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HARVARD AFRICA POLICY JOURNAL

JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

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
Review by *Daniel Bendix*

E-Governance and Local Governance in Africa

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Blonde Roots


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AFRICA RISING?



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Acknowledgments

First and foremost, we would like to extend our sincerest gratitude to the Harvard Kennedy School Student Government. Thank you for your unwavering generosity, without which, this issue would not have been possible.

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Harvard Africa Policy Journal

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Editor's Remarks

Africa has seen its share of problems, but it has also enjoyed many laudable successes. This issue, the first print version of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal, reflects on many aspects of African development and considers the question "Is Africa Rising?" While it is not for the Journal to definitively answer this question, the articles in this issue elucidate the options to be considered when assessing Africa's progress and future.

Two feature articles look at economic development in Africa. Dr Angemi's piece highlights the contradictory nature of foreign aid in Africa, which on the one hand has been a key feature of African economic development, but on the other hand – as the author argues – has fostered an element of donor parasitism on African economies. Using Uganda as a case study, the author shows how this country reached high levels of economic growth before experiencing a reversal in the first few years of the new millennium. He criticizes foreign aid for hampering domestic poverty reduction programs and contributing to the misuse of public resources. He also considers how governments and development partners can work together to address these issues. Sébastien Dessus shows how commodity price inflation reduces the welfare of poor and non-poor households in Tanzania especially due to rising oil prices. He reports that poor households, which derive their income mainly from agricultural activity, are relatively more sheltered from global commodity inflation because they don't consume oil-intensive products. He further explains how tax policies that encourage agricultural production may help reduce poverty. His article is especially important given the rising price of food and energy commodities globally, and their adverse effects on many African economies.

African countries have been plagued by security problems for decades, and two other feature articles explore some of the current security challenges and solutions. Kristina Kempkey's piece examines Africa's increased strategic importance for the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. She compares two military commands, CENTCOM (Middle East and Central Asia) and AFRICOM (Africa) and considers the historical events leading to their formation. Through her analysis, she defines key policy areas, such as establishing unified control and seeking support from African allies that could make AFRICOM more effective.

The decline in conflicts on the continent at large has been a trend in recent years, but security problems continue to plague the Horn. Joshua Ben-David and Shani Ross look at the escalating problem of Somali piracy. The authors show how piracy results from the incapacity of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to govern effectively, a problem compounded by the collapsed economy, and the activities of Islamic insurgents in the area. They call for the creation of a UN-mandated maritime task force, and recommend unified policy on ransom among shipping companies and governments as some of the potentially effective ways to counter the threat of Somali piracy.

Africa is a continent of innovation that is embracing the twenty-first century, as our commentaries expose. Timothy Anderson, the founder of World Computer Exchange, champions the use of computers in African classroom in his commentary. His organization has helped to bridge the digital divide between the West and Africa by working with local partners. In his commentary, Dr. Ako Amadi tackles the pressing problems of environmental degradation and climate change in Africa. He considers the historical factors that have led to awkward borders that splice important lakes and ecosystems, and how the economic, social, and political realities of African countries today exacerbate the challenge of promoting sound environmental policies. However, he identifies a number of measures that should be taken, from private sector participation in the energy-efficient economy to legislation aimed at integrating poverty reduction strategies and environmental concerns.

Africa has seen a number of players emerge on the scene, such as China, India and other developing economies. The Undersecretary for Foreign Trade in the Turkish government writes in his commentary about the role Turkey is playing on the continent, from technological transfer to sector-specific partnerships in textile, food processing and consumer goods. He shares some of the results of this strategy, and elaborates on Turkey's goals in Africa for the future. Lastly, Martin Ziguélé, former prime minister of the Central African Republic, offers reasons for why his country should receive more world attention than it has before. His commentary makes the case of the CAR as both the breadbasket and the wellspring of Central Africa.

As we have done in the past, we have conducted interviews with prominent individuals and experts for this issue. The interview with Dr Chinua Achebe explores the role of speech and writing in promoting discussion in African societies, and considers the nature of African leadership – a theme in most of Dr Achebe's writing. Another interview, with Stephen Lewis, who runs two non-profits working on HIV/AIDS in Africa, highlights recent developments in the fight against the epidemic and identifies some policies that could be effective. Finally, we interviewed Archbishop Desmond Tutu about South African politics, recent events in Kenya and Zimbabwe, and the ongoing economic crisis. The perspectives of these individuals will surely be rich fodder for students and advocates of African development.

The Journal concludes with book reviews of four recently published novels – *Breaking Stone Silence*, a documentary account of living with HIV/ AIDS; *The Paternalism of Partnership: A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in Development Aid*, a book about postcolonial development partnerships between Western donors (with a focus on Scandinavia) and African countries (specifically Tanzania); *E-Governance in Africa: From Theory to Action: A Handbook on ICTs for Local Governance*, which looks at the implementation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in local governments in sub-Saharan Africa; and finally *Blonde Roots*, which asks what would have happened if Africans had enslaved Europeans instead of the other way round.

This issue of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal brings together the ideas of policy makers, development practitioners, academics and other contributors to African development. I hope that readers will enjoy its contents, using the theme Africa Rising? as the running thread of analysis.

I would like to thank the Board and Staff members of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal, who have worked incredibly hard to bring this issue to fruition. They have been enthusiastic, dedicated and engaged and they are the real bedrock of the HAPJ. I would especially like to thank Andrew Silvestri, the Managing Editor, for his excellent work in supporting the overall making of the Journal. I also wish to extend thanks to the Kennedy School Student Government and to Tim Reid, an alum of the HAPJ, for their generous financial support. Dean McCarthy and Jen Swartout provided key administrative support, while Lori Goldstein did an outstanding job on copy-editing. Lastly, we sincerely thank Sam Unom, the founder of the HAPJ, for his visionary guidance and support. As a new Board takes over for the 2010 cycle, I have every confidence that the Harvard Africa Policy Journal will grow in strength in the future, and I hope our readers will continue to enjoy this publication.

Dambudzo Josephine Muzenda
Editor-in-Chief

Cambridge, Massachusetts
April, 2009

A Primer on Aid Effectiveness: Development Partners or Development Parasites? Evidence from Uganda

By Diego Angemi

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Abstract

During the 1990s, and especially over the second half of the decade, Uganda experienced high economic growth, falling income poverty, and relative political stability. In this dynamic environment, donors' contribution to Uganda's effective implementation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) can be conceptualized along a spectrum of aid partnership. At the extreme ends of the spectrum, while true development partners (e.g. DFID) support the government's development agenda by welcoming a switch from projects to government budget systems, development parasites like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) remain foreign to Uganda's dynamic development plan. Government and development partners share the responsibility to continue pursuing the effective implementation of Uganda's PEAP, while applying political pressure to regulate the activities of development parasites, who have failed to keep up with the pace of the policy debate.

Introduction

During the 1990s, and especially over the second half of the decade, Uganda experienced high economic growth, sustained reductions in the rate of income poverty, and relative political stability. In addition, while it is still too early to assess properly the medium-term impact of direct budget support (DBS) on the lives of poor people, Uganda features among the few countries where real gains have been made in terms of scaling up the delivery of basic health and education services, increasing the focus of the budget, and giving people confidence to claim their rights (DFID 2004). In spite of these achievements, the period between 2000 and 2003 witnessed a reversal in the trend of Uganda's record of both poverty and inequality reduction. The increase in the percentage of Ugandans living in poverty and the widening inequality gap between the poor and their wealthier counterparts undermine the government's commitment to the overriding priority of tackling poverty. The aim of this article is to provide an original assessment of the factors hampering the country's development and the effective implementation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), encouraged and supported by the development partners.

There is evidence to support the claim that the period between 1992 and 2000 may have marked Uganda's transition from recovery¹ to fresh growth. Recovery necessitated the

rehabilitation of traditional export crops, the restoration of the public sector, and a reversal of the retreat to subsistence. In this economic environment, the percentage of Ugandans who were poor decreased sharply from 56 percent in 1992 to 34 percent in 2000. Over the five-year period from fiscal year (FY) 1998/99 to FY 2002/03, however, real annual growth slowed down from 6.7 percent per annum, registered in the previous five-year period, to 6 percent per annum. In addition, between 2000 and 2003, inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) rose from 0.395 to 0.428, and the percentage of Ugandans living in poverty increased from 34 percent to 38 percent. This article will proceed to provide greater insight into these figures.

The poverty reduction of the 1990s was achieved through a very high rate of consumption growth and high rates of gross domestic product (GDP) growth.ⁱⁱ Between 1992 and 1997, a critical factor in consumption growth was the increased prices that producers received for their crops. As a result of agricultural markets liberalization, farmers were able to benefit from the increase in the world price of coffee.ⁱⁱⁱ Hence, the most dramatic poverty reductions were experienced by cash crop farmers, and the increase in poverty since 2000 is partly attributed to a decline in agricultural growth and a decline in farmers' prices, reflecting world market conditions (Government of Uganda 2004f).

The concerns that have been raised about the growth slowdown in Uganda should not be exaggerated. Research carried out by the Ministry of Finance shows that it is easier to start a period of rapid growth than it is to maintain one in the longer run. Looking at twenty episodes of sustained strong growth in Africa during the period of 1960 to 1996, the research shows that fifteen of those episodes had terminated before the end of the period. Of the remaining five, which included Uganda, only Botswana and Mauritius had sustained strong growth for more than fifteen years. As of FY 2002/03, Uganda had equaled the achievement of both Botswana and Mauritius by sustaining strong growth for more than fifteen years in spite of the slight relative slowdown seen over the past five years.

The remainder of this article introduces the Poverty Eradication Action Plan as a highly dynamic plan of action, which aims to respond as promptly and effectively as possible to the needs of the nation. In the context of the PEAP, analysis later in the article discloses original insight on the effectiveness of international aid in Uganda. The findings suggest that large proportions of overseas development assistance are not reaching their intended beneficiaries. Further, without more serious efforts to improve social services in order to reach the poorest segments of the population, sovereign governments and the international community might never succeed in their quest to alleviate the burden of poverty and improve the quality of life for the population as a whole.

The Poverty Eradication Action Plan

In 1997, the Government of Uganda launched the Poverty Eradication Action Plan. Since its original inception, under the able leadership of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development, the PEAP has undergone two major revisions in 2000 and 2004 (2000 revision had a lifetime from 2000 to 2004; 2004 revision had a lifetime from 2004 to 2008). The PEAP is Uganda's national development framework and medium-term planning tool. It also guides the formulation of policy and the implementation of programs through a sector-wide approach and decentralization. The ultimate objective of the PEAP remains the improvement of the quality of life of the poor and the population as a whole.

The relevance of the PEAP in this primer on aid effectiveness in Uganda is due to the role played by this plan in placing Uganda as a key recipient of Official Development Assistance. To illustrate, between 1987-1992 and 1997-2004 annual foreign assistance to Uganda increased every year to an average of \$500 and \$700 million, respectively.^{iv}

In the context of the PEAP, a number of sectors have successfully contributed, both directly and indirectly, to poverty reduction. For instance, since 2000 there have been significant improvements in health sector outputs, reflecting improved access to and utilization of public health services by the Ugandan population. A number of PEAP indicators, which were selected to assess performance of the health sector, have shown marked improvement (see Table 1).

Table 1: PEAP Indicators

No.	PEAP Performance Indicator	Baseline Value (1999/2000)	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003
1.	Out-patient department utilization (Government of Uganda and private not-for-profit subsector)	0.40	0.43	0.60	0.72
2.	DPT 3 coverage (< 1 year)	41%	48%	63%	84%
3.	Proportion of approved posts filled with trained health staff	33%	40%	42%	53%
4.	Deliveries in health units	25.2%	22.6%	20.9%	20%
5.	Urban/rural specific HIV seroprevalence (national average)	6.8%	6.1%	6.2%	6.2%

Source: Government of Uganda 2004b

Out-patient department (OPD) attendance, commonly referred to as hospital visits, has increased dramatically in most health facilities across the country. Total OPD new attendance increased from 9.3 million in FY 1999/2000 to 17.7 million in FY 2002/03. The OPD utilization rate has therefore improved from a baseline rate of 0.40 visits per person per year in FY 1999/2000 to 0.72 visits per person per year in FY 2002/03.

The increase in OPD utilization is attributable to a number of government interventions aimed at increasing the access of health services by the poor. These include: the abolition of user fees, expansion of rural lower health facilities, provision of subsidies to the private not-for-profit subsector, the introduction of health subdistricts structure, recruitment of qualified health workers, and increases in the volume of essential drugs purchased for the health centers.

Immunization services also improved significantly over the last three years. Diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT 3) coverage, another important Health Sector Strategic Plan and PEAP indicator, showed significant improvement over the last three years, increasing from 41 percent in 1999 to 84 percent in FY 2002/03.

Reproductive health services, however, have not improved despite substantial improvements in other PEAP indicators. Whereas the rates of antenatal clinic attendances have continued to improve (92 percent attended at least once), the proportion of deliveries conducted in health facilities has declined from 25 percent in 1999 to 20 percent in 2002/03. The contraceptive prevalence rate has also stagnated at 23% for the last three years. This has resulted in high fertility rates and high population growth rate.

The government has continued to implement active HIV prevention strategies that have effectively sustained the declining trend of HIV seroprevalence. This has now stabilized at around 6.2 percent at the antenatal clinic surveillance sites. It is hoped that the increasing trend in condom use and the rise in age at first intercourse will sustain this positive trend. New and effective components of HIV control have been introduced in the campaign against HIV/AIDS. These include: extension of voluntary counseling and testing services, increasing the number of centers offering services for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and improving the capacity to provide and deliver antiretroviral (ARV) treatment.

Malaria has continued to be the major cause of morbidity and mortality in the country. The government has strengthened the prevention, control, and treatment strategies for malaria. The strategy of Home Based Management of Fevers was successfully launched and implemented in ten districts with remarkable success. Information obtained from community distributors' registers shows 74 percent of children under the age of five receiving appropriate treatment within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms, which has markedly reduced morbidity and mortality due to malaria in those communities. In addition, the use of insecticide-treated materials has been strengthened. Use of bed nets is still low, estimated at only 15 percent, of which 22 percent is by children under the age of five.

The example from the health sector does not stand alone. Even outside the boundaries of individual sectors, the government has been able to identify critical areas of multi-sectoral intervention to improve the quality of life of the poor and of the population as a whole.

For instance, between 1995 and 2000, infant mortality increased from 81 to 88 deaths per 1,000 births. During the same period, under-five mortality increased from 147 to 152 deaths per 1,000 births, while maternal mortality fell only marginally from 527 to 505 per 100,000 live births. In addition to their negative impact on the quality of life, high mortality rates contribute to the perpetuation of poverty and hinder economic development.

In response to these findings, and under the auspices of the PEAP, the government set up a Task Force on Infant and Maternal Mortality to propose a strategic program for the rapid

reduction of mortality in Uganda. This task force includes government officials and members of the international community. According to the work carried out by the task force: (1) although high mortality is a health outcome, it is not solely the responsibility of the health sector, and activities geared toward reduced mortality are multi-sectoral; and (2) mortality reduction does not feature as an immediate, or as the central, focus of current national development policies. Mortality is generally taken as a peripheral problem, loosely appended to key policies.

It was also recognized that the problems facing mothers in achieving a healthy status can be divided into three dimensions: (1) problems within the household (and community); (2) problems with access; and (3) problems at health facilities (private and public). For example, the decision to seek antenatal care and deliver at a health facility can be subject to three sources of delay: (1) delay at home in the decision to seek health care; (2) even if the decision is made, the female may face delay in reaching the health facility due to poor accessibility; and (3) once at a health unit, there may not be the facilities to care for her adequately (Government of Uganda 2004d).

The recommendations directed at the household (and community) level focus on areas that seek to improve the conditions for women within the home and thereby improve their health status and their ability to receive appropriate health care. A woman might be unwilling to leave the household for an uncertain period of time because of child care or household workload. Poor status within the household might also restrict the woman's decision. Childbirth is not generally regarded as an illness, and thus a husband may forbid a woman from seeking medical attention unless there is a serious emergency, in which case a decision is frequently made too late for help to be possible. Clearly, even if conditions within the household are conducive to females seeking health care, this is undermined if there is no way of reaching a health unit. Thus, at the access stage, the most obvious hindrances to women receiving health care include lack of transport, roads, communication, and money for fares. At the dimension of service delivery, in this case, health, it is obvious that if there are no qualified staff, equipment, drugs, and supplies in place, then effective health care cannot be delivered, and pregnant women will be reluctant to travel to receive poor quality service. Other reasons that women have given for this low demand include the cost of additional requirements (e.g., gloves), rudeness of staff, lack of privacy, and inflexibility with regard to cultural differences (e.g., method of disposal of placenta) (Government of Uganda 2004d).

These dimensions of policy intervention bring together supply- and demand-side factors of service delivery. As a result, it is imperative to sequence policy actions in order to guarantee functional, reliable, and accessible health facilities, before mobilizing communities to ensure high demand for health services.

This work by the Task Force on Infant and Maternal Mortality was accurately reflected in the current Poverty Eradication Action Plan (revised in 2004, expiring in 2008), which (under the task force's recommendations) highlights infant and maternal mortality among the priority policy issues to be addressed in the short and medium term through a number of interventions including malaria control, family planning, improved sanitation and health care, and revitalization of community development workers.

Development Partners or Development Parasites?

An important aspect of the government's commitment to poverty reduction focuses on private-sector development and export-led growth. Clearly, private investment and export growth require a number of supportive measures such as low and stable inflation and interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, and growth in domestic savings. These targets can only be achieved by a gradual reduction in the fiscal deficit and donor aid dependency. Contrary to the perception that the government's economic strategy is based solely on reducing its fiscal deficit at the expense of depleting public spending and worsening social welfare (Okuonzi 2004), budget data from the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development shows that over the past decade, government has given higher priority to increasing public expenditure than reducing the fiscal deficit. For example, over the past fifteen years, government expenditure on the health and education sectors alone as a percentage of the budget more than doubled (from less than 15 percent to 35 percent).^v

In a presentation to the Annual National Budget Consultative Workshop for the financial year 2005/06, Honorable Gerald Ssendaula, former Minister of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development, stated that "Uganda has been extremely fortunate to receive consistent financial support from a number of development partners over the past decade. Without their support, we would have been unable to finance half of our planned expenditure, as our domestic revenues have been, and remain, insufficient to cover our expenditure needs. Indeed, without this support, we probably would not have achieved the significant reduction in poverty witnessed by all since the early 1990s" (Government of Uganda 2004a).

Notably, however, this support has come at a cost. The deficit has almost doubled, and the debt burden is once again threatening to become unsustainable, in spite of the generous debt relief the Ugandan government received under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative.^{vi}

Recent experience suggests that a high fiscal deficit, funded by donor aid, is not compatible with the government's objective of poverty reduction. Aid flows into the Ugandan economy have placed appreciation pressures on the exchange rate, diminishing the price incentive for export production and reducing the international competitiveness of Ugandan products. Moreover, the current level of the exchange rate is on the verge of rendering the maize, tea, and tobacco sectors unprofitable and squeezing profits in other export sectors such as coffee and cotton by lowering the farm gate prices being paid in shillings to farmers.

These sectors are the income backbone of the rural economy. Due to the structure of the economy, affected farmers cannot switch easily to a more profitable export sector such as flowers, which would require a large initial investment, or diversify into fish when they do not live by a lakeshore. Further, the farmers do not have the capital or the technology to add value instantly to their output. A fall in the profitability of their products on account of exchange rate appreciation has a direct knock-on effect on their income levels, which in turn lowers demand for locally produced goods and services, thus slowing economic growth in all sectors of the economy, not just agriculture.


Gradual increases in the proportion of domestic revenue financing total expenditure reflect the government's gradual efforts to improve fiscal sustainability without causing undue disruptions to public expenditures programs. The remainder of the budget is projected to be fully funded by donor resources.^{vii} Official data from the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and

Economic Development shows an increase in project funding as a proportion of total donor funding. This evidence is contrary to government's stated preference for direct budget support, also known as DBS, which provides a way to enhance budget discipline by promoting optimal resource allocation. Lack of incentive to limit donor project expenditures at a sectoral level places upward pressure on the aggregate fiscal deficit, which in turn complicates monetary policy, and especially exchange rate, management. Evidence from the health sector in Uganda provides a rich source of data to evaluate project support vis-à-vis DBS and assess the true motives behind the operations of certain donor agencies in Uganda (Yates 2004).

For a country at the forefront of development reforms, the 2001 Uganda Demographic and Health Survey figures (based on 2000 data) on infant and maternal mortality were extremely disappointing. A wide range of factors contributed to this poor performance, but financing and management problems were particularly implicated. A breakdown of the estimated \$6 per capita spent on public and nongovernmental organization (NGO) health services in FY 1999/2000 showed that: (1) the majority of the government budget (66 percent) was allocated to large hospitals and the central Ministry of Health, which tended to benefit the urban (and therefore better off) population; (2) donor projects tried to stimulate the development of primary health care services but proved relatively ineffective and inefficient; and (3) patient fees throughout the system raised little revenue, exemption schemes did not work, and as a result, utilization of services by poor people was very low (Yates 2004).

On the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of project aid, a recent analysis from the Ministry of Health has shown that for five large donors (i.e., USAID, SIDA, GTZ, DFID, DANIDA) providing project support, only 32 percent of funds are spent on basic health care inputs, while 68 percent goes toward technical assistance, project management costs, and high-cost investment goods and services (see Figure 1). By implication, increasing project spending is less likely to result in more basic inputs and is therefore less likely to generate increases in outputs.

Figure 1



Source: Government of Uganda 2004b

On a similar note, official data from the government of Uganda (2004c) highlights the poor budget disbursement performance of a highly politicized, yet much applauded, donor-driven basket of funds: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM, or the Global Fund). During the financial year 2003/04, disbursements from the center and releases for planned activities under the Global Fund stood at 19 percent and 7 percent, respectively. In contrast, both disbursements and releases from the national budget peaked at 98 percent. Part of the explanation for such poor performance of the former can be attributed to procurement delays resulting from poorly formulated and complex procurements procedures. Thus, the government budget remains a much more effective and efficient financing mechanism than project funding.

In an effort to encourage donors to channel financial resources through the national budget, the Ugandan government is gradually taking important measures to increase the quantity and enhance the quality of service delivery. Since 2000, there has been a small revolution within the Ugandan health sector. Through implementing a sector-wide approach (SWAP), the government of Uganda has managed to improve the supply of basic health care services to its population.

The defining characteristics of a SWAP are that all significant funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure program, under government leadership, adopting

common approaches across the sector and progressing toward relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds (Brown et al. 2001). This definition, in emphasizing a shift toward reliance on government financing mechanisms to fund a coordinated policy and expenditure program, sums up the essence of the Ugandan health SWAP.

Right from the outset of the SWAP, the Ugandan government stated that general budget support was its preferred donor financing mechanism. On the basis of programmatic evidence-based policy formulation, and in view of its strong commitment to implement the PEAP, the government of Uganda gradually laid the foundations for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and other partners to concur with this approach and begin switching resources from projects to government budget systems. As a result, since FY 1999/2000 the government's budget has doubled in real terms, and since FY 2000/01 it has become the primary financing mechanism for the sector.

Now that the Ugandan government controls more of the finances flowing into the sector, it has been able to allocate these resources more efficiently.^{viii} In particular, there has been a dramatic increase in funding for primary health care services with district budgets increasing seven times. For developing country social sectors, the key message appears to be that government-led SWAPs can deliver significant returns relatively quickly.

In this dynamic environment, donors' contribution to Uganda's effective implementation of the PEAP can be conceptualized along a spectrum of aid partnership. At the extreme ends of the spectrum, while true development partners (e.g., DFID) support the government's development agenda by welcoming a switch from project to government budget systems, development parasites like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) remain foreign to Uganda's dynamic development plan. Development parasites' resistance to embrace and support the government's development agenda results in a number of parallel programs yielding a large degree of duplication and financial wastage.

Such practices have gone a long way in turning international development into a profitable enterprise, benefiting home-based professionals, firms, industries, and ultimately the home economy. To substantiate this claim, according to the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, in 2005 6 percent of the US government's aid package involved "tied aid" (OECD 2008). Tied aid refers to aid that must be used to purchase goods and services from the donor country. As a direct result, when the aid is implemented most of the value flows right back to the United States instead of promoting growth in the developing country.

In this process, developing countries like Uganda have been subjected to unprecedented levels of political manipulation and economic exploitation. Former U.S. President George W. Bush's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is no exception to the rule. To this end, it may be argued that U.S. pharmaceutical companies, lobbying parties, and a strategically selected club of stakeholders were guaranteed a large share of PEPFAR funds when this plan came into action. At that juncture, rather than being earmarked for American-manufactured ARVs, those funds could otherwise have been spent purchasing generic (and equally effective) ARVs from countries such as India and South Africa at a fraction of U.S. prices.

The Ugandan government has been a large beneficiary of PEPFAR. PEPFAR's critical activities for prevention, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS in FY 2006 disbursed more than U.S. \$150 million in Uganda alone. While these funds have been successful in initiating infected

Ugandans on antiretroviral treatment, PEPFAR's disregard of Uganda's homegrown response to the epidemic coordinated through the Uganda AIDS Commission raises concern over the sustainability of this initiative beyond the project's lifetime and threatens to undermine government policy.

From the perspective of planning for combating HIV/AIDS, the existence of such parallel structures traps HIV/AIDS funding beyond the boundaries of the national budget. This project-based response to the epidemic crowds out government intervention and severely compromises the integration of HIV/AIDS into national plans and budgets. Given limited national resources, the government of Uganda will continue neglecting HIV/AIDS expenditure at the sectoral level so long as there are parallel structures and funding streams (e.g., PEPFAR) generously filling this gap. The national budget is stretched as it is, and the Ugandan government will choose to invest in those areas characterized by a lack (not abundance) of funds.


The U.S. government's reluctance to fully embrace Uganda's homegrown development agenda is further reflected in its increasing collaboration with nongovernmental implementation partners. NGOs have a very important role to play especially in rural parts of the country, which are home to 90 percent of the Ugandan population. According to D. Angemi (2005), however, large inflows of "unaccounted" funds are corrupting the NGO sector by encouraging local NGOs to operate as subcontractors for international NGOs and donor agencies. As such, local NGOs become de facto "for profit" philanthropic organizations, with excess revenues (over costs) easily absorbed (i.e., disguised) in high salaries, per diems, or perks.

While in most instances the work of NGOs remains commendable, there is growing concern that NGOs are becoming too intertwined with donors' ideologies, thereby losing important elements of their potential contribution to development through their loss of independence. According to the Human Rights Watch report (2005), "Uganda is redirecting its HIV prevention strategy for young people away from scientifically proven and effective strategies, towards ideologically driven U.S. programmes that focus on promoting sexual abstinence until marriage. . . . This trend is alarmingly watering down the C (i.e., Condom Use) component of the ABC (i.e., Abstinence Be faithful Condom use)".

In more general terms, the exploitative nature of parasitic institutions is catalyzed by the fact that in promoting local business interests of the donor it diverts public funds from social services and other burning priorities in resource-limited settings to project management and inflated overhead costs.

The provision of budget support vis-à-vis project aid in Uganda provides a suitable example to clarify the distinction between development partners (i.e., DFID-like) and development parasites (i.e., USAID-like). Figure 2 shows budget support as a proportion of total donor disbursement. In light of Uganda's effective and efficient management of DBS, while DFID switched up to 80 percent of its resource contribution to Uganda from projects to government budget systems, USAID did not show any sign of compliance with the government's bequests.

Figure 2




Source: Author’s calculations based on official statistics from the Ugandan Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development

In terms of total donor disbursement as project support, while since 2000 DFID embarked on a policy of gradually reducing its total disbursement as project support, USAID jumped on the opportunity to fill the project-support gap left open by the development partners moving toward DBS and consistently increased disbursement as project aid.

The manifestation of USAID’s distorted motives becomes clearer from Figure 3, which shows total donor disbursement as project support to the health sector alone. In spite of high ineffectiveness and inefficiencies associated with project aid, it seems paradoxical that, while DFID’s total disbursement as project aid to the health sector gradually declined, USAID’s project aid grew exponentially without showing any sign of trend reversal.

Figure 3



Source: Author’s calculations based on official statistics from the Ugandan Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development

Conclusion

The government of Uganda has developed a rather effective strategy to address economic growth hand in hand with improved social welfare. The ability to absorb temporary and permanent shocks to the system and the integrity of the officials responsible for the implementation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan—at all levels—are the most important determinants of the plan’s success. There is evidence to support the claim that the following factors have been the main culprits for the reversal in the trend of Uganda’s record of poverty reduction.

Uganda’s high rate of population growth at 3.4 percent makes it the third-fastest growing country in the world. In a discussion paper on population growth and poverty eradication, the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development (Government of Uganda 2004e) suggests that such a high rate of population growth is due to persistent high fertility levels (approximately seven deliveries per woman). If Uganda maintains the current population growth rate, the population will increase to 54 million in the year 2025, effectively doubling in less than twenty-five years. This will make it almost prohibitive to provide adequate social services for the population as a whole. Both theory and evidence clearly show that there are significant payoffs to Uganda if its fertility rate is reduced and its population growth consequently slowed from its current rate of 3.4 percent per annum.

On a different note, Uganda is a large recipient of project aid from development parasites like the U.S. government. As it was shown at the outset, not only is project aid extremely ineffective, but it also provides a breeding ground for the misuse of public resources.

All of the above, together with two decades of insurgency in the northern part of the country, have severely depleted the nation's resources, eroded the gains from improved social spending (as reflected in stagnating infant and maternal mortality rates), and slowed down the pace of Uganda's progress toward poverty eradication.

To conclude, the proliferation of development parasites, together with fast population growth, rising income inequality, and insecurity, threaten to compromise the government's effective implementation of the PEAP and its credibility. To this effect, the government of Uganda needs to (1) advocate and support family planning; (2) ensure a more even distribution of the benefits of growth between poor communities and their wealthier counterparts; and (3) invest in the processes of peace and reconstruction of the northern region. Most importantly, however, is a fourth factor: it needs to continue implementing its policy of gradual deficit reduction and reduced aid dependency by mobilizing more local resources to finance the government's expenditures. Development partners, for their part, share the responsibility to continue providing economic assistance while applying political pressure to regulate the activities of development parasites who have failed to keep up with the pace of the policy debate.

The future looks brighter, or so we like to think. The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action represent two milestones in the quest to bring more coherence and instill a greater sense of mutual accountability to donor practices in developing countries. Most importantly, and as far as this article goes, U.S. President Barack Obama's recent electoral success could mark the beginning of a new era for Uganda and the developing world—an era where aid is untied and its activities truly geared to serve the common interest of its intended beneficiaries.

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Endnotes

- ⁱ In January 1986 when the National Resistance Movement guerrillas captured power in the capital city of Kampala, Uganda's state and economy collapsed. More specifically, largely as a result of the civil war devastating most parts of the country, between 1971 and 1985 Uganda's gross domestic product shrank by no less than 40 percentage points (Collier and Reinikka 2001).
- ⁱⁱ The real average annual growth rate over the seventeen-year period from FY 1986/87 to FY 2002/03 has been 6.7 percent per annum.
- ⁱⁱⁱ The unit export price for Ugandan coffee tripled from U.S. \$0.82/kg in 1992/93 to a peak of \$2.55/kg in 1994/95.
- ^{iv} Bank of Uganda, Balance of Payment Statement, Analytical Presentation, 24 August 1998.
- ^v Today, government spending on both health and education amounts to more than 800 billion shillings, with education having the largest share of any sector in the budget. Further, the long-term expenditure framework projects that public expenditure will increase by an average of 8.7 percent per annum, with health and education continuing to be strategic expenditure priorities.
- ^{vi} The UK Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, and the World Bank have consistently been Uganda's biggest donors. Among the three USAID is the only one unable to provide direct budget support as a funding modality.
- ^{vii} On the bases of donor projections, the government of Uganda is not in a position to secure in advance the required financial resources for subsequent financial years. In spite of the government's efforts to avail timely and reliable expenditure projection for the medium term, many donors are unable to provide robust projections for their project funding. This clear deficiency of the donor community presents no easy challenge for the government of Uganda,

which is forced to gradually run down its (already depleted) reserves to make up for the potential shortfall.

^{viii} The Ministry of Health's presentation to the annual Public Expenditure Review in 2003 (available from DFID Uganda) highlights areas where the sector has improved allocative and technical efficiency.

The Short and Longer Term Potential Welfare Impact of Global Commodity Inflation in Tanzania

By Sébastien Dessus

Sébastien Dessus is lead economist with the Africa Region at the World Bank. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank Group, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. The author is grateful to Shanta Devarajan, Henry Gordon, Johannes Hoogeveen, Josaphat Kweka, Charbel Nahas, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, and Paolo Zacchia for their comments, assistance, and suggestions.

Abstract

This article uses a computable general equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of commodity price inflation in Tanzania and possible tax policy responses in the short, medium, and long term. The results suggest that global commodity inflation since 2006 may have had a significantly negative impact on all Tanzanian households. Most of the negative impact comes from the rise in the price of oil. In contrast, food price spikes are potentially welfare improving for all Tanzanian households in the medium to long term. In comparison with nonpoor households, poor households in Tanzania may be relatively shielded from global commodity inflation because they derive a larger share of their income from agricultural activity and they consume less oil-intensive products. Finally, the results suggest that tax policies encouraging greater agricultural production and consumption may help to reduce poverty. In contrast, policies discouraging agricultural production (such as export bans) bear the risk of increasing poverty in the long run. However, such policies would only affect poverty at the margin (in one direction or the other).

Introduction

In the face of its suddenness and severity, the surge in the international price of food and energy commodities since 2006ⁱ has been receiving great attention from the development community.

A first branch of research is trying to understand the initial reasons behind such price spikes (Mitchell 2008; Krichene 2008; Helbling et al. 2008)—from greater demand for biofuels and climatic shocks to expansionary monetary policies, changes in buffer stock policies, and commodity financial markets' development in response to diversification needs—against the backdrop of historically low precrisis world food prices.ⁱⁱ From this literature emerges the outlook that commodity prices, while still volatile, will remain higher than before 2006 (OECD-FAO 2008), implying a shift in relative prices vis-à-vis other goods and services in the foreseeable future.

A second branch of research is trying to assess the macroeconomic and welfare impacts of price spikes. Broadly speaking, risks of a balance of payments crisis are believed to be containable,ⁱⁱⁱ while inflation risks (second-round effects) could be more important, even if not as severe as in 1973.^{iv} As far as welfare impact is concerned, research (Ivanic and Martin 2008; Wodon et al. 2008; Dessus et al. 2008; Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik 2008) has so far mostly concentrated on the short-term and microeconomic^v impact of commodity inflation. From this bulk of work emerges the view that the urban poor and near poor are believed to be particularly vulnerable to price spikes, with concerns that such spikes could severely aggravate current malnutrition problems.^{vi} The poverty impact on rural households is less obvious and depends on the transmission of food prices to farmers' incomes and their consumption patterns, which are often less diversified than in urban areas.

A third branch of the literature, which is more operational, focuses on appropriate policy responses at the macroeconomic and social levels. Recommendations (World Bank 2008a) emphasize the need to accommodate relative price shifts (no export restrictions, no attempt to reduce the pass-through of world prices to domestic markets), with a view to foster private sector-led agricultural investments in the medium term, while protecting the most vulnerable with targeted transfers and tackling some of the policy-induced factors behind prices spikes, such as biofuel subsidies in high-income countries.

Yet, to our knowledge, little effort has been made so far to consistently integrate these macroeconomic, social, and time dimensions at the countrywide level, where policy decisions are generally made. So far, most studies scrutinize one aspect of the problem at the cross-country level. While it is useful to identify vulnerable countries and get a sense of the global magnitude of the crisis, such literature is less useful to understand the various possible interactions between the different effects at play and to assess the efficiency of envisaged policy response at the national level.

Thus, this article aims to develop a consistent, economy-wide, analytical framework to assess the impact of commodity price inflation and possible macroeconomic responses on poverty in the short, medium, and long term.

For this purpose, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the impact of global commodity inflation (agricultural products, fertilizers, and oil) on households' welfare in Tanzania. The country of Tanzania was chosen for its data availability as well as for the fact that it introduced various policies in 2008 to offset the negative impact of food price inflation, including export bans and the reduction of taxes on food grains. CGE modeling has become a standard tool for integrated assessment of policy-induced shocks, especially for small economies. This type of modeling allows the combining of detailed databases with a sound micro-based theoretical framework capturing the interdependence and interlinkages of markets.

Using this model, we simulate various exogenous and policy-induced shocks and assess ex-ante their impact on households' welfare, including various categories of poor households. Results first and foremost suggest that global commodity inflation since 2006 could have had a significantly negative impact on all categories of households, reducing their welfare by approximately 4 percent. Most of the negative impact comes from the rise in the price of oil, which is fully imported and for which little substitution possibilities exist. In contrast, food price spikes could have had a much more nuanced impact and could actually be potentially welfare

improving for all Tanzanian households in the medium to long run. This would in particular be predicated on the possibility of producing crops for biofuels on a large scale.

In addition, the results suggest that the poor in Tanzania could have been relatively shielded from global commodity inflation in comparison with the nonpoor. Indeed, the poor in Tanzania derive a larger share of their income from agricultural activity and consume less oil-intensive products than do the nonpoor.

Finally, the results suggest that fiscal policies encouraging higher agricultural production and consumption could further limit overall poverty increases, even if the policies are not particularly pro-poor. In contrast, policies discouraging agricultural production (such as export bans) bear the risk of strongly amplifying poverty increases in the long run. All in all, though, such policies would only alter at the margin (in one direction or the other) the likely impact of global commodity inflation on poverty.

This article first briefly describes the CGE model before assessing the impact of global commodity inflation since 2006 on Tanzanian households. It then explores the potential of various policy responses to contain poverty before offering some concluding remarks.

The Computable General Equilibrium Model

The CGE model developed for this study is a typical neoclassical model with endogenous relative prices,^{vii} market clearing, and imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods. As in any CGE, prices are endogenous to each market (goods and factors) and equalize supplies (imports; Tanzania's production for the domestic market; factors supply) and demands (final demand from households, the government, investors, and the rest of the world; intermediate demand from producers; factors demand) so as to obtain the equilibrium. The equilibrium is general in the sense that it concerns all the markets simultaneously.

Supply is modeled using nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions, which describe the substitution and complement relations among the various inputs. Producers are cost minimizers, and constant return to scale is assumed. Output is the result of two composite goods: intermediate consumption and value-added, combined in fixed proportions. The intermediate aggregate is obtained by combining all products in fixed proportions (Leontief structure). The value-added is then broken down into two parts: labor and the capital/land-energy-fertilizers bundle, which are both fully employed but imperfectly substitutable, more so in the short run. Substitution possibilities between capital/land, energy, and fertilizers are also limited.

Households derive their income from the various production factors they own, whose remuneration varies with sectors' demand. Households' consumption behavior results from the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function under the budget constraint of after direct tax (disposable) income. In other words, nominal shares of products' consumption (and savings) remain constant as relative prices vary.

The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods originating from different geographical areas (substitution possibilities increase with time). The import demand results from a CES aggregation function of domestic and imported goods. The export supply is symmetrically modeled as a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function.^{viii} Producers decide to allocate their output to domestic or foreign markets responding to relative prices.

Several macroeconomic constraints—closure rules—are introduced in this model. First, under the small country assumption, the Tanzanian economy is unable to change world prices, thus, its imports' and exports' prices on world markets are exogenous. Capital transfers are exogenous as well, and therefore the trade balance is fixed in nominal terms so as to achieve the balance of payments equilibrium. Second, the model imposes fixed real public expenditures to reflect the government's choice of delivering a given amount and quality of public services. Public receipts, depending on the tax structure and economic activity, are endogenously determined, and thus are government savings. Third, investment is determined by the availability of savings, which originates from households, government, and abroad.

The model comprises four periods: (1) a pre-shock benchmark period; (2) a post-shock short-term period during which producers face exogenous changes in relative prices (global commodity inflation) without any possibility to reallocate factors across sectors, to substitute factors within sectors, or to reallocate output between domestic and exports markets; final consumers, in contrast, adjust more rapidly their demand mix to the new set of relative prices; (3) a post-shock medium-term period in which sectors adjust their input mix (capital, including land, labor, energy, fertilizers) and reallocate their output between domestic and foreign markets in response to price changes; and (4) a post-shock long-term period in which investment decisions based on new relative prices and opportunities materialize in additional or lower-productive capacities (labor, capital) and in the introduction of new technologies. While difficult to say with precision, the short term could take less than a year, depending notably on the duration of import and export contracts. The medium term could take one to three years (the time required to reallocate existing resources and access new markets), and the long term could take three years or more (the average time for investment projects to effectively materialize into additional productive capacities, or more prosaically, to grow a tree).

Thus, while in the short and medium term, total factors endowments (capital, labor) are fixed, in the long term, labor and capital become endogenous. The former responds (with elasticities ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 depending on labor types) to changes in real wages. The latter evolves in proportion with real investment. In other words, we capture here the long-term impact of policy-induced changes in households' saving rates and in the price of investment on the steady-state capital stock. In the long run, we also allow some substitutability between intermediate consumption and value-added (an elasticity of substitution of 1, against 0 in the short and medium term), so as to reflect greater opportunities for changes in technologies.

The chosen yardstick for welfare is the assessment of equivalent variation, which is the sum of two terms: the first one measures the gain (or the loss) of disposable income caused by the reform (producers surplus), and the second one measures the income needed after the reform to obtain the same level of utility as before the reform (consumers surplus).


The model is calibrated using data (a social accounting matrix—SAM) for the year 2005,^{ix} the year before food prices started to surge on international markets. The SAM for 2005 updates the SAM built for the year 2001 by J. Thurlow and P. Wobst (2003). In particular, it accounts for (1) the large increase in public consumption over gross domestic product (GDP); (2) the large increase in the value of imported petroleum products; and (3) changes in output and exports of most important agricultural commodities between 2001 and 2005. The SAM contains twelve different households (including two rural poor and two urban poor,^x four rural nonpoor, and four urban nonpoor) of different population sizes, nine types of labor (distinguished by

gender and school levels, plus child labor), physical capital, and land, and forty-three sectors of activities (including twenty-one agricultural sectors and four food processing sectors).

The Welfare Impact of Commodity Inflation in Tanzania

We use the CGE model to measure ex-ante the impact of commodity inflation on households' welfare. This is achieved by simulating an increase in commodities' world prices (once converted in Tanzanian shillings to capture exchange rate variations) corresponding to the one observed between January 2006 and June 2008. Such a change is computed econometrically on monthly data and discounted by the overall consumer price index (CPI) in Tanzania to capture relative price changes on the domestic market. Figure 1 reports the computed changes for the most important products.^{xi} In white are the products for which Tanzania was estimated to be a net exporter in 2005, and in dark grey are those for which Tanzania was a net importer.

Figure 1: Changes in Commodities' World Prices
(TNZ shillings, January 2006-June 2008)



Applying these changes in commodities' prices to net trade positions by the end of 2005 results in a negative terms-of-trade shock of 3.1 percent of GDP, in line with the estimated average (4.2 percent) for sub-Saharan Africa over the same period (World Bank 2008b). Excluding petroleum oil, though, the overall impact of the shock declines to 0.5 percent of GDP, reflecting Tanzania's more balanced trade position vis-à-vis agricultural products^{xii} than vis-à-vis oil.

Simulations suggest that the impact of global commodity inflation on domestic prices (including indirectly through their impact on costs of production) could remain moderate for most items in the short run, except for wheat, fertilizers, and petroleum oil. In the medium to long run, though, domestic prices of wheat and fertilizers would fall as their domestic production increases and progressively replaces imports. Overall, the price of imports would increase by 12 percent in the medium term, against 9 percent for domestic products sold on the domestic market.^{xiii}

This result is consistent with what was observed so far in several countries, including Tanzania, where the transmission of high world prices to domestic markets was in most cases only partial. Effects depended on the depth of international markets for different commodities, countries' exchange rate variations against the U.S. dollar during the period, the degree of openness of the different economies, the share of non-traded goods in absorption, and domestic policies in response to the shock. Evidence is scant for many countries and commodities.^{xiv} But incomplete pass-through combined with differentiated price inflation across commodities is consistent with the observation of relatively moderate food inflation in many developing countries relative to the overall CPI. In all observable cases, domestic food inflation is significantly lower than international levels. In ten developing countries, the relative price of food over nonfood items went up by 15 percent on average between late 2005 and March 2008. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations obtains the same broad conclusion on a different sample of countries over the period 2007-2008 (Dessus et al. 2008; FAO 2008).

The three columns in Table 1 report simulated post-shock relative change in welfare (as a percentage of their pre-reform utility levels, or disposable income) for the various households regrouped into four categories—urban poor, urban nonpoor, rural poor, rural nonpoor—in the short, medium, and long term. Overall, the shock entails welfare losses in the short and medium terms, equivalent to 4.0 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively, of pre-shock total disposable income.


In the long run, though, see Figure 2, the shock turns positive for all households, 2.5 percent on average, as resources get reallocated in sectors with new comparative advantages, such as oil seeds. This reflects Tanzania's potential capacity to satisfy higher demand in crops for biofuel production.^{xv}

Table 1: Welfare Impact of Global Commodity Inflation Since January 2006

	Welfare Changes Relative to Initial Disposable Incomes		
	Short Term	Medium	Long Term
Rural poor	-2.3%	-1.4%	2.5%
Rural nonpoor	-4.0%	-1.6%	3.5%
Urban poor	-3.2%	-1.4%	2.9%
Urban nonpoor	-4.6%	-2.5%	0.7%
Poor	-2.5%	-1.4%	2.6%
Nonpoor	-4.2%	-1.9%	2.5%
Rural	-3.7%	-1.6%	3.3%
Urban	-4.4%	-2.3%	1.0%
Total	-4.0%	-1.8%	2.5%

In the short run, rural poor suffer the least from the shock in relative terms. Rural nonpoor and urban households—urban nonpoor notably—suffer more, as they consume more imported goods, oil in particular. But rural poor (comprising almost 90 percent of all poor) are also the ones benefiting the least from the reallocation of factors in the medium and long term in the face of a new set of relative prices. While rural nonpoor see their welfare gains increasing by 7.6 percentage points between the short and long term, the gains of the rural poor only increase by 4.8 percentage points, reflecting their relative inability to reap emerging opportunities on export- and import-competing sectors, thus their isolation from external markets.


Figure 2: Simulated Impact of Imported Inflation on Household Welfare
(Equivalent variation in percentage of benchmark disposable income)



This conclusion appears more clearly when distinguishing the impact of oil price spikes from that of agricultural goods. Even if high oil prices are unavoidably real, it is interesting to note that the change in agricultural relative prices benefits first and foremost the nonpoor rural households. This result is obtained by simulating the increase in agricultural prices (including fertilizers) between January 2006 and April 2008, leaving unchanged oil prices at their end-of-2006 level. As one can observe in Figure 3, changes in agricultural prices benefit all groups in the long run (with an overall welfare gain between 6 percent and 7 percent of total disposable income), in spite of the increase in fertilizer prices. But as rural poor suffer the least in the short term they also benefit the least in the long term.

In contrast, the distributional impact of the oil price shock alone remains largely unchanged over time. This is understandable given Tanzania’s limited ability to significantly reduce the content of imported oil in domestic production and consumption through substitution effects in the years to come. Poor households in rural and urban areas suffer less than nonpoor households at every period from the oil shock.

Figure 3: Simulated Impact of Imported Inflation (Excl. Oil) on Households Welfare
(Equivalent variation in percentage of benchmark disposable income)



Policy Responses

We first test the impact of fiscal policies aimed at lowering the pass-through of world prices on domestic markets through the introduction of (1) consumer subsidies and (2) export taxes. Percentage point changes in taxes/subsidies are set in proportion to observed imported inflation at the product level. In other words, the higher the observed change in the world price of a given commodity, the higher the tax change applied to that commodity.

Lower/higher induced tax receipts are financed through higher/lower government savings.^{xvi} Ceteris paribus, lower taxes induce lower public revenue and higher deficit, thus lower investment, the latter being determined by the sum of foreign, household, and public savings.

Consumer Subsidies

The first policy simulation consists of introducing consumer subsidies (in the form of vouchers, for instance) on agricultural goods recording positive imported inflation. This policy tends to lessen the transmission of global inflation to Tanzanian food consumers. The subsidy is equal to the imported inflation rate (compare to Figure 1) multiplied by the ratio of imports over total absorption for the given commodity.^{xvii} Results are reported in Table 2 in difference with those obtained without policy change to single out the impact of the considered policy. For instance, the 0.3 percentage point gain reported for the rural poor means that such households would see

their welfare decline by 1.1 percent in the medium run if global commodity inflation were to be accompanied with consumer subsidies (against -1.4 percent without).

Table 2: Welfare Impact of Accompanying Fiscal Policies

	Consumer Subsidies		Export Taxes		Producer Taxes	
	Medium Term	Long Term	Medium Term	Long Term	Medium Term	Long Term
Rural poor	0.25%	0.25%	-0.08%	-0.46%	0.07%	0.08%
Rural nonpoor	0.25%	0.22%	-0.17%	-0.59%	0.08%	0.09%
Urban poor	0.09%	0.07%	-0.11%	-0.55%	0.07%	0.09%
Urban nonpoor	0.22%	0.18%	-0.13%	-0.49%	0.06%	0.06%
Poor	0.21%	0.21%	-0.09%	-0.48%	0.07%	0.08%
Nonpoor	0.24%	0.21%	-0.15%	-0.55%	0.07%	0.08%
Rural	0.25%	0.23%	-0.15%	-0.57%	0.08%	0.09%
Urban	0.20%	0.17%	-0.13%	-0.50%	0.06%	0.07%
Total	0.23%	0.21%	-0.14%	-0.54%	0.07%	0.08%

Note: Welfare changes (relative to initial disposable incomes) are presented in difference with those estimated without accompanying policies (compare to Table 1).

Overall, introducing consumer subsidies on food commodities that record high imported inflation entails a slight reduction in the consumer price of grains (a 1 percentage point reduction in the inflation rate in the medium run), which favors both consumers and producers of these products. The latter reallocate part of their outlets to domestic markets to satisfy additional demand, which reduces exports (and thus imports, given our fixed trade balance closure rule). Investment also declines as the price of consumption decreases with respect to the price of

investment and as the fiscal deficit rises (to finance subsidies). This slightly reduces the available capital stock and development prospects in the long run.

Yet, as intended to offset a negative shock without being greatly distortional (as preserving relative prices between imports and domestic goods and not affecting directly the price of intermediate consumption and related costs structure), this policy generates mildly positive welfare results. Considering the post-shock situation as benchmark would have nevertheless possibly led to an opposite conclusion (as artificially encouraging the demand for subsidized products, reinforcing the term-of-trade shock, and reducing export opportunities). In any case, the magnitude of welfare gains stemming from such a policy is small, in comparison with the total welfare changes recorded when oil price spikes are factored in.

Export Taxes

The second set of policy simulations consists of introducing export taxes on products facing global inflation, with a view to redirecting part of the export supply to the domestic market to exert a downward pressure on its domestic price.^{xviii} Export tax levels at the product level are set in proportion to imported inflation, with a view to obtaining the same containment of consumers' grain prices as in the previous simulation, for the sake of comparability. In the medium run, the introduction of export taxes generates additional revenue for the government equivalent to 0.1 percent of GDP.

As intended, introducing export taxes redirects domestic agricultural output toward domestic markets, thus also reducing the demand for imports of similar goods (yet to a lower relative extent, given the imperfect substitutability between goods of different origins). But in so doing, the economy cannot fully benefit from the emerging income opportunities stemming from a positive agricultural term-of-trade shock. Thus, rural households stand to lose from the reform, as their income declines more rapidly than the price of their consumption basket. Through derived effects, other households, including poor, also lose from the reform, more so in the long run, in comparison with a situation where the economy is not prevented from fully meeting its new comparative advantages.

Producer Taxes, Tariffs

Other fiscal policy responses could entail amplifying the supply response to the terms of trade shock. In particular, producer taxes on goods facing large imported inflation could be reduced to (further) foster domestic production. Thus, the next simulation envisages a reduction of producer taxes proportional to the observed imported inflation (excluding oil), and a diminution in tariff rates by a similar amount, to keep levels of protection unchanged.

The combination of reduced producers taxes and tariffs on goods facing imported inflation entails greater demand for these products, both domestic and imported. With positive terms of trade for the set of products concerned, Tanzania stands to gain in macroeconomic terms from a closer alignment of domestic prices to world prices in these sectors. Interestingly, in spite of its cost in terms of foregone public revenue (and hence in terms of lower available savings), long-term benefits slightly exceed medium-term ones, reflecting significant gains of reallocation.

The reform is particularly beneficial to nonpoor rural households, nonpoor farmers in particular, who can reap the benefits of increased export opportunities. Yet, other households

also benefit from the reform, the urban poor in particular, who enjoy greater purchasing power for food products.

Petroleum Oil Taxes

Introducing consumer subsidies while liberalizing the sectors facing inflation does not suffice to offset the overall negative welfare impact generated by global commodity inflation in the short and medium run. This discrepancy stems from the large negative impact of oil price spikes on all the sectors of activity, including agriculture. Although the government might be reluctant to reduce the pass-through of imported oil prices, a reduction in taxes on petroleum oil could be considered given its large impact on the economy.

In 2005, the government collected the equivalent of 1 percent of GDP from the ad valorem VAT on petroleum.^{xix} As such, it is likely that higher oil prices have since allowed the generation of substantial additional tax receipts for the government.

In the next simulation, we thus reduce by a third the VAT rate on oil imports. As directly offsetting initial welfare losses induced by oil price spikes, such a policy generates large welfare gains, above 0.3 percent of total disposable income. Such gains nevertheless disproportionately favor the nonpoor, who consume more oil, and strongly impact the fiscal balance.

Combined Policies

In a last simulation, we combine the three sets of policies that produce positive welfare gains: consumer subsidies, producer taxes and tariffs reduction on goods facing imported inflation (except oil), and VAT reduction on oil products (see Table 3). Results obtained do not differ significantly from the sum of those obtained when simulating the three sets of policies separately, reflecting their additive natures. While beneficial to the poor, these policies are not particularly pro-poor, in the sense that nonpoor households would stand to gain more from it in absolute and relative terms. Besides, such policies would only reduce initial welfare losses by a third, certainly not eliminate them. But symmetrically, they would not hurt longer-term prospects and would actually increase welfare gains by a quarter in the long term.

Table 3: Welfare Impact of Accompanying Fiscal Policies

	VAT Petroleum		Combined Policies	
	Medium Term	Long Term	Medium Term	Long Term
Rural poor	0.20%	0.19%	0.52%	0.52%
Rural nonpoor	0.39%	0.38%	0.71%	0.69%
Urban poor	0.27%	0.27%	0.44%	0.42%

Urban nonpoor	0.42%	0.39%	0.70%	0.63%
Poor	0.22%	0.21%	0.50%	0.50%
Nonpoor	0.40%	0.38%	0.71%	0.67%
Rural	0.35%	0.34%	0.68%	0.66%
Urban	0.40%	0.38%	0.67%	0.61%
Total	0.37%	0.36%	0.68%	0.64%

Note: Welfare changes (relative to initial disposable incomes) are presented in difference with those estimated without accompanying policies (compare to Table 1). Combined policies comprise the introduction of consumer subsidies, the reduction in producer taxes and tariffs, and the reduction in VAT on oil discussed in the main text.

Other policies to curb the negative impact of imported inflation could obviously be envisaged, including in particular targeted transfers to the poor or the provision of public goods to raise agricultural supply and yields (research, extension services, infrastructure, irrigation, etc.). These policies are not tested here in the absence of data on their cost effectiveness. Indeed, given their nature, targeted transfers should directly favor the poor. But the targeting efficiency and its mode of financing need to be known to appraise the overall impact of such a policy in a general equilibrium framework. Similarly, one would need to know the induced public cost of raising agricultural supply and its mode of financing to assess its net efficiency.

Conclusion

Results from this exercise suggest that the poor could have been relatively shielded from current global commodity inflation in comparison with the nonpoor. Indeed, the poor in Tanzania derive a larger share of their income from agricultural activity and consume less oil-intensive products. The poor nevertheless most likely suffered in absolute terms, the result of oil price increases, even if their situation could improve once factor allocation and investment decisions respond to the new set of relative prices.

The results also suggest that fiscal policies encouraging higher agricultural production and consumption could further contain overall poverty reduction losses, even if not necessarily pro-poor. In contrast, policies discouraging agricultural production (such as export bans) strongly amplify poverty increases and reduce poverty alleviation prospects. All in all, though, existing tax instruments can only alter at the margin (in one direction or the other) the likely impact of global commodity inflation on poverty. One might want to contemplate the use of other

instruments (targeted transfers, infrastructure, etc.) to further contain poverty losses in the short run and turn them into poverty gains in the longer run.

The consideration given to structural policies (social protection, agricultural development) versus shorter-term tax policy responses is particularly important given the high uncertainty regarding the permanent versus transitory nature of the food price shock.^{xx} At least as important as the challenge of containing welfare losses in the short run is the challenge of being able to rapidly adjust the tax policy response to a changing environment. Indeed, tax policy reforms that could be considered today pro-poor and welfare improving could turn the opposite if the current evolution of commodity prices was reversed, as has been the case since the fall of 2008.

The results described above rely to some extent on the assumption of competitive transmission of prices from producers to consumers. However, the possible existence of market power in the trade and transport sectors could alter such transmission. In Tanzania, there is no obvious regulation candidate to generate monopolistic situations in these sectors. Rather, the absence of competition in intermediary sectors is often linked to the lack of adequate public infrastructure combined with fixed costs in the transport sector (Nyange 2005).

Another uncertainty lies in Tanzania's ability to benefit from its new potential comparative advantages, in oil crops notably. According to land surveys, Tanzania still disposes of a huge reservoir of uncultivated arable land (for oil crops in particular, but for sugarcane too^{xxi}), and World Bank analysis suggests that land extension significantly contributed to agricultural output growth in the past. But land extension might not be immediate, as it would depend on the ability of people to migrate to low-density zones, secure farmland, and use labor-saving technologies in these areas. The adequate provision of infrastructure and public services in these new areas might also be an important factor in this regard. Besides, the impact on rural poverty would depend to a large extent on who is able to claim new lands. In the model, though, land extension—as any other capital accumulation—only results from past investment expenditure, and it would take specific efforts to model correctly this dimension.

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Endnotes

ⁱ See FAO (2008) for a discussion of the events and first-order impacts.

ⁱⁱ World Bank (2005) also contends that “halfway” market-oriented reforms have created the worst of all possible worlds, where the private sector is encouraged to operate in an environment in which governments continue to intervene in discretionary and unpredictable ways that make prices even less stable.

ⁱⁱⁱ Thanks in particular to the fact that the broadening of the commodity price boom from oil to metals and food has helped many developing economies offset the adverse effects of higher import prices through higher export prices. In contrast, floating exchange rates have not played major stabilizing roles so far, given the inelastic nature of food and oil demand. In countries most adversely affected by price spikes, a possible trade-off between external adjustment and inflation pressures could emerge.

^{iv} See J. Lipsky (2008) for a general discussion on inflation risks in the context of the current commodity prices crisis.

^v With a few exceptions, these studies do not systematically account for substitution effects (between commodities), macroeconomic effects beyond changes in relative prices, or factor reallocation effects that could occur in the longer run. Yet, M. Ivanic and W. Martin (2008) account for changes in unskilled wages rates so as to capture higher factor remuneration in agriculture. J.C. Passa Orio and Q. Wodon (2008) estimate the longer-term impact of specific commodity price spikes on the price of other commodities through a social accounting matrix multiplier effect approach and suggest that indirect effects are much more pronounced for oil than food.

^{vi} The impact of lower food consumption on malnutrition is not straightforward. Malnutrition is a cumulative process and depends on many other factors (diets) than just the quantity of food consumed. But risks of malnutrition certainly increase as the situation perpetuates (Ravallion 1997).

^{vii} The nominal exchange rate is the numeraire in this model.

^{viii} We retained the following substitution elasticities: 4.0 between imports and domestic goods (CES); 4.0 between exports and domestic goods (CET).

^{ix} The estimated social accounting matrix for 2005 is available upon request from the author.

^x In each area (urban and rural), there are two categories of poor households: those living below the food poverty line (deep poverty) and those living below the basic needs poverty line (poverty). Poverty lines are defined by the government of Tanzania.

^{xi} One exception is cashew nuts (which represented 1-2 percent of total export receipts in 2005), for which world price data until mid-2008 was not found at the time of this writing. FOB prices of cashew nuts into the United States did not significantly evolve over the period 2005-2007 (Red River Foods 2008), and we thus assume unchanged terms of trade for cashew nuts for the period January 2006-June 2008.

^{xii} In 2005-2006, Tanzania recorded a food self-sufficiency rate of 103 percent. This ratio went up to 106 percent in 2007-2008.

^{xiii} These computations are made using Laspeyres indexes.

^{xiv} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations research suggests that the pass-through of the world price of rice in U.S.\$ to domestic markets in six Asian countries' currencies over the period Q4 2003 to Q4 2007 ranged between 6 and 64 percent, or one-third on average (FAO 2008).

^{xv} See, for instance, R. Janssen (2006) for a discussion of Tanzania's potential for palm oil production for biofuels. The author notably indicates that the land available and suitable for oil palm production approaches 1.2 million hectares. In comparison, less than 5,000 hectares of oil palm were harvested in 2004, or 1/250 of the potential. The potential for developing jathropha oil production is also promising.

^{xvi} Other fiscal closure rules could be envisaged, such as higher/lower current expenditures or taxes, for instance, in response to lower/higher government revenues. The closure rule used here can be considered as the "default" closure rule, that is, what would happen if no specific decision was made regarding the financing of policies tested here through offsetting tax or expenditure reforms? This closure rule, like any other actionable measure, is not strictly neutral from a distributional impact perspective. On the contrary, income transfers/taxes strictly proportional to initial levels of welfare could be considered neutral, but are almost impossible to implement in real life. Sensitivity analysis nevertheless suggests that using such a closure rule does not significantly affect the conclusions obtained when letting the public deficit adjust endogenously.

^{xvii} In the absence of any substitution possibility between domestic goods and imports, this policy would neutralize the impact of imported inflation on domestic consumer prices.

^{xviii} In May 2008, the government of Tanzania introduced a ban on all food exports.

^{xix} The government collects another 1 percent of GDP through excise taxes on oil. Oil imports are also subject to tariffs.

^{xx} As already mentioned, current outlooks from most international institutions now foresee a slow decline in food prices in 2009, stabilizing thereafter to a higher plateau than in 2006. But such an outlook still remains quite uncertain. Indeed, the transitory versus permanent component of food inflation is yet to be quantified with more certainty. This is not an easy task as many important factors exerting influence on agricultural supply and demand can move in the near future in different directions, implying the existence of multiple equilibriums in the medium term. The policy response to the current crisis is itself one of these factors, as well as its interpretation by markets. Others comprise global macroeconomic imbalances, the impact of climate change on agricultural yields and volatility, potential technological gains, energy prices, and possible remaining bubbles on financial and assets markets.

^{xxi} In spite of higher demand for biofuels, international prices for sugarcane have not gone up so far. But it is likely that they will if the high demand for biofuels is accompanied with a decrease in subsidies granted to producers of corn-based ethanol. This reduction in subsidies is justified on a couple of grounds: for the global environment, as biofuels produced with sugarcane in developing countries is far less CO₂-intensive than that produced with grains in developed countries; and for food consumers, as increased demand for grains to produce biofuels exerts upward pressure on food prices. Furthermore, relying on sugarcane ethanol imported from developing countries rather than only ethanol from corn would be likely to increase energy security. This is because the year-to-year variation of corn yields is very high (higher according to some calculations than the variation in oil prices), and because exporters of sugar ethanol would have a vital interest in exporting continuously.

Through the Looking Glass: A Comparative Case Study Analyzing the Origins of Central Command and Africa Command

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Abstract

This article examines the impetus for the establishment of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in an effort to better understand how perceived threats to U.S. national security have evolved since the Cold War. The commands were created because new threats to American national security were inadequately addressed by the preexisting military organization. The Persian Gulf and Africa were considered strategically unimportant, thus there was a willingness to tolerate the awkward manner in which each area was divided between existing commands. As new threats emerged, however, each region gained strategic importance and new commands were established. Without a solid understanding of this process, AFRICOM's planners risk making policy mistakes similar to those made during the creation of CENTCOM. Based on this study, there are five major areas from which AFRICOM can build these lessons learned: establishing unified command and control, ensuring a coordinated planning process, securing support from its African allies, properly funding the command's needs, and clearly defining AFRICOM's mandate.

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to understand why the two newest U.S. unified military commands, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which covers the "central" area of the globe located between the European and Pacific Commands, and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), were established. This issue is important in order to understand how perceived threats to U.S. national security have evolved since the Cold War. Consequently, it is also important to understand how the military's organizational capacities have evolved to meet these threats. A solid understanding of this process will give policy makers insight into how lessons learned from previous commands, such as CENTCOM, can inform the planning process for the military's newest centralized command for Africa, AFRICOM, which was established more than twenty years after CENTCOM.

In this article, I will argue that CENTCOM and AFRICOM were established because new threats to American national security were inadequately addressed by the preexisting military organization in each region. Because these regions were previously considered strategically unimportant, there was a willingness to tolerate the awkward way in which each region was divided up between existing commands. As new threats emerged, however, each region gained strategic importance and new commands were established.

This article begins with a historical study of U.S. foreign policy and threats in the Persian Gulf and Africa. It then offers a comparison of the differences and similarities between CENTCOM and AFRICOM before offering some conclusions.

Adapting to Meet the Threat: Evolution of U.S. Foreign and Military Policy

CENTCOM

On 1 January 1983, the U.S. Department of Defense established the U.S. Central Command. Before CENTCOM, the Persian Gulf was geographically divided between the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Over time, the military and foreign policy have gone through several different iterations depending on the threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. It was only when the threat to U.S. interests seemed unavoidable and an unacceptable cost, however, that CENTCOM was created.

U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf after World War II have been consistent: “first to ensure access for the industrialized world to vast oil resources of the region; and second, to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political or military control over those resources” (Sick 1989). This foreign policy has been described as “one hand at the gas pump and the other hand on the trigger” (Forest and Sousa 2006).

The United States relied primarily on British troops to protect U.S. interests in the 1940s and 1950s because Britain was the superpower in the Persian Gulf. After the British withdrew from the Gulf in 1968, Washington, D.C. implemented Nixon’s “twin pillar” policy, which relied on the two most powerful, pro-Western states in the Gulf region—Iran and Saudi Arabia—to protect U.S. interests. This policy aimed to minimize American military commitment and reduce the risk of being drawn into an open confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf. Events in the mid-to-late 1970s, however, shattered the American perception of politics and security in the Persian Gulf. In order to meet new threats, the United States would require more military power, stronger military coordination, and a new foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.

The first major shock to U.S. interests was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which resulted in an Arab boycott of Israel’s Western supporters, including the United States. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ordered production cutbacks that disrupted oil supply, increased demand for oil, and stoked fears of an oil shortage in the West. These production cutbacks allowed OPEC to raise the price of oil from \$2 or \$3 a barrel to a then-record high of \$12 a barrel (Sick 1989). The oil embargo clearly demonstrated to U.S. policy makers “that business and politics in the Persian Gulf could not be safely separated from each other” (Sick 1989).

The second major shock to U.S. interests was the rapid increase of Soviet military presence in the region. Although Moscow was always viewed as a threat to the Persian Gulf in the eyes of American policy makers, the 1970s marked the first time that the Soviets deployed a

substantial military presence in the region at an average of twenty vessels in the Gulf (Sick 1989).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 confirmed the fears of U.S. policy makers. The invasion instilled a sense of urgency and peril that had previously been lacking (Odom 2006), arousing “latent fears of Soviet foreign policy that were never very far beneath the surface of U.S. foreign policy” (Sick 1989). U.S. policy makers perceived the invasion not as a “political gambit to preserve a Soviet position in Afghanistan,” but as a conscious challenge to U.S. power in the region (Sick 1989).

The Soviet invasion had a number of important implications for U.S. military policy in the Gulf. First, Soviet occupation meant increased numbers of USSR military bases (Record 1983). Second, Afghanistan’s occupation doubled the length of the Soviet-controlled border with Iran, which the United States believed to be particularly susceptible to Soviet influence after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Lastly, the invasion of Afghanistan signaled the end of then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s administration’s willingness to seek “mutual accommodation” with the Soviets.

After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the ensuing Iranian Hostage Crisis from 1979-1981, the United States could no longer rely on Iran. With the loss of Iran as an ally, the twin pillar policy was rendered ineffective. Soviet military buildup also meant that the United States could not rely on its other allies in the region (who were militarily inferior to the USSR) to defend its interests (Kupchan 1987). In response to this series of escalating crises, the Carter administration overhauled its entire Persian Gulf policy under the Carter Doctrine.

Recognizing the military imbalance between Soviet and American forces, Carter undertook the initiative to review the U.S. force structure in the Persian Gulf in the Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-10) Net Assessment of 1977. PRM-10 was an interagency study of U.S. national security policy that comprehensively assessed U.S. military force posture. Central to this assessment was the conclusion that the earlier policy of U.S.-Soviet military parity was no longer viable (Record 1983).

The creation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 1980 was the United States’s *solution to the new Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf and the subsequent power imbalance*. The RDF could be deployed quickly and possessed military capabilities to fight the Soviets. Since its creation, however, the RDF was plagued by logistical problems. Consequently, a new unified command, CENTCOM, was created in 1983 to provide a single command and control structure to replace PACOM and EUCOM’s area of responsibilities for the Persian Gulf.

AFRICOM

Unlike the Persian Gulf region, Africa has never been a priority for U.S. defense planners. It was not until 1952 that EUCOM was given the responsibility for the Algerian Departments of French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya (Catoire 2000). In the 1960s, growing fears of communism in sub-Saharan Africa led to the strategic decision to give the Atlantic Command (now U.S. Joint Forces Command) planning and operational responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa, with EUCOM retaining responsibility for North Africa. The Unified Command Plan was again revised in 1962 when the newly established U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was given control for sub-Saharan Africa.

After USSTRICOM was dissolved in 1971, military responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa would remain unassigned for the next eleven years until the 1982 biennial review of the Unified Command Plan, when U.S. strategic planners assigned sub-Saharan Africa to EUCOM (Catoire 2000). In 1983, Africa was redivided between PACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM. This structure would remain essentially unchanged for the next twenty-five years until the creation of AFRICOM in 2007.

This fragmented military policy is directly correlated to Africa's lack of geostrategic significance in the eyes of U.S. policy makers for most of the 20th century. U.S. foreign policy toward Africa before the 1990s—like its military involvement—was driven mainly by Cold War geopolitics and strategic concerns. In this framework, Africa ranked lowest among U.S. priorities. From 1946-1976, the United States perceived that it had few interests at stake on the continent. Foreign direct investment in Africa was low, trade was minimal, and few major American companies had interests in Africa (Clapham 1996). Consequently, the United States preferred the status quo in Africa and maintained a low profile that would not disrupt the international system or destabilize the decolonization process.

The nature of U.S. military operations fundamentally changed after the Cold War. The United States did not use its military force to protect its strategic interests against perceived threats, but instead used its power to protect human rights and relieve natural disasters like drought and famine. Consequently, U.S. military activities on the continent after the Cold War were largely limited to interventions for humanitarian justifications (Lyman and Morrison 2006).

The most significant military event for the United States in post-Cold War Africa was its intervention in Somalia in 1993. Initially, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton promoted multilateral peacekeeping among warring Somali rebel factions under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) (Rothchild 2001). In July of 1993, however, this peacekeeping operation shifted into an international skirmish when the Somali National Alliance militia attacked and killed United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and three U.S. nationals. In response, the UN launched a series of raids, ending in a battle in central Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 that left eighteen U.S. soldiers dead. For the American public and most policy makers, Somalia underscored the basic tenet of U.S. military policy that military forces should not be used when U.S. interests are not in jeopardy. The United States's "role [is] too important in areas of the world that are significant to the United States' . . . interests to allow our military effectiveness to be dissipated in places where we have no economic and no security interests" (Rothchild 2001).

Somalia's legacy meant that by the end of the 1990s, U.S. engagement in Africa had become "highly selective engagement" (Kraxberger 2005). Not even an event such as the Rwandan genocide would elicit American intervention in Somalia's aftermath. The United States had switched from "principled engagement" to a passive stance on security issues on the continent (Rothchild 2001). This policy trend would continue until September 11, 2001, when terrorist attacks on American soil raised Africa's profile in U.S. foreign policy.

Current U.S. foreign policy toward Africa reflects this "post-9/11 response to perceived security threats emanating from the continent" (Berschinski 2007).

Africa is "no longer viewed predominantly in humanitarian terms, Africa matters increasingly to U.S. national interests due to rising transnational infectious diseases, counterterrorism, U.S. energy security, intensifying trade and investment competition with China

and other rising Asian powers, and as a potential partner in the global economy” (Andrews et al. 2008).

This belief reflects a new type of threat in Africa that is qualitatively different from threats during the Cold War. Africa is viewed as particularly worrisome due to its weak and failing states, high poverty rates, ethnic conflicts, poor governance, and large uncontrolled areas. These characteristics have been emphasized post-9/11 because poverty, weak institutions, and corruption make states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders (U.S. White House 2002). According to Susan Rice, former assistant secretary of state on African affairs during the Clinton administration:

Much of Africa has become a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, young, disaffected, unhealthy, undereducated populations often have no stake in government, no faith in the future, and harbor an easily exploitable discontent with the status quo. . . . These are the swamps we must drain. And we must do so for the cold, hard reason that to do otherwise, we are going to place our national security at further and more permanent risk. (Lyman and Morrison 2006)

In response to these new threats, U.S. policy has focused primarily on counterterrorism initiatives such as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) (Lyman and Morrison 2006).

U.S. concerns about terrorism in Africa are not completely unwarranted. To date, nearly 400 foreign fighters captured in Iraq have come from Africa (Lyman and Morrison 2006). Foreign fighters have reportedly returned to Morocco and Algeria, where they use their operational and bomb-making techniques to conduct terrorist operations (Ploch 2008). In 2002, the Sahel emerged as a region of concern due to “the weak capacities of states there, their extensive ungoverned zones and long, porous borders and ongoing activities of transnational jihadis groups” (Andrews et al. 2008). On 11 September 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri called upon Somali Muslims to “strike at America’s underlings in Somalia and eliminate the ‘Zionist-Crusader’ presence in the country” (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 2007). Communal tensions, anti-Americanism, and radical Islamism in Nigeria have produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy while al-Qaeda is increasingly exploiting Western and Central African regions to launder profits from illicit trading of natural resources (Lyman and Morrison 2004).

Growing U.S. interest in Africa is also a product of America’s growing dependence on African oil. Africa has surpassed the Middle East as the largest regional supplier of crude oil to America (Berschinski 2007). Individually, Nigeria is the fifth-leading oil supplier to the United States, Angola is sixth, and Algeria is seventh. (Berschinski 2007). In 2006, the National Intelligence Council estimated that the United States imported 18 percent of its oil from sub-Saharan Africa, almost the same percentage as oil from Saudi Arabia (Forest and Sousa 2006). This amount is expected to increase to 25 percent by 2025 (Forest and Sousa 2006).

Other major threats to U.S. energy interests stem from political instability and organized crime networks. In the Niger Delta, for example, organized crime syndicates are well-armed and frequently disrupt oil flows, stealing between 30,000-70,000 barrels per day (Lyman and Morrison 2006). Reports also indicate that al-Qaeda recognizes the significance of oil to U.S.

interests and has considered targeting oil fields and refineries in West Africa (Forest and Sousa 2006). Consequently, U.S. policy has concentrated on joint military training in the Gulf of Guinea and an increased diplomatic presence in Western Africa.

In response to these new threats, numerous initiatives have been pursued, including the Pan Sahel Initiative, African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Millennium Challenge Account, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, and the CJTF-HOA. While these initiatives have produced varying levels of success, there was a glaring lack of overarching policy framework. The division of Africa between three military commands, described above, also made planning, logistics, and coordination of military forces difficult. Consequently, U.S. capabilities to combat terrorism were adversely affected by a disorganized and uncoordinated policy.

Consequently, former U.S. President George W. Bush directed the creation of AFRICOM on 6 February 2007. Although AFRICOM's mission is to "conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs . . . to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy" (U.S. Africa Command 2008), one of its primary objectives is to make "organizational structure more efficient and effective by having one command focused on Africa . . . [and to] integrate better with our counterparts in the U.S. Government" (Whelan 2007). For the first time in African history, all of continental Africa (except for Egypt, which remains under the control of CENTCOM) was to be placed under one command.

Similarities and Differences Between CENTCOM and AFRICOM

Similarities

Geographically Divided Command and Control Structure

One of the most striking similarities between CENTCOM and AFRICOM is the fractured nature of military command and control before the creation of each combatant command. By splitting military planning and operations under multiple commands, military capabilities were considerably reduced and force deployment was delayed. U.S. policy makers tolerated reactive, ad hoc policies based on the divided geographical areas of responsibility (AORs) without considering the long-term implications. These policies meant that the Persian Gulf and Africa were not paid adequate attention by U.S. decision makers at various points in the 20th century.

The Persian Gulf was divided between PACOM and EUROM before the creation of CENTCOM in 1983. As outlined earlier, this organizational awkwardness was tolerated for most of the 20th century because the United States did not face significant threats in the region. In 1979, however, President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski concluded that the United States was overemphasizing tactical solutions to problems in the Persian Gulf, so he created the Persian Gulf Security Framework SCC (PGSF/SCC) to guide U.S. foreign policy (Odom 2006). At first, the planning under PGSF/SCC was ad hoc and driven more by events than long-term strategic planning. It quickly became evident, however, that the PGSF was significantly hampered by the existing command and control of the joint command structure divided between EUROM and PACOM. Initially, this geographical fault line was not a major constraint because there was not significant military planning for contingencies in the Persian Gulf before 1979. During the Carter administration, however, when "serious war planning began

and forces were assigned to execute the plans, the divided command became a major liability” (Odom 2006). The divided command was a serious liability because there was no clearly articulated strategy for how to integrate both commands into decision-making processes in the Persian Gulf.

Consequently, President Carter decided to create the Rapid Deployment Force—later the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)—to increase the United States’s power projection capabilities and coordinate military policy. As with the PGSF, however, the divided command and control was very problematic. Originally, U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) was given the responsibility for the planning and training of RDJTF forces during peacetime conditions. The authority to execute wartime operations, however, was given to the RDJTF. In practice, this meant that the RDJTF commander would have to execute operational plans drafted by another command in the theater of war. Moreover, when the RDJTF was located outside the Persian Gulf theater, its forces fell under the “ultimate” control of PACOM. Inside the Persian Gulf, however, the RDJTF would fall under the control of EUCCOM (Record 1983). The creation of CENTCOM has alleviated some of these planning problems, but command and control problems still occur when U.S. military forces from one command’s AOR cross over into that of another (Odom 2006).

Similar to the Persian Gulf, Africa was divided for most of the 20th century between various commands. Beginning in 1983, the African continent was divided among three different commands: EUCCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM. U.S. military assets for Africa are currently based overseas in Europe at EUCCOM in Stuttgart, Germany, due to Cold War strategic planning under these commands, which concentrated on Europe and Asia—not Africa.

This division between the three commands created problems in coordinating and conducting activities on the continent (Ploch 2008). The division of responsibility and lack of precision concerning policy made it difficult to prioritize national security interests, develop a cohesive foreign policy, consistently engage African militaries, and pursue U.S. objectives. U.S. humanitarian involvement in the Darfur conflict before the creation of AFRICOM exemplifies this problem. Darfur, as the Western province of Sudan, fell under the authority of CENTCOM, since that is where Sudan was located geographically. All Sudanese refugees, humanitarian *workers, and aid, however, were located in neighboring Chad, which fell under the responsibility* of EUCCOM. Given the artificial seam between EUCCOM and CENTCOM in this instance, coordination of American supplies, aid, and military resources proved difficult.

Another by-product of split military commands for Africa has been the low priority assigned to African security threats. Within the divided command structure between EUCCOM and CENTCOM, African issues have had to compete with higher priorities in Europe and the Middle East (De Lorenzo et al. 2007). EUCCOM and CENTCOM’s primary missions are to deal with their own strategic command priorities, often leaving African concerns insufficiently addressed until they grew to large-scale crises.

Interagency and Interservice Rivalries

Differences between organizational culture and behavior strongly influence the U.S. government’s ability to implement effective military policy in the Persian Gulf and Africa. Due to their different missions and policy functions, the State Department and Department of Defense (DoD) have often found each other at odds over policy decisions. The State Department is

typically characterized as more cautious, while the DoD is viewed as a “doer” seeking immediate results in a very result-oriented framework (Kendall 2008). Other analysts have colorfully described the organizational differences as “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus” (Forest and Sousa 2006). This friction is not limited to the State Department and DoD, however. Interservice military rivalries have also played large roles in determining organizational and bureaucratic policy and practice.

During the initial planning process for the RDF in the Persian Gulf (which formed the basis for CENTCOM), there was a large chasm between the State Department, which thought that “a more vigorous U.S. presence would be both unwelcome and disruptive,” and the Pentagon and National Security Council staff who believed that “although the moderate Arab states would never openly call for U.S. military deployments, they [Arabs] were desperately hoping that the United States would reassert itself” (Odom 2006). The State Department’s reasoning was justified on calculations of political backlash it feared would occur among its Arab allies. The DoD, however, was primarily concerned with creating a capable military force that could be rapidly deployed in the Persian Gulf in a relatively short time frame to meet an increased Soviet threat. Consequently the DoD’s strategic objectives depended on immediate action, while the State Department advised a “wait and see” position. This policy disagreement between the two agencies was a sticking point that delayed the RDF’s creation under Presidential Directive 18 by three years.

In addition to interagency friction, the RDF was also plagued by a great deal of interservice rivalry over its composition and the location of its decision-making authorities. Initially, the original structure of RDF was to be an almost all-Army force under the control of REDCOM. By 1980, interservice disputes between the Marine Corps and the Army led to the creation of the RDJTF with a rotating command between the Marine Corps and the Army. According to military analysts, the “organization and composition of the Rapid Deployment Force [was] largely the product of intense interservice rivalry, especially between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, for bureaucratic domination of the most significant U.S. military mission of the 1970s and 1980s (Odom 2006).

The case of Operation Eagle Claw, the United States’s botched attempt to free American hostages during the Iranian Revolution, is an illustrative example of how problematic military organizational behavior was before and under the RDF. The failure of multiple helicopters to reach the landing site “Desert One” in Iran was due largely in part to “parochialism and standard operating procedures of each of the services . . . [where] cooperation was primarily at the top level [and] unit commanders were uncooperative amongst themselves,” resulting in mixed communications and logistical catastrophes (Hart 1986). Furthermore, the choice to use Navy helicopters was questionable given their design to work as a mine-sweeping aircraft at sea and their inability to refuel in midair, as opposed to other helicopters that could refuel and operate in desert conditions. “The choice of Navy helicopters not only supports the organizational analysis in terms of each service demanding a role, but also indicates that interservice rivalry may have meant that another service helicopter would be denied permission to land on Navy ships” (Hart 1986).

AFRICOM’s political-military history reflects many of the same organizational difficulties associated with the creation of the RDF and CENTCOM. In its report, the Center for Strategic & International Studies identified institutional barriers to cooperation between agencies

working on African policy resulting from the frequent “stovepiping” of policy development, stark differences in institutional culture interfering with communication and coordination, misalignment of regional focuses between DoD, State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and a lack of understanding of each agency’s capabilities to address the overarching mission and challenges on the continent (Andrews et al. 2008).

This organizational friction is most evident in counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States in Africa since 9/11. Counterterrorism programs have been primarily “military in nature without adequate political oversight or complementary political, public diplomacy, or economic programs” (Andrews et al. 2008). There are few instances where each agency has integrated its strategies with the others, preferring instead to focus on their own agency-specific programs. This is especially problematic in planning joint activities between U.S. embassies and DoD combatant commands (COCOMs), where there is little coordination and communication.

This compartmentalized, bureaucratic approach has led to lack of understanding of each agency’s capabilities. The DoD has specialists who focus on regions for their entire career, developing extensive knowledge of in-depth military policy in a particular region. The State Department’s foreign service officers, however, do not specialize in a particular region, but rather focus on a functional specialty that cuts across regions. Moreover, DoD coordinates its operations on a regional scale through its regionally based combatant command, while the State Department implements its mandates through embassies and missions at the country level through country-based approaches (Andrews et al. 2008). This has led to a persistent structural misalignment on cross-cutting African policies.

Lack of International Support

Another striking similarity between CENTCOM and AFRICOM is the high degree of local opposition to new U.S. combatant commands in the Persian Gulf and Africa. Opposition in both cases was largely unanticipated because U.S. planners assumed that the regional actors shared common security threats and goals with the United States. In reality, regional actors have different threat assessments and security priorities that do not always align with those of the United States. In each case, American expectations of cooperation were exaggerated because their calculations failed to account for the gap between regional politics, military strategy, and political feasibility in each region.

In the Persian Gulf, many of the Arab states did not welcome a greater U.S. presence because overland invasion by Soviet forces was not their main security threat for much of the 1980s (Kupchan 1987). These states were more concerned with immediate threats such as the Iranian Revolution and internal instability than being occupied by Soviet forces. Furthermore, CENTCOM was initially opposed because Arabs suspected U.S. intentions in the Gulf “would validate the criticisms of radical Arabs about how the conservative [Gulf] states are toadies of the imperialists,” and thus “increase the chances of the internal turmoil that constitutes the main potential threat” (Record 1983). Arab states became more receptive to U.S. military presence as new Iraqi threats emerged and their national security goals realigned with U.S. interests in the region.

Following this pattern, many African states simply do not share the security goals and concerns on the continent that the United States does. There is an ongoing debate in Africa as to how much of a threat terrorism poses to the continent and to what degree it has firmly

established roots in local populations (Lyman and Morrison 2004). Local actors are more worried about poverty, disease, famine, economic development, and spillovers from regional conflicts across borders than they are about terrorism. Additionally, African leaders are concerned that their countries will be dragged into the U.S. war on terrorism and that AFRICOM will attract terrorists to Africa “like a magnet attracts metal” (Ortiz 2008).

Additionally, African perceptions are deep-rooted and ideological. While African reaction to AFRICOM is mixed, “to many, AFRICOM is, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, another sign that the U.S. is seeking to re-assert American power and hegemony globally” (De Lorenzo et al. 2007). Further, “many have viewed U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa with skepticism, and there appears to be a widespread belief that the new command’s primary goals will be to hang terrorists and to secure U.S. access to African oil” (Ploch 2008). Consequently, influential actors on the continent, such as Nigeria, the Southern African Development Community, and South Africa, have tried to prevent AFRICOM from establishing headquarters in their backyard (Ortiz 2008).

Moreover, the establishment of both CENTCOM and AFRICOM was marked by a period of increased U.S. activities in regions where the United States had chosen to pursue strategies of selective engagement. According to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa Donald Payne, African skepticism is validated “because there has been so little attention given to Africa. . . . All of a sudden to have a special military command, I think the typical person would wonder why now and really what the end game is” (Pham 2007).

Strapped Resources for the New Commands

Lack of resources is another commonality between AFRICOM and CENTCOM. Just as coordination and command issues impact operational capacities of the commands, so do resources. By comparing the two commands, important lessons can be learned on how to best manage resources and budget constraints effectively to maximize AFRICOM’s mandate.

U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf after World War II has been characterized as “an attempt—under circumstances of limited military resources—to cope with successive British retreats from Greece and Turkey (1947), Egypt, and the Arab East (1957) and the Persian Gulf (1971)” (Kupchan 1987). In addition to driving policy choices such as the twin pillar policy, which relied on allies to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf, limited resources played a significant role in delaying the creation of the RDF. Since the DoD did not have any extra resources at the end of the late 1970s, it ignored Carter’s Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18) to create the RDF (Odom 2006). When the RDF was finally pushed forward by the DoD it was still not adequately supported by resources and budgetary allocations. In fact, “little in the way of supporting budgetary initiatives was visible . . . until the early 1980s, following the seizure of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tehran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan six weeks later” (Record 1983). According to defense analyst Jeffery Record, the “pre-Afghanistan defense budgets of the Carter Administration (fiscal years 1978, 1979, and 1980) reflected a continuing preoccupation with U.S. Army, tactical air, and other NATO-oriented forces. . . . This preoccupation vanished in the fiscal 1981 budget” (Isenberg 1984).

Once CENTCOM was operational, it continued to face problems obtaining adequate funding and resources. Other military services viewed it as a drain on more important missions in Europe and East Asia. Although CENTCOM’s war strategies were approved by the joint chief of

staffs, “no one believed that the command had adequate resources to implement them in a timely fashion” (Odom 2006). CENTCOM relied heavily on the Army’s contributions and the reluctant cooperation by the Navy and Air Force (Odom 2006).

In comparison, many analysts worry that AFRICOM faces similar resource and funding challenges, especially in regards to how they are allocated between the different organizations that participate in AFRICOM (Holmes 2008). As of September 2007, unofficial start-up costs for headquartering AFRICOM on the continent were approximately \$5 billion dollars, although the official start-up costs had been expected to total \$300 million in fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 1.2 billion in FY 2009 (Andrews et al. 2008). This is a substantial increase from the DoD budget requests for \$100 million in FY 2008 and \$389 million in FY 2009 (Department of Defense 2009). In light of this funding discrepancy, there is the question of where the missing funds will come from and if Congress will even approve additional requests (Andrews et al. 2008). Given the unequal allocation of resources and funding almost exclusively to DoD, there is also a worry among State Department officials that “relatively resource-rich COCOMs may wind up driving U.S. engagement with target countries at the expense of U.S. ambassadors” (Andrews et al. 2008). In other words, the State Department is worried that U.S. foreign policy will be influenced—or militarized in worse-case scenarios—by a well-funded Defense Department.

Military planners will also have significant problems staffing AFRICOM. In 2006, General James Jones, former EUCOM commander and current National Security Advisor to U.S. President Barack Obama, reported “that EUCOM’s staff was spending more than half their time on African issues, up from none almost three years prior” (Ploch 2008). Officials are also having a hard time filling personnel task orders. African Defense Department attachés are understaffed and overstretched.

It is estimated that the average command ranges from 500 to more than 1,000 personnel (Ploch 2008). To date, AFRICOM was authorized to have 1,304 headquarter staff members by October 2008 (Ploch 2008). In order to fill these billets by that date, personnel was being shifted from EUCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM. CENTCOM and EUCOM have become overstretched, however, due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is questionable how much of their personnel can be transferred to AFRICOM.

Energy Security and Oil Concerns

In addition to a lack of resources, energy and oil concerns are recurring themes factoring into the creation of both CENTCOM and AFRICOM. It is important to note that oil and energy are only some of the many issues shaping and guiding U.S. interests in Africa. Given the relevance of oil and energy to both CENTCOM and AFRICOM’s development, however, I have chosen to focus my analysis in this last section on these particular strategic issues.

In the Persian Gulf, and increasingly in Africa, oil has been an important strategic asset that the United States relies heavily upon. The ability to maintain a healthy American domestic economy was essential for the United States if it was going to meet the Soviet challenge in the 1970s and 1980s. To do this, the United States required oil. “What was at stake was not simply influence but the vital commodity of oil; only the producers of south-west Asia, and in particular those of the Middle East, ... could meet the increasing demands of Western Europe and ... the United States” (Hass 1987). From 1979 to 1985, the United States imported approximately 31 percent of oil from the Persian Gulf, or 2.4 million barrels a day (Nakhleh 1982).

African oil is becoming increasingly important to the United States. Former President Bush stated a U.S. policy goal to replace more than 75 percent of U.S. oil imports from the Middle East by 2025 (Ploch 2008). To meet this goal, various reports project that Africa will supply around 25 percent of the United States's oil imports in 2025 (Ploch 2008). African crude also has the advantage of being "light and sweet." Light and sweet crude is easier for U.S. refineries to transport and process into gasoline, versus heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, West African oil takes only two weeks to reach U.S. shores, while it takes oil from the Persian Gulf about six weeks (Carmody 2005).

When comparing the role of oil in each case, it is also instructive to consider the different environments from which oil was extracted. In the Persian Gulf during the 1970s and 1980s, the threat of oil embargos and denied access was a source of constant concern for the West, which feared regional instability and Soviet influence. The United States has also worried about its oil supply being interdicted in strategic choke points such as the Suez Canal, as occurred during the Arab-Israeli War and 1973 oil embargo. Similar to the Persian Gulf, major threats to African oil include political instability, in addition to organized crime syndicates, terrorism, and underdevelopment. Unlike various periods in the Gulf, however, African oil supply has for the most part continued to flow with little overall disruption, despite regional conflicts and crime.

Differences

Cold War Environment

CENTCOM was created during the height of the Cold War. There was a clearly identified threat to U.S. interests in the region: the Soviet Union. By the 1970s and 1980s, the Carter and Reagan administrations had clearly defined and stated U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the creation of CENTCOM ranked high on the list of U.S. strategic priorities.

AFRICOM's operating environment is starkly different from that of CENTCOM's during the Cold War. While U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf tended to be coherent and consistent in its goals, U.S. foreign policy in Africa has been unsteady and reactive due to its low strategic priority (Catoire 2000). This lack of coherence in African foreign policy results from a lack of concrete, identifiable, "clear and present dangers" to U.S. interests in Africa, unlike in the Persian Gulf. In the 1970s, the Soviets were involved in Africa, but Moscow was never able to establish a lasting hegemonic influence, even if former President Ronald Reagan was determined to confront Moscow at every turn.

Today, threats on the continent are still defined in rather vague language. "Terrorism" is not easily identifiable or quantifiable. A defining feature of terrorism is the ability of terrorists to blend into their host populations, leaving behind little evidence of their activities and mounting surprise attacks with little warning. Furthermore, threats to American oil supply are equally as nebulous, stemming largely from "underdevelopment" and "poverty." Unlike the case of CENTCOM, it will be harder for the American public and U.S. officials to rally around these more abstract threats and convince Congress to provide AFRICOM with extra funding or more resources. Consequently, the success of AFRICOM will depend on a long-term strategy that focuses on clearly articulating the intersection of U.S. and African interests in the absence of a "Soviet-type" threat that existed in the Persian Gulf during the Cold War.

New Model of Combatant Command

Unlike CENTCOM, it is expected that AFRICOM will “depart from the Pentagon’s traditional ‘J-Code’ organization structure, a method of organizing a command for war fighting developed in the Napoleonic Age” (Ortiz 2008). This is important to note because it marks a departure in U.S. strategic policy regarding war fighting and strategic planning. CENTCOM was created based on the need to quickly deploy U.S. forces that were capable of defeating a larger Soviet threat (Record 1983). AFRICOM, however, will be organized around theater security cooperation activities focused on war prevention (Ortiz 2008) rather than actually conducting war campaigns like the other commands.

AFRICOM’s mission and mandate are distinctly different from the other unified commands. AFRICOM will also use an interagency model that is new and untested. The AFRICOM structure integrates staff members from civilian U.S. agencies, primarily the Department of State and USAID. While DoD will lead AFRICOM, it will have two deputies, one of whom will be a civilian. These deputy appointments distinguish it from CENTCOM and all other U.S. military commands. Consequently, the mission of AFRICOM will “necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrine mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies” (Pham 2007).

Conclusion: Reinventing the Wheel? Future Implications for AFRICOM’s Success

CENTCOM and AFRICOM were established because new threats to American national security were inadequately addressed by the preexisting military organization in each region. As new threats emerged, however, each region gained strategic importance and new commands were established. This analysis suggests that U.S. military planners and foreign policy advisors have assumed a high level of coordination and cooperation between agencies and service branches when creating both CENTCOM and AFRICOM. As illustrated by this comparison, however, limited cooperation existed in reality.

This case study has attempted to highlight the challenges associated with establishing military commands by providing a greater understanding of the complex historical relationship between U.S. foreign policy, strategic priorities, and threat assessment in the Persian Gulf and Africa. *Although many factors present very real challenges to AFRICOM’s elaborate mission design, this case study argues that they can be overcome by looking toward the past.* Consequently, AFRICOM’s success rests on its ability to learn from the past while adapting to meet changing security demands in the future. Based on this study, there are five major areas from which AFRICOM can build on lessons learned from the creation of CENTCOM:

1. **Divided command and control.** As indicated by this comparison, decades of inattention and undefined command and control systems cannot be fixed simply by realigning geographic areas of responsibility. Shifts in strategic planning—by both military and foreign policy planners—are needed to overcome this historical trajectory.
2. **Coordination.** Although AFRICOM strives for a level of coordination and compatibility between previously nonexistent service branches and agencies, future studies of CENTCOM’s operational challenges will be useful for U.S. policy makers searching for appropriate solutions. Planners should look to CENTCOM’s experiences and not assume that these complex challenges can be easily overcome.

3. **Allied support.** Support of African actors on the continent is critical and necessary to give legitimacy and validation to the command's mission. Realistically, allied support is also necessary to acquire logistical capabilities necessary for operational planning and military activities. Therefore it is important that AFRICOM planners learn from CENTCOM's mistake of assuming that its allies share the United States's security goals, as CENTCOM did in the Persian Gulf. AFRICOM must also not underestimate the weight of domestic political restraints that might influence African cooperation. Rather, AFRICOM should pursue security strategies that are politically feasible in Africa.
4. **Limited resources.** Given AFRICOM's limited resources, it will be crucial for the command to operate as efficiently as possible without duplicating mistakes, such as failing to meet staffing requirements and underfunding budgetary needs, of previous commands. By referencing the past, officials can avoid these mistakes made during CENTCOM's life span.
5. **Clearly defined and articulated mandate.** The threats that AFRICOM deals with are not as clearly defined as those present during the Cold War. Consequently, the success of AFRICOM will depend on a long-term strategy that focuses on clearly articulating the intersection of U.S. and African interests in the absence of a "Soviet-type" threat that existed in the Persian Gulf during the Cold War.

While stressing the importance of the past in ensuring the success of AFRICOM's future, this study also recommends that AFRICOM's planners pay special attention to one emerging trend in U.S. foreign policy: the militarization of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.

Due to AFRICOM's sweeping mandate encompassing all aspects of U.S. policy ranging from military intervention to humanitarian aid, analysts are concerned that the military might "overestimate its capabilities . . . [and] its diplomatic role in Africa" (Ortiz 2008). Already, DoD's share of official development assistance has increased from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent from 2002 to 2005 (Andrews et al. 2008). The Department of Defense also possesses the authority to directly appropriate resources for a range of activities traditionally associated with civilian missions (Andrews et al. 2008). This increasingly vague line between civilian and military functions has the potential to adversely affect and "stigmatize" future U.S. efforts in Africa. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy officials and defense planners should make a concerted effort to "elevate the priority attached to development, placing it as equal footing with defense and diplomacy in the U.S. foreign and national security policy" toward Africa (Andrews et al. 2008). This recommendation is important to assuage domestic and international concerns that the United States is interested in Africa for purely neo-imperialistic reasons.

Despite the challenges outlined in this study, there are still reasons to be optimistic about AFRICOM's future. As eloquently stated by Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, President of Liberia:

AFRICOM should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity and developing good civil-military relations. . . . AFRICOM should be seen as the end-product of a significant strategic realignment a long time in the making—one where engagement with African nations is more than just a humanitarian cause. (Sirleaf 2007)

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Somali Piracy: An Escalating Security Dilemma

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Abstract

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has grown exponentially in recent years. This article will explain the growing trend, which is the result of a number of factors including the unstable political environment, the collapsed economy, and the presence of Islamic terror groups in Somalia. The research concludes that only a unified stance by the international community that addresses a two-part strategy can facilitate the eradication of Somali piracy. If the global actors involved do not enhance cooperation in the fight against piracy while simultaneously enacting measures to improve stability in Somalia, global commercial trade will continue to suffer from extortion, and Islamic radicalism in Somalia will continue to thrive and potentially overtake the country.

Introduction

The dramatic increase in piracy¹ off the coast of Somalia in recent years and the enhanced organizational capabilities displayed by the perpetrators are sounding alarm bells in the ongoing Somalia security saga. Piracy in the region and in the world is by no means a new occurrence. However, the significant rise in the frequency and sophistication of piracy off the Somali coast (the number of incidents more than doubled in 2008 from the previous year) has had significant consequences: (1) the payment of multimillion dollar ransoms; (2) the suspension of critically needed food aid; (3) major disruptions to the international shipping industry and the resulting price hikes, especially in oil; and (4) the potential for environmental disasters created by attacks on oil shipments (Middleton 2008). Most alarming, however, is the growing concern over the possibility of cooperation between these organized groups of pirates and Islamic militants,

predominantly *al-Shabaab*ⁱⁱ (“the youth”). Al-Shabaab is the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union, and it is waging a fierce insurgency against the forces of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its allied Ethiopian troops. While there is limited availability of information to verify unequivocally that such a connection exists, increasingly there are reports to substantiate the assertion that al-Shabaab is forming closer ties with the pirates for a mutually beneficial relationship. That is, the Islamists seek financial and material gains to sustain their insurgency, while the pirates are interested in financial wealth and freedom to continue operations (Jane’s 2008). Direct involvement with criminal networks by insurgent and terrorist groups is the primary means by which these groups secure financial support for their operations (Jane’s 2001).

This article opens by identifying Somalia’s pirates and their methods of operation. It continues by examining the causes for the upsurge in piracy that derive from state failure and the ensuing instability and lawlessness that has ravaged the country. The two key resulting factors are that: first, the ineffective TFG lacks any capacity to govern or provide security on land or along its coastline; and second, extreme poverty and lawlessness have spurred the piracy industry and created an incredibly lucrative businessⁱⁱⁱ with little risk of punishment for those involved.^{iv} This article also examines the prospect of cooperation between the Somali pirates and Islamists (namely al-Shabaab), an issue that is at the center of current debate amongst scholars and security experts. We support this claim by demonstrating the mutually beneficial relationship between Somalia’s Islamist insurgents and the pirates (Jane’s 2008; PBS 2008b). The article concludes with an evaluation of the international community’s efforts to safeguard the shipping industry, which we believe is an inefficient, stand-alone strategy that is likely to fail in accomplishing its objectives unless a cohesive international response to the root cause of the problem, Somalia’s instability, is undertaken. Without international action that deals with these issues, there will likely be a continuation of brazen attacks by pirates and an increasingly successful insurgency by Islamists who may succeed in taking complete control of Somalia.

Who Are Somalia’s Pirates?

Andrew Mwangura, the program coordinator for the Seafarers’ Assistance Program in Kenya, argues that the Somali pirates can be divided into four main groups based on their tactics and capabilities (Mwangura n.d.). Each group has a unique structure, but all have the same objective: profit. The most sophisticated of the pirate groups are the Somali Marines (United Filipino Seafarers 2008), operating out of central Somalia, who have adopted the “mother-ship” model as an operational plan for besieging cargo ships that sail far away from the Somali coast. The Marines commandeer large fishing boats with the capacity to sail long distances and load them with smaller and faster skiffs. This allows the pirates to reach far distances on the mother ship before transferring to the skiffs that they use to approach and board their targets. The Somali Marines have carried out more than 80 percent of the piracy in Somalia due to their ability to launch attacks in deep water (West 2007). Other groups include the Puntland pirates operating from Bossaso, scattered factions based in Marka in the southern coastal region, and the National Volunteer Coast Guard, which operates mainly from Kismayo. These groups

use modified and many-times stolen fishing boats with mounted weapons to carry out piracy and armed sea robbery.

Many of the pirates operating in Somalia are former fishermen who attack foreign fishing boats claiming that they are illegally fishing Somali waters and threatening their business. This is especially true for the Somali "Coast Guard," which sees itself as the protector of the Somali fishing industry. "We don't consider ourselves sea bandits," say members of the guard. "We consider sea bandits [as] those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas" (Axe 2008). As the struggle for government power continues to prevent effective public institutions from forming, Somali pirates are free to take the law into their own hands. Ironically, however, Somali pirates often fulfill the government's duty to prohibit illegal fishing and smuggling.

Over time, the pirates have developed a sophisticated operational model that has dramatically increased their efficiency and subsequently the frequency of attacks. Their operation consists of an assemblage of three types of groups: (1) ex-fishermen who have intimate knowledge of the sea; (2) ex-militiamen who have manpower, strength, and combat skills; and (3) technical experts who can operate hi-tech equipment such as GPS systems and military hardware to assist with navigation and the detection of shipping targets (Hunter 2008). The pirates also have an intelligence network based out of certain ports through which they receive information on potential targets and threats (de Nesnera 2008). In addition to the core group of men used to hijack ships, there is a broader support operation that includes accountants, negotiators, and even local pirate restaurants to prepare food for the crews and hostages (Harper 2008). This demonstrates the evolution of piracy from small, ad hoc groups of opportunistic thugs seeking to defend their waterways from illegal fishing to well-organized and resourceful pirates with a resolve to achieve their aims effectively.

Reasons Behind Rise in Piracy

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a developing problem for more than a decade. In the wake of Mohammed Siad Barre's downfall (*Siad Barre was overthrown as president* of Somalia in 1991) and the irreconcilable conflict between warring parties that followed, Somalia's degeneration to a failed state has been a key reason for the rise in piracy off the Somali coast. Without an effective government to administer national institutions and public services, foster economic growth, and enforce law and order, criminality and nefarious activities have flourished. The most significant increase in piracy incidents occurred during 2008. When comparing the incident rate of 2007 to that of 2008, an increase of nearly 200 percent is noticed in reported instances of piracy on the east coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.^v It is this sharp rise in incidents and a number of brazen attacks in recent months by the pirates that draw increasing concern from the international community.

The increase in piracy in recent years can be attributed to three main reasons: first, the development of a more sophisticated method of operation has allowed pirates to successfully attack bolder targets and thus reap greater rewards; second, the growth of the region's maritime industry has increased the number of potential targets; and third, the

worsening state of affairs in Somalia has made illegal activities an increasingly attractive and viable business. Let's look closer at these factors.

First, piracy in the region has evolved from small-scale defensive attacks to highly organized operations whereby pirates are using advanced technologies and expertise to maximize their effectiveness. For example, pirate groups often are made up of several units, including security and attack teams, and offer assistance to one another during an operation (Schiemsky 2009). In turn, pirates have been able to push their operations farther out to sea and target larger ships that offer substantially greater rewards. The first such attack occurred in late September 2008 when a Ukrainian cargo ship, the *Faina*, was captured. The ship was carrying 33 tanks, small arms, rockets, and ammunition, sparking grave concern that the military equipment would fall into the hands of the pirates or, even worse, the Islamic militants. On 17 November 2008, a Saudi-owned oil supertanker, the *Sirius Star*, was seized by pirates in an unprecedented attack, as it was the largest vessel hijacked by pirates to date, carrying barrels of oil worth about \$100 million (Kaslowsky and Webb 2009). Another surprising factor in this incident is that the ship was attacked 400 nautical miles out to sea, far deeper than any other previous attack. The pirates emerged victorious from this high-profile attack with a ransom payment of \$3 million made to the pirates in early January (Reuters 2009). The scale of these attacks emphasizes that the pirates are clearly using the ransom money to invest in superior and more sophisticated equipment (including high-speed boats, weapons, and GPS satellite devices), which increases their attack capabilities. It is estimated that in 2008 between \$18 million and \$30 million in revenue was received by pirates, and it is these extremely high returns that have encouraged the significant growth in the piracy industry (Schiemsky 2009).

Second, the Gulf of Aden is the main trade route between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, with approximately 16,000 ships navigating this area each year (Brice 2008). The maritime industry off the Somali coast has grown over the years, and today, the Gulf of Aden serves as host to 12 percent of global maritime trade and 30 percent of the world's crude oil shipments (Economic Times 2008). Despite the economic slowdown in 2008 and its repercussions for global trade, the Gulf of Aden remains a vital and busy international lane of commerce. Shippers have few alternatives to avoid this route, as the added cost of navigating around the Cape of Good Hope is quite substantial.^{vi} Pirates thus have a wealth of potential targets that they use to their advantage.

The third major reason for the sharp increase in piracy relates to the dire state of affairs in Somalia, which has continued to worsen due to the unrelenting internal conflict, the lack of an effective government, a crippling drought, and limited business prospects. Indeed, pirates weigh the risks of engaging in piracy and benefiting from massive rewards and nonengagement in a country "where legitimate business is difficult, where drought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming, and instability and violence make death a very real prospect" (Middleton 2008). It seems involvement in piracy is seemingly worth any perceived risks. Some analysts would go as far as claiming that due to the recent global food price hikes that have exacerbated the calamitous living conditions in war-torn Somalia, a growing number of Somalis have been enticed to

embrace piracy (Baldauf 2008). At the same time, piracy is having a negative impact on Somalia's already devastating humanitarian crisis, as humanitarian aid shipments (primarily food) have been disrupted either as the result of a direct attack on a ship or due to decreased shipments stemming from the increased risk (FEWS NET n.d.).

Weak Government and Lack of Security

The prevalence of Somali piracy can be attributed predominantly to the lack of an effective government since the downfall of Siad Barre in 1991, which resulted in an unrelenting period of conflict that has allowed criminality to flourish undeterred. The only period in Somalia's seventeen years of chaos that can be considered an exception in terms of security provision occurred during the latter part of 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) gained power. The ICU brought a period of relative stability that also allowed businesses and state facilities to operate with relative ease, boosting confidence in the business sector and spurring investment money to once again flow into Somalia's economy (Gettleman 2006). As the ICU began instating law and order in an anarchic Somalia, piracy was substantially curbed. The ICU's resolve to combat piracy and "tame their crime-plagued fiefdom" appears to have been successful during this period due to its threat to employ harsh Sharia (or Islamic law)-based punishments (execution and amputation) to those involved in piracy.^{vii} The improvement to Somalia's economy also provided a growing number of Somalis with a livelihood that gave hope and encouragement to participate in the formal economy, as opposed to being involved in nefarious acts such as piracy. The lull in piracy ended after Ethiopian troops, with the tacit support of the United States and the Somali president, invaded Somalia in late 2006 (Terrorism Focus 2007). The Ethiopians ousted the ICU and ended Somalia's short period of stability. Analysts point to the ICU's rule to illustrate that an effective government in Somalia that can instill law and order is key to promoting stability and stifling the chaos and criminality rampant across the country (Middleton 2008).

Fourteen attempts have been made since the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 to construct a functioning Somali government. However, they have been unsuccessful due to the immense difficulty of reconciling the warring clans, many of which have strongly *opposed foreign intervention by Ethiopia. The current TFG is the most recent attempt*, although it is nearing collapse. Formed in 2004, the TFG governed from neighboring Kenya until February 2006, when the parliament convened for the first time in Somalia. Despite receiving a significant amount of foreign aid since it began governing from within Somalia, the TFG has not had the resources, internal support, or influence to provide security on land, let alone guard its coastline. Although the TFG is backed by the United States and its Ethiopian ally, it has failed to gain recognition and legitimacy from the population due to a lack of unity and internal strife from clan competition and disagreements. In the words of African expert John Prendergast, the TFG is considered "feeble, faction-ridden, corrupt and incompetent" (Hanson and Kaplan 2008).

Piracy as a Lucrative Business

The most profitable year ever for the pirates was 2008, with Kenya's foreign minister stating that more than \$150 million was paid in ransoms (BBC News 2008b). Piracy is an industry that awards handsome profits and is an increasingly attractive option in a

country with dwindling economic opportunities.^{viii} “All you need is three guys and a little boat, and the next day you’re millionaires,” said Abdullahi Omar Qawden, a former captain in Somalia’s now defunct navy (Gettleman 2008). In fact, according to reports, conspicuously extravagant residential buildings have sprung up all over Somalia’s poverty-stricken towns, raising questions as to the origins of this unaccounted capital influx. Newfound riches plundered from large shipping corporations as ransom for their crews and cargo have lined the pockets of Somalis and awarded them lavish lifestyles. “They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars; new guns,” says Abdi Farah Juha who lives in Garowe. “Piracy in many ways is socially acceptable. They have become fashionable” (Hunter 2008). As long as piracy is “trendy” for disenfranchised Somali citizens, the industry can be expected to develop and expand over time.

Although the piracy industry is managed and run by Somali citizens engaged in criminal activity, the economic benefits of piracy are not limited to Somalia’s private sector. “Believe me, a lot of our money has gone straight into the government’s pockets,” said Farah Ismail Eid, a captured pirate sentenced to fifteen years in jail. Farah carefully detailed his team’s payment structure whereby 20 percent of the spoils went to his bosses; another 20 percent went toward future missions to cover weapons, food, and other vital materials; 30 percent went to the mission members; and the last portion of 30 percent was allocated to government officials (Gettleman 2008). Various experts, including political analysts, nongovernmental organization workers, and government sources, further corroborate the claim that piracy funds are being channeled into government coffers. According to Roger Middleton, a researcher at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, “all significant political actors in Somalia are likely benefiting from piracy” (Gettleman 2008). Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has stated that the “Puntland leadership has made it easy for pirates to establish a base there” and that ransom money would “be used to fund the 2009 presidential elections in Puntland” (Pham 2008b). Government officials in Somaliland, a breakaway region in Somalia, say they recently carried out a sting operation on the nephew of Puntland region President Mohamud Muse Hirsi and found him carrying \$22,000 in cash when they arrested him (Gettleman 2008). Occurrences like this and numerous firsthand accounts of pirates admitting to paying off public officials give rise to suspicion of the direct involvement of government members in the sanction and support of piracy in Somalia.

Ineffective government and the lucrative incentives of the piracy industry are the two core issues of the current piracy crisis. While international attempts to combat piracy at sea are a necessary short-term tactic, the long-term strategy must entail greater international commitment toward the development of a comprehensive strategy to enhance security not only within Somalia, but also at the regional level. Piracy destabilizes the international shipping industry and, more worryingly, also contributes to the escalation of Somalia’s Islamist insurgency. The continuation of this insurgency will likely have dire consequences for regional security, a view expressed by terrorism expert J. Peter Pham who has stated, “it is intolerable that the lawlessness [in Somalia] should spill over and threaten the security of neighboring states like Ethiopia, Kenya, and

Yemen, as well as global commerce as a whole, much less that it should augment the already considerable terrorist challenge” (Pham 2008b).

Escalating Security Dilemma

Review of Somalia Crisis

Since the ICU was ousted in early 2007, al-Shabaab has launched an increasingly vicious insurgency against the TFG and allied Ethiopian troops. Daily fighting primarily in Mogadishu has resulted in approximately 9,000 civilians killed this year alone, according to some reports, and hundreds of thousands fleeing war-stricken zones (Economist 2008). Roadside bombings, explosions, regular gunfire, and the resolve of the Islamists have presented an almost impossible situation for the Ethiopian troops to overcome. The Islamic militants continue to tighten their grip on the country, having now gained control over most of southern Somalia and other key ports and towns along the coastline. The TFG controls only parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa (Mail and Guardian, 2008) which emphasizes their precarious position and the immense difficulty of solidifying control amidst ongoing United Nations (UN)-mediated peace talks.

Fueling the Insurgency

The most troubling aspect of the current piracy crisis is the increasing evidence confirming that Islamic insurgents are benefiting from the pirates’ success. In September 2008, a Greek-owned trade ship carrying a cargo of salt destined for Mombasa, Kenya, was hijacked and redirected to a southern port in Somalia controlled by Islamists, rather than back to the usual pirate bases in the northeastern region of the country near the Gulf of Aden (Pham 2008a). Indeed, the southern port of Kismayo was recently taken over by al-Shabaab, which has been declared a terrorist organization by the United States and has suspected connections with al Qaeda. Former notorious pirate cum radical Islamic leader Yusuf Mohamed Siad, better known by his nickname Inda’ade, is a member of al-Shabaab and the strongman in Kismayo (Ryu 2008). Using the ransom money and broad connections with various pirate groups in the country, Inda’ade funds and provides weapons for the al-Shabaab insurgency in Kismayo (Ryu 2008). Cooperation between *Islamists and pirates also extends beyond the city of Kismayo to the Puntland region in the north*, as Islamists sent trucks from Mogadishu to the Gulf of Aden to unload weapons from the captured Faina (Crilly 2008). According to Bruno Schiemsy, a Somali analyst based in Kenya, al-Shabaab has joined forces with the pirates, offering combat training in return for lessons on hijacking ships at sea (Crilly 2008).

An October 2008 report by *Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor* examines the strengthening relationship between Somali Islamists and piracy, warranting concerns that the ramifications of piracy are far more sinister than the threat to the shipping industry. The report identifies three areas in which the two entities cooperate: arms trafficking, investment in piracy, and training. Arms trafficking has been essential for the insurgents and their fight against the Ethiopian-backed forces, insofar as it enables the Islamists to hire the pirates, due to their extensive maritime knowledge, connections, and resources, to smuggle weapons and foreign fighters. This was evident when pirates delivered a shipment of explosives and missiles to Sheikh Hassan Abdullah Hersi (aka Hassan al-Turki) in May 2008 (Jane’s 2008). In terms of investment, cooperation is based on

mutual benefit, with al-Shabaab receiving a share of the ransoms: “pirate groups are shipping arms to the insurgents, who are also supplying some pirates with weapons and training in return for a share of their ransoms” (Jane’s 2008). It is claimed that between 20 percent and 50 percent of the ransom money is at times received by al-Shabaab, depending on the level of cooperation (Jane’s 2008). Training is also part of the cooperation package, making the pirates increasingly efficient at the benefit of both al-Shabaab and the pirates. Training is a two-way endeavor: the pirates receive training from al-Shabaab to increase their military proficiency, and the pirates provide al-Shabaab with training for the development of their maritime component (Jane’s 2008). According to J. Peter Pham, there is “credible intelligence that . . . al-Shabaab . . . is trying to create a small naval force of its own” (PBS 2008b), which would create a serious deterioration of security not only for Somalia but, even more worryingly, for the entire region.

Despite reports that illustrate the operational collaboration between the Islamic militants and pirates in Somalia, a RAND Corporation report on the maritime dimension of international security declared, “the objectives of the two actors [pirates and terrorists] remain entirely distinct” (Chalk 2008). The rationale for this argument is based on the diverging long-term interests of terrorists, whose aim is the complete destruction of international trade and commercial markets, and Somali pirates, whose strategy is profit-driven and thus actually benefits from a functioning international trade system. Though this theory is accurate at the ideological level, it cannot explain the convergence of the pirates and Islamists toward the same, short-term, practical ends: high seas robbery. In reality, the Islamists show a great deal of pragmatism by working with the secular pirates to attain weapons and money, while opportunistic pirates are obliged to cooperate with the Islamists to ensure that their activities continue uninterrupted.

International Response

International action to contain Somalia’s piracy crisis developed as a response to an increasing number of states that have suffered pirate attacks off the Somali coast. Countries that have been directly targeted by Somali pirates, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, India, Germany, France, China, and others, have sent warships to protect their national shipping industries and to safeguard United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) shipments destined for bereft Somalis by establishing “safe” shipping lanes. Success in doing so has been limited due to the sheer distance of Somalia’s coastline, which extends more than 3,300 km. With the recent capture of the *Sirius Star* by pirates at such a great distance out at sea, it is estimated that between 5 to 7 million square miles require protection (PBS 2008a), an amount that naval resources cannot possibly cover. Regional organizations have similarly deployed frigates and warships to enhance maritime security. The European Union adopted the decision on 8 December 2008 to launch a military operation called EU NAVFOR Somalia, which will include up to six frigates and three maritime patrol aircraft, utilizing approximately 1,200 people at any one time, at an estimated cost of euro 8.3 million (European Union 2009). In late October 2008, NATO established a maritime presence off the Somali coast—the NATO Task Group of Operation Allied Provider—consisting of three vessels mandated to escort ships carrying WFP cargo and to carry out deterrence duties. The

international community has, however, been slow in responding to the crisis, which has been escalating quite evidently throughout the past year.

Piracy has been an increasingly important issue for the UN throughout 2008, as is evident by the number of 2008 Security Council resolutions—1801, 1816, 1838, 1844, 1846, and most recently 1851—that all make explicit reference to the growing concern over piracy and provide recommendations for action. The importance of these resolutions is firstly to ensure that piracy off the Somali coast and its threat to international peace and security remain on the agenda of the international community. Secondly, they provide the legal framework for international action. For instance, prior to UN Security Council Resolution 1816, which gave authorization to states cooperating with the TFG to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use ‘all necessary means’ to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” (United Nations Security Council 2008), states were prohibited from entering Somali waters to pursue pirates. The resolution is a welcomed development, as it allows countries to circumvent the 1972 Law on the Territorial Sea and Ports, which legally recognizes that Somali territorial waters extend 200 nautical miles (370.4 kilometers) from the shoreline.^{ix} The downside of the resolution is that it permits international action against pirates only on the high seas. Thus, without a clearly defined system for prosecuting suspected pirates (Somalia lacks any capacity to do so), the resolution will not likely be as effective as it could. The signing of an agreement between the United Kingdom and Kenya in early December that sets provisions for Britain to hand over suspected pirates to Kenya for trial enhances the applicability of this resolution. However, there remain numerous obstacles (Hourelid 2008). While removing the legal barrier for prosecuting Somali pirates in a host country improves the international community’s capacity for combating piracy, discrepancies remain in relation to legal jurisdiction. For example, Yemen is challenging the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts, stating that the eight Somali pirates captured in Yemeni waters should be handed over to Yemeni authorities and not to the Kenyan authorities (McKenzie 2008). Consequently, the trials have been delayed, something that will likely continue due to legal uncertainty.

On 16 December 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1851, which authorized for the first time international operations against pirates on Somali soil. Advancements of this kind further reinforce the international community’s capacity to fight piracy in Somali waters. Pursuant to the request of the TFG, which appealed for international assistance in a letter to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the UN Security Council authorized all states capable of lending assistance to undertake all necessary measures “appropriate in Somalia” to interdict the pirates at sea and on land. Such action will nevertheless entail a substantial risk due to likely resistance from warlords and pirates onshore whose interest is to defend their operations. Similarly, Islamists will likely act to repel any international presence on Somali land in order to prevent further obstacles to gaining complete control over Somalia. In the words of an unnamed al-Shabaab member, “Our goal is to have Sharia as the permanent law of our country, and to get the infidels out of our country, whether they are Ethiopian or Americans” (BBC News 2008a). It thus remains to be seen if or how international forces will utilize this provision.

Conclusion

The international community must recognize the grave threat to regional and international security posed by a developing relationship between Islamists and pirates in Somalia. States must work together to develop a comprehensive strategy that addresses not only security offshore, but also the root causes onshore. We call for four specific policies that the international community should adopt.

First, the actors involved in the fight against piracy must implement the UN Secretary-General's recommendations to bolster existing efforts aimed at combating piracy and promoting stability in Somalia (UN News Centre 2008). One such method should involve expanding the sphere of operations of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007), to include a military component to tackle piracy onshore. At present the majority of funding for AMISOM originates from external organizations and donor states (Hull and Svensson 2008), as most African Union member states have resource limitations. Thus, the United Nations should take the lead in coordinating international funding, logistical support, training, and equipment in order to enhance AMISOM's operational capacity to bring security and stability to Somalia.

Second, in addition to the maintenance and expansion of AMISOM's capabilities, we believe a UN-mandated maritime task force empowered with offensive military capabilities for sea- and land-based operations against pirates is essential for any attempt to undermine the pirates. While Security Council Resolution 1851 sets the provisions for land-based action against pirates, a force that is mandated and equipped specifically to carry out offensive operations against piracy has a far greater chance of debilitating the industry. Such a force should be fully integrated with AMISOM and given the appropriate means to work closely with other international parties operating in the region. The establishment of such a maritime force may, however, be met with hesitation by UN members reluctant to commit forces to a land-based campaign in Somalia, especially as the threat of a power vacuum looms after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the takeover of Islamists. Moreover, the American experience in the early 1990s has ensured a continuous unwillingness by Western governments to get involved in a land campaign in Somalia. A maritime task force would also require substantial financial resources, which will be difficult to assemble given the present global economic climate.

Third, it is imperative that the international community takes a united stand against the pirates with respect to their demands for ransom. Piracy is largely the result of the troubled political environment that offers little economic alternatives other than crime to Somali citizens. A policy led by international shipping companies and their governments of not capitulating to ransom demands should lower the incentives for pirates to continue operations. An inherent drawback is that once a policy such as this is introduced, the pirates could change their tactics and hijack ships not primarily for the ransom, but for the cargo itself. However, it would be much more difficult to steal cumbersome cargo from ships and would demand an entire reorganization of the piracy industry's methods of operation. This would be very costly and time consuming in the least, if not impossible.

Fourth, improved clarity regarding the legality of regional countries prosecuting captured pirates is essential if this strategy for deterring piracy is to be effective. A greater number of countries operating in the area must sign agreements with regional neighbors to lay out the necessary legal provisions for the extradition and trial of captured pirates.

Thus, we believe that a strategy that offers any hope of success must combine two approaches. First is a coordinated and comprehensive effort aimed at undermining piracy at sea, which includes a united international stance against capitulation to pirate demands, enhancing the clarity of provisions relating to the capture, extradition, and prosecution of pirates, as well as a UN-mandated maritime task force with the military capabilities to pursue pirates at sea and on land. The second approach must be directed at improving security within Somalia, which means finding a political solution.

With the TFG facing imminent collapse and Ethiopian troops in the process of pulling out of Somalia, the Islamists are sure to receive a boost in confidence and power that will further destabilize the country and threaten international peace and security. As Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated, it is imperative that antipiracy efforts “be placed in the context of a comprehensive approach . . . to rebuild security, governance capacity, address human rights issues and harness economic opportunities throughout the country” (UN News Centre 2008). Only greater international commitment and a more comprehensive approach to this regional and international security crisis will increase the chances for the eradication of piracy and its contribution to the campaign of Islamic radicalism in Somalia.

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Endnotes

ⁱArticle 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as: "(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)"(United Nations 1982).

- ⁱⁱ The United States designated al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organization on 29 February 2008, describing it as a “violent and brutal extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with al-Qa’ida. . . . Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan” (U.S. Department of State 2008). Notable figures of al-Shabaab have provided safe havens for al Qaeda’s East Africa cell during the late 1990s (Menkhaus 2007).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Piracy has brought tremendous wealth and status to the perpetrators and is transforming villages into boomtowns with lavish restaurants, hotels, and shops springing up to provide for the new wealth. In the coastal towns of Harardhere, Eyl, and Bossaso, luxury cars, lavish houses, and restaurants are appearing at a rapid rate as the pirate economy skyrockets. Even catering that prepares Western-style food for the hostages have been employed (Hassan and Kennedy 2008).
- ^{iv} Whilst some pirates have been arrested, the potential for sharing in the extremely large ransom payouts is a big enough incentive to continue their involvement.
- ^v The International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce reports that out of the 293 worldwide incidents of piracy reported in 2008, 111 occurred in Somali waters. Whereas global piracy increased in 2008 by 11 percent, Somali pirates increased their activity by almost 200 percent (International Chamber of Commerce 2009).
- ^{vi} A report produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation clearly illustrates the added cost in time and resources involved in avoiding the Gulf of Aden to travel the safer route around the Cape of Good Hope (Maritime Administration n.d.).
- ^{vii} A similar punishment was handed down to those who committed serious crimes including murder (Freeman and Stares 2009).
- ^{viii} Somalia’s state failure led to an extremely volatile situation with fierce fighting between warlords, clans, and Islamists and an escalating conflict that has displaced more than a million people since 2007. Drought, prolonged conflict, and lack of governance have created a humanitarian crisis in which 43 percent of the population is in need of international aid (United Nations 2008).
- ^{ix} The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets the provisions for the breadth of territorial waters as 12 nautical miles; for which exceptions can be made such as in the case of Somalia (United Nations 1972).

A Novel Approach for Empowering Students in Africa

By Timothy Anderson

Timothy Anderson is the president and founder of World Computer Exchange (www.worldcomputerexchange.org) and executive director of World Computer Exchange—Canada.

The implementation of several of the Millennium Development Goals in the areas of youth development and education are clearly aided by vastly increased access to computers and the Internet across Africa. In our work deploying technology and volunteers to improve access to the Internet in Africa, we at World Computer Exchange (WCE) have found that a significant impediment to offering this increased access is misguided policy amongst policy makers in both developed and developing countries.

Issues of pride, trust, and sizzle often keep policy makers from choosing simple, cost-effective, and smart strategies for bridging the digital divide in Africa. World Computer Exchange is working hard to overcome these three obstacles.

John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University Professor Calestous Juma recently contacted WCE in support of a computer project for the small secondary school in Port Victoria, Kenya, where he studied as a boy. A year ago, the school had arranged for WCE to send it some of the donated used equipment that WCE gathers in cities all over North America. Two of the school's students, with virtually no training or support, informally started using the newly arrived computers on their own. In a few months they developed a science project and entered it in a national competition. Their project was judged fifth best in the science projects from all schools across Kenya. This motivated several area schools to get more computers.

Professor Juma is a member of the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) foundation. He believes in the OLPC approach to getting laptops into children's hands. He also believes in the World Computer Exchange approach of bringing used computers into classrooms and other public locations across Africa. The purpose of his call to the WCE was not merely to share a success story; he also wanted to arrange for more WCE equipment to be sent to his former secondary school along with OLPC laptops for local primary schools.

Most everyone knows about One Laptop per Child. It's a concept that has sizzle: putting brand-new, highly innovative, \$188 laptops in the hands of individual children in areas where large numbers of children will all have them so that they can share access to programs and the Internet.

However, not many people know of World Computer Exchange. It does not have sizzle. WCE focuses on gathering donated used computers outside of Africa. This

equipment is then delivered for a total of \$80 per desktop computer including monitor. The computers are publicly placed in primary and secondary schools, orphanages, libraries, universities, and cybercafes in the hope of moving more youth toward connecting to the Internet. WCE's equipment is used by many youths and, after class is out, by other people in their communities. WCE's computers are not brand new, and they are not colorful or flashy; they are surplus items donated by individuals, businesses, and universities in the United States that are upgrading their equipment. But before we send these used computers anywhere, our volunteers verify that they still have many years of valuable use ahead of them, and our partners develop careful plans to make the most of them in ways as varied as they are outside of Africa. For example, many teachers in Africa prefer desktop computers because their big screens allow for groups of students to learn from them at the same time.

However, pride is an issue for some agencies and organizations promoting education in developing countries. To such regulatory or donor organizations, the idea of importing used computers is unappealing, even insulting. WCE finds this reaction to be counterproductive, in part because it flies in the face of our organization's experiences with excited schools throughout Africa. It also contrasts with my own experience as an educator.

I founded one of the first charter schools in a grassroots education movement that continues to spread across the United States. For several years, the students in this charter school relied on surplus computers retrieved from storage rooms and even landfills. Our students experienced no loss of pride but a huge expansion of their opportunities to learn and to grow. Yes, they were using secondhand computers, but they were definitely not second-class students.

World Computer Exchange delivered our first used computers to Africa in November 2001, and we have now shipped 12,800 computers to 880 schools, libraries, orphanages, and youth centers in 18 African countries. Our local partners have never felt their pride undermined; indeed, they have felt empowered by the computers' ability to bring modern educational tools to their children. They tell us they are proud to be our partners, and, as in the case of Professor Juma's school, they want to work with us again.

One reason our partner organizations are proud is that they have sacrificed, sometimes greatly, to acquire their equipment. World Computer Exchange does not deliver free items to anyone; every partner struggles to cover at least part of the costs of sourcing, delivering, maintaining, and connecting their computers. Sometimes our partners win grants from agencies and ministries, and sometimes we help by finding sponsors in the United States to reduce these costs. Our partners come out of working with us with stronger capacity in planning and fund-raising to use in their future projects. In every case, the local partners are heavily invested in the equipment that we provide. They—not some outside agency—have made a commitment to give their children a better future, and they take this commitment seriously. No wonder they are proud of what they have achieved.

Major donors often consider it safer to fund capital infrastructure projects than to provide matching funds to help communities acquire computers for their children. Even

after the repeated successes of microfinance, many donors that I have met seem reluctant to trust grassroots groups with the comparatively small sums needed to acquire technology from nonprofits such as World Computer Exchange.

Trust is important. No one wants his or her funds or equipment misused. That is why we exercise due diligence in dealing with organizations that seek our help, and it is why we are pleased to work when we can with groups assisted by the U.S. Peace Corps, the global Voluntary Service Overseas, or Rotary Club volunteers around the world and with established institutions such as regional divisions of religious communities.

The need for trust also explains why our partners exercise due diligence about World Computer Exchange. They cannot afford to send their scant money to an organization that might fail to honor its promises. So they question us, they visit our facilities, they check out our reputation in development circles, and they examine our track record. We welcome this scrutiny. Only by such measures can one act on trust rather than on blind hope.

It is time for major donors to join WCE and our partners in working together to bridge the digital divide. We believe we can earn the trust needed to make those donors comfortable in dealing with us. This is not rocket science. It's more like connecting the dots: We can connect surplus technology on one continent with unmet needs on another. We can connect tech-savvy volunteers with tech-hungry students. We can connect groups working near each other in the same country who have never met. We can connect underserved communities with agencies and nongovernmental organizations that have resources to share. We can connect entrepreneurs in the field of recycling with people who want to dispose of their e-waste in a responsible fashion.

We must not allow misplaced pride, a lack of trust, and the allure of sizzle to get in the way. Time is too short, and the needs are too great.

Environmental Governance in African Development

By Ako Amadi

Ako Amadi studied marine ecology and international development in Germany at the universities in Kiel and Kassel before completing a short course in nonprofit management at Harvard. Positions as director of the Nigerian Conservation Foundation, founder/executive director of Community Conservation and Development Initiatives, and West African coordinator for the Ford Foundation-sponsored Pan-African Programme on Land and Resource Rights followed a career in research and teaching at the Nigerian Institute for Oceanography. Ako Amadi is presently Advisor for Governance and Natural Resources Management at the Canadian International Development Agency in Abuja, Nigeria.

By the middle of the 15th century the Kanem-Borno Empire had extended and established its rule in a massive triangle around Lake Chad within the savanna of West Africa. The Sefawa dynasty ruled Kanem-Borno from the ninth or tenth century AD until 1846, in what was certainly one of the longest dynasties in world history (Crowder 1977). A placid and shallow lacustrine ecosystem, embedded in vast, arid lands, easily became, and still remains, a center for the trans-Saharan trade for fisheries activities and flood recession farming.

Once a large reservoir of drinking water in Africa, recent satellite images clearly indicate a desiccation of Lake Chad to almost one-twentieth of its original size in the last forty years. Causative factors of this environmental disaster are neither well-known nor sequentially chronicled through conclusive scientific research. The area is naturally prone to cyclical droughts, a perennial risk factor in the Sahel, and more evidence now points to extensive scales of livestock grazing, crop farming, and water extraction. Undocumented impacts of climate change may have exacerbated the crises of livelihood around Lake Chad. So far, the prognosis of political conflict resulting from water scarcity has not materialized, but for decades, some very thirsty refugees have periodically embarked on the long trek from the receding shores of the lake in the direction of the Gulf of Guinea to the southern areas of Nigeria and Cameroon.

These occurrences must be viewed in a deeper historical context for explicit comprehension of governance as it relates to perspectives of ecosystem stability and international development in Africa.

At the drawing board of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to divide Africa, some lines demarcating the freshly created colonies in Africa intersected within lakes or bisected them. Thus Lake Chad, Lake Victoria, and the other Great Lakes of the East

African Rift Valley are shared by two or more countries. Fifteen African nations were denied access to the sea in the Berlin Conference divisions and remain landlocked to this day, a factor that contributes to their poverty and environmental problems.

The Berlin Conference, convened by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, was a watershed event in the annals of African history. It had the purpose of regulating the Scramble for Africa and ushered in formalized colonization of the continent by Europe. Treaties concluded by European explorers, traders, and missionaries with African chiefs and warlords were far from exact as to the actual territorial expanse of what was in the documents. Additionally, the long-term implications of colonial or protectorate status were not properly understood from the African side. Consequently, expensive military expeditions had to be undertaken by the European colonizers to enforce the treaties.

Surprisingly, Africa has made little or no changes to the colonial boundaries set by the Berlin Conference, which has resulted in some of the environmental issues now being faced.

For example, it is not uncommon for forest ecosystems to be contiguous to two or more adjoining African states, but they are often separated by wire fences and border posts that obstruct vital wildlife migrations. Levels of national management in such enclave habitats and the priorities for species conservation may then differ, despite international assistance instituted within a number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). With dissonance between governments in mind, MEAs attempt to set acceptable unified standards for global environmental management.

Transboundary and shared ecosystems, including the larger rivers (Congo, Nile, Zambezi, Niger, and Volta) of the continent, remain a common feature in the political constellation of Africa. It could be argued that these situations present opportunities for international and regional cohesion in environmental management, but in truth many of the affected nations have not achieved the level of internal governance and national security to inspire confidence and credibility in committing to the provisions of international conventions to which they have acceded. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the more recent International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, for example, are on paper of especial importance to the maritime states of Africa because they define the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for business, the environment, and the management of natural resources in waters within their jurisdiction.

In practice, few African nations have made the necessary investments that call for signatories to these maritime conventions to promote and facilitate individually or jointly scientific and technical research to protect fish stocks and prevent aquatic pollution. Moreover, the absence or irregularity of aerial surveillance and coast guard patrols (where they exist) of the continent's territorial waters results in overfishing and therefore depletion of fish and shellfish stocks, not only from uncontrolled, indigenous harvesting, but also through poaching by foreign fleets. Illegal dumping of toxic waste substances by vessels in the coastal environment is a growing lethal problem. Doubts are currently

expressed in international development circles over the financial and institutional capability in Africa to mainstream global conventions into national development strategies for the purpose of preemptive interventions against environmental damage.

Difficulties in managing shared habitats and resources are sometimes compounded by unclear cultural identity, allegiance, loyalty, and different shades of land-use interpretation as in a number of cases the same ethnic groups live adjacent to international boundaries. For almost a century before independence, most African peoples were under different trusteeships: French, German, Portuguese, Spanish, or British. The Yoruba of western Nigeria, for example, are officially English-speaking; their kith and kin across the border in the Republic of Benin remain Francophone. The Ewe are both Ghanaian and Togolese citizens; the Luo and Masai share a belonging to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. There are many other examples, which are too intricate to explain here.

There is a strong consensus among African scholars that external intervention in the form of colonial rule has had an impact on the traditional institutions—family, clan, village heads, chiefs, community leaders, and local governments—that still govern access to land and natural resources. In many situations the systems of access introduced during the colonial and postcolonial eras have not replaced customary systems. Rather, both systems have persisted, and the administrative dualism of overlapping state and community systems of resource tenure has increased the vulnerability of previously community-based systems to abuse. The statutory law of the state, arbitrarily imposed in a politically restrictive climate, is inexorably pitched against diverse traditional land-use patterns. Elaborating on this idea, C. Toulmin, P. Delville, and S. Traoré (2002) state that the colonial powers were unwilling or unable to alter local tenure systems radically, for a variety of reasons, and sought to keep local power structures on their side. Postindependence governments appear in some cases to have emulated this strategy of appeasement and containment. In parts of Africa settled by Europeans, mainly in the east and southern parts of the continent, contemporaneous legislation over land, property rights, and franchise were synchronized to fortify White supremacist rule and apartheid. With respect to the Republic of South Africa this statement is dispassionately validated in the autobiography of Nelson Mandela (1994).

According to J. Gunther (1955), a law in Kenya during the first decades of the 20th century, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 and subsequent Schedules to 1915, gave the governor the right to grant, lease, or otherwise alienate in His Majesty's behalf any crown lands for any purpose and on any terms and conditions as he may think fit. Seventy years on, the existing Land Use Act of 1978 of Nigeria bears a striking resemblance to the Crown Lands Ordinance of colonial East Africa in terms of residual feudalism. A state governor in Nigeria not only has authority over all urban lands within the state, but also the discretionary authority to classify land as urban or nonurban. Further, the governor may grant individuals a statutory right of occupancy for urban and nonurban lands for any purpose. The tenurial insecurity thereby created is a major deterrent to best practice in environmental management.

Under pressure to reform, arguments advanced by African governments relate to the need for the state to take a stronger role in land allocation and distribution in order to

free land as a productive asset and encourage investments from market-oriented actors. In actual practice, land is frequently used as an asset in notorious business and political negotiations, contracts and alliances, and import licenses and as a tool in the perpetration of corrupt practices and cronyism.

Land use at the communal level of the poor is equally beset with conflicts, even where money does not always change hands. Sharecroppers and herders in Africa regularly possess no security over lands on which they grow crops or graze livestock. In view of endless clashes between herders and farmers, the effectiveness of pastoralism as a form of land use in Africa's arid and semiarid zones is often in dispute. Rigid correlations between rainfall, primary production, annual carrying capacity, and the numbers and overall welfare of the human populations in these areas are unforgiving (Barrow 1996). Presently, what was formally pasture has largely made way for farms, infrastructure development, dams, and other irrigation schemes.

Nomadic herdsmen are often pilloried for actively contributing to desert encroachment through overgrazing of their livestock in already vegetation-deficient savanna ecosystems. Desertification affects approximately 70 percent of the land area in Senegal (Wiese 1997) and runs in a Sahelian belt across Africa from Mauritania to Djibouti. The Fulani, or Fulbe, and the Tuareg in West Africa and the Masai of East Africa often contest the rights of governments and sedentary farmers to effect alterations of grazing areas along their numerous stock routes, which they consider a natural endowment to pastoralism, irrespective of whether their habits are considered nomadic or not. To a large extent these groups remain marginalized on the periphery of the wider society. There is little understanding between the groups and the governments of their status.

States in the Sahel are increasingly taking the prudent course of formulating new laws aimed at assisting pastoral communities such as the Fulani to assume greater responsibility for natural resource management. Niger began this process in 1993, developing a Code Rural that defines the principles governing pastoralists' access to natural resources and gives substance to the concept of herders' home-grazing territory. Guinea was next, producing a Code Pastoral and a *Code l'élevage et des produits animaux* in 1995, a law regulating livestock and animal products. Mauritania followed with a Code Pastoral in 2000; Mali with a *Charte Pastorale* in 2001; and Burkina Faso with a framework law on pastoralism in 2002 (Touré 2004).

Environmental or natural resource governance has added significance in Africa because of the high percentages of populations in each country that live below the poverty level and subsist directly off the natural capital of the environment. These often malnourished, rural poor in Africa carry the burden of food security, forestry, and environmental conservation. Policies and laws for environmental management are conceived and promulgated often without their participation or inputs.

Overseas development assistance to Africa is sometimes sparing with the secateurs in its treatment of the tensile topic of tenurial rights, preferring the tactical subtlety of leaving it to national governments to sort out. Yet, proximately or remotely, inequity of land and resource rights is not only a factor in the disappearance of Africa's

high-profile wildlife, but is also linked to the internecine human conflicts in the continent: Dafur, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and the Niger delta. Inadvertently these conflicts rapidly mutate into recurrent ethnic and religious killings. Their origins then pale into imperceptibility and insignificance resulting in difficulties with conflict resolution. In Rwanda, Dafur, and Somalia, the dimensions of slaughter assumed genocidal proportions.

Land tenure systems are the socially defined rules for access to land (Bromley 1989). Examples of forms of access include public or private ownership, leasing and renting, easements, licenses, and simple possession—all of which can be further broken down into specific rights and which form layers of rights of access, use, and control over the same land (Bruce 1999; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Because tenure systems are based on social relations and are continually shaped and reshaped by political, economic, and environmental realities, they are evolving constructs and far more organic than mechanical in operation (Otsuka and Place 2001).

There are protracted definitional debates over the technical term “environmental governance,” which will be avoided here due to space constraints. Misunderstanding and ensuing discourse stem from the belief, even among sectoral scholars, that “governance” equates exclusively to the activities of a government. In a generic context, more convergence of opinion refers to the patterns and distribution of the institutionalized capacity to take and influence decisions, in which case governance refers to a wider constituency, to different organized groups exercising political authority for the purpose of finding solutions to problems. There will never be a completely satisfactory definition. By contrast, *Umweltpolitik*, or “environmental politics,” has been used and understood by experts and the general public in German-speaking countries for decades and appears to define the wide range of perspectives within environmental governance in one composite.

Semantics aside, multilevel interactions at local, national, and international scales, public participation in decision making, civil society, pluralism, regulatory mechanisms, institutions, constituted authority, policy, decentralization and devolution of powers, and *legislation are all some of the keywords related to environmental governance. Evidently,* linkages of ecology to economics, law, politics, and public administration are implied. When considering the African continent the subject revolves mostly around the environment-poverty nexus.

Most recent indices of development in Africa are familiar and far from encouraging, in spite of slight improvements in the gross domestic product of some places in sub-Saharan Africa. From an ecological perspective, poverty means a relentless search at the national level for resources, particularly minerals. But at the local level, sheer hunger drives communities to harvest natural resources beyond maximum sustainable and maximum economic yields. African governments are investing in extractive industries in the hope that rents from the minerals will be channeled into the promotion of economic development.

There are a couple of things to note here. The first point is that royalties from minerals do not often result in the projected economic and social benefits for all citizens.

A large portion of Africa's revenues from solid and liquid minerals is funneled into banks and assets abroad in any case. Entreaties from African governments requesting a return of embezzled and illegally transferred assets often fall on deaf ears. The second point is the level of environmental destruction that accompanies the extractive process. Natural resources are often regarded as "common property," which routinely sets off a signal for a measure of recklessness in their exploitation. Few African nations adhere to strict codes of environmental impact assessment; with the result that habitat destruction goes largely unpunished and little remediation is undertaken within damaged environments.

The oil industry, in particular, does have significant ecological footprints. More than 1.5 million tons of oil have been spilled over the course of fifty years in the Niger delta, destroying mangrove vegetation and the nursery grounds for marine fish, shellfish, turtles, and mammals on the continental shelf and in estuaries, in addition to the damage done to coastal homes and farmland. Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua puts the total estimated losses to environmental degradation in his country at \$5.1 billion annually.

Vignettes from Nigeria's Niger delta clearly illustrate the dual impacts of inequity in sharing proceeds from rich mineral resources and environmental degradation. Africa holds an estimated 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, and the United States imported more oil from Africa than from the Middle East in 2005, with Nigeria supplying 10 to 12 percent of U.S. imports (Perry 2007). Yet, every year hundreds of Nigerian children are sold off into slavery by impoverished parents. Two-thirds of Nigeria's 135 million people remain in poverty, one-third is illiterate, and 40 percent have no safe water supply.

In Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe—five of Africa's oil-producing nations—governments that lack accountability and therefore moral authority increasingly neglect the development needs of the populace, neglect the degradation of the land, air, and water through oil exploration, and fail to implement policies for compensation of communities suffering from oil spills and other deleterious impacts of extractive industries. The oil companies operate in partnership with national governments and wield extreme influence within the corridors of power in each of these countries. Notwithstanding their financial assistance to the oil-producing communities, they share responsibility for restiveness and conflicts in the Niger delta.

The book *Escaping the Resource Curse* posits that countries with huge endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas, often perform economically worse than their less fortunate neighbors. The authors proceed to identify problems and proffer solutions. It is a must read for students of African resource economics and environmental management. M. Ottaway, J. Herbst, and G. Mills (2004) extend the argument beyond resource abundance to the combination of land mass and sizeable population as causes of the chronic political instability of Nigeria, DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola. Beyond this controversial postulation the proponents fail to discuss the impact of historical factors as well as the difficulties of managing valuable mineral resources on which militarily powerful industrialized nations depend for energy and survival. The internal political structures that manage Africa's mineral resources are heavily influenced and guided by forces outside the continent.

Expert opinions of Africa's resource problems often assume that a natural endowment with rich minerals such as oil, uranium, and diamonds necessarily guarantees a commensurate human capacity for their management. When the Belgians granted independence to the Congo in 1960 there was not a single African manager in any of the country's mines, and only a dozen Congolese had graduated from a university. The size of the Congo (2.3 million square kilometers) is slightly greater than the combined areas of Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway. Despite this impressive land mass and a plethoric abundance of minerals, or perhaps because of it, the country was governed from 1876 to 1908 through a three-man board appointed by the Belgian King Leopold II. The Belgian government took over the Congo's administration from 1908 until 1960. Unlike other African colonies, local legislative councils or assemblies were never constituted to assist Belgian representation. History per se may not bring solutions to poor governance but it does present a conduit through which nations are able to understand and accept solutions recommended for development and resolving conflicts.

While colonies in Africa were arbitrarily carved out at the Berlin Conference solely on the basis of European interests in natural resources and the potentials for profitable trade, less attention was paid to the development of governance capability and local content to manage resource wealth and geopolitics within the kaleidoscope of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria and the Congo. Once the countries were freed from colonial rule, latent problems boiled over on the surface. The civil wars in the Congo and Nigeria that rapidly followed independence in 1960 were thus well-programmed in advance.

More recent wars in Africa, some resulting from resource scarcity and fought between small states, have taken a heavy toll on wildlife habitats internationally classified and protected as heritage sites. The national parks of Simien (Ethiopia), Tai (Ivory Coast), Banc d'Arguin (Mauritania), Garamba (DRC), and Virunga (DRC) are endangered both by regular poachers and from occupation by refugees.

Regarding the perception of environment-politics-poverty linkages, what is the institutional framework in Africa within which the ensuing concerns are treated? What role is played by governance considerations? African workers in what could be termed *the "environmental sustainability" sector not only complain about the lack of lateral coherence in inter-sectoral policies and inter-ministerial strategies in their countries, but also about administrative rigidity that prevents a vertical diffusion of ideas between the center of government and key stakeholders. Shoestring budgets designated for environmental management are a common refrain.*

Inadequate consultation with communities that hold the keys to forests, land, lakes, and rivers impairs the capability of a government to design pro-poor and pro-environment policies. More difficulties are subsequently experienced when the time comes to implement a unilaterally defined policy. International institutions and the global civil society network have been of great assistance to Africa in making the necessary reforms to situate ecological issues within development strategies. Some of the priority areas of concern and sustained policy action include enhancement of the asset base of poor people in order to diminish their vulnerability to environmental hazards and economic shocks, improving the quality of growth, and reforms to international policies related to trade, private investment, development assistance, and debt.

The role of civil society as a linkage institution between the people and government in Africa rather than a disruptive wedge is the subject of extensive commentary in seminars and published works. Structural and functional aspects of civil society existence are crucial in situations where democratic governance is still in embryonic stages and vestiges of dictatorship remain part of the development. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their international affiliates are not always the most popular with politicians on the continent. Civic organizations in Africa are often accused of being elitist, donor-driven, and therefore market-insensitive. Like the continent's journalists, they frequently endure castigation for what governments consider overt criticism of development policy and incitement in communities. Some governments tacitly classify the entire panoply of civil society groups in their country as a *de facto* opposition party. Thus, the activities of these groups are monitored in a number of countries with unnecessary suspicion. Nonetheless, NGOs that are more practically as opposed to ideologically motivated are able to unblock resistance to institutional change and achieve successes that even central governments recognize.

In truth, many African governments are alienated from the masses they govern for various reasons including electoral malpractices that bring the wrong rulers into power; for corruption; and for the inability of leaders to tackle poverty and disease. If the popular belief is that with the advent of decentralized local government, opportunities for engagement of emerging civic groups with government may grow (Keeley & Scoones 2003), how much decentralization and subsidiarity will transform into actual devolution of administrative powers? How much backing will this development enjoy through acceptable fiscal structures? Local governments in many African countries are far from being models of probity and have certainly not lived up to expectations in terms of transparency and accountability.

Policy ecology is certainly an area where organizations working at the grassroots have a coordinating function. Civil society groups are better placed than civil servants to discuss delicate topics such as gender equality, religious tolerance, the rights of marginalized groups, agricultural expansion into forest lands, hunting and logging, equitable sharing of royalties from oil exploration and harvest of forest products, protection of endangered species, intellectual property rights, and how best to mainstream indigenous knowledge and cultural sensitivity into the management of ecosystems with communities. It is the local environmental NGOs that approach these themes bottom first and prepare draft policies before governments table them at such mega-conferences as the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002) and the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

During the last five years some amount of debate has gone into what was mainstreamed adequately or not into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers of different African countries. Environmental issues were only partially integrated in most of the documents. National institutions able to conduct scientific research in ecology are few in sub-Saharan Africa, with the notable exception of South Africa. Their decay and the inability of governments to address the systemic reasons militating against their existence is part of a wider problem of governance. Formulations of environmental policies, strategies, and action plans and the drafting of legal instruments are fraught with errors

when the knowledge base is insufficient. As a result, economic development could march off in the wrong direction.

Environmental governance as well as economic planning will be severely tested by the encroaching impacts of climate change in the coming years, and perhaps throughout the next century, unless dramatic measures are employed in the industrialized countries to cut carbon emissions and mitigate global warming. Climate variability in Africa is associated with water—either too much or too little of it. Small-scale, rain-fed farming is the basis of food production in Africa. The continent is therefore extremely vulnerable to the uncertainties and weather extremes of global warming. Despite pontificating reports on potential consequences in the local media and cable television, awareness of climate change and action to combat its impacts remain lethargic and will take a long time to acquire critical mass in Africa. A former British foreign minister remarked that climate change is a threat multiplier. How these threats fan out into other areas such as health, the economy, human migration, biodiversity, and others in the foreseeable future can only be imagined.

While African nations have all ratified the Kyoto Protocol and regularly participate in policy declarations and international action programs to mitigate global warming and adapt to the impacts of climate change, it is important that these international agreements are domesticated in the countries that have acceded to them. This remains an unwieldy process in much of Africa. Climate change has ignited a feverish revision of energy and growth policies in the direction of efficiency everywhere else except Africa. How is Africa preparing for the period when the industrialized countries will be less dependent on its raw materials such as oil and gas? How much is the continent's environmental capital—forests, oil, gas, solid minerals—considered a question of security by Africans?

The drive to convert large tracts of African savanna and rainforest into plantations in order to produce feedstock (sugarcane, jatropha, allanblackia, soybean, etc.) for biofuels is attractive to African politicians and businesses. Communities that may lose their forests in the process are presently not aware of what lies in store for them. It is a *controversial move, and not without its critics, in as much as uncertainties exist regarding* impact on food security and biodiversity. Evidence-based guidance on sustainable biofuel production and consumption must become a prerequisite for the development of climate and energy policies.

Perspectives of environment and development present key policy challenges for African governments and civil society. Laws and policies are only as good as the political will to enforce them. There is the need in Africa for policy coherence—nationally, regionally, and continentally—processes that could be facilitated by the African Union/New Partnership for Africa's Development and the regional economic commissions of the different subregions through the existing African Ministerial Conference on the Environment. This requires a strengthening of the country, regional, and continental capacity to participate and negotiate effectively in meetings around the MEAs, with especial reference to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The policy levers of most African

governments are not effectively positioned to stimulate public conversation and attitudinal transformation over the search for alternatives to the burning of fossil fuels.

Internally, African parliamentarians must initiate and support appropriate and facilitating legislation aimed at integrating poverty-environment issues in economic policy making. Campaigns of passion and idealism will not halt the loss of Africa's biodiversity or mitigate the impacts of climate change on its people. What is needed is more environmental assessment and poverty social impact analysis—an increase in the use of economic valuation of the African environment at both the macro and micro level—in order to highlight the full cost of environmental degradation for the poor in particular and within the economy in general.

Leaders in Africa have been strongly advised by international development agencies and NGOs regarding the creation of enabling policies for private-sector participation in an energy-efficient economy. Oil companies in Nigeria continue to flare and vent gas associated with oil drilling into the atmosphere, despite official policy against the practice. The business sector in Africa has not quite developed ethical sensibilities in respect of the environment, about which it demonstrates little willingness to be informed.

The African continent imploded in a spate of military coups d'état in the 1960s and 1970s, during which period dictators who had no respect for the dignity of man were far less interested in the welfare of wild beasts within forest estates. The architecture of pluralism and democratic governance is far from perfect in this first decade of the 21st century. Ultimately, the health of the environment will depend on the capacity of African countries to design and nurture efficient institutions, legal instruments, and coordinated regulatory mechanisms to safeguard a high degree of political stability as well as the equilibrium of ecological systems.

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Turkish Trade and Investment Promotion Strategy toward Africa

By Tuncer Kayalar

Tuncer Kayalar has been the Turkish Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade since 2002. He is also the chairman of the administrative boards of the Turkish Ex-Im Bank and the Export Promotion Center of Turkey and a member of the Money-Credit and Coordination Committee of Turkey. His other memberships include the administrative/advisory boards of Turkish institutions such the Scientific and Technological Council, the National Productivity Center, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, and the Administration for the Development and Support of SMEs. He has published a number of articles and is the founder and owner of the Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy and the journal Uluslararası Ekonomi ve Dis Ticaret Politikaları (International Economy and Foreign Trade Policies).

Today, globalization, despite its discontents, offers an opportunity for collective prosperity and sustainable development. The long and winding road to shared success naturally necessitates shared responsibility and a vision toward narrowing the income differences between the rich and the poor.

For decades, the poverty of Africa has stood in contrast to the affluence of the developed world. Today, the African continent remains marginalized in the world economy, with more than half of its population left to live on less than US \$1 per day. Many dwell in excessive poverty, lacking access to safe drinking water and food, and many inescapably die from preventable diseases.

Uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of globalization impose a threat on global stability. Receding incomes and a sentiment of exclusion from the rest of the world can only breed political chaos and strife. Only a comprehensive global approach can break the vicious cycle of extreme poverty.

Historically, several initiatives have been undertaken to enable the African countries to access the institutions of the international community and its credit facilities, which are so central to economic development. The United Nations has been devising strategies and projects to set Africa on a path of sustainable development, encouraging its active participation in the global economy.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which aim primarily to halve extreme poverty, halt the spread of HIV/AIDS, and provide universal primary education by 2015, focus fundamentally on the challenges of global poverty. The MDGs have become a driving force behind addressing excessive destitution prevailing on the African continent. These goals are praiseworthy in the sense that they are people-centered, time-bound, and measurable. Furthermore, some progress has been achieved during the past decade. Yet, much work remains to be done.

In addition to such noble international initiatives, bilateral economic partnerships can offer tremendous opportunities for development. In light of Turkey's recent accomplishments in foreign trade (almost a threefold growth during the last six years), one could presume that each additional percentage increase in Africa's foreign trade would deliver many times more income than the continent currently receives in humanitarian aid. Thus, it is crucial to formulate strategies that transform the structure of African exports from raw materials to more lucrative semifinished and/or finished products, hence increasing the return on investment rate. Within the context of realizing prosperity, it is essential to establish an environment conducive to international trade by removing the barriers against African exports and attracting foreign direct investment to the region.

Turkey, currently ranked the 17th largest economy in nominal measures, 15th in purchasing power parity measures, and 18th in foreign trade volume, is one of the countries most suited to assist Africa in further breaking the chain of excessive poverty with its "not aid but trade and investment" vision. On the one hand, Turkey's geographical proximity and its historical ties to many African countries are key factors in the development of its relations with the continent. On the other hand, Africa offers vast potential for Turkish companies in various sectors that are subject to the utmost competition in international trade. Among these sectors, textile and clothing are the most likely to benefit significantly from partnerships with African enterprises. In fact, strategic foreign direct investment toward production facilities in Africa is one of the few realistic options for Turkish textile firms to attain a competitive edge against recently rising Asian countries. Considering the pivotal role this sector plays in many African countries, the yields from such cooperation would be extraordinary.

Turkey further presents an enormous opportunity for technological advance in Africa. In particular, Turkey has been sharing its know-how, technology, and expertise to help industrialize African countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Senegal, specifically in sectors like agro-industry, food processing, textiles and clothing, construction materials, and durable consumer goods. Concerted efforts at developing competitive export sectors in the region will pave the way for further trade opportunities between African economies and Turkey.


With this mindset, the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade initiated the "Trade and Investment Promotion Strategy Toward Africa" at the beginning of 2003. This strategy put forth the following objectives:

- To establish the legal infrastructure between Turkey and African countries with agreements such as "Avoidance of Double Taxation" and "Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments"
- To build new capacities and activate new trade, creating mechanisms such as investments, transfer of technology, and know-how
- To increase the share of Turkish direct investments in Africa over the next five-year period
- To emphasize importation from Africa and to support policies geared toward eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers against African products
- To achieve a growth rate of trade with Africa higher than that of Turkey's overall trade
- To consolidate the presence of Turkish contractors and consulting companies in Africa

As of the end of 2008, which marked the sixth year of the strategy, the results achieved so far are promising:

- The legal infrastructure has been established with more than forty African nations. The number of Turkish commercial missions in Africa is projected to reach twenty-three by the end of 2009.
- Turkey organized seventy-six national participations to various trade and investment fairs in Africa. Many seminars, business forums, and conferences have been organized in Turkey and several African countries.
- For the first time in history, the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, underlining the utmost importance Turkey attributes to its overall relations with African nations, was held in August 2008 in Istanbul with the participation of about twenty presidents and prime ministers as well as seventy ministers from Africa.
- Turkey-Africa investment and trade forums are being organized on a yearly basis, bringing together ministers, bureaucrats, and business community leaders.
- Turkey's trade with African countries exceeded \$18 billion as of the end of 2008 (see Figure 1). The average increase of trade before the inception of the strategy was 5.7 percent annually. This ratio has now reached 31 percent annually post-initiation of the strategy.

Figure 1



Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade records

- The value of the projects undertaken by Turkish construction companies in Africa reached \$26.8 billion by the end of 2008 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2

Construction Projects Undertaken by Turkish Companies in Africa (bn \$)							
Before 2003	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
11.1	0.6	1.2	0.9	2.5	6.7	3.8	26.8

Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade records

- There has been a steady increase in the number of Turkish companies operating in Africa. The cumulative Turkish direct investment to Africa climbed to \$1.5 billion, 90 percent of which has been realized during the last five years.

Epitomized by the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade’s strategy, Turkey-Africa relations are developing very rapidly. As a new member of the United Nations Security Council for 2009-2010, Turkey is determined to strengthen its partnership with Africa, actively contribute to its development, and further promote its integration to the globalized world.

The Central African Republic in 2020

By Martin Ziguélé

Martin Ziguélé was prime minister of the Central African Republic from April 2001 to March 2003.

A former French colony by the name of “Territoire de l’Oubangui Chari,” the Central African Republic (CAR), declared its autonomy on 1 December 1958 under the leadership of Father Barthélemy Boganda. An Oubanguian member of the French Parliament, Boganda passed away in a plane crash less than a year before the country formally sealed its independence on 13 August 1960.

Landlocked at the heart of the African continent, the CAR shares its borders with five countries: Chad along 1,197 km in the North; the Sudan along 1,165 km in the East; the Congo along 467 km and the Democratic Republic of Congo along 1,090 km in the South; and Cameroon along 600 km in the West (with the Douala, Cameroon, port being the CAR’s closest access to the sea).

The CAR belongs to the group of Least Developed Countries and ranks 171 out of 177 on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2007 human development index.¹ Though its territory of 623,000 km² is larger than that of France, the country is underpopulated with only about 4 million inhabitants. The Central African Republic people are extremely poor; in 2006, 67 percent lived on less than a dollar per day and 84 percent on less than two dollars per day. UNDP estimates gross domestic product per capita to be U.S. \$725.8 (PPP, purchasing power parity) in 2007.

In sharp contrast with this rampant poverty, the country’s soils are extremely rich (mainly diamonds and uranium, with evidence of oil and steel), and its agricultural potential enormous (15 million hectares of arable land, most notably in the Northwest and in the center for cotton and sugarcane plantation). The CAR also enjoys vast tropical wood reserves and abundant hydrographic resources. Such immense opportunities could arguably position the Central African Republic as both the breadbasket and the wellspring of Central Africa.

However, many years of failed management, internal political troubles, and eventually military rebellion have greatly undermined the country’s governance capacities and its appeal to the international community. That said, a return to peace and stability—if confirmed following the inclusive political dialogue that just ended in December 2008 in the CAR capital of Bangui—could help foster the country’s development by leveraging the aforementioned comparative advantages.

For instance, the exploitation of the uranium mines in the East (operated by the French company AREVA) could almost single-handedly jump-start other sectors of the country's economy. It could dramatically improve transportation infrastructure and gather momentum around a potential nuclear power plant that could, in the long-term, sell energy to neighboring countries. While the extraction of uranium primarily serves the production of electricity, a variety of other applications can be derived from its transformation. This is particularly true in the agribusiness (e.g., fertilizers) and medical (e.g., radiography, radioisotopes) fields, both of which represent potential development sectors for the Central African Republic.

From a purely agricultural standpoint, by 2020 the CAR could become a major breadbasket for Africa. Our country could export its surplus to Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and even Eritrea, which all suffer from a structural deficit in terms of agricultural goods. The CAR enjoys vast tracts of land and has access to ample water sources. What it needs is capital, seeds, and skilled manpower. This is why, when I was prime minister, I invited the White farmers expelled from Zimbabwe to come join us. Considering their pivotal role in once making their country the breadbasket of Southern Africa, I thought they could contribute substantially to the development of our agriculture. The Central African Republic must indeed do more to attract both human and financial capital.

The CAR is ultimately of great geostrategic interest for the international community, due to its common borders with the Sudan and Chad. The ongoing wars in Eastern Chad and Sudanese Darfur could at any time spill over into our country. Considering the CAR's geographic position, such an outcome would almost immediately destabilize the entire Central African region, starting with the gigantic Democratic Republic of the Congo with whom we share more than 1,000 kilometers of borders. This is precisely why French President Nicolas Sarkozy strongly pushed an otherwise reluctant Europe to deploy the European Union Force (EUFOR)ⁱⁱ in January 2008 along the Chad-CAR border facing the Sudan. This force was replaced by the United Nations Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) on 16 March 2009.

Because of its vast resources, its enormous agricultural potential, and its critical geographic position, the Central African Republic deserves more attention from international actors and investors. In light of our people's openness and our country's immense opportunities, I am convinced such attention would prove greatly beneficial to all and dramatically enhance the CAR's development.

Endnotes

ⁱ All United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) statistics refer to the 2007/2008 United Nations Human Development National Report on the Central African Republic, published in July 2008 by UNDP.

ⁱⁱ The European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR is a one-year transitional military operation dedicated to improving regional security in close coordination with the multidimensional presence of the United Nations in Eastern Chad and in Northeastern CAR.

Chinua Achebe: Storied and True

An Interview with Chinua Achebe

Interviewed by Jasmin Johnson and Adibeli Nduka-Agwu

Albert Chinualumogu Achebe is a world-renowned Nigerian poet, novelist, and critic. His first novel, Things Fall Apart (1958), is the most widely read African novel; it sold 8 million copies worldwide and has been translated into fifty languages. He has written four other novels, several short stories, collections of poetry, and a significant number of political commentaries. His thematic concerns are colonialism and its effects, clashes of value, and African traditions. He sparked international controversy when he delivered a lecture on Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness and criticized the novel's inherent racism. He is now a professor of language and literature at Bard College in New York.

Interviewers: Jasmin Johnson and Adibeli Nduka-Agwu interviewed Chinua Achebe during his visit to Cambridge, MA, on 17 November 2008.

Jasmin Johnson is the Senior Editor for Interviews of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal. She will receive her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kenned School in 2010. She obtained her Bachelor of Arts in English and Sociology from Middlebury College in 2005.

Adibeli Nduka-Agwu is enrolled in the Master of Public Policy Program at the Harvard Kennedy School, where she is the Senior Editor for Commentaries of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal. She obtained her Bachelor of Arts in Social and Political Sciences from Cambridge University in 2007 after which she worked at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra.

HAPJ

Your literary works heavily consider themes of cross-cultural clashes of value, such as in your treatment of colonialism or corruption within African states. What are the main implications for the formulation of policy, such as development policy?

ACHEBE

I write fiction. There are crossroads between fiction and fact. Any good fiction should be a telling of something *else*—something other than the story. The story is very important, but generally the underlying ideas bear on what you call “policy.” I believe, for instance,

the truth of fiction is sometimes stronger than that of the newspaper. There is a certain area of our experience that you can reach best through imagination.

However, we, that is, all readers including policy makers, should be aware of this. You don't want your readers reading fiction as though it was fact. As an author, you also don't want to suggest that because you present a hero who is unpleasant, for instance, it means you support unpleasant people. So I think as long as that boundary is respected, everybody should be happy: both the writer and the reader.

HAPJ

What is the role that the African author should or is likely to play in the development of policy in the conceivable future?

ACHEBE

I think that role is determined by the life that is going on around us at any moment. The way one writer responds to what is going on around him or her is always different from the way another writer responds. It is rather risky to lay down the law for writers in general. I wouldn't dream of doing that because it is arrogant to begin with, and it also doesn't work. It shows a kind of unawareness that a writer should not be encouraging.

HAPJ

Thinking about your work and that of other African writers, can you describe what impact these works are having on Western communities?

ACHEBE

It has impacted Western audiences. The amazing thing about stories is that they travel quickly and strongly. I am a bit hesitant in finding my words here, because it is not my intention to begin thinking of a novel in terms of "what impact can I have." I don't think: "How will people respond to this?" You let the story develop. You let the story begin. The story makes all kinds of preparations for its own arrival.

If you are looking and you are close to what is going on in your society, you will have no difficulty in encountering a difficult issue and then saying, "Ah!—this is important. If I don't respond to it, I will be missing an opportunity." You don't start out by saying, "I can make an impact with this."

But a story could still be a good story even if it is not making the kind of impact that you think will be relevant at that point. I am evading any kind of suggestion that the writer has a solution [and] that he only needs to take out his pen for the solution to flow to the advantage of society. The relationship between society and the writer remains in some ways ambiguous.

HAPJ

Have conditions improved for African writers? Do you think enough has been done to encourage them?

ACHEBE

There is always room to encourage. Take the example of Nigeria, a place where literature has made some impact—some people would even say considerable impact. But it is never enough.

Society does demand constantly from its observers—the writer. The writer's presence is, in my view, always necessary. In terms of the number of people who have been writing, we should not feel like “it's okay, we've got there, we've done it.” I think there should be a constant interest of writers in the life of their community.

And as to whether the work of writers has fulfilled its path of reflecting on the society, I happen to believe that we have a necessary relationship between writers and society.

It is not every one who will agree with me. This is what I think and what I feel. The relationship between writer and society is where there is considerable debate and discussion.

HAPJ

Your writing addresses leadership in general and leadership in Africa in particular. Could you share with us the important traits of leadership in Africa in what is now a “postcolonial” world?

ACHEBE

Leaders are not there to show how clever they are. They are there to make a contribution to improve the lives of the citizens of their country. As long as leaders don't forget who the “boss” is, I am quite happy with them.

The election of Barack Obama was a most extraordinary event. I had my doubts all along. I couldn't resist or put it aside—I believed someone was going to pull something at some point that would ensure that that the first African-American president in the United States would only remain a dream.

We've seen this in the past: the whole independence in West Africa was drowned one morning by the Cold War. So people who had followed Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were suddenly disappointed. First thing: be astonished. We have seen one of the most important events in a number of centuries.

Africans Living with HIV/AIDS Are Vital Partners

An Interview with Stephen Lewis

Interviewed by Jasmin Johnson

Stephen Lewis is currently the codirector of AIDS-Free World and the Stephen Lewis Foundation, two nonprofits dedicated to supporting and empowering Africans with HIV/AIDS. Born in Canada, he began his career as a politician in Ontario, rising to hold the leadership position in the New Democratic Party in the 1970s. He then served as the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations. From 2001 to 2006, Lewis was the United Nations Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, and he has received international acclaim for his effectiveness in bringing this epidemic to the attention of world leaders.

Interviewer: Jasmin Johnson interviewed Stephen Lewis during his visit to Cambridge, MA, on 2 December 2008.

HAPJ

What are some recent developments in HIV/AIDS infection rates in Africa?

LEWIS

We have seen an unprecedented growth in physical and sexual violence in Africa recently, which has in turn led to a further rise in HIV/AIDS infections. We have also seen an increase in the number of people living with disability and AIDS.

HAPJ

What are your policy suggestions for the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa, particularly as it relates to sexual violence?

LEWIS

Well, we already have Security Council resolutions which call for an end to sexual violence and mandate peacekeeping forces to protect women. That has to be implemented. If it cannot be implemented right now due to short staffing, then they have to add to the peacekeepers. That becomes a policy decision.

How do you get countries to send more troops in order to stop sexual violence against women? Well, why do you pass Security Council resolutions if you're not going to do anything about them?

On June 19th, there was a Security Council resolution saying sexual violence was a threat to international peace and security. We are about six months down the road, and not a single thing has happened. On October 1st, 2000, there was a very famous resolution called 1325, which said that women must be at the peace table in all of the negotiations around conflict. It has never been used once in eight years.

Therefore, the policy recommendation is to put into use the decisions that have already been made, whatever it may take to implement them; otherwise, why make them? We have the whole range of objectives, solutions, policies, and programs that are clearly evident but they are never introduced.

There is so much negligence and inertia in the multilateral system. The “3 by 5,” an inspired solution to the AIDS pandemic, fell to the wayside because of rivalry, negligence, and inertia.¹

I feel the same way about policy making at the national level, for example, with national AIDS councils that don’t implement their agreements. Governments say, “We will pass laws against rape and sexual violence,” and then take years to get down to it. All of the apparatus around AIDS is in place; it is not a mystery what to do. It’s just doing it. That’s the policy suggestion.

The smaller organizations usually make policy and adhere to it. There are big NGOs—CARE, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children—that don’t have difficulty pursuing their policy. Why should governments have difficulty?

HAPJ

What are the common organizational weaknesses when it comes to HIV/AIDS?

LEWIS

The main organizational weaknesses are always ones of leadership and not questions of design or financial probity. The United Nations has lacked the leadership to implement significant programs. Other organizations that fail have failed because they simply don’t have the leadership to get their staff to do what they ordinarily would want to do, but need some direction to actually do it.

We have Bono, Oprah, Alicia Keys, Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, Madonna, George Clooney, Richard Gere—why are they so prominent in the fight against AIDS? Because we have celebrity leadership in the absence of political leadership.

What I am hoping is that the emergence of [U.S. President Barack] Obama, in conjunction with [British Prime Minister] Gordon Brown in the United Kingdom, will give us the political leadership that is required. That is where the money lies and where the force comes from for social change. That’s what I see as the primary difficulty of public policy. Spare me the further documents of public policy. We know what needs to be done.

HAPJ

Is collaboration always effective in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa?

LEWIS

That depends on who your partners are. In the world of AIDS, you have to choose your partners very carefully. You have to ensure that you share common assumptions about condoms, abstinence, fidelity, and use of resources. The one absolute law in partnerships is that you have to have an association of people living with AIDS with whom you are partnering, or else you are on the wrong track. You can't impose solutions on a situation that is so complex and so difficult without having people living with AIDS as your key partners. They know more about the pandemic than anyone else will ever know.

Yet, these people are rarely consulted. They are ostracized and stigmatized and can't get to see cabinet ministers or presidents. Their lives are very difficult. If an organization is serious about making a difference, they should partner with an association of people living with AIDS. It is supposed to be part of the United Nations [UN] system. GIPA—Greater Involvement of People Living with AIDS—is supposed to be a key part of the UN AIDS structure, but it's merely rhetorical. It rarely happens on the ground in a serious way, which is painful. People living with AIDS really understand what's going on, and if you consult with them, we would have broken through by now.

Governments that have been more successful in including these people include Botswana and Rwanda. And the major NGOs that I mentioned—Care and World Vision and others—are conscious of it. Anything my organizations do [AIDS-Free World, Stephen Lewis Foundation], we do as much as possible in conjunction with people living with AIDS—it's so colonial not to.

Endnotes

ⁱ The “3 by 5” initiative, launched by UNAIDS and the World Health Organization in 2003, was a global target to provide three million people living with HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income countries with life-prolonging antiretroviral treatment by the end of 2005.

Desmond Tutu: Lessons from History

An Interview with Archbishop Desmond Tutu

Interviewed by Dambudzo Muzenda and Andrew Silvestri

Desmond Mpilo Tutu is the Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, South Africa. He is also a human rights activist and the winner of the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize. He played a prominent leadership role against the apartheid regime in South Africa and then chaired the Truth and Reconciliation Commission upon its abolition in the 1990s. Tutu was elected the first black South African Anglican Archbishop in Cape Town. He is currently the chairman of the Global Elders (or "The Elders"), a group of twelve public figures with much experience in government, peace negotiation, and human rights.

Interviewers: Dambudzo Muzenda and Andrew Silvestri interviewed Desmond Tutu during his visit to Cambridge, MA, on 18 October 2008.

Dambudzo Muzenda is the Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal. She received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government in 2009 and a Bachelor of Political Science from Yale College in 2007.

Andrew Silvestri is the Managing Editor of the Harvard Africa Policy Journal. He received his Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School in 2009, and a Bachelor of Science in Government and Legal Studies and International Studies from Oklahoma Christian University in 2007.

HAPJ

Please comment on the recent shake-up in the South African government. South African President Thabo Mbeki and several ministers have resigned, and a splinter group is under formation. What do you think about these developments?

TUTU

I think that the cause of concern is not that somebody resigned or was asked to resign, but that the developments stemmed from vengeance. They tolerated Thabo for nine years, and he had only about six or so months left for his term to run out. They expelled two premiers, and they did so not entirely based on their performance. One of them was probably not as effective as he could have been, but the other was probably one of their best premiers. They expelled these two because they supported Thabo, and right now they are considering expelling two others for the same reasons.

This is going to be the pattern. They were hurt by Thabo in various ways. Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, and Matthews Phosa plotted, and they were able to get their own people back. Now, similarly, they are going to be hurting certain people by their actions—people who will then plot and wait for the day when they will get their own people back. So we're getting into a cycle of tit-for-tatting, which bodes ill. And it looks like—especially in the Western Cape—there is a very serious breakaway. That's the negative side of all of this: it could set off a cycle of tit-for-tatting.

The good thing is, and credit is due to Thabo for this, he didn't invoke the army. He could have done so, and if you look at what happened in other parts of Africa and the world, we could easily have had bloodshed. The fact that we had what really amounted to a coup—a bloodless coup—says something about South Africa.

Some people say that it is a good thing for the ANC [African National Congress] to split, and that that party has what amounts to an undemocratic control of the country. They say ANC had a monopoly that was not good, that South Africa was effectively a one-party state. That's not entirely true, because we still have an independent judiciary, which has been attacked by some leaders of the ANC but is still strong all the same. We also have a fairly vibrant media, which I think is very independent. We used to have a lively civil society but I think we were lulled into a kind of false sense of security or complacency. Allan Boesak [former churchman and a leader of the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front who recently joined the newly formed Congress of the People (Cope)] is talking about a revival like what happened with the old United Democratic Front. We have to see.

HAPJ

The global financial and economic crisis is likely to affect Africa in several ways. How do you think Africa should react? Do we need to develop a different paradigm of development?

TUTU

Capitalism, while being able to make certain people rich, appears to operate on something morally abhorrent. It seems to operate on the basis of encouraging the worst side of all of us—our selfishness. It seems to allow us to operate on the law of the jungle—eat or be eaten.

I don't think we're likely to have too many countries being sympathetic during these times, if their fundamental worldview is one that is reflected in capitalism. All along, God is trying to say, learn one lesson: "You are one family. You are not going to be able to be prosperous in isolation. If we're going to be prosperous, we're going to be prosperous together. There is not going to be security if you have conditions that make people desperate in another part of the world." It seems so obvious but it is a lesson that is taking us so long to learn.

At present, many African countries have tried to produce many primary goods. We're trying to become more self-reliant. The EU subsidizes their own agricultural produce substantially so that those farmers there are able to sell their produce at low

prices, which they then dump on African countries. On top of those subsidies, they often have tariffs.

What happens is that you see people playing a game in which there are two sides. On one side are players, but these players are also the same ones who make the rules of the game, and they are also the referees of the game. So where can you hope to have a fair deal?

I think that African countries that produce commodities and have products that are very greatly sought after ought to form cartels. There are African countries that produce oil, such as Nigeria. These countries ought to try to persuade OPEC to be harsher.

HAPJ

What is your opinion on power-sharing agreements, especially given what happened in Kenyaⁱ and what is unfolding in Zimbabweⁱⁱ right now? Do you think this is a viable solution to civil unrest?

TUTU

I went to Kenya very soon after the trouble started. I was invited by the General Secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches. I did not go to negotiate. The visit was billed as a solidarity visit. I met with Mr. [Mwai] Kibaki, Mr. [Raila] Odinga, and a representative from the third party—the party that split from the Orange Party. In my view, Mr. Odinga and his people were extraordinarily magnanimous. Because they had won the local parliamentary elections, it is highly unlikely that they did not win the presidential election. I was shown ballot papers which had been quite crudely altered. They did not use Tipp-Ex [a brand of correction fluid] or anything like that. They just scratched the one figure and put a new figure on the top.

I think that if Mr. Odinga and his people had dug in his heels, as he very well could have done, there would have been a great deal of bloodshed. So if that kind of thing has to happen, there has to be considerable magnanimity on the part of the side that knows they had won in reality. In Zimbabwe, all indications are that MDC [Movement for Democratic Change] had won, and then there was the run off.

So is it a pattern? No, I don't think it is a pattern. It's not the pattern in Botswana. We need to have people who are statesmanlike.

I just visited Cyprus last week with [former U.S.] President Carter. As Elders, we had gone to try to persuade the people to have a settlement that unites that island. The two sides had different districts. The Turk Cypriots have a history that started in 1964, when they were forced out as a state out of the coalition. The Greek Cypriots have a history that started in 1974 with the invasion—as they call it—of their lands by the Turks. It's terrible how people can be divided by perspective.

We went to them to say that no agreement is possible when both sides are unwilling to make concessions and compromises. If you say “all or nothing,” the so-called zero sum, you've had it. You won't get that peace settlement.

We had thought that in Africa, a new dawn had occurred when we moved away from military dictatorships and one-party states. But when you see what is happening in

Somalia, the Sudan, and the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo], you sometimes think that there is a curse.

But how long did it take Britain to become a stable democracy? How long did it take France? Just recently there were dictatorships in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. We forget that two world wars happened very quickly—one after the other. You had the Holocaust in Germany.

When people ask me how I feel about Africa, I usually say to Westerners that their history gives me a great deal of hope. If the West, given what happened to them in their lands, could now be as they are, then what reason is [there] for us not to follow suit? They also forget that South Africa has been free for only fourteen years now. How long has the United States been free? See how many divisions are still in this country? Hurricane Katrina showed just how deeply divided the United States is on racial ground. So, I have a great deal of hope for Africa.

HAPJ

Do you see Africa “rising”?

TUTU

When you ask: “Who is the world’s most admired statesperson?” almost everyone says “Nelson Mandela.” And when people talk about what you do in a post-conflict situation, mostly they will refer to the experience of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

There are many things that are wrong here in Africa, but take a historical perspective: developed countries evolved over a very long period, and they want to shorten the process for Africa. I mean, look at the number of wars there were in Europe. When there was a famine in Canaan, where did Abraham and those people try to find succor? The Holy Family fled to Egypt. And when Christ carried his cross, the person who helped him carry his cross was an African—Simon of Cyrene. We forget all those things . . . [but] some of the greatest Christian scholars were Africans. Athanasius and Augustine of Hippo—one of the most merciful minds of the early Church—were African. You need to actually remind Africans that they do in fact have a glorious past and ought to live up to that past.

Endnotes

ⁱ According to a 28 February 2009 article in the *New York Times* (“Starvation and Strife Menace Torn Kenya” by Jeffrey Gettleman): “Kenya . . . pulled apart in 2008, when hundreds of thousands of people fled ethnically mixed areas for the safety of homogeneous zones. This was the result of a disputed election in which the president, Mwai Kibaki, was widely believed to have rigged the results to stay in power. Supporters of the top opposition leader, Raila Odinga, who hails from a different ethnic group, then vented their rage on Mr. Kibaki’s people.”

ⁱⁱ According to an 11 February 2009 article in the *New York Times* (“Mugabe Swears in his Rival as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe” by Celia Dugger), “After months of violence, negotiation and reluctant compromise, Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, on

Wednesday swore in his nemesis, Morgan Tsvangirai, as prime minister of a power-sharing government in which Mr. Mugabe still dominates the repressive state security forces. . . . Mr. Tsvangirai's decision to accept the role of prime minister constituted an ambiguous coda to almost a year of bitter confrontation. Mr. Tsvangirai, 56, bested Mr. Mugabe, 84, in the first round of presidential elections last March, but dropped out of a discredited June runoff because of state-sanctioned attacks on his supporters."

Paul E. Terry

An Insightful Portrait of Living with AIDS in Africa:
A Review of *Breaking Stone Silence: Giving Voice to AIDS
Prevention in Africa*

(Africa World Press, 2006)

Reviewed by Fatina Abdrabboh

Fatina Abdrabboh earned her MPP from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in June 2008. Her research focuses on Arab American and African American relations in Detroit.

On the cover of this captivating book stands a despondent young boy, shovel in hand, in front of a barren, leafless tree that hovers above his head in the background. His slouched shoulders and downcast stare suggest an exhaustion that is a symbol of the thousands of ordinary African citizens infected with HIV since the discovery of the virus in the 1980s. *Breaking Stone Silence* is a documentary account of the devastating effects that HIV and AIDS have wrought in every sphere of society in African nations such as Zimbabwe and Malawi where rates of the disease is as “high as 60 percent in some townships” (31). The devastating social and economic consequences that AIDS inflicts on ordinary Africans was apparent to Dr. Paul Terry following a visit he made to Zimbabwe as a Kellogg National Fellow in 2000. This book is an attempt to honor the identities of these victims and thus penetrate the deafening “silence surrounding AIDS” (x) in Africa today.

Faced with what he describes as the impossible task of addressing all issues related to AIDS in Africa, Terry argues that AIDS, like racism, cannot be “overcome” (88) via individual effort but rather requires a pooling of resources to enable a collective effort. Thus, in order to be effective, future HIV prevention initiatives in Africa must coordinate “national and international efforts” (155) in a manner that addresses the rampant “denial of the problem” (26) while simultaneously broaching the “taboo” (49) subject that has left females vulnerable in a nation like Malawi where thousands of “wives are dead because of philandering spouses” (29). Advancing social changes that are capable of reducing the devastating impact of this disease can be accomplished through a national effort that undermines the disease by stripping away the taboos surrounding it.

Still, public health officials and policy makers must remain aware of the realities of AIDS in Africa and tailor initiatives accordingly since advancing social change through policy in Africa is “constantly thwarted by political strife and cultural forces such as racism and sexism” (155). Otherwise, AIDS policies will be incapable of transcending the “cultural sanctity” (11) surrounding beliefs that sleeping with female virgins cures AIDS or that AIDS is not spread via human intercourse but as a result of dead relatives’ displeasure with one’s way of living (33).

Throughout this fine book, Terry makes no pretense of objectivity. Instead he places his readers at the “epicenter of the world’s most virulent epidemic” (3) and thus confronts the international community and its numerous failed policies vis-à-vis the AIDS epidemic in Africa. With a searing blend of skepticism and outrage that provides lucid insight into the endemic failures of current international approaches to AIDS in Africa, Terry demonstrates that one need not be a “cross cultural savant” (19) in order to recognize “how social justice issues impact” (8) the spread of AIDS in Africa. Terry’s intimate knowledge of Africa allows him to dissect and illuminate the lives of individual Africans throughout the continent to paint a picture of how the epidemic affects individuals and how society’s lamentable silence has perpetuated its spread. His desire to give voice to the individual stories compels him, on many occasions, to undertake life-threatening risks.

In *Breaking Stone Silence* Dr. Paul Terry constructs an insightful and moving portrait about living with AIDS in Africa. This well-researched narrative depicts a scholar’s devotion to help eradicate a devastating epidemic by reminding individuals that problems affecting Africans can only be rectified after they have been recognized. In all, Terry’s portrayal of AIDS in Africa is convincing and, at times, gripping. Though there is no shortage of stories on the subject of AIDS in Africa, few published works elucidate the sacrifices of ordinary Africans engaged in the disease in as engrossing a manner as Terry’s book does.

Maria Eriksson Baaz

Postcolonial Development Aid: Between the Quest for Equality
and the Persistence of Colonial Frames and Mindsets

A Review of *the Paternalism of Partnership: A Postcolonial
Reading of Identity in Development Aid*

(Zed Books, 2005)

Reviewed by Daniel Bendix

Daniel Bendix is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute for Development Policy and Management of the University of Manchester (UK). His dissertation project deals with the colonial legacy in Germany's development politics. Mr. Bendix has work experience as a research assistant at the Free University Berlin in a project on inclusive and democratic reforms of security sectors in Africa. He is working as a freelance facilitator in political adult education. His political activities include involvement in antiracist struggles that challenge Germany's colonial present.

International development thought and practice has seen the rise and decline of multiple theoretical approaches: several embrace the idea of development as a societal process toward a supposed modernity and take the superiority of the global North's development for granted. After decades of development intervention failures, post- and antidevelopment approaches emerged in the 1990s and challenged this stance: they undertook fundamental critiques of Western development interventions in the global South by unmasking neocolonial and capitalist agendas. Maria Eriksson Baaz's monograph is an example of current attempts to situate development in the broader picture of South-North relations that are marked by the legacy of colonialism. Using postcolonial theory as a framework, she analyzes how identities of Scandinavian donors and their development workers in Tanzania are constituted in the context of development and partnership discourses.

Regarding the methodological framework presented in chapter one, the author follows the discourse theory of the post-Marxist political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. For Baaz, discourses define and restrict the ways in which a phenomenon can be understood; they are "a historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of representations or articulations through which meanings are constructed and social practices organized" (11).

The other central concept she employs is identity, which she understands as relational and constructed through difference and as dynamic rather than fixed. It is “a double process in which the subject is not only ‘hailed’ into certain subject positions but also ‘invests in’ a particular position” (14). In Baaz’s view, identities are only provided with meaning through discourse and therefore need to be thoroughly situated in specific contexts. As to her method, Baaz conducted open interviews with Scandinavian development workers from Scandinavian organizations. She avoided naming and thus positioning the interviewees as Westerners or Whites, but rather tried to give them space to position themselves. To complement the data from the interviews she used publications by the donor organizations. Both interviews and documents were interpreted within two major discursive contexts: (1) that of discourses constituted during colonialism and in its aftermath and (2) that of the discourse of development aid in the context of economic inequality.

In the second chapter, the author identifies two main discourses—dating back to European Enlightenment and colonialism—within which Western identities are formed: evolutionary progress and otherness. Through these discourses, donors and development workers construe the African Other as similar to the European Self and as inherently different at the same time. Baaz, for example, points out that the policy of cultural exchange—central to the partnership discourse—turns out to be a desire for a reformed Other that can never become like the Self. The aim of the so-called exchange is to change the Other toward “modernity”; but for the exchange to continue, the difference of the Other has to persist and be reiterated.

In chapter three, Baaz focuses on the second main context: development aid and economic inequalities. She shows how the new development policy of partnership within development “aid” involves several contradictions. Development workers are meant to empower partners to make their own decisions but are at the same time confronted with high expectations from the donors to present tangible results. Development workers thus reinterpret partners’ resistance to their proposals—a sign of the partners’ commitment to decision making—as passivity, drawing on the age-old representation of Africans as idle and irrational.

In chapter four, the author demonstrates the tensions between the partnership discourse and the persistence of the development workers’ and donors’ image of a “superior, active innovative Self” versus an “inferior, passive, unreliable ‘partner’” (147). How the critique of development by, *inter alia*, postdevelopment authors has changed the image of the development workers’ Self is shown in chapter five. Results of the criticism of development are, for example, the very fact that development agencies now formally embrace the notion of partnership and that they ascribe to the development worker the role of an adviser rather than that of a manager. Baaz finds, however, that these results and the development workers’ doubts about their legitimate role coexist with an image of Western superiority. She points out that the donors’ and development workers’ construction of the Tanzanian Other has a lot in common with the discursive strategies of many postdevelopment studies, that, according to Baaz, reinforce colonial dichotomies of a progressive West and a passive global South by condemning “Westernization” and celebrating Third World authenticity. Both tend to depoliticize poverty by relegating it to

endogenous and cultural factors. She concludes that the development agencies' discourse of partnership, while reflecting change in formal policies, is undermined by informal structures and practices both in the development institutions and by development workers in the projects: development practice remains paternalistic because the donors continue to identify the problems supposedly inhibiting development—for example, passivity and dependency on the side of the partner—and subsequently provide the treatment in the form of more development interventions.

Baaz's study is of great value for understanding the conflicted identification processes of donors and development workers in the face of continuing critique of development cooperation. By thoroughly situating development workers' identities in the context of both postcolonialism and the development discourse of partnership, she takes seriously the changes in development policy rather than dismissing them as a devious scam by donors to keep a grip on the global South. She convincingly demonstrates how, for example, the discourse of African passivity is not in contradiction with the partnership discourse, but how the corresponding images form part of this development discourse. Baaz's combination of different methods of data collection proved to be fruitful: it unearthed the variety and contradicting statements emanating from different subject positions (of the donor organization in Europe and the development worker in Tanzania).

It would have, however, completed the picture if Baaz had taken into account the way the Tanzanian counterparts see the development workers and themselves; this would also have done justice to her understanding of identity as relational. Furthermore, her critique of the postdevelopment authors she refers to is flawed in its generalizing tendency: she only scrutinizes what has been coined the "populist" (Ziai 2004) writers instead of engaging with the "sceptical" ones like Arturo Escobar or James Ferguson, who have more thoroughly analyzed the workings of knowledge and power in development. A more fundamental critique needs to be directed toward Baaz's discourse analytical approach. First, her study lacks a consideration of the impact of the author's position (White, female, academic, etc.) for the research process and of her own entanglement in the discourses she analyzes. The impression of an author hovering above the discourses renders the discourse theoretical foundations moot. Second, she does not provide us with any analytical tools as to how to detect and dissect discourses. An approach drawing on the elements constituting discourse as put forward, for example, by Michel Foucault would have made the study more intersubjectively comprehensible. Third, her notion of discourse—regarded as congruent with the social and not decidable—leads her to proposing the issue of representation, that is, the provision of alternative meaning, as a vehicle for change. Such a strong constructivist stance diverts attention away from the pivotal question of access to material resources: societal change can only be brought about by a struggle for both new physical realities and alternative social meanings.

Reference

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Gianluca Misuraca

E-Governance and Local Governance in Africa

A Review of E-Governance in Africa: From Theory to Action: A Handbook on ICTs for Local Governance

(Africa World Press, 2007)

Reviewed by Andrew Myburgh

Andrew Myburgh is a native South African. He is a Master in Public Administration/ International Development student at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Over the last few years he has been working as an economic consultant in Johannesburg.

The rapid advance of the Internet and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) has created the means to transform the effectiveness of government. The hope is that these technologies will make government more cost-effective and more responsive to citizens' needs. Given this potential, the question arises whether ICTs can be successfully used by African countries to overcome the challenges they face. Those who are interested in this possibility will welcome the publication of this book. It provides a thoughtful discussion of the use of ICTs in local government in Africa. The book has three sections: the first largely covers theoretical issues; the second discusses four case studies where ICTs were implemented in local governments in sub-Saharan Africa; and the third concludes the book by discussing key lessons learned.

In the four chapters of the first part, which is entitled "Conceptual Framework: Towards a Multi-Dimensional E-Governance," the author provides a theoretical framework for evaluating the impact of ICTs on the performance of local government. He argues that one should not consider the impact of ICTs on government performance in isolation. Rather one should consider the impact of ICTs on the networks in which governments operate: an approach he calls e-governance. This approach considers the "interactions and collective problem-solving among and between" business, government, and citizens with (and around) ICTs (34). The author suggests that e-governance constitutes "a new way of coordinating, planning, formulating and implementing decisions and operations related to governance problems" using ICTs as a medium of communication and partnership development (29). The book argues that e-governance is particularly important in the context of the decentralization of government functions to the local level. The benefits of decentralization arise because local governments are more responsive to

local communities' needs. The author suggests that "effective decentralisation can make a big difference by making the provision of local (social and economic) services more efficient, equitable, sustainable and cost-effective. Through community participation in decision making, planning, implementation and monitoring, and backed by appropriate institutions and resources, it can go a long way in improving the quality of life, particularly of the poorer and marginalised sectors of the population, thereby alleviating poverty" (44). The book suggests that this "promise of democratic governance can be more readily accomplished through the embodiment of networked electronic facilities in local government administration" (x). This contention is supported with a discussion of local authorities that have successfully implemented ICT solutions. Most of these examples are from developed countries, but there are examples from developing countries such as India and Malaysia. While the book argues forcefully for the benefits of ICTs in Africa, the discussion also clarifies the challenges. It suggests that the necessary prerequisites for the successful implementation of e-governance include (amongst others) access to technology, "appropriate management and co-ordination mechanisms," "knowledge and skills," and "proper resource planning and access to innovative financing mechanisms." The author also says that "management systems, records and work processes must be in place to provide the necessary data to support the move to e-government" (63). These are not present in many local authorities in Africa, which suggests that e-governance is most likely to transform local authorities that are *already* performing relatively effectively. This challenge of implementing e-governance in Africa is illustrated by the four case studies that make up the second section of the book. The case studies review the impact of ICTs in projects in Senegal, Uganda, South Africa, and Ghana.

The two projects in Senegal and Ghana were largely unsuccessful. The Senegal case study found that after ten years there had been no "significant impact on the introduction of electronic resources on the decentralization of governance in Senegal" (xi). The author provides a useful discussion of the reasons for the project's difficulties. He emphasizes the lack of political support for the investments in information technology when basic infrastructure is still lacking. He also mentions the role of donor funding, which he suggests leads to a culture where local government officials are "looking for aid instead of investing in their own future" (134). The Ghanaian project was a review of a number of projects that sought to use ICTs to improve the traditional governance by the country's chiefs. This project has faced a number of challenges. The author suggests that the prerequisites for the implementation of ICT were lacking. Interestingly, he argues that "traditional leaders must acquaint themselves with modern practices of public sector administration and management while building on the traditions and values that command the trust and respect of members of their communities" (173).

The South African and Uganda projects were more successful. In the Uganda case study, information systems were implemented in four local governments, which constituted pilot sites. In these sites the agencies reported that they "have made savings in administrative expenses" and "users now have easier access to useful information for planning purposes" (206). The challenge still remains to implement the pilot projects more widely. In this area difficulties still need to be surmounted including the allocation of funds for the maintenance of computers and improving coordination between stakeholders. The South African case study looks at the city of Cape Town's efforts to create a "Smart City." These aim to transform the city's administration; the metropolitan area of Cape Town had previously fallen under four different local governments. This project was principally focused on integrating these four administrations into a single

government entity. The project was a success. The author provides a useful discussion of the various challenges that were faced and overcome to achieve this.

The third and final section summarizes the author's conclusions from the four case studies. Amongst his other conclusions are the following: "no one strategy fits all; local content is important; engaging large numbers of the focus population is difficult but important; the high cost of ICTs equipment, applications and services remains a deterrent to the adoption or successful implementation of local e-government programmes; and local conditions must be considered rather than seeking to import external models wholesale" (xiii).

The book provides a useful discussion of the relevant issues. The early chapters of the book are largely theoretical and so will be most rewarding to the reader with a particular interest in the theory of information systems and public administration. The second part of this book is a useful resource for those interested in implementing information technology in local governments in Africa.

Bernardine Evaristo

What If? A Review of *Blonde Roots*

(UK: Hamish Hamilton/Penguin 2008)

Reviewed by Tolu Ogunlesi

Tolu Ogunlesi was born in 1982. He is the author of a collection of poetry, Listen to the Geckos Singing from a Balcony (Bewrite Books, 2004), and a novella, Conquest and Conviviality (Hodder Education, 2008). His fiction and poetry have appeared in Wasafiri, Other Poetry, Magma, Pyramid, The Obituary Tango (Caine Prize Anthology, 2006), Sable, and more. He has also had his poems broadcast on the BBC World Service. In 2007 he was awarded a Dorothy Sargent Rosenberg poetry prize, and in 2008 he received a Guest Writer Fellowship from the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. He lives in Lagos, Nigeria.

What if? These two words effortlessly shoulder the burden of infinite history. *Blonde Roots*, the fictional fourth novel by British-Nigerian novelist Bernadine Evaristo, asks the simple but provocative question: What if it was Africa that enslaved Europe instead of vice versa?

In an interview published in the online journal *Pulp.Net*, Evaristo lays out the “manifesto” of *Blonde Roots*: “What I want people to focus on is the idea that if the table were turned historically and Africans had enslaved Europeans, what would that mean in terms of how we (a) view that history and (b) understand notions of civilization and savagery. Hopefully this parallel universe gives readers a modern and historical context through which to reexamine this issue.”

In *Blonde Roots*, she invites us to partake of this reexamination through the interconnected stories of slaves and slave masters. Through Evaristo’s pen, Europe becomes “Europa,” variously known as the “Heart of Greyness” and the “Grey Continent.” It is the land of the “whytes” or “Europanes,” who are enslaved by the “blaks” aka “Aphrikans” of the continent of “Aphrika” (the “Sunny Continent”), and shipped in large quantities to work on plantations in “Amarika” and the “West Japanese Islands.”

Slavery with a difference.

The novel revolves primarily around the (interweaving) lives of two characters: Doris Scagglethorpe, a whyte, snatched from her poor but idyllic existence in “England” and shipped off, first to the United Kingdom of Great Ambossa, a tiny island off the coast of Aphrika, and then to “New Ambossa,” part of a cluster of islands known as the “West Japanese Islands” (off the coast of “Amarika”); and Chief Kaga Konata Katamba I (Bwana), preeminent blak slave

trader who rises from “humble origins” to earn fame, fortune, and power across the world from diligently applying himself to the trade in human beings.

Holocaust?

African American academic Maulana Karenga, in a 2001 article entitled “The Ethics of Reparations: Engaging the Holocaust of Enslavement,” argues for the classification of the transatlantic slave trade as a “holocaust.” Karenga defines a holocaust as “a morally monstrous act of genocide that is not only against the people themselves, but also a crime against humanity” and outlines three main manifestations of this “holocaust of enslavement,” as follows:

1. The morally monstrous destruction of human life
2. The morally monstrous destruction of human culture
3. The morally monstrous destruction of human possibility

Blonde Roots is filled with manifestations and examples of this trio. By the standards of the trade, human life is cheap. This of course is ironic; the fact that the slave trade revolves around the conversion of human life into mind-boggling profit should make life anything but “cheap.”

But the reality is that enslavement is only a thin line away from a cruel death. A significant number of the millions of enslaved Africans died on the long, tortuous marches from the hinterland to the coast, even before reaching the ships waiting to carry them to a new life. Many of those who survived that trek succumbed to the horrendous conditions aboard the slave ships or to the backbreaking labor—and ruthless punishments—that came with life on the plantations of the “New World.”

However, life is not the only thing at risk; in Evaristo’s imagined world we are constantly made to witness the encroachment and degradation of whyte culture—everything from cuisine and dress to language and religion—by the enslaving blaks. As is customary with enslavement, old names and ways are forcefully replaced with new ones. Doris becomes Omorenomwara.

A Deeper Truth

The power and beauty of *Blonde Roots* lie in its unflinching reversal of historical truth. Evaristo succeeds in convincing us that a reversal of the truth does not necessarily translate into a lie, that it might actually offer us the possibilities of a new, deeper truth. If *Blonde Roots* were a transatlantic ship, it is this deeper truth that we would find trapped in its dark, dingy hold.

And what is this deeper truth?

It is the fact that evil is not the exclusive preserve of any one race, that wickedness is not racially or genetically determined. In telling us the touching stories of *Blonde Roots*’ multifarious characters (stories of familial bonds lost and never regained, of forced exile, of inferiority complexes, of deep loneliness and self-doubt, and of relentless humiliation, all of which cut across racial and skin-color lines), we are not only supplied with a new light in which to view the transatlantic slave trade and to review notions of racial power and guilt, but also gently reminded of the universality of human cruelty.

The biggest achievement of *Blonde Roots* lies in its ambitious attempt at making history count all over again. We have been told that the only lesson history teaches us is that we never learn anything from history. We constantly forget; we take for granted; we lose the ability to be

moved by tragedy. The danger is that recognition and memory will be drowned in the deluge of slavery-related information and statistics on the Internet and in history tomes as well as the government-sanctioned memorials and apologies that have become a staple of our times.

Evaristo, with her skillful turning of history on its head, succeeds in jolting us out of our comfort zones, and she brings us face to face with ourselves—as we might have been.

Her act of subverting the role of race in the slave trade by making Africa the enslaving party and Europe the enslaved is an interesting—and successful (if sadly temporary)—balancing act. She invests Africa (the blak/black race) with a power and influence historically denied it—a position from which it rules the world and, even more significantly, from which it looks down condescendingly on the rest of the world. “Yes, Dear Reader, the natives of those lands are just now emerging from the abominable depths of savagery which we civilised nations left behind in prehistoric times” is how the character of Bwana, Doris’s new owner, explains it in his memoir within the novel.

A Balancing Act and a Redemption

One of the chapters of *Blonde Roots*, entitled “Some Are More Human Than Others,” is a justification of the enslavement of the white (whyte) race using scientific data like brain shapes and sizes. It is a stark reminder of the many instances in which science has historically been used to justify human-to-human cruelty.

But at the end, *Blonde Roots* strives to maintain its “balancing act” mission. The same slavery-justifying, “anti-abolitionist” Chief Katamba regards himself as a “reasonable man and a man with reasons.” In other words we see him as a thinking man, not a mindless sadist. His moving personal story reveals that his overwhelming success and wealth are not powered solely by greed or cruel conquest. We hear his confessions about the inferiority complex that drove him to prove himself a success. Later on we see his eldest son and heir apparent—also a slave master in his own right—trapped and destroyed in the vicious grip of the same inferiority complex against which his father struggled.

Blonde Roots redeems the slave trade from the banality of mere statistics and historical dates and focuses instead on a multitude of human characters and their interweaving stories. The Aphrika of *Blonde Roots* is not a fallen, beggarly, savage “dark continent.” It is not the Africa that the world has long learned to put in a box. It is a superpower: technologically advanced, culturally arrogant, condescending. In showing us an alternative reality, Evaristo is subtly hinting that we should guard against believing that exploitation is the only fuel that can power our prosperity as a continent or that it will make up for our age-old victimization. The line between “victimhood” and “oppressorship” is a thin, shifting, unreliable one.

As democracy entrenches itself in greater degrees across the continent, as Africans take their destinies into their own hands with greater seriousness, and as the continent’s success stories mass into a tipping point force that will overwhelm the trademark negative images, we will see the emergence of a New Africa—an Africa that will reach its full potential.


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