will insure the readiness of the individual pupil to function successfully in the regular program."<sup>9</sup> The single exit criterion amendments would delete all reference to the review process and the students' readiness to function successfully.

The Code is more specific than the law on the function of the Advisory Committee. According to the Administrative Code, the Advisory Committee "shall advise the Department of Education and the Department of Higher Education in the formulation of policies and procedures related to the act." The Committee had no input into formulation of the single exit criterion policy. It was informed of the proposed criterion. It submitted directly to the Commissioner of Education, Saul Cooperman, a position paper advising him to withdraw the proposal on the grounds that it was educationally unsound and contrary to available research on second language proficiency. This advice was totally ignored, and the Department presented the amendments to the State Board in May, 1987.

The multiple criteria in the review procedure delineated in the Department's *Guidelines* are very specific:

- a score at or above the norm on an English language proficiency test adopted by the district;
- standardized test scores in math and English reading at or above *district* norms for the grade level;
- bilingual and ESL teachers' recommendations based on the students' classroom work;
- regular classroom teachers' recommendations, when a student participates part-time in the mainstream classroom.<sup>10</sup>

It is curious that, if the Department found its own specific exit standards too high, it did not just modify those without seeking the more drastic and permanent Code amendment. Conceivably, the standardized test score criterion, particularly in math, could have been eased and the teachers' records of students' classroom performance would still have been consistent with the Code's stipulation of "documentation of the pupil's academic work in English."

## POLICY BACKGROUND

The more drastic code change, however, is consistent with a series of policy changes instigated by Commissioner Cooperman's administration, which are perceived to have weakened bilingual education in New Jersey. The single exit criterion is just the most recent such initiative. The Department, under Republican Governor Thomas Kean, has manifested in several ways the influence of the conservative national direction in education. Commissioner Cooperman has echoed many times publicly the conservative position that the purpose of bilingual programs is to teach English as soon as possible, ignoring entirely the academic benefits of the programs. He has also reiterated the notion expressed by the Reagan administration that neither federal nor state government should dictate a bilingual "method," and that local school administrators should have flexibility in choosing the type of instruction LEP students receive.

There are vocal advocates in New Jersey for alternatives to bilingual education programs, such as strictly English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. In 1984, Cooperman initiated an experimental immersion program for Hispanic students in Elizabeth, New Jersey. He was unsuccessful in persuading two other districts to try it. He has remained silent on the negative preliminary results of immersion programs, both in New Jersey and in a national study,<sup>11</sup> and continues to hope that immersion will be a viable alternative to bilingual instruction.

The Department has been carefully monitoring districts' exit rates, that is, the percentage of students exited annually into the mainstream program. The Commissioner has two letters, known as A and B, which he sends to district superintendents whose reported exit rates are below what Cooperman thinks is reasonable. One district, for example, received letter A admonishing it for having only a thirty-eight per-cent exit rate for students in the program three or more years, and a fifteen per-cent exit rate for students in the

program for one or two years.<sup>12</sup> Letter A imposes a plan to improve the exit rate. Letter B is much stronger.<sup>13</sup> It threatens

Districts which have still [by Spring 1989] not been successful at improving their programs or improving student exit rate may be subject to direct state management of their bilingual programs, withholding of bilingual categorical aid or on-going monitoring (in districts with small programs).

The concern over exit rates after only one or two years in the program goes beyond the law which entitles LEP students to bilingual instruction for at least three years.

Clearly, then, accelerating exit rates is a major objective of the Department under Cooperman, and this concern apparently precipitated the proposal for the single exit criterion. Officially, the concern about exiting is, according to the letters, "that limited English proficient students are provided with a sound educational program that will offer them every opportunity to succeed."

Nevertheless, there are other considerations. The categorical state funding for reported LEP students in programs could tempt districts to report students in programs—could tempt districts to report students as needing services longer than they do need them for educational success. A second problem is the shortage of qualified bilingual and ESL teachers, especially of certified bilingual teachers who speak languages other than Spanish. One of Cooperman's priorities is the statewide elimination of emergency certificates, in favor of a provisional certification program for which candidates must meet certain entry requirements, including a college degree and a passing score on the National Teachers' Examination. Cooperman has been unsuccessful so far in eliminating emergency certification for bilingual and ESL teachers because of the shortage. Districts which must provide mandated programs must sometimes hire teachers who do not yet meet all requirements for state certificates.


A program for provisional certification of bilingual and ESL teachers had been projected to be implemented in September 1990, simultaneously with the single exit criterion;<sup>14</sup> but as of this writing it has been delayed. There is widespread concern that many bilingual and ESL teachers now holding emergency certificates would not enter the provisional program. Proposed standards for candidates for provisional bilingual and ESL certificates are higher than standards for teachers provisionally certified in other fields, and the proposed training programs would be more demanding. Non-native speakers of English would be required to pass the National Teachers' Examination, in general knowledge or in a subject field, and a difficult language proficiency interview in order to receive the provisional certificate. The provisionally certified teachers, while holding full-time teaching jobs, would be subject to proposed training programs ranging from 90 to 380 hours, with little opportunity to receive graduate academic credit.<sup>15</sup> It is doubtful that such a program will hold onto all currently emergency certified teachers or attract new teachers into the field. If such a provisional program is implemented, the bilingual and ESL teacher shortage will be quite serious indeed. If, because of higher exit rates, fewer students are legally eligible for bilingual or ESL services, the teacher shortage would be a less serious matter.

A third concern, and perhaps the most significant, is the prevailing assumption among administrators in the Department that bilingual programs are inherently inferior to all-English programs. Assistant Commissioner Richard DiPatri, who directly supervises bilingual program activities within the Department and who has been a vocal advocate for the single exit criterion, has stated that LEP children should not be "condemned to the bilingual program" or "relegated to the bilingual program."<sup>16</sup> In its official statements in support of the single exit criterion, the Department has argued that, "The mainstream program best prepares students to successfully 'function politically, economically, and socially' in an English-speaking society."<sup>17</sup> It offers no justification for assuming that a bilingual program cannot do this just as well, yet bilingual programs as well as mainstream programs are covered by the same *Thorough and Efficient Education Act* from which the Department quotes.

### SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE CHILDREN

There is no question that the single exit criterion would exit more children more quickly into mainstream classes, but once there, they would probably become eligible for remedial services. The Department contends that such services are appropriate for exited LEP students,<sup>18</sup> but the Advisory Committee and other opponents argue that assignment to remedial programs would be stigmatizing and ineffective, because few remedial teachers are trained to deal with even advanced ESL learners.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, remedial teachers are easier to employ than bilingual or ESL teachers because they need no special certification or language skills. The Department argues that once the students are able to pass the language proficiency test, their problems with academic work are basic skills problems, not language problems.<sup>20</sup> Opponents cite the research of Cummins which distinguishes between conversational or Basic Interpersonal Communication Skills (BICS) and Cognitive-Academic Language Proficiency (CALP). The research shows that most LEP students acquire BICS long before they demonstrate CALP, which might require up to eight years of schooling in the second language.<sup>21</sup> There could be legitimate debate over just what level of CALP is necessary for bilingual students to benefit from instruction in the all-English classroom. Cummins explains it in terms of continua: cognitively demanding versus cognitively undemanding tasks and context embedded versus context disembedded language activities. These continua intersect to form quadrants to show the kinds of language demands placed upon students in the classroom.

Chamot and O'Malley<sup>22</sup> have analyzed typical academic activities and offer examples of the types of language demands which fall into each quadrant. Of particular concern to academic success of bilingual students are the cognitively demanding tasks. Examples of context embedded, cognitively demanding tasks are: listening to lessons with demonstrations and illustrations; hands-on science activities; reading heavily illustrated textbooks; doing math word problems with concrete referents. Examples of context *dis*-embedded, cognitively demanding tasks are: listening to content explanations without demonstrations or illustrations; doing math word problems without



illustration; reading for information in subject areas; research and report writing; taking standardized tests. Most academic language demands become more context disembodied as grade level increases. It is assumed that students who have mastered cognitively demanding, context disembodied tasks in their native language will need less time to master such tasks in English. New Jersey's LEP student population, however, includes many students with low literacy skills in their native languages. These children principally account for low bilingual program exit rates in many districts. Clearly, these students need considerable time to master both the English language and academic skills.

It is impossible to sever the language skills from the academic demands, and tenets of equal educational opportunity require that bilingual children be given ample opportunity to master the language needed for the most difficult tasks. The context disembodied, cognitively demanding activities at upper elementary grade levels and beyond meet the definition of "ordinary classwork" specified in the state *Bilingual Education Act* as the type of work which LEP students have difficulty performing.<sup>23</sup>

Children with good conversational skills who do poorly in reading, writing and content areas may be puzzling to untrained mainstream teachers. They are no puzzle to the Department, which ironically still issues several publications explaining the importance of developing CALP within bilingual and ESL programs.<sup>24</sup> The distinction between BICS and CALP is well known to Department administrators who carefully review every document published by the Department. One such document, a training manual for county personnel that emphasizes the importance of Cummins's theory, was sent to the Advisory Committee in October, 1987, at the same time that the Department was preparing its justification for the single exit criterion. The justification dismissed Cummins's work as irrelevant to New Jersey, because his subjects were French-speaking Canadians in a bilingual society.<sup>25</sup> That was a misstatement: Cummins did most of his work on limited English proficient students from many language backgrounds in the English-dominant city of Toronto.<sup>26</sup>

Evidence of development of CALP is generally considered to be classroom academic performance, but particularly performance on standardized achievement tests which have been normed on English proficient students. One of the multiple criteria for exit, which is specified in the Department *Guidelines* but not in the Administrative Code, is performance at or above *district* norms (not to state or national norms) on standardized achievement tests of reading and mathematics. This requirement, the Department has argued, is too high a standard.

This means that LEP students are being held to a higher standard than other students. Other students below district basic skills standards are educated in the mainstream program and receive supplemental basic skills improvement services to address their identified needs.<sup>27</sup>

Academic success, however, is often defined as grade level performance on standardized tests. Conversely, a student's academic performance on classroom tasks is generally dependent upon that student's ability to read at or near grade level, as measured by a standardized test. If students exited from bilingual programs are going to be able to compete academically with their native-speaking peers, they also must be able to read at or above grade level. That is a goal of the bilingual programs, even if it takes students several years to achieve it. The Department has offered no evidence that LEP students would profit more from remedial instruction than from bilingual and ESL instruction. Evidence is accumulating, however, that LEP students do profit from bilingual programs.<sup>28</sup> The evidence offered is students' performance on standardized achievement tests in English.

The language proficiency tests are good for measuring progress in the acquisition of English, but do not reflect reading and writing skills even close to grade level. Several experts testified to that effect at the State Board hearings on the single exit criterion in May and August, 1987.<sup>29</sup> The language proficiency tests recommended by the Department are the LAB (or Language Assessment Battery) which was developed for use with Hispanic students in New York City after the ASPIRA Consent Decree, and the Maculaitis Test, adopted as a graduation requirement for LEP students in New Jersey high schools. The Department plans to conduct a norming study on both tests to determine cutoff scores for both entry to and exit from bilingual programs. The Advisory Committee requested that a predictive validity study also be conducted to find out whether the cutoff scores could actually predict the students' success in the mainstream classroom.<sup>30</sup> The Department has refused.<sup>31</sup>



A predictive validity study on the language proficiency test would obtain a correlation between scores on the test and a criterion variable, such as promotion rates, grade point average or standardized achievement test scores of students who had been mainstreamed. A high correlation would indicate confidence in the language proficiency test's validity in predicting a student's degree of success in the all-English classroom. A successful predictive validity study is the only legitimate way to substantiate the use of the language proficiency test as the single exit criterion.

## PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES

The Department's rationale for the one criterion has been elusive. Failure to make public a rationale for the change in criteria is the procedural basis for the Public Advocate's suit against the State Board and the Department. When representatives of the Advisory Committee met with Commissioner Cooperman on March 2, 1987, they asked directly what his rationale for the single criterion was. He replied not by citing research, but by relating his own personal experience on a three-week trip to Mexico. He had studied his phrase-book on the plane, ordered his meals by pointing to menu items, and started picking up phrases in Spanish as he overheard conversations in the street. This experience, he said, made him understand the best way to learn a second language.<sup>32</sup> A preliminary memorandum issued by the Department on April 30, 1987, merely stated, "This change in exit policy would give students the opportunity to function in monolingual classes as soon as possible."<sup>33</sup> The Department provided to the public no serious rationale for the single criterion until after the final vote by the State Board in November, 1987.

In a position paper issued in August, 1987, the Department of the Public Advocate<sup>34</sup> called the proposal for the single exit criterion "arbitrary and capricious" for lack of a proper rationale. It cited the Supreme Court decision in the case of *Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.* (103 S. Ct. 2856, 2862 [1983]). That case involved the U.S. Department of Transportation's abrupt rescission of its regulation requiring passive restraints in automobiles. The Court ruled that "an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the changes beyond that which is required when an agency does not act in the first instance." The Court ruled further that the agency must examine all available data to explain its action "including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made (103. S. Ct. 2866)." The New Jersey Department of Education has not provided any such clear rationale for changing from multiple criteria to a single criterion.

The Public Advocate's comments also questioned whether the single exit criterion was consistent with the Bilingual Education Act's intention that LEP students receive equal educational opportunity, criticized the Department's failure to heed the advice of its Advisory Committee to conduct research, and analyzed much of the available research which supported the use of multiple criteria. After receiving the Public Advocate's comments, the State Board postponed its final vote on the single exit criterion from September until November, 1987. In September, the Department announced to the Advisory

Committee that it was preparing a response to the Public Advocate's position paper and other comments received.<sup>35</sup> The response and other documents were sent only to State Board members during the last week of October. The documents were not available to the Committee or to the public before the Board conducted its final hearing in October. Representatives of the Advisory Committee and the New Jersey School Boards' Association protested the inaccessibility of the documents at the hearing.<sup>36</sup>

Representatives of the Advisory Committee and other interested individuals attended the State Board meeting on the day of the final vote. The documents were still not available to the public. A department employee was instructed to keep them locked in his car until after the vote.<sup>37</sup> After several board members expressed satisfaction with the documents and after promises from the Department that it would design a "reentry policy" to be incorporated into the Code later, the Board voted unanimously to approve the single exit criterion.

Three documents were released after the vote: the Department's responses to all comments submitted against the single exit criterion; a special response to the Public Advocate's comments; and a third document which purported to be a reasoned rationale.<sup>38</sup> In these documents, the Department claims that the single exit criterion is merely an effort to adopt a consistent operational definition of limited English proficiency for both entry into and exit from bilingual and ESL programs. The Department here asserts that it wants a uniform, statewide standard: the single test score for exiting students from the programs. This is in contrast to Cooperman's urging of flexibility to districts whether or not they provide a bilingual approach to the education of LEP students. Opponents contest the uniformity arguments. Although the language proficiency test is the principal criterion for identifying students in need of bilingual/ESL services, the departmental Guidelines also recommend screening by use of a reading test.<sup>39</sup> Students who meet grade level standards on the reading test may enter the all-English program without taking the language proficiency test. Students who fail the reading test must take the proficiency test. A score at the current state norm of the 40th percentile or above indicates that the student shall not be enrolled in a bilingual program. There is reason to be concerned about how well students who fail the reading test but pass the proficiency test might be progressing in the mainstream. There is no follow-up on such students required by the Department.

The Department admits in one of its documents that a group of experts which it appointed ten years ago to study entry and exit criteria recommended multiple criteria for both. The multiple criteria the experts recommended for entry, which included extensive testing of academic ability in the students' native languages, were not adopted because they were administratively "cumbersome."<sup>40</sup>

The multiple criteria for exit specified in the review procedure in the Guidelines include LEP students' achievement test scores in English, reading and math which must be at or above district norms. Now the Department claims that this means that in some districts students will still be classified as LEP, while in other districts they will not be. This inconsistency among district standards is an advantage to the bilingual student who moves from one district to another. Disparities exist between norms in both reading and math, primarily between urban and suburban districts. Therefore, a bilingual student who reaches the norm in an urban school, but moves into a suburban

district, would be at a disadvantage under a statewide standard for competing academically in all-English classes in his new school.

The Department argues, furthermore, that the available research on bilingual education does not address exit criteria. As mentioned above, it dismissed Cummins's findings as irrelevant to New Jersey. It does cite preliminary results of a study by the New York City Board of Education which followed up on mainstreamed students who had passed its cutoff (the 20th percentile) on the LAB test. The study found that the mainstreamed students were continuing to make progress, but were performing at an average of 13 to 19 points below average on city-wide tests in English.<sup>41</sup> The study will continue for three more years, because the researchers suspect that these mainstreamed LEP students may fall further behind in subsequent years. Ironically, the director of that study submitted comments to the State Board against the use of the single exit criterion.<sup>42</sup>

The New Jersey Superior Court will decide in the coming weeks whether the department provided a sufficiently reasoned rationale and whether there was a "rational connection between the data found" and the single exit criterion. The Public Advocate argues that the public has had no meaningful opportunity to comment on the Department's rationale and its reliance on the New York City study, because the Department withheld its documents.<sup>43</sup>

## CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The issue of New Jersey's single exit criterion has ethical and political ramifications as well as legal. The leading educational and psychological research associations have a firm standard against using a single test score for making educational decisions.

"In elementary or secondary education, a decision or characterization that will have a major impact on a test taker should not automatically be made on the basis of a single test score. Other relevant information for the decision should also be taken into account by the professionals making the decision."<sup>44</sup>

Forcing LEP students into mainstream classes before they are ready to compete academically will have great impact on those students. That is the reason bilingual education programs were established in the first place. The failure of our educational system to stem the dropout rate for Hispanic students is well known; weakening bilingual education programs for those students who need them will not help.

The intransigence of Commissioner Cooperman and the State Board of Education in passing the single exit criterion, in the face of overwhelming opposition from bilingual educators and the Hispanic community, is perplexing. Despite the conservatism of the current Republican administrations in Washington and in Trenton, it is Republican strategy *not* to alienate Hispanics. Governor Thomas Kean campaigned on a slogan of "the politics of inclusion." He also claims national leadership in the educational reform movement. The single exit criterion policy is inconsistent with both of those trends. Kean has not publicly intervened in the dispute, but two of his appointees, the Public Advocate and the Commissioner of Education, will argue the procedural issues before the Superior Court.

It will be some weeks before the issues are finally resolved. So far, the opposition has successfully halted the new exit policy. Educationally sound multiple criteria are still in effect. Judicial stays against New Jersey state agencies are very rare. The stay granted against the single exit criterion has heartened bilingual educators and Hispanic community leaders. There is reason for optimism in looking forward to the eventual resolution of the issues before the court.

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## ENDNOTES

1. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Survey of the Limited English Proficient Student Population in New Jersey and the Educational Programs to Meet Their Needs, 1986-87*, Trenton: (No Date).
2. Ana Maria Schuhmann, Kean College Administrator, protested this at the hearing. Administrators from the Newark Board of Education confirmed that they had been contacted by the Essex County Superintendent, representing the Department. A secretary to the State Board also confirmed that Department officials had insisted on allowing district administrators to testify after the deadline to be placed on the list to testify.
3. Untitled summary of comments submitted and the Department's responses to each, released by the New Jersey Department of Education, November 4, 1987.
4. *Department of the Public Advocate Act of 1974*, N.J.S.A. 52:27E- 1, *et seq.*
5. *Bilingual Education Act*, N.J.S.A. 18A:7a.
6. *Thorough and Efficient Education Act*, N.J.S.A. 18A:7A.
7. N.J.S.C. 6:31.
8. New Jersey State Department of Education, Division of Compensatory/Bilingual Education, *Guidelines for Development of Program Plan: Bilingual/ESL Education Programs*, Trenton: (Fiscal Year) 1988.
9. N.J.A.C. 6:31-1.10(b).
10. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Guidelines-----, op. cit.*
11. (D. Ramirez, *et al*) S.R.A. Technologies, Inc. Memorandum to : (National Bilingual) Advisory Committee Members, Subject: summary results of pre/post achievement test comparisons for matched groups of target students, FY 1984-85; December, 1985. This memorandum reported the first year's results of a national study comparing bilingual and immersion programs. In that year, the children who received the most instruction in Spanish achieved the best results in English. An unpublished report prepared for the New Jersey State Department of Education, D. Ramirez, *et al*, *First Year Report : Longitudinal Study of an Immersion and an Early -exit Transitional Bilingual Education Program*, 1987, reported that the bilingual program students out-performed the immersion program students on five out of six tests in English.
12. Letter from Commissioner of Education, Saul Cooperman, to Anonymous district superintendent, April 14, 1987.
13. Letter from Saul Cooperman to anonymous district superintendent, May 8, 1987.
14. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Defining an Appropriate Policy for Exit from Bilingual and English as a Second Language Program*, Trenton: October, 1986.
15. *The Report of the Bilingual Teacher Certification Committee*, presented to Saul Cooperman, Commissioner of Education, May, 1987, recommended a program consisting of 150 hours of instruction for the bilingual endorsement. *The Report of the English as a Second Language Teacher Certification Committee*, May, 1987, recommended a program of 250 hours. In addition to those hours, all provisionally certified teachers who possess no previous certification in any area must take 200 hours of state mandated basic teacher training. The committee recommendations were presented to State Board on May 6, 1987, the same day that the single exit criterion was introduced. Commissioner Cooperman told the Board that he wanted them to take "a comprehensive look at bilingual education" in the state.
16. Assistant Commissioner Richard Dipatri, in statements before the State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education, March 19, 1987, and before the State Board of Education, May 6, 1987.
17. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Defining an Appropriate Policy for Exit from Bilingual and English as a Second Language Programs*, Trenton: (no date).
18. *Ibid.*
19. *The New Jersey State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education's Position Statement on Proposed Change in the State Administrative Code, Section 6:31-1.1* (Trenton: March 2, 1987).

20. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Defining an Appropriate Policy*---, *op. cit.*
21. Two major works on the BICS/CALP distinction are J. Cummins, "The Entry and exit fallacy in bilingual education," *NABE Journal*, v. 4, Spring, 1980, and J. Cummins, *Bilingualism and Special Education; issues in assessment and pedagogy*, Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters, 1984.
22. A. U. Chamot and J. M. O' Malley, *A Cognitive Academic Language Learning Approach: and ESL content-based curriculum*, Rosslyn, Va.: National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education, 1986.
23. "'Children of limited English-speaking ability' means those children whose primary language is other than English who have difficulty performing ordinary classwork in English," Section 2, *Bilingual Education Act*.
24. C. E. Cochran, *Effective Practices for Bilingual/ESL Teachers*, Trenton: New Jersey State Department of Education, 1985 and R. Sinai, *An Introduction to Bilingual Education; a manual for trainers*, Trenton: New Jersey Department of Education, Winter, 1986.
25. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Response to the Comments of the Department of the Public Advocate on the Proposed Revision of Criteria for Exit from Bilingual and ESL Programs (N.J.A.C. 6:31-1.10)*, Trenton: October, 1987.
26. J. Cummins, *Bilingualism and Special Education*---, *op. cit.*
27. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Response to the Comments of the Department of the Public Advocate*---, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
28. In a major survey, K. A. Baker and A. A. de Kanter, *Effectiveness of Bilingual Education; a review of the literature*, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Education, Office of Planning, Budget and Evaluation, 1981, it was established that bilingual programs, in general, promoted the acquisition of English. A subsequent meta-analysis of the same program evaluation data revealed a considerable advantage of bilingual programs, A. Willig, "A meta-analysis of selected studies on the effectiveness of bilingual education," *Review of Educational Research*, v. 55, 3, 1985. The D. Ramirez studies, previously cited, also contribute to the literature favoring the bilingual approach.
29. E. Schuman, ESL teacher, Passaic, N. J., and W. J. Eliason, Associate Professor of Education, Rider College, in testimonies before the State Board of Education, May 19, 1987. Ruth Thomas, in testimony before the State Board, August 19, 1987.
30. New Jersey State Advisory Committee, *op. cit.*
31. Memorandum to Ruth Thomas, Advisory Committee Chairperson, from Sylvia Roberts, Director, Division of Compensatory/Bilingual Education, January 20, 1988.
32. Saul Cooperman, conversation with Advisory Committee members, March 2, 1987.
33. Sylvia Roberts, Director, Division of Compensatory/Bilingual Education, *Proposed Amendment of the Bilingual Code: Exit Criteria*, April 30, 1987.
34. R. Torres and B. Passade, *Comments of the Department of the Public Advocate on the Proposed Amendment to the Bilingual and ESL Program Regulation, N.J.A.C. 6:31-1.10*, Trenton: August 10, 1987.
35. Sylvia Roberts, statement, meeting of the State Advisory Committee on Bilingual Education, September 23, 1987.
36. Ruth Thomas, Advisory Committee, and R. Bourse, New Jersey School Boards' Association, at State Board hearing, October 21, 1987.
37. Jay Doolan, Department of Education employee, conversation with the author, November 4, 1987.
38. Documents released were (1) untitled summary of comments against the amendments and the Department's responses; (2) *Defining an Appropriate Policy for Exit from Bilingual and English as a Second Language Programs*; and (3) *Response to the Comments of the Department of the Public Advocate*---.
39. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Guidelines*---, *op. cit.*
40. New Jersey State Department of Education, *Defining an Appropriate Policy*---, *op. cit.*
41. S. Morgulas, B. Harris and R. Shore, *An Educational Profile of Language-Minority Students in the New York City Public Schools*, New York: Office of Educational Evaluation, 1984, and J.S. Torres, et al, *An Educational Profile of Language-Minority Students in the New York Public School; a one-year follow-up*, New York: Office of Educational Assessment, 1986.
42. Mentioned in the Department's untitled summary of comments against the single exit criterion.
43. Cynthia Samuels, Public Interest Section, Department of the Public Advocate, statement to the Bilingual Advisory Committee, February 18, 1988.
44. American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, and National Council on Measurement in Education, *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing*, Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1985, p. 54.



# FEATURE ARTICLES

## HISPANIC EDUCATION, LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY

**Louis Freedberg**

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### 1. EDUCATION AS A UNIFYING ISSUE

Education is an issue that seems to unite Hispanics across America, irrespective of background—a unanimity which has profound implications not only for the future of Hispanic children but for the extent to which Hispanics will be integrated into the political process. A 1987 National Education Association study concluded that “education is a key concern of a broad cross-section of the Hispanic community—from parents to politicians and in between. The issues transcend interest in just bilingual education. Underlying that sentiment is the view that the public schools undoubtedly require restructuring to meet the needs of today’s Hispanic American student.”<sup>1</sup> In a survey of 796 Hispanic elected officials conducted by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), access to higher education and high school drop outs were rated as the two most important issues facing Hispanics. “Clearly the issue of education is of transcending importance to Hispanic elected officials,” the NALEO report conclude.<sup>2</sup>

A quick glance at the educational status of Hispanics makes it clear why education is such a paramount issue in Hispanic communities. There is no disguising the fact that the educational system is failing to serve large numbers of Hispanics. “In general, the data show that approximately 50 percent of Mexican American and Puerto Rican youth leave high school without a diploma,” is the understated observation of a report by the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).<sup>3</sup> Nationally, Hispanic students do marginally better than blacks on test scores, but they drop out in greater numbers—and at earlier ages. They are much less likely to earn A’s in school, and almost twice as likely

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to have earned D's and F's than white students.<sup>4</sup> The end result is that in 1987, 11.7 percent of Hispanics over the age of 25 had not completed elementary school as compared with only 1.8 percent of the total population.<sup>5</sup> Forty percent of Hispanics had not gone beyond the 8th grade as compared with 18 percent of all Americans. Although Cuban Americans are doing better than other Hispanic groups, they still lag behind non-Hispanics. Sixty-one percent of Cuban Americans completed four or more years of high school as compared with 77 percent of non-Hispanics.<sup>6</sup>

Nor have Hispanic enrollments at the post-secondary level kept pace with increases in Hispanic population. According to U.S. Department of Education figures, the numbers of 18 to 24-year old Hispanics in the 18 to 24-year old age group overall increased by 62 percent from 1976 to 1986, while the number of Hispanics in that age group who enrolled in college increased by only 43 percent, from 309,000 to 433,000. Additionally, 43 percent of those students enrolled in college are enrolled in community colleges rather than four-year institutions that lead to graduate study.<sup>7</sup> One bright note is that, after a two-year decline, the percentage of Hispanic high school graduates going to college increased by a small percentage—from 26.9 percent in 1985 to 29.4 percent in 1986—for a total Hispanic enrollment of 624,000 in institutions of higher education.<sup>8</sup> NCLR concludes, however, that there is a "critical and continuing Hispanic under-representation in post-secondary education."<sup>9</sup>

If education is indeed a unifying issue within Hispanic communities, to what extent have Hispanics become involved in the schools? If they have not become involved, what have been the barriers to this involvement? Has attention to education moved beyond mere lip service to actual involvement on the part of community leaders, parents and organizations? Is there identifiable educational leadership emerging, paralleling an emerging political leadership? Are strategies emerging to cope with some of the most vexing issues in Hispanic education?

Answers to these questions have considerable implications for the extent to which Hispanics will themselves be able to shape public policy affecting Hispanics. If Hispanics continue to drop out and under-perform in large numbers, the numbers of Hispanics entering higher education will continue to be lower than their representation in the general population. Thus, while education itself presents some significant public policy challenges, the extent to which the educational system can be made to work for Hispanics will, itself, have a considerable impact on the extent to which Hispanics will be able to shape public policy in a wide range of other areas as well.

There is also a widespread feeling among Hispanic elected officials and activists that unless major gains are made in Hispanic educational advancement, Hispanics will remain a weak force in American politics.<sup>10</sup> Thus, there can be few more important challenges in the panoply of issues on Hispanic agendas locally and nationally.

## II. HISPANIC LEADERSHIP IN THE SCHOOLS

In light of the crisis in Hispanic education and the shared perception—among Hispanics—that it is a problem that must be tackled, it is no accident



that the place where Hispanics have made the greatest inroads into the political arena has been in local boards of education. Out of 3,306 Hispanic elected officials in 1987, 1,199 were school board officials, making up the largest category of elected officials.<sup>11</sup> "We do 200 campaigns a year, and a surprising percentage of those are around school boards," said the late Willie Velasquez, former director of the Southwest Voter Registration Project. "The question of education is a major reason why people get involved in politics in the first place."<sup>12</sup> Yet Hispanics are as underrepresented on school boards as in other political arenas. Ninety-eight percent of Hispanic school board members are from only eight states, and 47 percent of these are from Texas. Out of 1,199 school board members, only 24 have been elected in 42 states.<sup>13</sup> Even in Texas, where Hispanics make up 25.5 percent of the general population, they comprise only 8.1 percent of school board members. In California, the disparity is even greater: only 6.6 percent of school board members are Hispanic, compared with their 23 percent share of the overall state population.<sup>14</sup>

There are other disturbing features of Hispanic school board representation. In Texas, the percentage of Hispanic school board members only comes close to matching the percentage of Hispanic students in those districts where Hispanics make up 90 to 100 percent of the student enrollment. In school districts with fewer Hispanic students, Hispanic school board members are likely to be underrepresented in proportion to Hispanic student enrollment. For example, in school districts with a 40 to 50 percent Hispanic enrollment, less than 20 percent of school board members are Hispanic.<sup>15</sup>

An equally serious problem is that Hispanics are severely underrepresented in teaching and administrative positions in the schools. A 1980 survey indicated that Hispanics comprised only 3.5 percent of "full-time employees" in elementary and secondary schools nationally. They made up 2.6 percent of all elementary school teachers and 1.7 percent of secondary school teachers. Two percent of principals were Hispanic. In Los Angeles, the school district with the largest concentration of Hispanic students, Hispanic students comprise 56.9 percent of the student body, but only 10.2 percent of the full-time teaching staff. On the other hand, Hispanics have fared better in non-instructional and non-certified positions. Nationally they comprise 7.9 percent of teacher's aides, 5.9 percent of service workers, and 4.4 percent of clerks and secretaries.<sup>16</sup>

As a result of affirmative action and the expansion of bilingual programs, the percentage of Hispanic teaching and administrative staff has increased since 1980; but Hispanic educators are still not close to achieving parity with their numbers in the general population. There are some positive signs of progress, however. The numbers of school board members has almost doubled since 1970, and Hispanics have assumed school superintendencies and other high-level leadership positions in some of the nation's key school districts. Additionally, Hispanic organizations, on both a local and national level, have become increasingly involved in the public schools.

#### IV. AN EMERGING EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP: HISPANIC SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS

Although still a small group, the number of Hispanic school superintendents has gradually increased over the past decade. The following are Hispanic superintendents of medium to large-sized school districts (above 15,000): Hernan LaFontaine in Hartford; Joe Fernandez in Dade County, Florida; James Vasquez in Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio; Victor Rodriguez in the San Antonio Unified School District; Lilian Barna in Albuquerque (until June, 1988); George Garcia in Kansas City; Joe Coto in Oakland, California; Ramon Cortines in San Francisco; and Anthony Trujillo in Sweetwater Unified School District in San Diego. In Los Angeles, William Anton is deputy superintendent, with Hispanics in key administrative positions throughout the district. (In Texas, there are approximately 50 Hispanic school superintendents, but almost all are in small independent school districts with almost entirely Hispanic enrolments.)

The emergence of this select group of Hispanic educational leaders raises the question as to whether Hispanic leadership makes a difference in the educational outcomes of Hispanic children. While appointment of Hispanic superintendents is welcomed from a purely affirmative action perspective, the larger issue is whether a Hispanic superintendent brings certain insights and sensitivities that allows him or her to be unusually responsive or effective in meeting the needs of Hispanic students. Such a determination could presumably only be made based on a scientific assessment of educational achievement prior to, during and after a superintendent's tenure. In the absence of such a study—which in any case would be fraught with methodological pitfalls—site visits to several school districts (Hartford, Miami, San Antonio, Albuquerque, Oakland, San Francisco and Los Angeles) were undertaken by the author, in which superintendents were interviewed and programs for Hispanic students were examined.

These site visits strongly suggest that Hispanic superintendents are having a considerable impact on providing direction and shaping new approaches to Hispanic education. Interviews with superintendents reveal that they share common perspectives in several key areas: a firm belief that *all* children can learn; an insistence that administrators raise expectations and standards for Hispanic children; a recognition of the need to develop customized approaches to dealing with individual differences; and an emphasis that children at lower achievement levels must be paid attention to in the same way that college bound students are. All stress the need for drop out prevention programs. Most superintendents express the view that schools must be held accountable for the system's failure to retain Hispanic students, and that what is needed is more than educational "reform" but major structural changes in how schools are run.

Hispanic superintendents appear to be making a difference in at least three areas directly affecting Hispanic students: 1) raising sensitivities of their districts to the unique needs of Hispanic students by acting as role models for those students and becoming spokespersons on behalf of Hispanic and minority education in their states, both regionally and nationally; 2) increasing the hiring of Hispanics and other minorities in leadership positions; and 3) providing leadership in the development of both bilingual and dropout programs.

These superintendents provide the core for an emerging educational leadership within Hispanic communities. Once in office, there are usually high expectations for them to have a considerable, if not immediate, impact on Hispanic and minority performance. But there are major barriers to this occurring in the short term. In the first instance, test scores do not change overnight. Moreover, changing school bureaucracies—among the most conservative in our society—can be a slow and tedious process. Says Jose Cardenas of the Intercultural Development Research Corporation in San Antonio and former superintendent of San Antonio's Edgewood Independent School District:

You're very constrained in how much you can do. One of the biggest frustrations of being superintendent of schools was that policy decisions and change did not automatically filter down through the hierarchy. And you get assistant superintendents and principals who disagree with you, and teachers who are dysfunctional, and even though you feel you have identified some of the basic problems and you recommend drastic changes in the educational system, there is no guarantee that these changes are going to filter down and that you're going to have drastic changes, at the classroom level, in methodology and in the performance of kids.

Because of their central role in the educational arena, the reasons behind why there are not a larger number of Hispanic superintendents warrants some examination. First, Hispanics are underrepresented in teaching and administrative positions, so the pool of candidates has been limited compared to other groups. This, says former New York City schools chancellor Anthony Alvarado, is partially a result of long standing historical forces that have kept Hispanics out of the teaching profession. Says Alvarado:

As a community, we have been more mal-educated and have received low levels of education generally. A lot of folks didn't go into education. If you look at New York City 30 or 40 years ago, you found a significant number of black educators in the system. They were predominantly Southern educated, who migrated North, took the civil service exams, and got placed. But there wasn't any corresponding Hispanic equivalent.

Simply put, says Lilian Barna, schools superintendent in Albuquerque, "If the pool of teachers and lower level administrators isn't large enough, then you don't produce as many candidates for the superintendencies that are available."

The small number of Hispanic superintendents has also been tied to the relatively low levels of Hispanic political empowerment, especially where Hispanics constitute a small percentage of the voting population. School superintendencies have become highly politicized in recent years, so that appointments to this office reflect overall political realities in a community. In recent years, the new development has been the competing pressures between black and Hispanic constituencies to get a favored candidate elected, often resulting in bitter clashes. Recent examples of such competition are in New York City, San Francisco and Denver. In the words of Anthony Alvarado:

The superintendency is a political job that one gets through a political process, and if one's community has less political clout, you'll have less of an opportunity of Hispanics being selected for those positions. Even where you have a large Hispanic population, you have other groups that control the politics of those situations.

Another factor is a rather complex byproduct of affirmative action. When seeking a minority superintendent, there is a tendency to seek the "best" Hispanic or the "best" black in the country for a position, which further reduces the eligible pool. Similar standards are rarely applied when hiring white superintendents, says Jose Cardenas:

They have a lot of white Anglos who are certainly not the best whites in the country. Why does it have to be the best Hispanic in the country to fill that one Hispanic position? The same thing is true in the selection of a superintendent. I feel there is an implementation of a double standard, with demands being made on a Hispanic candidate which far exceeds the demands that have traditionally or are currently being made on white Anglo candidates.

Finally, there is the less quantifiable issue of discrimination in hiring. Most Hispanics are superintendents in school districts where Hispanics constitute a large proportion of the school population, and where there is a community-wide perception that it is "time" to hire a Hispanic superintendent. The fact that Hispanics are not hired to any significant degree in districts where Hispanics are a small minority indicates that ethnicity is still a major obstacle in hiring. However, the recent appointments of Joe Coto in Oakland, where Hispanics comprise only 12 percent of school population, and George Garcia in Kansas City, where the comparable figure is 4 percent, are signs that ethnicity is becoming less of a factor in certain geographic areas, and hopefully are harbingers of more openness in hiring nationally.

In spite of difficulties in getting hired, and in carrying out reforms once in office, Hispanic superintendents have uniformly emerged as major leaders in their communities, and have initiated reforms of benefit to Hispanic and other minority students. It is likely that the number of Hispanic superintendents will increase simply as a result of demographics. Says Miami's Joe Fernandez:

One of the things that is happening is that we're relatively new, it's a matter of time, at some point in time, by mere attrition, by mere numbers, we'll be like the Irish, the Italians, the Germans, like everyone else. Mere numbers are going to make the thing happen, not only in the school superintendency but in all areas.

#### IV. HISPANIC SUPERINTENDENTS: THREE CASE STUDIES

Hispanic superintendents face different challenges, depending on the size of the district, location, and a myriad of other variables. They also differ in the resources at their disposal to implement effective strategies. The following section highlights some of the challenges faced by three Hispanic superintendents.

## 1. DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

The Dade County school district is the nation's fourth largest, with 236,127 students and an annual \$1.2 billion budget. It is a massive, expanding enterprise. Each month 300 to 400 new students enroll in the schools, half the size of an average new elementary school. Hispanics comprise 41.7 percent of the student enrolment, blacks 33 percent and whites 24 percent. In July of 1987, 55-year-old Joe Fernandez became the district's first Hispanic superintendent, after serving 27 years as a teacher, principal and administrator in the district. Fernandez, of Puerto Rican descent, born and raised in New York City, has had an impact in two major areas: affirmative action and "professionalization" of the teaching staff.

His key innovation has been to spearhead a "school based management" program which places the locus of control at the school site rather than with central administration. This approach has been called for in several national reports on educational reform, most notably that issued by the Task Force on Teaching as a Profession of the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy. Dade County is the first school district to implement it in a major way.

The approach is part of a larger effort to "professionalize" teaching, which Fernandez sees as the key to attracting more minorities, and especially Hispanics, to the teaching profession. Until recently, teaching was one of the few professions readily open to minorities, but as other options have opened up for them, fewer minorities are choosing teaching as a career option—at the very time that minority enrollments in urban school districts are rising by leaps and bounds. In Dade County, only 16 percent of teachers are Hispanic, and most are employed in the district's large bilingual program.

The goal of the school-based management program is not only to attract teachers and improve their performance, but also to have an impact on reducing the dropout rate, which the district estimates is 34 percent for Hispanics, higher than the district's overall dropout rate of 29.5 percent. Says Fernandez, "We're doing the grand experiment in education. We've decided to empower teachers, and we're trying to tie the empowerment to student results. We're basically telling our teachers, 'Dream, the sky is the limit, tell us what you think you have to do to make things better for these children out there.'"

One of the participating schools is Riviera Junior High School, which has 1,700 students. Overcrowded because of the recent Hispanic influx into the county, it has a 78 percent Hispanic enrollment. Last year, 13 teachers came up with a proposal to restructure the school, a plan which was approved by virtually all the teachers. Since it was introduced in September, 1987, principal Armando Sanchez' role has changed dramatically. Instead of being able to make decisions unilaterally, control of the school now rests in a newly formed council, which meets monthly. Sanchez is on the council but the majority of its members are teachers' representatives from the schools major academic departments. A secretary, a custodian and a union steward also sit on the council.

One of the council's first actions was to change the teaching day from six hour-long periods to seven 50-minute periods. Teachers argued that 60-minute periods are too long to hold the attention of junior high students. And by adding an extra class, the school could offer more electives. The schedule change also gave teachers more time outside the classroom. They chose to spend the

time—20 minutes a day—in a variety of non-teaching activities, labeled “professional duty,” as a way to help teachers feel more involved in the total life of the school. Some teachers counsel students. Spanish-speaking teachers call parents of Hispanic students who are cutting school. Others help monitor the hallways during recess, or assist in the school store. Three teachers were designated “teacher assistants,” and spend half their time outside the classroom.

As part of the plan, all teachers are required to volunteer in one of several committees which oversee aspects of the school environment, such as curriculum, school finances, and student services. The result, says Principal Sanchez, is that “there is better morale, because the teachers feel they have some control over the school’s destiny.”

It is too soon to tell how successful this approach will be in improving school performance, which is why for the moment only 44 out of Miami’s 250 schools are participating in the program while results are monitored. Its outcome is being watched closely by school districts around the country.

On the affirmative action front, Fernandez has developed a Leadership Experience Opportunity (LEO) Program, the goal of which is to bring minorities into top level positions in the district. Only 11 percent of administrators are Hispanic; 24 percent are black. The goal of the program is to give minorities experience in top level positions which will allow them to apply for similar jobs in open competition. For example, a minority assistant principal will become principal of a six-week summer program. Minority principals are in turn given internship opportunities in the district’s central office. Fernandez is also moving minority principals into non-minority schools. “Historically we have had black principals in black schools, Hispanic principals in predominantly Hispanic schools, and whites in white schools,” says Fernandez. “I’m shaking that up totally.”

Fernandez is promoting the Partnership in Education (PIE) Program, which is designed to involve all sectors of the community in local schools. The program reflects Fernandez’ view that all constituencies of the community—and not only the school—must take responsibility for education.

I can’t just deal with the educational program, knowing that when those kids leave us, they go in substandard housing, or into areas which have a lot of crime, or where there are no human resource services. We have to approach this thing holistically. At Miami High, for example, you are trying to say that rather than just the schools doing it alone, you bring in the parents, you bring in housing, you bring in police. We deal with the kid in school, but beyond that we try to provide some work for them if they need work, we provide child care services, if they need child care, we try to provide eye glass care. You have to look at the whole picture, you can’t look at it piece by piece.

These programs are being introduced against the backdrop of a wide range of dropout prevention programs initiated over the past several years. In one program, 100 potential dropouts are identified at a number of schools, and a rebate of \$50 per student is given to the school for each student who remains in school, and demonstrates improvements on a variety of measures. The Recruitment into an Educational Program Through Outreach (REPO) program tries to “reclaim” dropouts by working with the private sector to provide training and employment when students reenrol in school. The Student At Risk program provides intensive high-interest instruction to eighth or tenth grade students, along with close supervision and counseling.

While Fernandez says his task is to serve all students, he says his Hispanic background allows him to be especially sensitive to the needs of minority students. "I don't want to imply that someone (Anglo) won't make a difference for minorities too. But I do think that I have a sensitivity to the problems of Hispanics, being Puerto Rican, being raised on a 125th and Amsterdam (in New York City)."

## 2. SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

In the Edgewood Unified School District, on the poverty stricken western edge of San Antonio, Superintendent James Vasquez faces a different kind of problem: lack of an adequate financial base. Until recently, the district was the poorest of Texas' 1063 school districts. Vasquez grew up in nearby neighborhoods, and has spent his entire professional life in the district. He has been Edgewood's superintendent for 10 years. Now with the help of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) he is engaged in a David vs. Goliath struggle with the state of Texas over how schools should be financed. Edgewood is the lead plaintiff in challenging the way schools are funded. For Vasquez, *that* is the key structural obstacle to Hispanic achievement in his district, rather than lack of responsiveness on the part of the district to Hispanic concerns. In the *Edgewood vs. Kirby* case (April 1987), Edgewood won the 1st round when—in a strongly-worded decision—Judge Harley Clark (250th district court) ruled that under the Texas Constitution the state's system of school financing was unconstitutional. The ruling referred to the huge disparities in expenditures on students, from a low of just over \$2,000 per student in one district to over \$19,000 in another.

The Edgewood schools have a 94 percent Hispanic enrollment. Six out of seven board members are Hispanic, as are close to half of its teachers and principals. Almost all the top administrators are Hispanic. Yet students still perform way below state averages. The poverty in the district is obvious even to a casual observer. Most residents live in tiny woodframe houses with peeling paint. No industry boosts the tax base. As a result, Edgewood has a tax base of \$38,854 in property wealth per student. Eighty-five percent of its 15,000 students qualify for free or subsidized school lunches. Just minutes away, the Alamo Independent School District, also within San Antonio's city limits, has a tax base of \$570,109 in property wealth per student. In spite of these disparities, Edgewood has developed a reputation for innovation. The district introduced a wide range of reforms long before the state mandated similar reforms, such as a "no pass no play" rule in athletic programs, remedial summer school providing students with practice on standardized tests, and requiring four years of English for graduation.

A 1983 state accreditation team concluded that a prospective visitor to the district "would hold no hope of finding any acceptable quality in the instructional programs. In point of fact, the monitoring team found conditions that ranged from good through excellent to exemplary. It can be said with confidence that nowhere in the state is a school district achieving such high degrees of excellence in its operation, given the handicaps under which all concerned are operating."

In spite of these efforts, Hispanic educators express extreme frustration about their inability to raise test scores. "Students still scrape the bottom on state tests," says Pete Escamilla, who recently resigned after 10 years on the Edgewood Board of Education. "You get frustrated with the idea that we do so much that is innovative, but come testing time you get hit right between the eyes."

The answer to Superintendent Vasquez is simple: more money to provide better programs for poor students who have greater needs than wealthy Anglo students. Says Norma Cantu, a MALDEF attorney, "You can have excellent leadership, but if the leadership doesn't have any of the resources to carry out its educational mission, that district will never reach its full potential." Thus is a view shared by Vasquez:

We're not a minority in the sense that our kids don't get lost in the cracks because the administration doesn't give a damn about them. The problem is that we don't have a tax base to get us into a competitive stance. If I want to get the best science and math teachers, I can't compete out there. I can't give them the perks other school districts can give. So I have to take what's left over for the most part.

### 3. OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

Compared to Edgewood, where the entire school system is oriented toward meeting the needs of Hispanic students, Oakland's Hispanic student population comprises only 12 percent of the student enrollment. There are no Hispanics on the school board in a district where blacks are the dominant minority. Poverty is also a pervasive factor here. Forty-three percent of students come from families on public assistance. Coto has pushed the notion of raised expectations for minorities, including Hispanics, to the limit. While most educators insist on the need for all students to go get a high school diploma, Coto argues that a high school diploma should not be the end goal, but only a first step. All students, Coto argues, must be encouraged to set their sights on going to college. He has set up what he calls a Promise program—the promise being that financial need will not be a barrier for any Hispanic students who want to go to college. This year, the financially strapped Oakland school board set aside \$500,000 in a trust fund which will be used to pay college costs that students are unable to cover through regular scholarship or financial aid packages. Seventh, eighth and ninth graders sign pledges in which they agree to "complete all courses required for college admission, maintain the minimum grade point average required for college admissions, take all tests required for college admission," and to participate in district-sponsored college preparation programs. The pledge is also signed by the student's parents, the superintendent, and the presidents of all the major colleges in the area.

The Promise programs are not restricted to minorities, but that clearly is the target group. It will be an uphill struggle. In the 1986-87 school year, only 17 (11 percent of all) Hispanics in the senior class, went on to a four-year college. Among blacks, the comparable figure was 10 percent. Says Coto:



What we are really trying to do with our Promise program is to effect major institutional change. It's an effort at getting counselors, teachers, parents, the business community, the school board, the superintendent, everyone saying to the students, "a high school education is not enough, the world is changing too dramatically, the only way you are going to survive effectively is by going to college."

In addition to the Promise program, Coto has initiated a High Intensity Program in the elementary grades, in which there is a 1:15 teacher to pupil ratio, targeting students at risk of dropping out. These classes will serve primarily black students, who make up the majority of students in the district; but Hispanic students will also benefit where appropriate. Coto believes that his Hispanic background has made a difference, but in not easily quantifiable ways. When he visits classrooms, for example, he is able to talk to Hispanic students in Spanish. Coto's task is additionally difficult because there are no Hispanics on the school board, and he is in the position of having to be the major advocate on behalf of Hispanic students, as he explains:

Even though black and white board members have sensitivity to bilingual education, I bring a stronger sense of what needs to be done for Hispanic children, and a stronger sensitivity to the needs of Hispanic children. The stronger I get, the greater visibility I get, the more I talk to students, to parents—it all has to help. It translates to other ethnic groups too. Other Hispanics are going to say, "Yeah right on, *mira, el señor Coto*, he says you can go to college." They are going to believe me more strongly than if it was someone else who, they could not *visibly* see, is from the same roots.

## V. ROLE OF HISPANIC SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS

Coto's task of advocating for Hispanics without Hispanic representation on his school board underscores the importance of Hispanic school board membership in the overall equation of educational leadership. Clearly the role of the Hispanic school board member is a key element. But several questions arise: How effective can an Hispanic school board member be in the absence of an Hispanic superintendent, or, at the very least, if Hispanics are not represented significantly in high-level administrative positions? How effective can a lone Hispanic school board member be on a board dominated by Anglos or by other ethnic groups? Is an Hispanic board member more constrained when he or she is elected city-wide and must represent a wide range of constituencies, than if he or she is elected from a predominantly Hispanic district?

None of these questions have been examined in any detail and answers to them must be based on the experience of school board members in specific districts. What is clear is that even in the absence of a Hispanic superintendent or other high-level Hispanic leadership, it is critically important to have Hispanic board members who can act as advocates on behalf of programs benefiting Hispanics. Unavoidably, several issues of key importance to Hispanic school board officials, such as bilingual education, affirmative action, and minority set-asides in construction projects and contracts, will come

up for deliberation and will prove politically controversial; but strong political representation will facilitate easier passage of initiatives in these areas, and make it easier for the superintendent to implement them. School board members can also provide the impetus for hiring a Hispanic superintendent.

In Hartford, for example, Maria Sanchez is the only Hispanic member of the Hartford Board of Education. On the board for 15 years, she played a key role in the selection and appointment of Hernan LaFontaine as Hartford's first Hispanic superintendent—and the first Puerto Rican superintendent in the United States. Sanchez—who is sometimes dubbed the “godmother” of Puerto Rican politics in Hartford—has a strong base in Hartford's Hispanic community from the newstand she has run for almost twenty years just two blocks from the district's administration building.

In Miami, two out of seven school board members are Hispanic. Paul Cejas was the leading vote-getter when he was first elected to the board in 1980 with 247,000 votes. Rosa Castro-Feinberg was appointed by former Governor Bob Graham in 1986, becoming the first woman Hispanic on the board. For his part, Cejas has played a key role in promoting affirmative action and minority contracts, as well as becoming a major spokesperson on behalf of dropouts. The recent appointment of Superintendent Fernandez points to the effectiveness of having a strong Hispanic superintendent working closely with outspoken Hispanic representatives on the school board. Says Fernandez, “If you don't have a board member who makes affirmative action a main goal for the board, and pushes on a policy level, the board is not going to move in that area.” Cejas says that until Fernandez was appointed “there was basically white Anglo-Saxon male dominance at all ranks.” As for the previous Anglo superintendent, Cejas says, “he talked a big show, but where we had our major disagreements was in minority contracts and in affirmative action. He said he was sensitive (to Hispanics) but he didn't do enough.”

In San Antonio's Edgewood School District, six out of seven school board members are Hispanics, and their experiences dramatize what can be done with majority representation on the board. In 1976, a political action committee called Committee for an Alternative and Relevant Education (CARE) was put forward to run candidates, and eventually its candidates took control of the board. Mostly in their twenties and early thirties, the board [members] have made the school board a central player in evolving strategies for Hispanic children who make up the majority of the school district. Here they do not feel pressured to automatically rubber stamp proposals put forward by their Superintendent Vasquez, and Hispanic representation on the board is not an issue. Board members have staked out an independent position, and some question whether Vasquez' argument that unequal school financing is the key to Hispanic success or failure. All share the view that setting high standards for Hispanics is an essential element in ensuring educational progress. One senses that a healthy and vigorous debate is going on in Edgewood about what will really make a difference for Hispanic students, a debate free of the political constraints imposed by the lack of adequate Hispanic representation on those boards.

The impact of underrepresentation of Hispanics was dramatically illustrated recently in Los Angeles where only one Hispanic, Leticia Quezada, sits on the seven member school board. Deputy superintendent, William Anton, an Hispanic who enrolled in predominantly Hispanic eastside schools in the first grade, and had risen through the ranks over a 37 year career in the schools, was a leading candidate for the superintendent's post. The last time the school

board had hired an outsider for the superintendent's post was in 1948. But in spite of tremendous support for Anton from Hispanic parent groups and organization, the board hired Leonard Britton, the Anglo superintendent in Miami. Its decision was widely regarded as an affront to the Hispanic community.

Ironically, those school districts which have high Hispanic representation on their boards are likely to be in areas where Hispanics are heavily concentrated, and are therefore likely to be poor districts. Even though Hispanic board members may be adequately represented and be committed to implementing effective programs, the resources will probably not be available. Conversely, in higher wealth school districts, which tend to have higher Anglo enrollments, there are likely to be fewer, if any, Hispanics on the school board. Thus, a lone Hispanic school board member may not have the political clout to spearhead significant programs or reforms, even though the resources may be available to do so. Yet if he or she can strike the right kinds of allegiances, he or she might be able to convince non-Hispanic board members to free-up the necessary resources to target Hispanic students.

The challenge is not only to increase resources in poor heavily Hispanic districts but to increase representation on school boards in areas where Hispanics are not in the majority. Says Jose Cardenas, "When a school district is 97 percent Hispanic, then it is no great political accomplishment to elect an Hispanic board member. In fact, you have to turn over rocks to find someone who wasn't Hispanic to run for the school board."

But increasing Hispanic representation is tied to the larger problem of the large numbers of Hispanics who are not eligible to vote because they are non-citizens. According to the U.S. Census, 52 percent of Hispanics who did not vote did not do so because they were non-citizens, compared to 8 percent of Anglos and 8 percent of blacks. This is a particularly acute problem among the large numbers of parents who have children at the elementary grades, a population which is likely to contain a high proportion of recent immigrants, and also to have a direct interest in the schools. They are effectively disenfranchised from political representation on school boards.

In spite of the obstacles, obvious opportunities exist. Running for school board seats usually requires less money than other political offices. A parent is helped by the fact that simply being a parent is a qualification for running. Thus, the opportunities for Hispanic parents to run for school boards are significant and virtually untapped, especially in the forty or more states that have almost no Hispanic representation in this arena.

## VI. INVOLVEMENT OF HISPANIC ORGANIZATIONS

A key to the furthering of an Hispanic educational agenda is the involvement of Hispanic organizations in the schools. In general, there has been a high degree of involvement of these organizations, both at a local and national level, reflecting the high level of concern about education in Hispanic communities. This has occurred in spite of an inherent tendency by schools to resist intervention from outside organizations. Say Jose Cardenas, "Education has been a closed enterprise which has never encouraged participation

by blacks or whites or anybody, and that there had not been an extensive amount of any types of community involvement in the schools." Nonetheless, Cardenas says, "Hispanic organizations have placed a very high value on education, and up to the present time they have been one of the instigators for reform."

Nationally, few organizations have been as instrumental in the reform process as MALDEF. This organization has played a major role in filing lawsuits on behalf of bilingual education programs and in challenging discriminatory admissions practices and school financing systems. Its major educational target is now in Texas, where it is representing the Edgewood school district and some 60 others in the landmark *Edgewood vs. Kirby* case referred to previously. In addition, MALDEF along with the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and G.I. Forum are the lead plaintiffs in a suit filed in December, 1987 that alleges that the state has failed to adequately recruit and admit Hispanics to public universities, and to offer programs, especially at graduate and professional schools, in areas where Hispanics are concentrated. The suit is attempting to address the fact that while Hispanics make up 24 percent of high school graduates, only 12 percent of college freshman at traditionally white colleges are Hispanic.<sup>17</sup>

Other national efforts include the Southwest Voter Registration Projects' challenges to district-wide school board elections, and participation in school board elections in the Southwest. LULAC has developed a High School Dropout Prevention Program, and is compiling a compendium of model high school drop-out programs which were issued in 1988.

But the most comprehensive educational involvement of any national Hispanic organization is the Innovative Education Project of the Washington, D.C.-based NCLR. The project has developed five innovative community-based approaches for improving the educational status of Hispanics, and they are being implemented in several communities, including Kansas City, Rochester, Houston and Chicago. A key aspect is that the programs are run by community-based organizations *outside* the public schools. What is impressive about the project is that it is based on a carefully thought out and remarkably detailed strategy for tackling key points in the educational system where Hispanics are most vulnerable. It involves parents, teachers, students and educators, and provides a blueprint for community-based efforts for Hispanic education nationwide.<sup>18</sup>

The project consists of five programs: *Academias del Pueblo*; Project Success; Project Second Chance; Parents as Partners; and a Teachers Support Network. The *Academia Del Pueblo*, run by the Guadalupe Center in Kansas City, is a community based after-school and summer program to help elementary school children meet or exceed grade promotion requirements. It is intended to cope with the 10 percent of Hispanic children aged 8 to 13, and the 25 percent of those aged 14 to 20 who are more than two years below grade level.<sup>19</sup> The program concentrates on strengthening English language skills, but also includes a Spanish language component. The program is designed to create a "three-way partnership" between the *Academia*, parents and the local schools. Parents are integrally involved by signing a cooperative learning plan in which they agree to: 1) establish household rules about homework, 2) review homework daily, 3) read to the child for a certain number of minutes week, 4) and attend parent training seminars or meetings.

Project Success, currently being implemented by the Rochester public schools and in Chicago by the non-profit *El Hogar Del Niño*, is an after-school and summer program for at risk-junior high school students. It begins by targeting 4th and 5th graders. Students are assigned counselors who work with students and parents, as well as their regular teachers, and counselors to assist them in identifying weaknesses and developing short and long-range academic plans. The focus is not only on remedial assistance in one or more subject areas, but also on helping students "learn how to learn."

Project Second Chance, recently begun in Houston by the Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans, is designed to provide Hispanic dropouts with a "second chance" to resume their education. It provides students with counseling in the academic and English language skills they will need to get a General Educational Development (GED) certificate or a high school diploma in a traditional or alternative setting. It also provides for internship opportunities to help students make informed decisions about their careers.

Parent as Partners, currently operating in Kansas City, is designed to actively involve parents in the education of their children by providing them with information about the schools and about "improved skills in effective parenting."<sup>20</sup> Projects are staffed by a bilingual program coordinator. A Community Advisory Committee engages in a wide range of activities, including organizing a parent community "volunteer bank" as a resource for classroom teachers and providing assistance in translating material or information into Spanish. The purpose of the Teacher Support Network, now underway in Chicago, is to increase the effectiveness of public school teachers working with Hispanic children, including non-Hispanic monolingual teachers and Hispanic and bilingual teachers.

In addition to programs and initiatives sponsored by national organizations, there are a plethora of local efforts that go largely unreported. In San Antonio, for example, Hispanic journalists sponsor writing contests for aspiring student journalists. The San Antonio Area Association for Minorities in Engineering tries to interest students in taking advanced math courses, and the Hispanic Lawyers Association is providing scholarship and guidance for students wanting to go to law school. In Hartford, members of the Hispanic Chamber of commerce visit schools to encourage students to stay in school, and has launched an advertising campaign with that goal. In Albuquerque, the *Las Padillos* Community Organization provides scholarships to students in one of the poorest areas in the city's heavily Hispanic Southside. The G.I. Forum and LULAC have also donated substantial amounts of money for local scholarships. In Miami, the Cuban American National Council (CANC) runs the Little Miami Institute—a private school for potential dropouts—on the second floor of a small shopping center in the heart of Miami's Little Havana district. The school serves students from a variety of Hispanic backgrounds, including Cubans and Nicaraguans. In San Francisco, the Real Alternative Program (RAP), a 20-year-old non-profit Latino organization, runs *La Escuela*, an alternative school for 50 "at-risk" students operated out of four portable bungalows in the city's Mission District.

All these efforts do not conform to the stereotype that Hispanics are not involved in the schools. Instead, they point to a new partnership between schools, parents and Hispanic organizations locally and nationally—a partnership that may be a key element in advancing the educational fortunes of Hispanic children.

## VII. THE FUTURE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The preceding discussion points in several important policy directions. Just as there have been concerted attempts to develop an Hispanic political leadership, such as MALDEF's leadership program, a coordinated campaign to develop an educational leadership needs to be undertaken as well. Unless major advances can be made on the educational front, political gains will also be limited. What is clear is that any serious effort to tackle the crisis in Hispanic education must take a four pronged approach:

1. Hispanic leadership should be expanded at *all* levels of education, from superintendencies to top- and middle-level administrators and teaching staff;
2. Hispanic school board membership needs to be increased as a way to ensure that attention is focused on the particular needs of Hispanic students, and to provide Hispanic educators with the necessary political support to implement programs benefitting Hispanic students;
3. Hispanic organizations and parent groups need to become extensively involved in the educational process, and be encouraged to establish educational programs in the schools as well as in the community; and
4. The obvious inequities in school financing between high wealth districts and low wealth districts where Hispanics are heavily concentrated need to be eliminated.

Each of these elements will require far-reaching strategies to ensure their success. In order to develop Hispanic educational leadership at the highest levels, the number of Hispanic teachers will have to be increased beyond their current levels. This will require aggressive recruiting efforts to increase teacher salaries and generally to "professionalize" the teaching profession, along the lines of the Miami "school based management" program, will have to be supported. To increase school board representations, a concerted effort will have to be made to encourage local activists and parents to run for school boards in greater numbers. Where necessary, at-large elections will have to be challenged and replaced with single-district elections along the lines of numerous such efforts by the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project. Special efforts will have to be made *outside* California and the Southwest, where only a handful of Hispanics have been elected to school boards. Regarding involvement of Hispanic organizations and parent groups, program initiatives currently being sponsored by those organizations and local groups need to be studied to assess their effectiveness, and expanded to other school districts. This will require the development of a vigorous partnership between school districts which are providing leadership in Hispanic education, Hispanic elected officials, and educational advocacy organizations. Finally, to reduce funding inequities, legislation will have to be enacted in those states that have to assume a major responsibility in this effort. Where legislation cannot be passed, lawsuits along the lines of *Edgewood vs. Kirby* in Texas will have to be filed.

Efforts like these will help clarify a major theoretical question as to what interventions are likely to have the most impact on educational achievement. Will changing the structure of the classroom be sufficient? Will it require changing teaching styles? How important is the role of the principal? To what extent does the home environment shape educational performance? What influence does racial and ethnic discrimination have in the educational equation?

While leading Hispanic educators mostly insist that all these aspects have an impact on educational outcomes, they have a consistent belief that the most important determinant is what happens *within* the school environment itself, and that schools must take responsibility for the success or failure of Hispanic children. Within the schools, they say that raising expectations for Hispanic students will have the greatest impact, as graphically demonstrated by Jaime Escalante, the math instructor at Garfield High School in Los Angeles who was featured in the movie *Stand And Deliver*.

On the surface, "raising expectations" sounds relatively straightforward. Yet, it will be a challenge. Teachers and counselors, both Hispanic and non-Hispanic, will have to be sensitized to the needs of Hispanic children. Support programs will have to be installed to ensure that students do not fall through the cracks.

This is a major public policy challenge that cannot be left to educators alone. Hispanics have an important role to play in sensitizing the larger society as to the particular needs of Hispanic students and as to how they are similar or different from other minority students. But the educational success or failure of Hispanic children has profound implications for the futures of Hispanics in the United States, and, in that sense, it is a society-wide responsibility that extends far beyond just the schools, and beyond the Hispanic community itself.

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## ENDNOTES

1. . . *Justice For All*, The National Education Association Executive Committee Study Group Reports on Ethnic Minority Concerns, Washington, D.C., 1987.
2. National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials, 1987, National Association of Latino Elected Officials, Washington, D.C.
3. Orum, Lori, *The Education of Hispanics: Status and Implications*, National Council of La Raza, Washington, D.C., 1986.
4. *Ibid*, page 29. Data from High School and Beyond Study, 1982.
5. Hispanics in the Work Force: Hispanic Youth, Part II, National Council of La Raza, Washington, D.C., 1986.
6. Education Network News, vol. 6, no. 6, pps. 2 and 3, National Council of La Raza, Sept. 1987.
7. Figures cited in New York Times, March 30, 1988.
8. Figures released by Department of Education, cited in Education Week, March 9, 1988.
9. Orum, *op cit*, page 37. These statistics have a particular meaning for Hispanics, because Hispanics have a higher percentage of children than any other major population group. As of 1987, 24.9 percent of Hispanics are between 5 and 17 (compared to 18.4 percent of the total population). One in ten Hispanics is under the age of five. The impact of this young population is already being felt in large urban school districts where Hispanics are disproportionately represented in kindergarten and elementary grades, most notably in Los Angeles where Hispanics make up 63.5 percent of the kindergarten enrollment (*Education Network News*, *op cit.*, p. 2).
10. It is well known that voting turnout is positively correlated with education levels. This may help explain low turnout of Hispanics at the polls. In the last Presidential election, only 48 percent of eligible Hispanics were registered to vote because they were non-citizens – significantly lower than the national rate (Pachon, Harry, *Recurring Issues in Hispanic Politics*, Washington D.C. NALEO Educational Fund, 1984, cited in Abolos, David, "The Politics of the Family," *Journal of Hispanic Policy*, vol. 2, 1986-87, page 86). Among 18 to 24 year olds, the actual turnout was only 21.9 percent among blacks, and 41.6 percent among whites of the same age.

In local electoral politics, there have been considerable advances. The number of elected Hispanics has more than doubled from approximately 1,400 in 1972 to 3,317 in 1987. But Hispanic political empowerment is still at an emergent stage, in large part due to the lack of participation of large numbers of Hispanics in the political process. Less than 1 percent of the 490,000 elected officials nationwide are Hispanic, considerably less than their 7.5 percent in the general population (National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, 1987 National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials, Washinton, D.C. p. xv).

11. NALEO, *op cit.*

12. Personal Interview, November, 1987. Unless otherwise noted, all succeeding quotes by individuals are taken from interviews conducted by the author between November, 1987 and March, 1988.

13. NALEO, *op cit.* p. xv. Of the total number of school board members (1199), 1175 are from 8 states: Arizona (77), California (251), Colorado (43), Florida (4), Illinois (11), New Mexico (160), New York (54), New Jersey (18), and Texas (560).

14. Unpublished figures provided by the Southwest Voter Registration Institute, San Antonio, TX, November 1987.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Elementary and Secondary Staff Information Survey, (EEO-5), EEOC 1980, cited in Orum, *op cit.*, p. 45.

A study of the possible impact of black teachers on black students provides concrete suggestion of how increasing representation of Hispanic Teachers might have for educational outcomes of Hispanic students. Looking at data from 82 urban school districts, the study found that the greater the proportion of black teachers the less likely black students were to be suspended from school, drop out of school, be assigned to special education or educable mentally retarded programs, and the more likely they were to be assigned to enriched classes. See Meir, Kenneth J., "Teachers, Students and Discrimination: The Policy Impact of Black Representation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 46, 1984, pp. 253-263.

17. *New York Times*, December 4, 1987.

18. Orum, Lori and Arturo Vargas, *Innovative Education Project: Preliminary Report*, National Council on La Raza, Washington, D.C. undated.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 7.



# SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTING VERSUS AT- LARGE ELECTIONS: A PAROCHIAL CHALLENGE TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

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The use of at-large elections is widespread nationally.<sup>1</sup> Sixty percent of U.S. cities in 1960 with a population above 10,000 elected their councilors at-large, while only 23 percent elected them strictly from districts. In cities with populations of at least 50,000, most councilors in 1971 were chosen at-large and over twice as many cities elected some councilors by this method rather than entirely by single-member districts. Consequently, less than 1 percent of council members in 1971 were Black, American, or Hispanic.<sup>2</sup>

Is there a causal relationship between the small proportion of minority public officials and the use of at-large elections? Scholars have long believed so. It is clear, for example, that the municipal reform ideal of nonpartisan, at-large, apolitical politics is generally attractive to white, native, Protestant, upper-class citizens. When party labels are removed, the lower-status groups are generally disoriented and too easily misled by the media. There is little doubt that abolishing the small constituencies and making the election of councilors city-wide weakens ethnic or racial solidarity.<sup>3</sup>

The increased financial burden, as well as the difficulty of becoming known to all of the voters in an at-large electoral system is much greater than under a district system. This places minority groups at a special disadvantage, economically, in their ability to elect candidates by their own votes. Moreover, where the ballot is nonpartisan as well, the inequity is greater since the groups who dominate under this arrangement have disproportionate advantages in their ability to mobilize resources and support through their control of important social institutions such as the mass media, the banks, and civic organizations.

Predictably, therefore, lower socioeconomic groups have not been motivated to participate more because their experiences have fostered relatively

little efficacy in the political process. But, when the opportunity structure changes, they are as ready as other members of the community, if not more so, to enter the political arena. This invites the question whether certain structural factors skew participation toward some groups and away from others. Does a polity indifferent to the structure of participation, in fact, favor activity for some at the expense of others? The impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on Black political participation clearly demonstrates that as the opportunity structure for participation expands, so does participation, a conclusion that invites further research in the other forms of participation in the democratic polity.<sup>4</sup> Ms. Judith Sanders-Castro, an attorney with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, who has studied the lack of minority political participation and assisted with litigation aimed at expanding voter education and access, stated that:

Political scientists, in their studies of political participation and electoral reform, have concluded that minority persons have a considerably lower voter and political participation due to their average age being lower than the national average, their depressed poverty status, their lower registration levels, their lower socio-economic and educational levels, and their political inefficacy or feeling of powerlessness.<sup>5</sup>

Citing Professor Gunnar Myrdal's observation that "Negro apathy" in Detroit, Michigan was partially the result of at-large elections, one scholar has concluded that:

Municipal reforms of this nature: nonpartisanship, smaller city councils, the replacement of mayors by city-managers, may serve admirable technical purposes and in the long run be in the best interests of some groups in the community, but they weaken the political ties of the disorganized and depressed groups in the community. And in doing this, they serve the interests of the community's "power elite," whose focus may ostensibly be upon the gains in efficiency and honesty brought about by the reforms, but who profit from the political apathy of the underdog.<sup>6</sup>

Occurring in hundreds of political jurisdictions during the past decade, the change to single-member districts has been instigated primarily by Blacks and Mexican-Americans and, since 1975, by the U.S. Department of Justice as well. This has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of minority members elected to legislatures, city councils, county commissions and school boards, often in communities where no minority person has ever been elected before.

As mentioned earlier, at-large elections have long been known to diminish representation of minorities on elective bodies. This electoral device was widely adopted during the Progressive Era (1890-1920) with that aim generally in mind, especially in the South. While it is true that, along with other "progressive reforms," at-large elections were advertised as a remedy for political machine corruption, they were often motivated by the desire of elite business elements to wrest control of local government from members of racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the working class.

For more than a hundred years, "good government" has been part of the jargon of the municipal reform movement. In the jargon, "good government" meant government that was honest, impartial, and efficient—the kind of government that would exist (so the reformers thought) once the machines

were destroyed, "petty politicians" driven out, and public-spirited citizens—like themselves—elected to office. Good government in this sense was neither very democratic nor very much concerned with the needs and wishes of the low-income and low-status elements of the community. But whereas to the reformers the machine represented evil, "good government" represented virtue.<sup>7</sup>

The reformers also assumed that there existed an interest ("the public interest") that pertained to the city "as a whole" and that should always prevail over competing, partial (and usually private) interests. Local government entailed simply the business-like management of essential public services. The task of discovering the content of the public interest was therefore a technical rather than a political one. What was necessary was to put affairs entirely in the hands of the few who were "best qualified," persons whose training, experience, natural ability, and devotion to public service equipped them best to manage the public business. The best qualified men would decide "policy" and leave its execution ("administration") to professionals ("experts") who would work under the direction of public affairs; attempts to assert private or other partial interests against the public interest would not be tolerated.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, anyone who advocates legislating for the city "as a whole" (whether for selfish or unselfish reasons) will object to the small-district plan. Typically, businessmen, upper-class civic leaders, and reformers oppose small districts. Such people are invariably placed at a disadvantage by them; this is true in part because they are exclusive groups, in part because the resources they command (social status, expertise, corporate wealth) are not effective in influencing small-district councilors, and in part because they believe that a politics of personal influence and neighborhood interests is wrong and inefficient. They will favor large districts or, even better, at-large elections, in order to encourage councilors to act on behalf of the city "as a whole" and because the wealth, publicity, and prestige they control will then be more effective.<sup>9</sup>

Ernest S. Bradford, an early advocate of commission government with at-large elections, defended his plans for at-large representation on grounds that under the ward system of governmental representation, the ward receives the attention, not in proportion to its needs but to the ability of its representatives to "trade and arrange deals with fellow members." In his view, nearly every city under the aldermanic system offers flagrant examples of this "vicious method of part representation." The commission form changes this to representation of the city "as a whole."<sup>10</sup>

There is, then, a philosophical case for at-large elections, but many contemporary criticisms continue to emphasize the class, racial and ethnic bias attached to at-large elections. According to these arguments, at-large elections lead to city and county governing boards dominated by citizens from well-to-do sections of the community. At-large elections favor candidates with the monetary resources to run expensive city-wide campaigns. The at-large format also benefits candidates in the so-called "political mainstream" who can count on the support of local media and political slating organizations. Consequently, critics assert that at-large elections diminish the political importance and participation of racial and ethnic minorities in local politics. As a simple illustration, Chicanos concentrated in several wards of a city might easily elect council members from that group under single-member district elections. The same group, since it constitutes only a minority of the *city-wide*

population, might go totally unrepresented in a city council chosen through at-large elections.

Surely no one wishes to argue that at-large electoral systems dilute the votes of ethnic minorities under all circumstances. On the contrary, it is those instances where racially or ethnically polarized voting exists that one would expect at-large elections to most seriously underrepresent minorities. And, where such large-scale polarization does exist, the discriminatory effect can be absolute. In fact, that a minority group can muster 49 percent of the vote will not assure it can elect a single representative of its own. The arithmetic is both simple and devastating: if 51 percent of a community is of one "suasion" and vote as a solid bloc, they can always elect all of the representatives; the minority 49 percent elects no representative at all.

Should one simply dismiss this political outcome as one of the unfortunate realities of majoritarian democracy? In my political judgement, large groups of citizens should not be officially deprived of power to influence decisions which seriously affect their lives. The usual consequence is a feeling of general despair and political estrangement from one's government, as well as a sense of powerlessness to have a meaningful impact on the political system. And to whom shall these citizens look for leadership and direction? In some smaller communities across America, minorities have almost no one to turn to for such leadership. Several judges of the U.S. District Court, West District, Texas have described the problem vividly:

Thus the process spirals endlessly. History and powerlessness create apathy and unresponsive representatives: unresponsiveness breeds more apathy, apathy more powerlessness and unresponsiveness. Not only those who do not learn from history, but also those who are trapped by history, are condemned to repeat it.<sup>11</sup>

As we know, quality leadership and effective political representation helps to bring government closer to the people and furnishes many heretofore forgotten citizens with a heightened sense of community identification, and respect for laws. I believe the following quotation from the Final Report of the 1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in the United States to be instructive for all Americans. The report, of course, was issued following two successive years of urban rioting and destruction by frustrated American minorities:

It is beyond the scope of this Report to consider in detail the many problems presented by the existing distribution of political power within city governments. But it is plain that the minority resident feels deeply that he is not represented fairly and adequately under the electoral arrangements which prevail in many cities. This condition strikes at basic democratic values.

To meet this problem, city governments and the majority community should revitalize the political system to encourage fuller participation by all segments of the community. Whether this requires adoption of any one system of representation, we are not prepared to say. *But it is clear that at-large representation, currently the practice in many American cities, does not give members of the minority communities a feeling of meaningful involvement or a stake in their city government* (italics mine). Further, this system of representation dilutes the normal political impact or effectiveness of the citizens who reside in these particular neighborhoods or districts.<sup>12</sup>

Another major consideration when assessing the pros and cons of an electoral system, is political *accountability*. Accountability is the essence of representative democracy. Its major character is the political ability of the populace to choose and, where necessary, replace their leaders. An elected official safe from removal because of the nature of the electoral process is, to a very large extent, a leader free from the control of his constituents.

It has gradually been recognized that, while partisanship and particularism have their dangers, so does expansive government that elects its governing body *at large* on a nonpartisan basis and selects its chief political official indirectly. There is no one in the at-large manager structure who is directly responsible to any group of individual citizens, only to the aggregate. In such a situation, political responsibility can become so amorphous and diffuse that the governing body is observed to represent everyone and, therefore, no one. Unless a demand or need rises to the level of a community-wide proposal, supported by an electoral plurality, it can be safely ignored or set aside.

Furthermore, county-wide or city-wide elections can result in exceedingly lengthy ballots, making it a herculean task for dedicated voters to be discerning and perceptive in making a well-advised political selection. And, the victors of such at-large elections are less likely to represent existing social, racial, or economic interests in equitable proportions. In the legal case, *Chavis v. Whitcomb*, it was found that although the central metropolitan area of Marion County, Indiana has approximately 41 percent of the population of the county, only 18 percent of the representatives elected during the previous decade lived there. In contrast, Washington Township (a rich white suburban area with approximately 15 percent of the county population) had been the residence of a majority of the senators and a near majority of the representatives.<sup>13</sup>

The other side of the coin of accountability is that of *accessibility*. Accessibility makes it much more possible for voters to identify and contact specific elected officials whom they perceive as "their representatives." Consequently, such representatives are more likely to become better informed about, and more sensitive and responsive toward, the needs of a clearly identifiable constituency. Thus, if there are district or residency requirements for local elections, one is more likely to maximize the voting participation and strength of minorities. This is especially true for Blacks and Hispanics because of the likelihood of their concentration in the ghettos and barrios of America. At this juncture in our history, the nature of compact and contiguous districting inherently favors these particular minorities. Of course, this might not be true for other groups, however identifiable they might be, since they are not as likely to be concentrated in ghettos or barrios.

Representative Walter Martinez, chairman of Mexican American Democrats, State of Texas, has described the implications of these electoral changes:

The (electoral) structures were our stumbling block. Without federal pressure the city council (single-member districting) wouldn't have happened. These new electoral structures have brought the people closer to their officials. People have more hope of influence.<sup>14</sup>

Policy questions which naturally arise when assessing the pros and cons of shifting to single-member districting are, whether districting will make representatives more accessible to minorities, or, if we have districts, should

we draw them in order to ensure the presence of minorities in the legislature, city hall or school board? But perhaps the centrally important policy question is whether we *want* minorities in our legislatures, city halls, or school boards. Assuming that we do, then what electoral design or compromise is workable? Subdistricting at-large jurisdictions can surely do the job, provided the new districts are drawn with an eye toward fairness and rationality. An obvious concern of present-day electoral reformers is that new districts might possibly be adversely gerrymandered.<sup>15</sup>

If and when single-member districting is undertaken, should newly-drawn district lines encompass or divide certain ethnic, racial, neighborhood, and income groupings? By one method of districting we assure that a given group will be "represented" in the legislature, and by another we assure that it will not be, or that it will be under some handicap. At times, even the members of such a group cannot decide what method is best for them. Blacks and Mexican Americans, for example, do not always agree whether it is better to "give" them a legislator by placing all minority voters into one district or, by splitting the Black or Chicano voters among several districts, to enable them to influence (but not to "have") a larger number of legislators.

Some commentators do maintain that "affirmative gerrymandering" may in effect weaken minority influence by concentrating minorities in a smaller number of districts, encourage other ethnic or religious groups to demand favorable district lines, and promote the adoption of geographically-contorted districts. But if minority voters and leaders take the position that an increased number of minority lawmakers would increase their power and influence, it seems condescending for the majority to argue otherwise. Certainly, in racially-polarized communities, minority voters gain nothing by being scattered among white-dominated districts. In any case, both the 15th Amendment and the Voting Rights Act were designed to protect racial minorities from having their access and right to vote diluted, abridged or denied. Moreover, Blacks and Hispanics frequently live in compact, clearly delineated geographic areas. Creating districts with minority majorities is, therefore, unlikely to require unusually-shaped districts.

From the above, we are reminded that any electoral system confers advantages and disadvantages—sometimes some of both on the same persons. No system can possibly do perfect justice to all under all circumstances. However, because at-large electoral systems are presently under vigorous challenge by minority communities, we would do well to review the legal approaches presently in use, specific community challenges, and some consequences and results.

Legal attacks against at-large elections fall into two categories: 1) objections to at-large elections under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as severally amended, and 2) constitutional attacks on at-large elections under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. The voting rights disputes have been more numerous and constitute a more developed area of law. Challenges to at-large elections under the Voting Rights Act are limited to jurisdictions covered by the act and, more narrowly, to those jurisdictions seeking to make changes in election procedures. In contrast, suits asserting the unconstitutionality of at-large elections can be brought against localities anywhere in the country.

In the landmark case of *White vs. Regester* (1973), the United States Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's finding that multi-member legislative districts in Bexar (San Antonio) and Dallas Counties diluted the votes of Blacks and Mexican Americans in elections for the Texas Legislature. The court-ordered remedy was single-member districts.<sup>16</sup>

It is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1975, that empowers the U.S. Department of Justice to intervene in jurisdictions covered by the Act when changes in voting procedures will result in minority-voter dilution. Consequently, the Voting Rights Division of the Department has become increasingly involved in the process of electoral change.

It is very important to note that under the Voting Rights Act any change in an electoral scheme (including annexation) in covered jurisdictions must be precleared by the Justice Department. When such changes are judged dilutionary, and a single-member district remedy is required, the Department of Justice reviews the newly drawn boundaries to prevent blatant racial or ethnic gerrymandering. When a court orders the remedy, the court itself has the responsibility to ensure fairly drawn boundaries.<sup>17</sup> Neither is it necessary to establish that minority voters are being legally disenfranchised. The courts are permitted to "explore the entire environment and to measure its political pollutants."<sup>18</sup>

The combined impact of voter-dilution litigation and Justice Department intervention is exemplified by the changes that are rapidly occurring in Texas. In 1970, almost one-half of the Texas Legislature was elected from multi-member districts, and virtually all Texans living in cities and school districts chose council members and trustees by the at-large method.

In contrast, by 1976, all state legislators were chosen from single-member districts. Presently, one-third of all the state's urban inhabitants—including those in its five largest cities—elect at least some of their councilors from single-member districts. Several of the larger school and junior college districts have also changed to the single-member district system, primarily as the result of litigation, actual or threatened. Before abolition of at-large elections in 41 Texas jurisdictions during the 1970's, only 10 percent of the top elected officials in those units were minority persons. In a number of instances, there were none. After the change to single-member districts, the number tripled to 30 percent.<sup>19</sup>

When the Voting Rights Act was utilized to force the city of San Antonio to adopt single-member council districts in 1977, the percentage of Chicanos elected to the council rose from 26 percent (1971-77) to 45 percent (1977-81). In the few years since the Voting Rights Act affected Bexar County, the number of Mexican American elected officials in Bexar County, San Antonio city Government and the state legislature has risen by over half—from less than one-fourth to more than one-third overall.<sup>20</sup>

An interesting development was that the 1977 elections produced the first San Antonio city council with a majority of council persons being members of ethnic minorities. Five of the ten newly-drawn district seats were held by Chicanos representing the city's south and west sides, and one Black council member was elected from an east side district. This shift in control of the San Antonio city council indicated a fundamental change in the distribution of political power in the community. Not only did the Anglo business elite lose its political arm, the Good Government League, as a result of the split in that elite in 1973, but it also lost councilmanic control to the city's Mexican American majority.<sup>21</sup> In a recent assessment of the results and consequences of the change-over to single-member districting, Professor Robert Brischeto said: "Before 1977, we didn't have a truly pluralistic democracy in San Antonio. A few powerful people in backrooms were making all the crucial policy decisions. Now, the new neighborhood representatives debate and determine public policy in the open, with broad enthusiastic public debate and input."<sup>22</sup>

There remains in San Antonio a substantial degree of underrepresentation of Chicanos with regard to appointive offices such as state and local boards and commissions, which have been shown to greatly underrepresent Mexican Americans and other minorities. However, it is reasonable to assume that as Mexican Americans win more formal representation in elective offices, the appointment of Mexican Americans to such boards and commissions will increase.

A striking example of similar representational benefits accruing to Black Americans occurred when a federal court ordered Mississippi to adopt single-member legislative districts. The result was the election of an additional 13 Black legislators, including the plaintiff in both *Kirksey* and another lawsuit challenging Mississippi's multi-member state legislative districts.<sup>23</sup> With reference to the congressional level of representation, and with respect to the matter of possible increased representational benefits for Blacks, the author was impressed to hear a conservative white candidate locked in a rather tight Alabama Democratic primary race for U.S. congress express that he would receive a respectable percentage of the "Black" community's vote because ". . . even though they might not think that much of me, they [the Black voters] think less of ol' 'so-and-so.'"<sup>24</sup>

But the benefits of newly-established single-member districts have not accrued to ethnic minorities alone. Many large cities of our country have been historically dominated by a social and economic elite that maintains control of municipal government by virtue of the at-large system, which necessitates heavier campaign financing than a single-member district system. In cities such as Raleigh, North Carolina and San Antonio, Texas and San Francisco, California, non-elite Anglo and other candidates, independent of the traditional establishment, have finally managed to win election under the new single-member district approach, and they have spoken out for previously ignored constituents in the poor and middle-class areas of these cities. These social and political results seem to have occurred in smaller rural-based communities as well. The following comments by Mr. J. Valdemar Espinosa are instructive in this regard:

I favor all efforts designed to replace at-large districts with single-member districts. In my opinion, single-member districts are more effective, not only for the minorities to be able to elect their own officials, but also for the Anglo community. The results that single-member districts have had in New Braunfels are very positive. Members of the Anglo community who were very much against it have since made comments in praise of it, because of the representation they can have in their own sub-districts. They have begun to realize that an elected official from the opposite side of town might not be as concerned about their neighborhood as his own area.<sup>25</sup>

One of the most significant developments of the single-member electoral system is the emergence of neighborhood groups as a potent political force. Under the previous at-large system, city politics have been dominated by conservative business interests, especially developers and downtown merchants. The shift to district elections has led to a major decline in their control. Candidates running on platforms supported by neighborhood groups have now been able to win a growing number of council seats. A connected result is that different political priorities and issues have been introduced as this new



breed of candidates express concern about the quality of life in the city's varied neighborhoods and educational systems, and advocate new ways the city or school district can respond to them. The above points are supported by the following observations of Mr. Ben Reyes, an elected official in Houston, Texas:

Single-member districting requires the representation of communities of interest. It requires more constituent work, close personal contact, hard work, and a lot of energy. A district representative can't "pass the buck." I know. I've been elected from single-member districts both for the State Legislature and the Houston City Council.

Today, it isn't necessary to rely on the traditional sources of political and financial support. Instead, it comes from the "grassroots"; working closely with them, door-to-door efforts; getting out there and meeting with your neighbors!<sup>26</sup>

Yet another development is the diminished influence of the mass media in district elections. Wealthy or well-connected candidates have generally relied upon the media for the bulk of their campaign exposure. In contrast, the new neighborhood-based candidates have depended primarily upon communication networks and grass-roots "get-out-the-vote" campaigns. Consequently, the media, while still playing an important role in local elections, appear to have become less important than in the past, whenever at-large jurisdictions are replaced by single-member district systems.

A word of caution is necessary regarding future efforts to measure the impact of electoral structure on minority representation. One must realize that the mere presence of minority officials does not necessarily ensure highly dedicated, effective minority group representation. Strictly racial or ethnic head-counting can be a somewhat limited and misleading measure of meaningful representation. For example, it is well known that dominant non-minority groups will sometimes co-opt "safe" minority candidates by including them on a ticket or slate which generally guarantees their election city-wide. An interesting revelation to note is that the minority candidates appointed in this fashion are seldom supported actively or enthusiastically by the ethnic community they ostensibly represent. In the case of Houston, Texas an incumbent Black councilman, who had won at-large with the imprimatur of the city's informal business establishment, ran a poor third against two other Black candidates in a primary race for the congressional seat (vacated by Barbara Jordan) which represents the heart of Houston's Black ghetto.<sup>27</sup>

So negative was the conservative, elite-controlled Good Government League's (GGL) image in the San Antonio Mexican American community that on several occasions, Chicanos voted against GGL-nominated Hispanics in favor of Anglo reformers running against the GGL. Professor Brischetto et al., in a recent study of voting patterns in San Antonio city elections, state: "Support for GGL candidates in predominantly Mexican American precincts is clearly lacking in all but two of the 26 races from 1971 through 1975." Even popular Henry Cisneros, who would in 1981 be elected mayor with overwhelming Chicano support, in 1975 ran as an at-large GGL candidate and suffered significantly from the reverse polarization pattern.<sup>28</sup>

In many cases, then, a minority person elected at-large to a city council or a school board will be unable to carry the minority area of the city. It is quite clear that such political co-optation through the slating method is more likely in at-large than in single-member district systems, where discerning voters

within minority districts are generally better able and more inclined to provide a counter-balance to the blandishments of the non-minority Political Establishment. As is often the case, underrepresentation of the council or board is not the only disadvantage. Not only are few minorities elected to office, but those who are elected generally find it necessary to be "politicians" first and "minorities" second. If they are to stay in office, they must often soft-pedal the racial/ethnic issues that are of the most concern to them as minorities.<sup>29</sup> Both of these problems relating to underrepresentation and the quality of representation have been attributed to nonpartisan, at-large elections. At-large elections make it difficult to elect members of minority groups because they must appeal to entire city electorates. When a minority member is elected under such a system, it is almost always the result of an accommodation made by the majority group to provide token representation for pragmatic political reasons.

As we have observed, there is a serious discrepancy between the ideals of democratic government and the realities of government in urban America. Blacks, Mexican Americans and other minorities in particular, but the lower classes in general, are disadvantaged by formal barriers in the electoral systems used in many of our cities. Such groups continue to find it difficult to elect their preferred representatives to sit on local legislative bodies. Much that is done in the name of "good government" is done without their meaningful input or consent.

Prominent urban specialists on civil disorders and the political process in the U.S. have commented on the need for more representative and responsive political structures to channel protest and dissatisfaction. An alternative during the last few decades has been a shift of protest and politics to the streets. Most experts predict it will continue. Perhaps what is at stake in American cities today is the very stability of the democratic process itself. Serious consideration at least should be given to possible alternatives to the present structures of government, in order to provide more equitable representation in the governmental process for the alienated and disaffected groups, and specifically urban Blacks and Hispanics. We would do well to act quickly and positively upon the advice of the judges who comprised the majority opinion in a recent case which was aimed at eliminating at-large elections in Texas:

We do not believe that the forest has been trackless, and at the end of the trail we hope that we have come to a clearing, in order to observe the rays of a true democratic society. Without the opportunity of minority groups to express their political preferences, hopes, and aspirations, democracy would become perverted into a *majoritarian totalitarianism* (italics mine). Our founding fathers were conscious that a majoritarian government must guarantee the minority access to the political process. The circulatory system of our democratic society cannot tolerate an ethnic embolism.<sup>30</sup>

A question commonly raised, whenever communities across the United States are faced with actually addressing, and possibly redressing, social, political and other types of community inequities is, how far and fast to move? During the course of an interview with a rather progressive-minded white public official in Mobile, Alabama, it was suggested to the author that we [the U.S.] would do well to avoid the "meat-axe" approach toward remedying matters touching upon equality, race relations, and political change in favor of

the "scalpel" approach.<sup>31</sup>

In light of our clear understanding that *political* rights are fundamental rights in a democracy, can any governmental interest be superior to the rights of minorities in America to have fair and effective political access and representation? It can hardly be over-emphasized that in a constitutional democracy, where the power of decision is vested in representative government, no interest is as fundamental and more precious than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. To be sure, "Our constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right."<sup>32</sup>

Organizations such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), Texas Rural Legal Assistance, and the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project have moved quickly to take advantage of a strengthened section of the Voting rights Act and the recent Supreme Court interpretation of the equal protection clause in *Lodge v. Rogers* which makes it easier for minorities to sue local governments in cases involving at-large election schemes.

The intent of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is to remove structural barriers which limit access of minorities to the political process. In adopting a "result" standard rather than "intent" standard, the U.S. Congress recognized the difficulty in proving intentional discrimination.

The Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project and MALDEF will soon review at-large election systems in California, New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona at the county, school board and city council levels, and although considerable resources would be required to sue a large number of political jurisdictions, Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project litigation director, Rolando Rios, contemplates a few successful lawsuits having a "ripple effect." One can assume that similar efforts on behalf of Black and other American minorities are developing or already underway in other communities across the United States.

In short, there could be a massive political and legal assault on at-large electoral systems in the months ahead.

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## ENDNOTES

1. In an at-large system, candidates in a political unit such as a city are elected city-wide rather than by the voters in a particular city district. Therefore, candidates residing in minority neighborhoods are voted on by residents in out-lying neighborhoods as well as their own. When racial-bloc or polarized voting exists, minority candidates tend to lose city-wide while carrying their own neighborhoods by a large margin.

2. Alan Klevit, "City Councils and Their Functions in Local Government," in *The Municipal Yearbook*, (Washington, D.C.: International City Managers' Association, 1972), Vol. 19, pp. 24-25.

3. Several electoral factors are known to adversely affect minority chances, including gerrymandering, the nonpartisan ballot, place voting (or its functional equivalent, the anti-single-shot rule), small council size combined with small minority percentages, low minority geographical concentration, and the run-off requirement.

4. See the very comprehensive and informative study by Ronald J. Terchek, "Political Participation and Political Structures: The Voting Rights Act of 1965," *Phylon*, Vol. 87, (March, 1980), pp.25-35.

5. From an interview with Ms. Judith Sanders-Castro, Staff Attorney, MALDEF, San Antonio, Texas, June 21, 1984.

Yet another factor which sometimes impedes and reduces political participation among minorities is intimidation. I am reminded of a comment by one nationally-known and respected Chicano civic leader, to the effect that "Texas is our deep South." Ms. Anna Martinez, Special Assistant to Congressman Mickey Leland of Houston, Texas, informed the author (interview of June 28, 1984, Houston, Texas) that as late as May, 1980 there were "Anglo police armed with *pistolas* stationed at polling places in Crystal City, Texas. Many *Ancianos* were somewhat intimidated."

6. From Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 270.

7. Edward C. Banfield, "Good Government: Introductory Note," in Edward C. Banfield, *Urban Government: A Reader in Administration and Politics*, (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 267-68.

8. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics*, (New York: Vintage, 1963), Chapters 7 and 12.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

10. Ernest S. Bradford, *Commission Government in American Cities*, (New York: Macmillan, 1911), p. 165.

11. *Graves v. Barnes*, 378 F. Supp. 640 (Western Dist. of Texas, 1974).

12. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *U.S. Riot Commission Report*, (1968), p. 296.

13. *Chavis v. Whitcomb*, 305 F. Sup. 1364 (S.D. Ind., 1969).

14. Quoted from "The Impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in San Antonio, Texas," *Bilingual Elections at Work in the Southwest*, (San Antonio, Texas: MALDEF Report, 1982), pp. 132-133.

15. For example, in El Paso, Texas minority groups strongly objected to the recent reapportionment there, which actually resulted in a decrease in minority representation on the city council. The move to districts and the plan itself were products of a retired Anglo military resident, and the board that drew the districts was overwhelmingly Anglo.

It should be noted that "gerrymandering" for the purpose of minimizing the political and voting power of Blacks is in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment (U.S.C.A., Constitutional Amendment 15).

16. 412 U.S. 755.

17. Terchek, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-35.

18. *Graves v. Barnes*, (1974).

19. Chandler Davidson and George Korbel, "At-Large Elections and Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence," in *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 43, (1981), p. 984.

20. See MALDEF Report (Executive Summary), *Bilingual Elections at Work in the Southwest*, (San Antonio, Texas: April, 1982), p. 12.

21. Robert Brischetto, Cotrell, and Stevens, "Conflict and Change in the Political Culture of San Antonio in the 1970s," in John A. Booth, et al., eds., *Community Progress and Power: The Evolution of San Antonio, 1836-1980*, The University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 90-91.

22. From an interview with Dr. Robert Brischetto, Office of Research, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, San Antonio, Texas, June 23, 1984.

23. Kenneth Eshleman, "Affirmative Gerrymandering is a Matter of Justice," *National Civic Review*, Vol. 69, No. 11, (December, 1980), p. 620.

24. From an interview conducted in Mobile, Alabama, July 6, 1984.

25. Comments provided to author by Mr. J. Valdemar Espinosa, City Councilor, New Braunfels, Texas, June 30, 1984.

26. Interview with Mr. Ben Reyes, City Councilor, Houston, Texas. June 28, 1984.

27. For an in-depth account refer to Chandler Davidson and Douglas Longshore, "Houston Elects a Mayor," *New South*, Vol. 27, (Spring, 1972), pp. 47-61.

28. From *Bilingual Elections at Work in the Southwest*, (MALDEF Report), *op. cit.*, p. 165.

29. One of the most politically candid and honest expressions I have ever read—which sets forth the proposition or position that a representative ought to champion minority constituents, first and foremost—was expressed by Congressman William Clay of Missouri: "I don't represent all people, some already have too much representation. I serve as a voice for those who have no spokesman at the higher levels of government." (Quoted in Alan Ehrenhalt, "Pulling Away From the Racial Gerrymander," *Perspectives: The Civil Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2, (Winter-Spring, 1983), p. 33.)

30. *Graves v. Barnes*, (1974).

31. Interview with Mr. Roderick Stout, City Attorney, Mobile, Alabama. June 30, 1984.

32. *Westberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, (1964).

# TWICE PROTECTED? ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN\*

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(In Winston A. Van Horne's *Ethnicity and Women*. Madison:  
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## INTRODUCTION

Critics of existing affirmative action legislation, executive orders and regulations<sup>1</sup> have continually sought to weaken federal requirements.<sup>2</sup> Opponents claim that anti-discrimination goals and employment strategies have resulted in "reverse discrimination" towards white males. In particular, correcting the practice and effects of discrimination by establishing goals and timetables has been perceived as "preferential treatment" or "protective status" given to minorities and women. The reverse discrimination viewpoint suggests that minority status within the marketplace is an advantage under affirmative action policies. It is argued that discriminatory hiring practices based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin have now become "preferential" hiring practices of persons previously denied equal opportunity. Such practices are identified as a violation of the meritocratic norm which

\*I have profited greatly from my discussions with Dan McGovern and Teresa Peck. I should also like to express my thanks to Eric Margolis and Angie Zophy for their critical comments.

assumes selection and advancement of the most meritorious, ambitious, hard-working and talented individuals.<sup>3</sup>

Most employers' adherence to affirmative action has revolved around two decisions: to hire and promote women and minorities; and not to hire white males. The second decision has come to be considered reverse discrimination, since white males would have been hired had it not been for an employer's affirmative action program. The opposition of "neoconservatives" to affirmative action is presented as a moral dilemma: the employer either continues to discriminate against women and minorities or chooses to discriminate against white males.<sup>4</sup> Their opposition to affirmative action draws strength from traditional American principles of fair play and egalitarianism.

The reaction against affirmative action certainly suggests that there have been major shifts, or at least the potential for drastic changes, within the American occupational structure. As Nijole Benokraitis and Joe Feagin have commented:

"Affirmative action must be heading in the right direction in attempting to eliminate institutionalized inequality because this is the first time a policy has elicited so much fear, hostility, antagonism, and virulent rhetoric from the otherwise complacent and condescendingly concerned dominant white group."<sup>5</sup>

In order to assess the validity of the criticism of affirmative action, one must discover if the programs have actually changed the relationship between white men and minority workers: Has affirmative action been successful in removing white male dominance in prestigious and high-paying occupations? Has affirmative action resulted in upward mobility for women and minorities by eliminating their concentrations within unskilled, low-paying white- and blue-collar occupations? Have white males had to suffer economically for advances made by minorities and women?

Assessing the effects of affirmative action legislation is not a simple matter because various factors have affected hiring practices. Women and minorities have increased their educational attainment as well as their participation in fields entered with post-secondary levels of education. Furthermore, the women's movement and various minority movements have continually kept employment issues at the forefront of their concerns.<sup>6</sup> However, while it is difficult to isolate a specific cause, the degree of representation of minorities, women, and men in a variety of occupations can be analyzed statistically.

If the reverse discrimination viewpoint is correct, one would expect that the occupational distribution of white males has shifted downward, and that that of minorities and women has shifted upward. Minority workers and women would no longer be concentrated in low-paying, dead-end jobs, and would be improving their representation in higher-status occupations. Moreover, if minority status operates as an advantage in the labor market, it should follow that minority women (who "benefit" both by race and sex) would have made the most significant gains. In an attempt to address issues posed by the reverse discrimination viewpoint, comparisons were made between the occupational distribution of white males and Chicana<sup>7</sup> females. Comparisons between Chicana females and both Chicano males and white females were also made to assess the legitimacy of the claim that minority women operate in the marketplace with two advantages—race and sex.

## TWICE PROTECTED? TWICE A MINORITY HISTORICAL SITUATION

Before comparing the various groups, it is important to understand the historical basis for Chicanas' double-minority status. After the Mexican-American War, Mexican citizens were divided into those living in Mexico and those living in the area now occupied by the United States. Those remaining in the newly defined United States territory were forced to choose between losing their Mexican citizenship or losing their homes. After 1848, Mexican immigration expanded the Chicano presence in the Southwest and increased the number of Chicanas and Mexican women in the labor force. Immigration restrictions placed upon Asians through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan in 1907 made Mexico an even more important source of cheap labor. As a result, one-eighth of Mexico's population crossed the border, not primarily for a dream of freedom and democracy, but for economic reasons.

Too often analogies and comparisons have been made between Chicanos and European immigrants which only serve to obscure and dissolve important differences. Carey McWilliams states the differences succinctly:

"Living in a region which is geographically and historically a projection of their 'homeland,' and having struck deep roots in this region, the Spanish-speaking are not like the typical European immigrant minority in the United States. They did not cross an ocean; they moved north across a mythical border. They resemble, therefore, certain suppressed national minorities in Europe, although a closer parallel would be the French-Canadians in the Province of Quebec. There is this all important difference, however, that the border between the United States and Mexico is one of the most unreal borders in the world; it unites rather than separates the two peoples."<sup>8</sup>

The attempts to resist the fate of a conquered people were unsuccessful. Between 1854 and 1930, Chicanos lost two million acres of private land and 1,700,000 acres of communal or *ejido* lands.<sup>9</sup> Along with this loss of land went a loss of economic prosperity, which, in this society, has inevitably been followed by a decline in political power.

Scholars have documented the process by which land was enclosed and Chicano labor was "freed" for the industrialization of the Southwest. Numerous historical studies clearly illustrate the existence of a racially stratified labor force.<sup>10</sup> Mario Barrera has identified four aspects in the colonial labor system that affected Chicanos: labor repression; the dual wage system (sweetheart contracts); occupational stratification; and the need to maintain a reserve labor force and buffers for economic dislocation.<sup>11</sup> Although most labor history research on Chicanos has focused on the Mexican and Chicano men's experience in the colonial labor system, Chicanas worked alongside Chicano males in the fields, and were concentrated in low-paid service, laundry and garment industry jobs. Recently, several studies have been published on Chicanas that have documented their experience within the colonial labor process.<sup>12</sup>

As pointed out by Barrera, Anglos made no distinction "between the older Chicano settlers and the new arrivals."<sup>13</sup> Chicanas and Mexican women were a distinct segment of the labor force sharing similar economic relationships

and the common experience of discrimination in the job market. The 1930 census listed 67,088 "Mexican" females over the age of ten as participating in the labor force.<sup>14</sup> During the 1930's, Chicanas and Mexican women were primarily employed as agricultural workers in "traditional" female occupations, including domestic work, food service, laundry work, factory work in food processing plants and the garment industry.<sup>15</sup> Census data on Chicanas in 1930 show 44.8 percent in domestic and personal service, 20.7 percent in agriculture and 19.3 percent in manufacturing. Mario Garcia's<sup>16</sup> study of the Chicano/Mexicano experience in El Paso documented the fact that Chicanas and Mexican women were the victims of occupational stratification and a dual wage system in local laundries and department stores. Other studies show that Chicanas, along with other women, were paid less than men in various occupations.<sup>17</sup> As Barrera has observed:

"Chicanas in the labor force generally find themselves in not one but two subordinate class segments, one based on race and another on sex. Their place in the occupational structure can be seen as representing a kind of intersection or overlap of the two kinds of class segments."<sup>18</sup>

## THE CURRENT SITUATION

The 1980 census provides information on the current status of Chicanas.<sup>19</sup> The median age of the Chicanas is 21.8, which is approximately eight years younger than the general population. Among Chicanas twenty-five years old and over, only 36.3 percent are high school graduates, whereas 65.8 percent of the total female population has completed high school. Within this same age range, approximately 9 percent of the Chicanas have completed between one to three years of college, and approximately 4 percent have four or more years.<sup>20</sup> Table 1 provides comparative data on educational levels for Chicano male and female populations and the total United States.

**Table 1**  
Years of School Completed by Chicanos  
Twenty-Five Years Old and Over (Percent)

| <i>Years of School Completed</i> | <i>Chicana*</i> | <i>Chicano**</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------|
| High School Graduates            | 36.3            | 38.9             | 66.5         |
| College: 1 to 3 years            | 8.8             | 12.1             | 16.1         |
| College: 4 or more               | 3.7             | 6.1              | 20.1         |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, United States Summary, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 166, "Age, Fertility, Relationship, and Educational Characteristics by Spanish Origin, Type of Spanish Origin and Race: 1980" (Washington, D.C.: 1980).

\*n=1,868,673

\*\*n=1,861,040

Census data<sup>21</sup> on female labor force participation display no significant difference between Chicanas and the general female population. This is an



improvement because Chicana participation in the past has consistently been below white women. Forty-nine percent of the Chicanas sixteen years old and over are in the labor force, and slightly over three-fourths of these work in the private sector, almost identical to the general female population. The second major employer of Chicanas is local government, followed by state and federal government. Only 2 percent are self-employed. Both married and single Chicanas participate in the labor force.<sup>22</sup> Approximately 46 percent of married Chicanas are in the labor force, and over half of the mothers with school-age children work.<sup>23</sup>

## METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Annual reports (from public and private employers, unions and labor organizations) identifying the sex and racial/ethnic makeup of their work forces are required by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This is mandated by Public Law 88-352, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. This analysis is based on data from the 1971, 1975 and 1980 Employer Information Reports (EEO-1), subtitled "Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry." EEO-1 reports are filed by private employers with: (a) 100 or more employees, or (b) 50 or more employees and: (1) have a federal contract or first-tier subcontract worth \$50,000 or more, or (2) act as depositories of federal funds in any amount, or (3) act as issuing and paying agents for U.S. Savings Bonds and Notes.<sup>24</sup>

Racial and ethnic identification were collected for nine job categories: officials and managers, professionals, technicians, sales workers, office and clerical workers, craft workers (skilled), operatives (unskilled), laborers, and service workers.<sup>25</sup> Occupational distribution and participation statistics were given by race/ethnicity and sex.

Two problems occur in assessing the changing occupational distribution of Chicanas: 1) the lack of available data, and 2) the lumping together of Hispanic groups as a single ethnic category.<sup>26</sup> The unique historical experiences of Chicanas in the United States that resulted in their minority status become lost in the Hispanic label. This is a critical observation, for it calls attention to the fact that empirical data pertaining to the work force status of Chicanas have been collapsed into data concerning Hispanic females, and thus remain undifferentiated. How this problem is addressed in this study will be explained shortly.

Differences between groups identified as Spanish origin or Hispanic can be observed in the 1980 census. For instance, the median age for Mexican Americans is 21.8 years and 22.3 for Puerto Ricans, whereas the median age is 37.5 for Cubans and 25.6 for other Spanish. Only 36.3 percent of all Chicanas and 39.1 percent of the Puerto Rican women, twenty-five years old and over, are high school graduates, while 53.3 percent of the Cuban women and 54.9 percent of other Spanish women complete high school. Median years of school completed are 9.6 for Chicanas, 10.5 for Puerto Rican, 12.2 for Cuban and 12.3 for other Spanish women. Differences are also observable at the college level. As mentioned previously, roughly 4 percent of Chicanas twenty-five years

**Table 2**  
Female Labor Force Status and Industry by Type of Spanish Origin, 1980 (Percent)

| <i>Labor Force Status<sup>a</sup></i> | <i>Total of All Women</i> | <i>Chicana</i>  | <i>Puerto Rican</i> | <i>Cuban</i>  | <i>Other Spanish</i> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| 16 and Over                           | (n = 89,482,168)          | (n = 2,702,151) | (n = 675,370)       | (n = 352,782) | (n = 1,156,600)      |
| in Labor Force                        | 49.9                      | 49.0            | 40.1                | 55.4          | 53.4                 |
| With Children Under 6                 | 15.2                      | 28.5            | 26.3                | 11.1          | 20.8                 |
| (and in Labor Force) <sup>b</sup>     | (45.7)                    | (43.8)          | (31.0)              | (51.3)        | (46.1)               |
| With Children 6-17                    | 19.0                      | 21.3            | 23.6                | 20.3          | 20.4                 |
| (and in Labor Force)                  | (63.0)                    | (55.8)          | (42.1)              | (67.0)        | (62.2)               |
| 16 and Over, Married <sup>a</sup>     | (n = 49,369,352)          | (n = 1,506,869) | (n = 286,422)       | (n = 189,410) | (n = 581,115)        |
| in Labor Force                        | 49.2                      | 46.1            | 44.8                | 58.9          | 52.0                 |
| With Children Under 6                 | 23.0                      | 42.8            | 36.4                | 17.8          | 33.5                 |
| (and in Labor Force)                  | (43.9)                    | (42.5)          | (38.9)              | (50.5)        | (45.7)               |
| With Children 6-17                    | 27.5                      | 29.7            | 30.8                | 31.0          | 30.2                 |
| (and in Labor Force)                  | (60.1)                    | (52.7)          | (47.7)              | (65.9)        | (59.6)               |
| <b>INDUSTRY</b>                       |                           |                 |                     |               |                      |
| 16 and Over, Employed <sup>a</sup>    | (n = 41,634,665)          | (n = 1,189,458) | (n = 235,025)       | (n = 180,987) | (n = 563,179)        |
| Private Wage and Salary               | 75.0                      | 77.7            | 77.9                | 84.9          | 79.9                 |
| Federal Government                    | 3.6                       | 3.6             | 4.6                 | 1.8           | 3.8                  |
| State Government                      | 5.7                       | 4.6             | 4.3                 | 2.8           | 4.9                  |
| Local Government                      | 11.3                      | 11.6            | 11.8                | 7.2           | 8.3                  |
| Self-Employed                         | 3.7                       | 2.0             | 1.2                 | 2.6           | 2.6                  |
| Unpaid Family Workers                 | 0.8                       | 0.4             | 0.3                 | 0.6           | 0.5                  |

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *United States Summary, General Social and Economic Characteristics*, Table 168, "Labor Force Characteristics by Spanish Origin, Type of Spanish Origin, and Race: 1980." (Washington, D.C.: 1980).

<sup>a</sup>"Labor Force" is defined as those employed and those unemployed and actively seeking work, whereas those "Employed" are only those who are currently working.

<sup>b</sup>Numbers in parentheses refer to the percentage of the number just above.

<sup>c</sup>Husband present

old and over have four or more years of college, compared to 9.5 percent of Cuban women. Differences found in labor force characteristics between groups identified under Spanish origin are noted in Table 2. Chicanas and Puerto Rican women share more similarities than with Cuban or other Spanish women.

One now returns to the problem of undifferentiated data mentioned previously. In order to measure changes in the occupational status of Chicanas, three states with a significant Mexican population have been selected from the 1980 census. California and Texas have the largest populations of Mexican Americans. Illinois, with the fourth largest Chicano population,<sup>27</sup> was selected in order to include the Midwest. As alluded to earlier, EEOC data limit the researcher in that Chicanas are not disaggregated from the larger category of Hispanic females. By drawing conclusions and using statistics only from the three states mentioned, an attempt is made to focus as much as possible on Chicanas only. The reader should be cautioned, however, that thereafter the conclusions made and statistics given for Chicanas actually cover data that include all Hispanic females.

**Table 3**  
Persons Who Represented Mexican Ancestry For Selected States, 1980

|            | Total      |           |            |
|------------|------------|-----------|------------|
|            | Persons    | Mexican   | Percentage |
| California | 23,667,902 | 3,361,773 | 14.20      |
| Texas      | 14,229,191 | 2,495,035 | 17.50      |
| Illinois   | 11,426,518 | 360,728   | 3.15       |

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, Ancestry of the Population by State, 1980. Supplementary Report PC 80-51-10, Table 3 (1980).

The analysis of occupational distribution and participation for Chicana workers in private industry in California, Texas and Illinois indicates the extent of occupational mobility Chicanas have experienced during the affirmative action era (see Table 4). Affirmative action was intended to change former recruiting patterns that excluded Chicanas and others as applicants. One would expect that guidelines providing equal opportunity for advancement within the work force would result in an increase in the number of Chicanas in managerial and professional positions. The period since affirmative action legislation was enacted has provided employers with time to implement affirmative action programs based on anticipated employee turnover rate and new vacancies, as well as time to promote and upgrade qualified Chicanas.

The question of reverse discrimination can be addressed by determining the degree of occupational shift among white males. If the reverse discrimination viewpoint is correct, one would expect to find that white males have experienced some shift from managerial and professional occupations to lower-paid positions, and are less dominant in managerial and professional occupations. Double protection under the law for minority women can be determined by comparing the advances made by groups protected only by sex or by race. If Chicanas do indeed experience double protection, advances into higher-income and prestigious occupations should be occurring at a faster rate than for either white females or Chicano males.

**Table 4**  
Occupational Distribution of Chicanas in Private Industry,  
by Selected States, 1971, 1975, 1980 (Percent)

|                                | <i>California</i> |               |               | <i>Texas</i> |              |               | <i>Illinois</i> |              |              |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|
|                                | 1971              | 1975          | 1980          | 1971         | 1975         | 1980          | 1971            | 1975         | 1980         |
| <i>Total Employment</i>        | 100.0             | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0        | 100.0        | 100.0         | 100.0           | 100.0        | 100.0        |
|                                | (n = 99,016)      | (n = 146,608) | (n = 241,486) | (n = 59,089) | (n = 85,703) | (n = 137,297) | (n = 25,516)    | (n = 32,244) | (n = 45,953) |
| Officials and Managers         | 1.4               | 2.1           | 2.7           | 1.1          | 2.1          | 2.4           | 0.5             | 1.2          | 1.6          |
| Professionals                  | 2.2               | 2.0           | 2.9           | 1.6          | 1.9          | 2.4           | 1.8             | 2.0          | 2.4          |
| Technicians                    | 2.3               | 2.4           | 3.4           | 3.5          | 4.0          | 3.8           | 1.6             | 1.9          | 2.5          |
| Sales Workers                  | 5.9               | 7.2           | 8.1           | 9.9          | 11.1         | 11.7          | 3.3             | 4.9          | 5.7          |
| Office and Clerical<br>Workers | 32.1              | 30.1          | 26.9          | 20.6         | 23.8         | 23.8          | 19.1            | 22.0         | 21.6         |
| Craft Workers                  | 3.3               | 4.1           | 5.2           | 4.3          | 3.3          | 3.4           | 2.3             | 2.1          | 2.2          |
| Operatives                     | 24.8              | 23.1          | 22.9          | 32.7         | 28.9         | 26.3          | 37.0            | 32.3         | 29.8         |
| Laborers                       | 18.2              | 18.5          | 17.5          | 12.0         | 8.9          | 9.8           | 27.0            | 22.5         | 22.3         |
| Service Workers                | 9.9               | 10.4          | 10.5          | 14.3         | 16.1         | 16.5          | 7.4             | 11.0         | 12.0         |

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. *EEO-1 Reports*, "Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Private Industries, Occupational Employment in Private Industry by Race Ethnic Group and Sex and by State and Industry, 1971, 1975, 1980" (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980).

## OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION

The occupational distribution of Chicanas in private industry in 1971, 1975 and 1980 is presented in Table 4. Chicanas were primarily in blue-collar occupations in 1971. Over one-third of working Chicanas were operatives, semi-skilled workers or laborers in California and Texas, and almost two-thirds in Illinois fell within these occupational categories. Within blue-collar occupations, Chicanas were less likely to be in highly skilled positions. Only 4 percent of the Chicanas in Texas were craft workers, 3 percent in California and 2 percent in Illinois. Texas had the largest percentage (14.3) of service workers, followed by California (9.9). Illinois had the least (7.4). Thirty-two percent of Chicanas in California were office and clerical workers. That is 10 percent more than found in Texas or Illinois. Very few Chicanas occupied managerial occupations. Approximately 6 percent of all official, managerial, professional, and technical occupations were held by Chicanas in California and Texas in 1971. Only 3.9 percent were found to be in such occupations in Illinois.

Occupational mobility over the decade has been minimal. Over half of employed Chicanas in Illinois (54.3) percent, and approximately 40 percent in Texas and California, have continued to work in blue-collar occupations. Approximately 50 percent of the blue-collar workers were likely to be in operative occupations, a figure not much different from that of 1971. There has been no more than a 3 percent increase in Chicanas employed in skilled occupations (craft workers). Although each state has experienced an increase of Chicanas in white-collar positions, most of these women have remained office and clerical workers.<sup>28</sup> There has been only a 1.3 percent increase of Chicanas in official and managerial positions in California and Texas, and 1.1 percent in Illinois. Even less progress has been made in professional occupations. Not one state showed over a 1 percent increase in the number of Chicanas in professional occupations in ten years. Neither have Chicanas advanced in technical occupations. The largest increase made by Chicanas has been in California (1.1 percent). It is important to keep in mind that all three states have recorded increases in the number of Chicana employees in private industry.

Another measurement of advancements made by Chicanas in private industry is occupational participation. Table 5 shows the share of total employment and occupational categories held by Chicanas. Each of the three states shows an increase in the proportion of Chicanas that participate in private industry. Chicanas in Illinois made up 1.3 percent of the work force in private industry in 1971, 1.6 percent in 1975, and 2.1 percent in 1980. Chicanas in Texas made up 2 percent more of the work force in 1980 than they did in 1971. The largest increase in the proportion of total employment occurred in California, where the Chicana participation rate increased from 3.8 percent to 7 percent.

**Table 5**  
Occupational Participation of Chicanas in Private Industry,  
by Selected States, 1971, 1975, 1980 (Percent)

| Share of:               | California |      |      | Texas |      |      | Illinois |      |      |
|-------------------------|------------|------|------|-------|------|------|----------|------|------|
|                         | 1971       | 1975 | 1980 | 1971  | 1975 | 1980 | 1971     | 1975 | 1980 |
| Total Employment        | 3.8        | 5.2  | 7.0  | 4.5   | 5.3  | 6.5  | 1.3      | 1.6  | 2.1  |
| Officials and Managers  | 0.5        | 0.9  | 1.6  | 0.5   | 1.0  | 1.3  | 0.1      | 0.2  | 0.3  |
| Professionals           | 0.6        | 0.9  | 1.7  | 0.8   | 1.3  | 1.7  | 0.3      | 0.4  | 0.6  |
| Technicians             | 1.6        | 2.4  | 3.9  | 3.2   | 3.6  | 4.2  | 0.5      | 0.6  | 1.0  |
| Sales Workers           | 2.5        | 3.8  | 5.7  | 4.9   | 5.9  | 7.5  | 0.5      | 0.8  | 1.3  |
| Office/Clerical Workers | 5.8        | 8.0  | 9.9  | 5.4   | 7.6  | 9.7  | 1.4      | 2.0  | 2.7  |
| Craft Workers           | 1.0        | 1.8  | 3.3  | 1.3   | 1.2  | 1.7  | 0.2      | 0.3  | 0.4  |
| Operatives              | 6.3        | 8.1  | 11.1 | 7.4   | 8.0  | 9.5  | 2.1      | 2.4  | 3.1  |
| Laborers                | 9.8        | 13.3 | 16.8 | 6.7   | 6.4  | 8.3  | 3.4      | 4.0  | 5.8  |
| Service Workers         | 5.1        | 6.4  | 8.2  | 9.5   | 10.7 | 12.1 | 1.5      | 2.4  | 2.9  |

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Reports, "Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Private Industries, 1971, 1975, 1980," Table 2 (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980).

The participation rate identifies occupations where Chicanas are concentrated. In 1971, Chicanas in Texas were concentrated in service occupations, unskilled blue-collar occupations and lower-paid white-collar occupations. Chicanas in California and Illinois were disproportionately distributed in similar occupations in 1971; however, the difference is higher in unskilled blue-collar positions than it is in service occupations. Chicanas are underrepresented in skilled and higher-paying positions in all three states. Chicanas did not have their proportional share of official, managerial, and technical positions in 1971. Chicanas were also underrepresented in sales occupations in California and Illinois.

The 1975 and 1980 occupational participation percentages show very little redistribution of jobs held by Chicanas. Both Illinois and California have a concentration of Chicanas in the same occupational categories as noted in 1971. Although Chicanas were only 7 percent of the labor force in California in 1980, they comprised 16.8 percent of laborers, 11.1 percent of operatives, 9.9 of office and clerical workers and 8.2 percent of all service workers. The same discrepancy can be noted in Illinois where Chicanas were only 2.1 percent of the labor force in 1980, yet comprised 5.8 percent of all laborers, 3.1 percent of operatives, 2.9 percent of service workers and 2.7 percent of office and clerical workers. Texas showed the largest concentration of Chicanas in service occupations.

The second major area of concentration of Chicanas in Texas is found among office and clerical workers (9.7 percent), followed by operatives (9.5 percent), laborers (8.3 percent) and sales workers (7.5 percent). Chicanas in California and Illinois differ from those in Texas in that they were underrepresented in sales occupations in both 1971 and 1980. Chicanas in all three states did not have a proportionate share of either official, managerial, professional, or technical occupations. In 1980 Chicanas held only .3 percent of the official and managerial positions in Illinois, 1.3 percent in Texas and 1.6 percent in California.

**Table 6**  
Occupational Distribution of Chicanas and White Males in Private Industry  
by Average for California, Texas and Illinois 1975 and 1980

|                                    | Chicana |         | White Male |           |
|------------------------------------|---------|---------|------------|-----------|
|                                    | 1975    | 1980    | 1975       | 1980      |
| <b>Total Employment</b>            |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 100     | 100     | 100        | 100       |
| Number                             | 264,555 | 424,736 | 3,144,274  | 3,296,314 |
| <b>Officials and Managers</b>      |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 1.97    | 2.47    | 18.05      | 19.34     |
| Number                             | 5,220   | 10,500  | 567,514    | 637,412   |
| <b>Professionals</b>               |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 1.99    | 2.66    | 12.89      | 13.8      |
| Number                             | 5,256   | 11,315  | 405,285    | 455,019   |
| <b>Technicians</b>                 |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 2.89    | 3.42    | 6.37       | 6.63      |
| Number                             | 7,648   | 14,547  | 200,231    | 218,606   |
| <b>Sales Workers</b>               |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 8.19    | 8.97    | 9.55       | 9.37      |
| Number                             | 21,671  | 38,094  | 300,210    | 309,005   |
| <b>Office and Clerical Workers</b> |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 27.09   | 25.33   | 5.54       | 4.9       |
| Number                             | 71,677  | 107,588 | 174,152    | 161,411   |
| <b>Craft Workers</b>               |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 3.59    | 4.3     | 19.7       | 18.34     |
| Number                             | 9,498   | 18,250  | 619,334    | 604,508   |
| <b>Operatives</b>                  |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 26.1    | 24.76   | 17.61      | 17.12     |
| Number                             | 69,051  | 105,177 | 553,761    | 564,286   |
| <b>Laborers</b>                    |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 15.86   | 15.51   | 5.63       | 5.41      |
| Number                             | 41,954  | 65,859  | 176,920    | 178,416   |
| <b>Service Workers</b>             |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 12.32   | 12.57   | 4.67       | 5.09      |
| Number                             | 32,480  | 53,406  | 146,867    | 167,651   |

Source: Composed from data in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Reports, "Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Private Industries, Occupational Employment in Private Industry by Race/Ethnic Group and Sex and by State and Industry, 1975, 1980" (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980)

**Table 7**  
Occupational Participation of Chicanas and White Males in Private  
Industry by Average for California, Texas and Illinois  
1975 and 1980

| Share of:                          | Chicana |         | White Male |           |
|------------------------------------|---------|---------|------------|-----------|
|                                    | 1975    | 1980    | 1975       | 1980      |
| <b>Total Employment</b>            |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 4.07    | 5.47    | 48.33      | 42.46     |
| Number                             | 264,555 | 424,736 | 3,144,274  | 3,296,314 |
| <b>Officials and Managers</b>      |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 0.72    | 1.18    | 78.29      | 71.56     |
| Number                             | 5,220   | 10,500  | 567,514    | 637,412   |
| <b>Professionals</b>               |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 0.87    | 1.41    | 67.25      | 56.57     |
| Number                             | 5,256   | 11,315  | 405,285    | 455,019   |
| <b>Technicians</b>                 |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 2.25    | 3.59    | 58.8       | 53.9      |
| Number                             | 7,648   | 14,547  | 200,231    | 218,606   |
| <b>Sales Workers</b>               |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 3.4     | 5.0     | 47.1       | 40.62     |
| Number                             | 21,671  | 38,094  | 300,210    | 309,005   |
| <b>Office and Clerical Workers</b> |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 6.08    | 7.9     | 14.78      | 11.85     |
| Number                             | 71,677  | 107,588 | 174,152    | 161,411   |
| <b>Craft Workers</b>               |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 1.14    | 2.02    | 74.62      | 66.75     |
| Number                             | 9,498   | 18,250  | 619,334    | 604,508   |
| <b>Operatives</b>                  |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 5.91    | 7.98    | 47.37      | 42.82     |
| Number                             | 69,051  | 105,177 | 553,761    | 564,286   |
| <b>Laborers</b>                    |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 8.3     | 11.18   | 35.01      | 30.28     |
| Number                             | 41,954  | 65,859  | 176,920    | 178,416   |
| <b>Service Workers</b>             |         |         |            |           |
| Percentage                         | 6.3     | 7.82    | 28.39      | 24.55     |
| Number                             | 32,580  | 53,406  | 146,867    | 167,651   |

Source: Composed from data in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Reports, "Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Private Industries, Occupational Employment in Private Industry by Race/Ethnic Group and Sex and by State and Industry, 1975, 1980" (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980).

These data all indicate that the occupational distribution and participation of Chicanas in private industry over a ten-year period of time has not shifted. Working Chicanas in California, Illinois and Texas continue to occupy the lowest-paid, unskilled blue-collar and white-collar occupations.



## PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

In 1975 over 30 percent of all white males were in managerial and professional occupations, while fewer than 4 percent of employed Chicanas were in similar positions. In order to investigate whether a downward trend exists in the occupational distribution of white males in private industry as a result of the hiring and promotion of Chicanas and other minorities, the average of the three states was taken and occupational distribution and participation were calculated. The average for all industries in California, Texas and Illinois was computed for 1975 and 1980 (see Table 6). Where a downward shift in the distribution of white males in private industry occurred, it was less than 1 percent (with the exception of craft workers). More important, the downward shift occurred primarily within unskilled and lower-paid occupations. On the other hand, the distribution of white males in managerial and professional occupations actually increased. Chicanas made less than a 1 percent increase in any occupation during this period. Thus, the data do not indicate that white males have experienced a downward occupational distribution as a result of the entry or promotion of Chicanas or other minorities into managerial and professional positions; on the contrary, white males appear to have made continued progress.<sup>29</sup>

An average of the occupational participation within all industries in California, Texas and Illinois provides information on the price paid by white males for the hiring and promotion of Chicanas in private industry (see Table 7). Chicanas experienced a small increase in their proportion of total employment from 1975 (4.07 percent) to 1980 (5.47 percent). Even with this rise in total employment, Chicanas experienced little increase in their share of managerial, professional, technical, and craft worker positions in 1980. However, their concentration as office and clerical workers, operatives, laborers, and service workers did increase. In 1975 Chicanas not only were predominantly office and clerical workers, operatives, laborers, and service workers, but were underrepresented in higher-paying white-and blue-collar occupations. For instance, they were overrepresented by 4.23 percent in laborer positions and by 2.23 percent in service occupations, compared to their share of the total employment. Chicanas were underrepresented in higher-paid and skilled occupations. They had 3.35 percent fewer of the managerial positions and 3.2 percent fewer of the professional positions.

White males comprised 48.33 percent of the total work force in 1975 and 42.46 percent in 1980. White males were dominant in all the skilled and highly paid positions (officials and managers, professionals, technicians, and craft workers) in 1975. White males held almost 30 percent more than their proportional share of the managerial and nearly 20 percent more of the professional positions, and about 25 percent more of skilled blue-collar positions. The overabundance of white male representation in these jobs continued in 1980. As might be expected, white males were underrepresented in low-paid, low-status occupations in 1975. The most disproportionate distribution occurred in the "traditional female" occupation, office and clerical work, where white males were underrepresented by 33.55 percent. In 1975 white males were underrepresented by 19.94 percent in their share of service workers and 13.32 percent in the laborers category.

In short, white males have been able to maintain a disproportionate share of the higher-paying and skilled jobs in private industry despite affirmative action. The slight increases Chicanas have made into professional occupations have not been at the expense of the status quo.

### TWICE PROTECTED?

The question of whether sex and/or race operate as advantages in the labor market can be investigated by comparing advances made by white women and Chicano males from 1975 to 1980 to those made by Chicanas. The averages for all industries in California, Texas and Illinois were used in this analysis in order to identify trends. Table 8 shows the occupational distribution among Chicanas, white females and Chicano males. Although women were primarily hired as office and clerical workers, white women were more likely to occupy this position than Chicanas in 1975, with 42 percent of white women in these positions as compared to 27 percent for Chicanas. Chicanas were more than twice as likely to be hired as operatives and laborers than white women. Over half of Chicano males were unskilled blue-collar workers in 1975 compared to about 40 percent for Chicanas. White females (17.02 percent) were more likely to be in managerial, professional, or technical positions than either Chicano males (10.16 percent) or Chicanas (6.85 percent) in 1975. Almost a fourth of white women were employed in these positions in 1980, while only one-tenth of the Chicanos were.

The participation rates of each group provide more detailed information on the degree of representation in each occupational category (see Table 9). In 1975, white women were underrepresented in high-paying white-collar and blue-collar positions. Although white women comprised 27.71 percent of the total work force, they occupied only 13.36 percent of managerial, 21.88 percent of professional, and 22.94 percent of technical positions. White women did not hold their share of blue-collar positions either. However, white women occupied more than their share of the sales positions (38.59 percent), service jobs (32.79 percent), and office and clerical positions (64.57 percent). Chicano males lacked their share of all white-collar occupations, and were concentrated in all blue-collar and service jobs in 1975.

**Table 8**  
Occupational Distribution of Chicanas, White Females and Chicano Males in Private Industry by Average for California, Texas and Illinois, 1975 and 1980

|                                    | Chicana |         | White Female |           | Chicano Male |         |
|------------------------------------|---------|---------|--------------|-----------|--------------|---------|
|                                    | 1975    | 1980    | 1975         | 1980      | 1975         | 1980    |
| <b>Total Employment</b>            |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 100     | 100     | 100          | 100       | 100          | 100     |
| Number                             | 264,555 | 424,736 | 1,802,407    | 2,211,695 | 471,876      | 665,247 |
| <b>Official and Managers</b>       |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 1.97    | 2.47    | 5.37         | 6.81      | 4.55         | 4.97    |
| Number                             | 5,220   | 10,500  | 96,862       | 150,547   | 21,462       | 33,084  |
| <b>Professionals</b>               |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 1.99    | 2.66    | 7.32         | 10.23     | 2.54         | 2.73    |
| Number                             | 5,256   | 11,315  | 131,854      | 226,220   | 11,990       | 8,153   |
| <b>Technicians</b>                 |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 2.89    | 3.42    | 4.33         | 5.64      | 3.07         | 3.3     |
| Number                             | 7,648   | 14,547  | 78,108       | 124,697   | 14,485       | 21,929  |
| <b>Sales Workers</b>               |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 8.19    | 8.97    | 13.65        | 13.74     | 4.40         | 4.75    |
| Number                             | 21,671  | 38,094  | 245,953      | 303,945   | 20,770       | 31,614  |
| <b>Office and Clerical Workers</b> |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 27.09   | 25.33   | 42.21        | 37.94     | 4.27         | 3.92    |
| Number                             | 71,677  | 107,588 | 760,863      | 839,066   | 20,151       | 26,054  |
| <b>Craft Workers</b>               |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 3.59    | 4.3     | 2.15         | 2.61      | 18.46        | 17.71   |
| Number                             | 9,498   | 18,250  | 38,692       | 57,828    | 87,064       | 117,828 |
| <b>Operatives</b>                  |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 26.1    | 24.76   | 10.98        | 9.28      | 31.07        | 29.33   |
| Number                             | 69,051  | 105,177 | 197,860      | 205,209   | 146,615      | 195,111 |
| <b>Laborers</b>                    |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 15.86   | 15.51   | 4.58         | 3.9       | 21.86        | 21.61   |
| Number                             | 41,954  | 65,859  | 82,610       | 86,222    | 103,172      | 143,754 |
| <b>Service Workers</b>             |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 12.32   | 12.57   | 9.41         | 9.85      | 9.78         | 11.68   |
| Number                             | 32,580  | 53,406  | 169,605      | 217,961   | 46,167       | 77,720  |

Source: Composed from data in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Reports, "Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Private Industries, Occupational Employment in Private Industry by Race/Ethnic Group and Sex and by State and Industry, 1975, 1980" (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980).

**Table 9**

Occupational Participation of Chicanas, White Females and Chicano Males in Private Industry by Average for California, Texas and Illinois, 1975 and 1980

| Share of:                          | Chicana |         | White Female |           | Chicano Male |         |
|------------------------------------|---------|---------|--------------|-----------|--------------|---------|
|                                    | 1975    | 1980    | 1975         | 1980      | 1975         | 1980    |
| <b>Total Employment</b>            |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 4.07    | 5.47    | 27.71        | 28.49     | 7.25         | 8.57    |
| Number                             | 264,555 | 424,736 | 1,802,407    | 2,211,695 | 471,876      | 665,247 |
| <b>Officials and Managers</b>      |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 0.72    | 1.18    | 13.36        | 16.9      | 2.96         | 3.71    |
| Number                             | 5,220   | 10,500  | 98,862       | 150,547   | 21,462       | 33,084  |
| <b>Professionals</b>               |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 0.87    | 1.41    | 21.88        | 28.12     | 1.99         | 2.26    |
| Number                             | 5,256   | 11,315  | 131,854      | 226,220   | 11,990       | 18,153  |
| <b>Technicians</b>                 |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 2.25    | 3.59    | 22.94        | 30.74     | 4.25         | 5.41    |
| Number                             | 7,648   | 14,547  | 78,108       | 124,697   | 14,485       | 21,929  |
| <b>Sales Workers</b>               |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 3.4     | 5.0     | 38.59        | 39.95     | 3.26         | 4.16    |
| Number                             | 21,671  | 38,094  | 245,953      | 303,945   | 20,770       | 31,614  |
| <b>Office and Clerical Workers</b> |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 6.08    | 7.9     | 64.57        | 61.61     | 1.71         | 1.91    |
| Number                             | 71,677  | 107,588 | 760,863      | 839,066   | 20,151       | 26,054  |
| <b>Craft Workers</b>               |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 1.14    | 2.02    | 4.66         | 6.39      | 10.49        | 13.01   |
| Number                             | 9,498   | 18,250  | 38,692       | 57,828    | 87,064       | 117,828 |
| <b>Operatives</b>                  |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 5.91    | 7.98    | 16.92        | 15.57     | 12.54        | 14.81   |
| Number                             | 69,051  | 105,177 | 197,860      | 205,209   | 146,615      | 195,111 |
| <b>Laborers</b>                    |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 8.3     | 11.18   | 16.35        | 14.63     | 20.42        | 24.4    |
| Number                             | 41,954  | 65,859  | 82,610       | 86,222    | 103,172      | 143,754 |
| <b>Service Workers</b>             |         |         |              |           |              |         |
| Percentage                         | 6.3     | 7.82    | 32.79        | 31.92     | 8.93         | 11.38   |
| Number                             | 32,580  | 53,406  | 169,605      | 217,961   | 46,167       | 77,720  |

Source: Composed from data in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Reports, "Job Patterns of Minorities and Women in Private Industries, Occupational Employment in Private Industry by Race/Ethnic Group and Sex and by State and Industry, 1975, 1980" (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980).

Chicanas and white women had modest increases in their share of the total employment from 1975 to 1980. Chicano males increased their share of total employment by 1.32 percent. In spite of the similarity of increases in the total employment over the five years, disparity exists between the degree of advances made. White women were able to obtain a larger share of professional<sup>30</sup> (28.12 percent) and the technical (30.74 percent) occupations, while both Chicano males and females continued to fall short of their share of these positions. Nor did either group make substantial gains in obtaining its share of official and managerial positions. White women held a little over

half of their share of managerial positions,<sup>31</sup> and Chicano men held a little less than half. Chicanas held less than a third of their share of managerial positions. White women managed to reduce their overrepresentation within certain low-paying jobs (office and clerical workers, operatives, and service workers), but this was not the case for Chicanas and Chicano males.

## CONCLUSION

The incredibly slow pace at which Chicanas are moving into higher-paying managerial and skilled positions and their concentration in lower-paid white-collar and blue-collar occupations hardly legitimate the claim of "preferential treatment." Analysis of occupational distribution and participation of Chicanas and white males clearly indicates that white males have maintained their dominance in managerial and professional positions. White males continue to be overrepresented in the better jobs and fewer white males are relegated to the less attractive jobs – a rather odd effect of reverse discrimination or "affirmative discrimination," as Nathan Glazer prefers to call it.<sup>32</sup> It appears to be simply a continuation of racial and sexual inequality. William Ryan urges that we clarify reality again by

... properly defining the discrimination issue as the continuation of old-fashioned, unreversed discrimination and preferential treatment of whites; affirmative action is providing merely the scorecard with which to judge to what extent the old problem is being eliminated.<sup>33</sup>

Analysis of the occupational distribution and participation of Chicanas in private industry from 1975 to 1980 shows very little improvement. Chicanas are a long way from obtaining their fair share of higher-income and prestigious occupations. The minuscule progress made by Chicanas is not very encouraging when one considers that it occurred not only during the affirmative action era, but also during a period of rising Chicana labor force participation and increased educational attainment, and of pressure from Chicano and women's organizations. It seems that instead of focusing research of the effects of affirmative action on minority and women's employment, we need to assess the impact of white male backlash on the composition of the labor force.

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## ENDNOTES

1. These statutes and orders include the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Executive Order 11246 as amended by Executive Order 11375, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was the first legislation passed requiring equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. Later, coverage was extended to executive, administrative and professional employees in Title IX of the Education Amendment Act of 1972. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits

"discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion or sex in any term, condition or privilege of employment by unions and by employers." All public and private employers with fifteen or more employees were included under the amended law in 1972. Affirmative action activities are aimed at changing former recruiting patterns that tended to exclude women and minorities as applicants and to provide equal opportunity for advancement within the work force. Executive Order 11246 required that employers develop goals to include underrepresented groups. Timetables to achieve affirmative action goals were to be based on the "anticipated employee turnover rate, new vacancies, schedules for promotion and upgrading, and the availability of qualified women and minorities."

2. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) has proposed changes to alter requirements for federal contractors covered under Executive Order 11246 to apply only to contractors employing one hundred persons, rather than the existing fifty, and to contracts exceeding \$100,000, rather than the existing \$50,000. The seriousness of the proposed changes are pointed out by the National Council of La Raza in their publication, "Changes Proposed in Affirmative Action Requirements for Federal Contractors." "Presently, the federal contract compliance program covers nearly 29,000 contractors who hire 31 million persons, or one-third of the working population, and includes over \$80,000 billion in federal contracts." Therefore, the proposed changes would apply to even fewer work sites than before.

3. Critics of affirmative action have frequently claimed the lack of representativeness of minorities and women in particular occupations is due to their own deficiencies, such as lack of qualifications or the interference of family roles. This "blaming-the-victim" approach suggests that the remedy exists in programs aimed at changing the individual rather than the system. For specific examples, see Amitai Etzioni, "On Academic Blood Tests," *Science* (June 1971): 1087; Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Foster, *Preferential Treatment and Quotas* (New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1974); Alan H. Goldman, "Affirmative Action," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6:2 (Winter 1976):178-195; Richard A. Lester, *Anti-bias Regulation of Universities: Faculty Problems and Their Solutions* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974). Several studies show that minorities and women are overqualified for positions when compared with their white male counterparts. See Morris Goldstein and Robert S. Smith, "The Estimated Impact of Antidiscrimination Programs Aimed at Federal Contractors," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 29:4 (July 1976):523-543; Stanley H. Masters, "The Effects of Educational Differences and Labor-Market Discrimination on the Relative Earnings of Black Males," *The Journal of Human Resources* 9:3 (Summer 1974):342-360; Dudley L. Poston, David Alvarez and Marta Tienda, "Earning Differences Between Anglo and Mexican American Male Workers in 1960 and 1970: Changes in the 'Cost' of Being Mexican American," *Social Science Quarterly* 57:3 (December 1976):618-631.

4. One of the most prominent neoconservatives is Nathan Glazer. See his book *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

5. Nijole V. Benokraitis and Joe P. Feagin, *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity: Action, Inaction, Reaction* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 211. It may not actually be the first time. One could compare the reaction of southern white to the Civil Rights Act and court orders to integrate.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 193. Minority movements include Chicano, black, Native American and other political groups.

7. The term "Chicano" refers to U.S. citizens, or persons of Mexican origin with long-term residency in the United States; frequently referred to as Mexican American, Spanish American or Mexicanos throughout the Southwest. Chicana refers to women.

8. Care McWilliams, *North from Mexico* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 207-208.

9. Clark S. Knowlton, "The Impact of Social Change upon Certain Selected Systems of Spanish American Villages of Northern New Mexico," paper prepared for the Rural Sociological Society (Chicago, 1965).

10. Rodolfo Acuna, *Occupied America* (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972); Thomas Almaguer, "Historical Notes on Chicano Oppression: The Dialectics of Racial and Class Domination in North America," *Aztlan* 5:1/2 (Spring/Fall 1974):27-56; Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); David Montejano, "Race, Labor Repression, and Capitalist Agriculture: Notes from South Texas, 1920-1930" (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Institute for the Study of Social Change, 1977), Working Papers Series 102.

11. Barrera, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

12. Douglas Monroy, "La Costura en Los Angeles, 1933-1939: The ILGWU and the Politics of Domination," in Magdalena Mara and Adelaida R. Del Castillo, eds., *Mexican Women in the United States: Struggles Past and Present* (Los Angeles: Chicano Studies Research Center Publications, 1980); Mario T. Garcia, "The Chicana in American History: The Mexican Women of El Paso," *Pacific Historical Review* 49:2 (May 1980):315-337; Paul S. Taylor, "Mexican Women in Los Angeles Industry in 1928," *Aztlan* 11:1 (Spring 1980):99-131.

13. Barrera, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

14. Cited in Barrera, *ibid.*, p. 95. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States:1930, Vol 5:General Report on Occupation, Table 4.*

15. Taylor, 1980.

16. Mario T. Garcia, "Racial Dualism in the El Paso Labor Market, 1880-1920," *Aztlan* VI:2 (Special Issue, 1975): 197-218.

17. Charles Hufford, *The Social and Economic Effects of the Mexican Migration into Texas* (San Francisco: R & E Research Associates, 1971, reprint of 1925 edition), pp. 58-59.

18. Barrera, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

19. U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Summary, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 166, "Age, Fertility, Relationship, and Educational Characteristics by Spanish-Origin, Type of Spanish Origin, and Race: 1980" (Washington, D.C.: 1980).

20. Information on the Chicana population enrolled in school is limited to women twenty-five years and older. However, the percentages given of the total Chicano population are informative: 39 percent of eighteen to nineteen year olds are enrolled; 19 percent of the twenty to twenty-one year olds are enrolled; 11 percent of twenty-two to twenty-four year olds are enrolled. For the total U.S. population, the percentages are respectively 52 percent, 32.5 percent and 17 percent.

21. U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Summary, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 168, "Labor Force Characteristics by Spanish Origin, Type of Origin, and Race: 1980" (Washington, D.C.: 1980)

22. For further discussion on working mothers and comparisons between Chicanas and white women and black women, see Rosemary Santana Cooney, "The Mexican American Female in the Labor Force," in Charles H. Teller, Leo F. Estrada, Jose Hernandez and David Alvarez, eds., *Cuantos Somos: A Demographic Study of the Mexican-American Population* (Austin, Texas: Center for Mexican American Studies, 1977), pp. 183-196.

23. The 1970 census showed 28 percent of married Chicanas in the labor force. Forty-five percent of the married women had children under six. Twenty percent of mothers with children under six were in the labor force.

24. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEO-1 Report "Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry" (Washington, D.C.: EEOC, 1980), p. vii. Although data are collected from various industries, the term "employee" does not include temporary employees or employees hired for a specified period time or for the duration of a specified job, which limits the data on the construction industry and agriculture.

25. Officials and managers includes executives, middle management, plant managers, department managers and superintendents, purchasing agents, buyers, and kindred workers. Professionals includes accountants and auditors, airplane pilots, navigators, architects, artists, chemists, designers, dietitians, editors, engineers, lawyers, librarians, mathematicians, natural scientists, registered nurses, personnel and labor relations workers, physicians, social scientists, and teachers. Technicians includes occupations which require two years of post-high school education. Sales workers includes insurance agents, brokers, real estate agents, sales clerks, grocery clerks, and cashier checkers.

26. For a detailed discussion on differences between groups classified as Hispanic, see: Rosemary Santana Cooney and Vilma Ortiz, "Nativity, National Origin, and Hispanic Female Participation in the Labor Force," *Social Science Quarterly* 64:3 (September 1983):510; Morris J. Newman, "A Profile of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force," *Monthly Labor Review* 101:12 (December 1978):3-14; and Lester Thurow, "Not Making It in America: The Economic Progress of Minority Groups," *Social Policy* 6:5 (March 1976):5-11. For problems specific to use of census data, see Jose Hernandez, Leo Estrada and David Alvarez, "Census Data and the Problem of Conceptually Defining the Mexican American Population," *Social Science Quarterly* 53:4 (March 1973):671-687; and Leo F. Estrada, Jose Hernandez and David Alvarez, "Using Census Data to Study Spanish Heritage Population of the United States," and Edward Fernandez, "A Comparison of Persons of Spanish Origin and Persons of Spanish Surname in the United States Using the March 1971 Current Population Survey," in Teller, et al., *Cuantos Somos*, op. cit. Another major problem with these particular data is the broadness of the categories used in the EEOC reports. This breadth may tend to hide important income differences within an occupation.

27. Arizona has the third largest Mexican population, 368, 259.

28. This is not an unusual finding. Blumrosen noted that the bulk of new women workers have taken traditional female jobs. Ruth G. Blumrosen, "Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Women Workers," *Employee Relations Law Journal* 61:1 (Summer 1980): 77.

29. Morris Goldstein and Robert S. Smith found that affirmative action programs were helping white men but were having an adverse effect on women. Morris Goldstein and Robert Smith, "The Estimated Impact of the Antidiscrimination Program Aimed at Federal Contractors," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 29:4 (1976): 523-543.

30. This increase in the participation of white women in professions does not necessarily guarantee equality. Cooney found in her study on female professionals in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand that women tend to be concentrated in the lower-status positions within occupations. Rosemary Santana Cooney, "Female Professional Work Opportunities: A Cross-National Study," *Demography* 12:1 (February 1975): 107-120.

31. The increase in the number of women holding managerial positions has been questioned because the category includes supervisory positions in fields that have low-paying jobs.

32. See Glazer, op. cit.

33. William Ryan, *Equality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 207.









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