

ASIAN AMERICAN POLICY REVIEW

Volume XIII • 2004

Thirteenth Issue



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ASIAN AMERICAN POLICY REVIEW

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Current volumes are available at \$40 per copy for libraries and other institutions; \$15 for individuals; and \$10 for students. Back issues are also available for purchase.

Donations

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ASIAN

AMERICAN

POLICY

REVIEW

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John F. Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

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ISSN# 1062-1830

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FROM THE EDITORS

As the dividing line between domestic and international policies continues to blur, we see our role as Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders growing in America and around the world. The migration of Asian peoples and the development of global foreign policies have not only intensified our awareness of the critical role we play as advocates for peace and justice around the world, but also compel us to increase our efforts to protect our civil rights and challenge social injustices here at home.

It is with great pleasure that we present Volume XIII of the *Asian American Policy Review*, published at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The wide variety of topics covered both celebrates our achievements and critically analyzes relevant issues at home and abroad. The *Asian American Policy Review* remains committed to addressing the issues affecting Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders today. We hope that the stories shared, and policies analyzed, will inspire, educate, and initiate action.

For the first time in the journal's history, we have included a transcript from the National Asian Pacific American Conference on Law and Public Policy (NAPACLPP). We present statements made by human rights activist **Yuri Kochiyama** and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee attorney **Kareem W. Shora** during the plenary panel entitled Activism against Racial Injustice in Times of War. The *Asian American Policy Review* has partnered with Harvard Law School's Asian Pacific American Law Students Association in organizing NAPACLPP since its inception, and we are proud to continue to build upon this partnership by bridging the substance of the journal and the conference in celebration of the conference's tenth anniversary.

This year's interviews highlight local and national leaders in Asian American politics who are shaping policies and making history. The **Honorable Mike Honda**, United States Congressman (CA-15), explains how the United States *PATRIOT Act* affects the Asian American and Pacific Islander community in balancing national security with civil liberties. He also shares his thoughts on Asian American politics and this year's presidential elections.

In our second interview, the **Honorable John Liu**, New York City Councilman, describes his groundbreaking rise to becoming the first Asian American councilmember for the city of New York. In addition, he shares his thoughts on the challenges faced by Asian Americans in politics and his vision for the city he serves.

The research published for Volume XIII examines the marginalization of immigrants, the role of the media in crisis situations, and the paradigm of race. **Angela Fuhn Chan** critically analyzes overseas Chinese communities through a concept she calls the Global Enclave Model. She describes the causes of ethnic enclaves, intra-ethnic conflicts, and the continuing marginalization of Chinese immigrants. **Antonio Lambino II** redefines the role of the Philippine news media in times of crisis. He uses the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings to demonstrate how the media shapes

politics and public opinion. Ms. Chan and Mr. Lambino's research are particularly important in light of rising global ethnic conflicts and the news media's influence over public policy.

Rowena Robles also presents a timely study considering the growing neo-conservatism that challenges affirmative action and other civil rights. Ms. Robles analyzes how plaintiffs in the *Brian Ho, Patrick Wong, and Hilary Chen v. SFUSD* case racially reconstruct the Asian American model minority stereotype to influence the media and policy.

The journal continues to expand upon last year's successful review of top Asian American and Pacific Islander Web sites on the Internet by publishing picks for this year's best. The staff has highlighted five sites that provide information about policy, law, activism, and research. We recognize the importance of access to knowledge and resources about the Asian American and Pacific Islander community, and we encourage our readers to email us with suggestions of top Web sites.

Finally, **Ernesto Martinez Yee** reviews Jonathan Y. Okamura's book entitled *Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora: Transnational Relations, Identities, and Communities*. Mr. Okamura describes the international ties binding Filipinos and the challenges faced by Filipino Americans in shaping identity and building coalitions.

We would like to thank the *Asian American Policy Review* staff for their commitment in making Volume XIII a success. We extend special thanks to Fred Wang and the Wang Foundation for their continued support and for allowing us to provide a space to address Asian American and Pacific Islander issues. Moreover, we appreciate the time and effort of article contributors, interviewees and authors for educating the staff and helping us produce a journal of substance. Finally, we thank our readers for not only supporting our work, but also challenging us to improve the journal's style, quality, and content.

We hope that Volume XIII increases knowledge, creates dialogue and encourages you to help the Asian American and Pacific Islander community and to create positive change for the next generation.

PJ Gagajena
Johnny Vong
Editors-in-Chief

THIRTEENTH ISSUE

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Activism against Racial Injustice in Times of War

Plenary Panel from the Tenth Annual National Asian Pacific American Conference on Law and Public Policy (NAPACLPP): Border Crossings—Globalizing the APA Movement for the 21st Century, held 12–13 March 2004 in Cambridge, MA. Sponsored by the Asian Pacific American Law Students Association of Harvard Law School and the *Asian American Policy Review* of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

This year the NAPACLPP celebrated ten years of addressing significant legal and policy issues affecting the Asian Pacific American community and bringing together students, academics, community members, lawyers, and policy makers from around the nation. The plenary panel reflects the conference theme about the challenges faced by the Asian Pacific American community in times of war, particularly concerning race and the role that activism plays in altering mainstream paradigms about what the “enemy” looks like.

*The panelists included Yuri Kochiyama, Dr. Peter Nien-chu Kiang, Hamid Khan, Kareem W. Shora, and Gloria Chan, conference co-chair and second-year Harvard Law School student, moderated the panel. The AAPR would like to present the following remarks presented by Ms. Kochiyama and Mr. Shora. Due to the time constraints imposed between the date of the event and publication of Volume XIII of the *Asian American Policy Review*, Dr. Kiang and Mr. Khan’s statements are not included here.*

CHAN: Border Crossings is the theme of this year’s Asian Pacific American law and policy conference, and we are going to look at not only how perceptions from non-Asian Americans have changed during times of war but also how our very own activism has changed. Questions about our politics, history, and culture will be addressed today, and I am very honored to have our panelists here. Let me now introduce Ms. Kochiyama.

KOCHIYAMA: Thank you for inviting me to this conference. I’m very excited just to see all you young people here. I’m going to speak about the impact of World War II on JAs [Japanese Americans].

Some sixty-five years ago on December 7, Japan's air force bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Never had a United States military enemy [struck] so close to home. Hawaii was not yet a state but a commonwealth. About three thousand American sailors were killed, and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt immediately condemned the bombing as an act that would go down in history as a day of infamy. Many historians within the past twenty years have said that it was not a surprise attack. Michi Weglyn, one of the finest Asian American writers, wrote a book almost using the same name, but instead of day of infamy she called it *Years of Infamy*. Every person of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast was considered an enemy alien, and some already in the U.S. military were asked to leave because of their ancestry. General DeWitt, the highest officer on the West Coast, proclaimed that "the only good Jap was a dead Jap." In the first forty-eight hours, thirteen hundred *issei* men and six women were rounded up and sent to prison. My father was one of the first picked up on the morning of December 7, just when [the Japanese air force] began bombing.

It seems that the U.S. government already had a list of who they considered [as] subversive. By May and June of 1942, 120,000 Japanese Americans and *issei* were mustered up and sent to assembly centers. The concentration camps were not built yet—we were in race track grounds and fairgrounds, and staying in horse stalls. Seven months later the camps were built in remote desert lands, swamp lands, and mountainous areas, where we lived in barracks like in the Army. In camps, all those under eighteen went to school, and those eighteen and over went to work. And we had a choice of working in the commissary, laundry, schools, post offices, hospitals, mess halls, the administration building, or farms.

There were three categories of pay scales. Unskilled workers were paid eight dollars; skilled twelve dollars; and professionals, like doctors and lawyers, sixteen to nineteen dollars a month. Most of us got eight dollars. The only other camp where living was harsher was Tule Lake. It had twenty thousand people, as opposed ten thousand, and the people were called the no-nos because they would not serve in the U.S. Army. They declared their allegiance to Japan and refused to serve in the military because they did not think it was fair for their parents to be in camps.

Overall statistics have shown that eighteen hundred people died while in internment. Some died because of old age, but also, of course, [others died of] illness, injuries, or lack of medication and medical care. Many women miscarried, and infants died at birth, and an estimated two thousand suffered mental illness or stress. Several hundred families were evacuated from Hawaii. Also, a little over two thousand Japanese from thirteen South American countries, mostly Peru, were sent to camps and not allowed to return to their own country.

Yet with all this happening, thirty-five thousand JAs served in the U.S. military. The JA infantry unit, the 442, was known as the Purple Heart Battalion because of the huge number of KIAs, killed in action, and WIAs, wounded in action. At the end they were recognized as the most distinguished fighting unit in all of World War II. The military intelligence JAs who fought in the Pacific and Asia were also recognized. They were first called secret weapons, so they got very little publicity. But after the war they were recognized for their courage and mission. Should ever

any such disaster happen again to any people, anywhere, I hope you, as young aspiring attorneys, will be moved to work on such cases. Right now many young Asian American lawyers are working on cases of the Peruvians and Latino Americans, Latino Japanese Americans, and Latino Japanese.

As we look at today's situation, we see another group of people—the Arabs, Muslims, South Asians—undergoing the same kind of experiences as the Japanese. They are rounded up, detained, deported, placed in federal prisons, and their families are broken up. They are also experiencing racism, physical and psychological abuse, discrimination, uncertainty, and marginalization.

Of course we cannot forget that Japan did some terrible things, too, because she is like the U.S.'s junior partner, another capitalist nation. We cannot forget what they did in Nanjing during the 1930s and in World War II, [when] they used two hundred thousand Asian women, mostly Korean, as sex slaves. Most of them have probably died and have never been compensated. I know that several times lawyers have tried to bring this back up, and perhaps your group will be successful in bringing justice to comfort women.

But we must never forget the challenges of black Americans who received little help from white Christians or peoples of other races or nations. Since 1865 to 1965, more than five thousand blacks were lynched. Lynching is worse than murder because murder is killing someone intentionally, while lynching is killing intentionally but includes the mass participation of viewers who are part of the lynch mob. The government and those in power remain silent.

As for the North Atlantic slave trade, the Durban [South Africa] Conference on Racism a few years ago considered it the most appalling, brutal, inhumane and long-lasting crime in human history. You Asian American law students are needed by the Asian community today. Look at how many Cambodians have been deported and other Asians imprisoned because they could not find Asian American lawyers who spoke their language. Also, Chinese prisoners languished in prison because they did not know that they could consult first with their consulates, who could have helped them.

Also, immigrants are in trouble because they are caught in between immigration laws and racism. We also hope that you will set a legacy by supporting Black reparations, same-sex marriages, rights to abortion, voting rights for all, justice for juveniles, indigenous protection, and abolishing all U.S. wars and U.S. terrorism. We need Asian lawyers. Be a lifeline in the courtroom and leave a legacy for the next generation of Asian American lawyers to inspire them to fight for justice, human rights, basic needs, and human dignity for all. Thank you.

CHAN: So I want to turn to Mr. Shora because we don't usually consider Arab Americans or Arabs under the category of Asian. But our experiences have been so similar that maybe you can share that with us.

SHORA: I'm going to start off with a news item. A couple of years ago there was a bank robbery in Springfield, Missouri. Security cameras showed that there were ten men involved—five Caucasians, four Latinos, and an African American. So the next morning the sheriff in Springfield called a press conference and declared that there were ten men wanted—five Caucasians, four Latinos, and one African

American. He declared plans to carry out a manhunt by first going after the African American suspect and, once they caught and detained him, going after the rest.

Now this didn't happen, but did in fact happened on a much larger scale last year. The attorney general [John Ashcroft] of the United States initiated a program known as the Absconder Apprehension Initiative. This program targeted, very legitimately, individuals who had been ordered deportation from the United States. They had their day in court and fled from the law. There are approximately 315,000 individuals that fit this category, and six thousand of these are Arab men. This program targeted those six thousand, and the attorney general did that by including their names in the NCIC [National Crime Information Center] database, operated by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and accessed by local law enforcement.

Many might argue, "Why not? They broke the law. They violated court order. We should go after them." But many may also argue, "Why don't we go after this African American? When we catch him, then we will go after the rest." It's un-American. It goes against everything this country stands for. Unfortunately, it was, or it is, the policy of the federal government.

Now I'm going to highlight several of the post-9/11 programs that have targeted Arab Americans, Middle Eastern Americans, and South Asians since the terrorist attacks on our country. The Voluntary Interview Program, phase one and phase two; the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, also know as Special Call-in Registration; some provisions of the *U.S. PATRIOT Act*; and then the Absconder Apprehension Initiative.

Shortly after the terrorist attack, where three thousand innocent civilians were killed by a group of nineteen Arab men, the U.S. attorney general initiated phase one of the Voluntary Interview Program. His declared goal was to interview five thousand Arab men between certain ages who entered the country on non-immigrant visas after January of 2000 to see if they knew anything about these attacks or the terrorists. Most Americans, most members of my community, said, "Absolutely, yes. We're going to volunteer. We're going to prove how patriotic we are."

The problem is that what's on paper, or what Ashcroft declared in these press conferences, is not what happened on the ground. We know for a fact that U.S. citizens, even second-generation U.S. citizens who happen to be of Arab descent, were contacted as part of this program. They were often contacted at work by FBI agents who said, "We'd like to speak to you if you wish. It's not going to be forced upon you, but we'd like to talk to you."

Over 90 percent of individuals who were contacted agreed to speak. They didn't have anything to hide. What happens to those individuals? I can give you one example. An electrical engineer who worked for a major corporation in New York City was approached by two FBI agents at work. [He] met with them for two hours and answered all their questions. They thanked him, were very professional, and then they all went home.

The next morning he showed up to work as usual, and he was told that he was not supposed to be there. Corporate security approached him and declared that he

was being placed on a leave of absence pending the investigation. He was puzzled, and so he called this FBI agent who had questioned him the day before and verified that there was no criminal investigation that he was involved with.

After we worked with him, we worked with the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] and found out that his private employer decided to take on its own investigation of this seventeen-year employee because he was questioned by FBI agents at work. Now we have anecdotal evidence from across the country where official government action led to private acts of what mounted to be discrimination according to the federal EEOC.

Now several months later the attorney general declared phase two of the Voluntary Interview Program, and we heard a lot of complaints of private acts of discrimination or harassment on the part of neighbors after these individuals knew that the FBI had just questioned this person or that neighbor or that person in that cubicle or the person on the seventh floor.

Then we saw the Special Registration Program initiated, which was a program where the justice department required men from twenty-five different countries—mostly Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian—to register by a specific deadline with what was previously known as the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service].

Now we all know that being in this country as a visitor is a privilege, not a right. And most people who learned about this new regulation in time actually wanted to comply. The problem was, again, not what was announced but what happened on the ground with Special Registration. On the day of the deadline, December 16, 2001, those in group one waited at the INS office to register to comply. Advocates claim there were over a thousand people there, and the government claims about 250.

It was about 5:00 p.m., the time to close the office, when the INS director in Los Angeles decided to lock the doors and detain the people that had not been processed. The people were placed in jails, moved to county jails and city jails. Now when you are detained by INS, it doesn't become a routine registration like it is supposed to be, if there is such a thing. You have to go through secondary registration or inspection where they have to verify much more information. In the meantime, you are a man in jail.

People in California who were detained on December 16, 2001 were held for up to three weeks in jail. Now detention isn't a country club. You're housed usually with the general population, sometimes in solitary confinement, and not charged with anything. You're not convicted of anything, and you're the person who wanted to comply with this law.

Well, how did people learn about the Special Registration Program? You presume that there were public service announcements circulated or published in ethnic newspapers or announced in the main media. Maybe these individuals were contacted through a letter. Maybe their embassies were contacted. No, they were never contacted. The only thing that was done was [that] an announcement in the federal register was placed saying, "You have to go register."

Now put yourself in the shoes of one of those [individuals], say a student from one of these countries. You're studying here at Harvard. You go to class. You do

your thing. How would you know that by a specific date, if you didn't go to the local immigration office and register, you'd be found in violation of your visa status and you'd have a criminal sanction against you? The ultimate result would be deportation.

So again implementation of all these programs—implementation is different from what is announced. A lot of people, I guarantee you that a majority of Americans said, "Well, why not? We were attacked by a group of nineteen Arab men, so we should scrutinize this population." The counter argument is [to] agree that you are at war, that you are fighting this non-conventional enemy.

Have we learned lessons from the Japanese experience? How many spies for Japan were captured as a result of the Japanese internment that were in fact Japanese Americans? Zero. How many terrorists were captured as a result of Special Registration that were from those twenty-five countries? Zero.

The attorney general announced that there were 515 individuals deported as a result of Special Registration due to terrorist ties. Not one of those 515 individuals was charged with, detained for, or convicted of any terrorist or criminal activity.

After all, if you do catch a terrorist, would you want to deport him? They tend to regroup. Unfortunately, the attorney general doesn't seem to realize that. Now as far as what ADC [American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee] has done, we have been party to litigation. We've been working through coalitions, national as well as local, to try to address some of these concerns. We filed lawsuits with coalition members in New York City against the use of the NCIC database and the enforcement of civil immigration laws. In the Ninth Circuit, we joined in a lawsuit challenging the detentions that I mentioned.

We've also challenged Section 215 of the *U.S. PATRIOT Act*. It is known as the sneak-and-peek provision, along with Section 211. The *U.S. PATRIOT Act* seems to be used as an overall umbrella to encompass a lot of these programs I mentioned even though they are not in it. These are all executive branch initiatives carried out by the attorney general's office, not indicated at all in the *U.S. PATRIOT Act*. Section 215 provides the ability of the justice department to walk into any library or any medical office or any membership organization and request any data [that organization has] on any or all individuals who deal with that entity.

Now, can that librarian call their boss and tell them, "Oh, FBI agents just picked up information, credit card information, membership information, readership information about this person or that person?" Can they call their lawyers? No. You are criminally sanctioned from telling anyone about the fact that this private information was taken.

Before I finish, I want to make one remark about what General Westmoreland said in 1974, which is that it is in Asian philosophy that the value of life is less. It reminded me of a statement that was made last year by General William Boykin, Department of Defense chief of intelligence operations, where he said, "My God is bigger than your God." He was quoting himself when he was back in Somalia two years ago and interacted with a Muslim gentleman. He related how these Muslims are so inferior to us and that they have a different philosophy.

I want to tie this together to say that the problem here is ignorance. One good thing that resulted from the tragedy that we faced in 2001 was that communities

came together. We saw the Arab American, Muslim American, South Asian American work with the Asian Pacific American community and advocacy organizations. The Latino community came on board. The African American community came on board. All minorities now work together, both on a national level, inside the Beltway in Washington, D.C., as well as on a local level.

I want to mention specifically, after 9/11 there were two Asian American individuals who reached out to us and said, "We will help you"—Karen Narasaki of NAPALC [National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium] and Paul Igasaki former vice chair of the EEOC. Those two individuals got ADC and the Arab Americans involved in coalitions in Washington, D.C., and we're very much grateful to those two specific Asian Americans for including us in the coalition work that they had started doing back in the eighties and in the seventies. Thank you.

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The Impact of National Security and Civil Liberties on the Asian American and Pacific Islander Community: An Interview with U.S. Congressman Mike Honda (D-CA)

T. Linh Ho

Introduction

Congressman Mike Honda represents the 15th Congressional District of California in the U.S. House of Representatives. His district encompasses the area known throughout the world as Silicon Valley, the leading region for the development of innovative technologies. Congressman Honda has been a public servant for decades who has been lauded for his work on education, transportation, civil rights, the environment, and the high-tech community. This interview took place on November 2, 2003.

Interview with Congressman Mike Honda

AAPR: Representative Honda, thank you for joining the *Asian American Policy Review* today for an interview on national security and civil liberties. Please share some of your thoughts on the Bush administration's national security policies, and how are these policies affecting the Asian Pacific American (APA) community? For example, what has been the general impact of the *U.S. Patriot Act* on our civil liberties?

HONDA: Under the current leadership and administration, policy making has not been the most transparent or democratic process. For example, the Rules

T. Linh Ho is a master in public policy candidate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Linh was born in Malaysia, raised in Orange County, CA, and has studied abroad at Vietnam National University. As a public policy and international affairs fellow, Linh studies civil rights, community development, education policy reform, immigration and refugee issues, juvenile justice, and campaigns/elections.

Committee . . . has established how we can debate issues on the floor and whether bills or resolutions come out of the committee. This process has not been as transparent and [is] quite a bit dependent upon how leadership feels about the bills or the resolutions.

[That] lack of transparency, with a lack of the ability for us to make any impact, even at the conference committee level, really in effect denies probably close to 50 percent of this country's voice to be heard through its representatives. And so, to me, it's been very difficult to get our viewpoints and voices to be heard.

To my understanding, one of the things that happened with the *Patriot Act* was that the Judiciary Committee worked very hard with both sides to hammer out a bill that would be both balanced in terms of extending police powers and guaranteeing our civil liberties. And my understanding is, from my colleagues like Representative Zoe Lofgren, that the bill that they had hammered together was unanimously voted on in committee, 36-0.

However, on its way to the floor, the administration had persuaded the Senate to come up with a little bit more draconian overreach in terms of law enforcement, in terms of minimizing or eliminating judicial oversight and accepting the *Patriot Act's* version on the Senate side.

The leadership of the House then put aside the House Judiciary bill and adopted the Senate's version. And it was hammered out again in conference. But the bill that came out of conference was not to the liking of our representatives from the House side and the Democratic side. It was criticized as overreaching and minimizing judicial oversight. And there were a lot of onerous pieces of the *Patriot Act* that did not make many of my colleagues happy or confident that this would be a balanced bill. So they recommended voting against it . . . I felt very confident that it [was] a bill that we should vote against.

AAPR: Can you give us an example of some of the rumors in the *Patriot Act*?

HONDA: The Department of Justice claims that there are a lot of provisions in that Patriot bill that [have] not yet been implemented. But I think that the *Patriot Act* gives the Department of Justice a lot of cover to be able to take immigration statutes and regulations, and really abuse those regulations. For instance, if a person who has been called in to register with the [then] INS (and they have asked only certain kinds of people to come and register to the INS), and if they come in late, then they're detained. If they had overstayed their visa and had not been able to renew it, then they are detained. So for any violation of their visa, even if it's a technicality, they would come down very, very hard. Then they'll institute deportation proceedings. And part of the proceedings is that usually you're able to have the Bureau of Immigration to oversee it and pass judgment on each one. Those hearings used to be public, but now they're not. So there are a lot of things that have become less transparent or have been completely closed off to the public.

And so, those are the kinds of things that are driving a lot of us crazy in terms of trying to make sure that these folks are given fair due process. There are some provisions in there that are called "sneak and peek," where they are able to tap into your telephones and e-mails. Or usually, under a criminal investigation, you can do that if you have a subpoena or a grand jury's permission to do that. But it's only if you know what content you're looking for, and that's very specific. Under

the *Patriot Act*, it's only under suspicion. And so you're allowed to go on a fishing expedition to find out whether, in fact, you have found something or not. If you do find something, then you can act on it, but it hasn't been based upon a reasonable search.

But all the procedures in terms of due process have been set aside or have been overlooked or have put aside the judicial balance. And in our country, our Constitution has set up this concept of checks and balances. I believe that the balance is gone and that the law enforcement overreach is present. And I think that that makes me feel very uncomfortable. This happened in World War II, the violation of people's civil rights and the setting aside of due process. So when those things start to happen by the government's actions, then its citizens are in trouble.

AAPR: Seeing that we're pursuing pretty aggressive policies in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, do you foresee the possibility of a negative backlash against the APA community?

HONDA: I think that the potential for backlash is out there. I think the lessons learned from the Japanese American experience from World War II sort of temper people's behavior, and where mass evacuations may not happen for all the populations, it has not stopped the targeting of Muslims and Sikhs or other folks from the Middle East. They have been targeted, but it's been more refined, but I still think that that's a danger and still pushes us to the constitutionality question. In particular, I am concerned with [detaining] folks without knowing when they're going to be charged and how long they are going to be held. Right now, I believe they're being held indefinitely. I think the *U.S. Patriot Act* says that you can only hold them for seven days, but I don't think that that's been observed.

AAPR: How do you see your position as a congressman in terms of trying to improve the current situation and improve the transparency of the laws?

HONDA: I think part of my particular role would be to keep speaking up on this issue. After the inspector general had come back with a report on the *Patriot Act* [to] Attorney General Ashcroft, we looked at the recommendations. And we believe that the recommendations were good recommendations. So we put that in writing and requested that the attorney general move forward with those recommendations that the inspector general had come up with. I think there were twenty-three recommendations that he came up with. But we thought that that was something that needed to be done, so we wanted to put public pressure on them. People like [Congressman] Barney Frank and other congressmembers who sit on [the Judiciary Committee] are coming back with different bills to clean up or refine the *Patriot Act*, so that it has more safeguards in it. But I believe [these are] safeguards that [were] sought in the original Judiciary Committee's bill.

AAPR: We are also interested in learning about the upcoming 2004 election, some important election issues, and different ways for the APA community to get involved in that process. What are your thoughts on these issues?

HONDA: There are a couple of things, one being appointed as deputy chair of the DNC. It offers us opportunities to be on the inside, to anticipate certain kinds of

activities or opportunities for Asian American communities to be part of the main-stream proceedings of the Democratic Convention in Boston this summer.

The other is to take advantage right now, sit down with some of the business people and the community leaders of Boston, the Asian communities, and to sit down and listen to what their aspirations are, and to try and listen to some of their questions, too.

My goal is to have our thoughts heard, our concerns incorporated into the main platform of the Democratic Party. [Another goal is that] our community leaders are given access to the presidential nominee. But prior to that, our community should become an integral part of the selection for the nominee, too. So I want to encourage communities across the country on preparing themselves to run as delegates to the convention. And in order to do that, you have to be prepared and get involved now in the local political process.

AAPR: What kind of advice would you give for young students to be more involved in democratic politics?

HONDA: You are off to a great start by studying politics and public policy at places like the Kennedy School of Government and Harvard University. I'm still learning the Democratic structure and the political machine. But it's all very much steeped in participation. It's steeped in knowing what's going to happen or having the expectation of certain things to happen as a matter of process. Then it's getting in the process to have yourself in that arena so that people know who you are, what you can do, what your talents are, what your skills are. And that's saying, "I want to be part of this."

And having done that, they can't say that we don't have anybody from the Asian American community in terms of we don't know who's interested, we don't have a leadership. We have a talented base of Asians and Pacific Islanders that can hold their own against anybody in this process. So I would suggest that young people find out the process of their own particular community, and study, and try to figure out how to, one, get involved, and, two, to get help. And people like me have ways to make introductions and help open doors or direct people's attention to certain opportunities.

AAPR: Critics charge that the APA community is very small—only about 4 percent of the national population—and it isn't viewed as a strong voting block. What are your responses to that?

HONDA: Well, statistically George Bush, had 500,000 votes less than Gore. Statistically, yeah, we are about a little over 3 percent of the total population. But I think in the year 2000 we lost about five or six seats nationally with a total of about four thousand votes across the country. So if you take four thousand votes, four seats, and you take 3 percent of the population . . . a total of about 16 million people across the nation. Would the president like to win [those votes and win] by a million? That means [politicians] have to pay attention to what I call the critical number. We're a critical margin of votes that people have to pay attention to.

And I don't think that we gave that up. We make them understand that we can make a difference. And together with the black vote, the Latino vote, the Asian American vote can be a deciding factor in a lot of close races. And so I believe

that the presidential race will be close enough that they will have to court the Asian American vote. The Asian American Republicans will cross over if the issues resonate with them because I believe that most Asian Americans vote for the candidate and not the party.

AAPR: And more importantly, leading up to election, what are different things that folks in the community can do to influence that vote, that power leading us? What do you think about the initiatives over the Internet, different community-based organizations? What are some of your thoughts on that, and what are other ways in which APAs can collectively exert their political voice and power?

HONDA: Statistically, 70 percent of the Asian population owns computers. So I suspect they all have e-mail. That would be a good way to communicate with the Asian American community. Campaigns should have invested the appropriate and talented folks on their campaigns who can make the campaigns with vernacular newspapers. And so, if you couple that with the electronic media, then you're hitting a population that sometimes doesn't get hit very hard in campaigns. For example, most people don't care too much about everyday politics, but if you can get radio, TV, and print in different languages (i.e., Vietnamese, Spanish, Khmer, and Laotian), you can reach an untapped population.

So looking at that and extending the campaign out to them on a personal basis will make a big difference because people talk. "Well, did you know that so-and-so visited our temple, talked to our church, took pictures with our folks?"

But on top of all that, I think that we have to extract from the candidates commitments through our communities. What will they do that we can count upon if they're elected president? And I think we have to be prepared with a laundry list, issues around immigration, families, women and children, issues, language access, and educational issues. All those, I think, are important to our community.

And we need to tap into the strength and talent of our communities as far as appointments to boards and commissions and to the cabinet because we'd have a lot of people who—as a matter of course, you have trade overseas—understand a variety of languages, nuances, culture, language, and business. And they have the skills and acumen to be able to do that. So, there's a wealth of talent and a depth of experiences there that go untapped.

AAPR: Thank you, Representative Honda, for sharing your thoughts with us. I think it's important to hear your perspective because a lot of people feel disempowered and disenfranchised by the political process. And hearing from an elected official, like yourself, who actively reaches out to the community, is very helpful and inspiring.

HONDA: Well, you can feel left out, but then part of the things is stepping up and getting involved, not waiting to be called. Because I grew up with the idea that if my work is good and I'm skilled, they should notice that. Now that doesn't always happen, and sometimes you have to put yourself out there and say, "Excuse me, I can help you with this," and just be a little bit more self-assured and confident.

AAPR: Thank you again, Congressman Honda.



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Blazing a Path in the Big Apple: An Interview with New York City Councilman John Liu

PJ Kim

Introduction

In November 2001, John Liu was elected to the New York City Council by the people of northeast Queens (Auburndale, Flushing, Fresh Meadows, and Whitestone), becoming the first Asian Pacific American legislator in New York City. Lui is currently chair of the Council's Transportation Committee and a member of the committees on Education, Consumer Affairs, Contracts, Oversight and Investigation, and Lower Manhattan Redevelopment.

An active community leader, John Liu has dedicated his life to public service. As president of the North Flushing Civic Association, member of Queens Community Board #7, and Vice President of the Queens Civic Congress, John fought for greater community participation in citywide development issues. He has also been vice president of the New Century Democratic Association and has served on the Board of Directors of the Queens Symphony Orchestra, Chinese American Voters Association of Queens, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Democratic Association, Saul Weprin Democratic Club, and the Eastern Queens Democratic Club.

As council member, Lui's mission is to hold city hall accountable and help restore public trust in our democracy. Prior to his tenure on the City Council, John worked as a manager at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the world's leading accounting and financial services firm. Lui plans to use his real world fiscal expertise to root out waste and mismanagement in municipal government. Liu's priorities include improving our public schools, keeping neighborhoods safe, expanding programs

PJ Kim is concurrently seeking a master of public administration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University with a master of business administration at Harvard Business School. He was born in South Korea, raised in Louisiana and Tennessee, and received his undergraduate degree from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, in addition to a certificate in American studies. He is involved with several nonprofit organizations and hopes to pursue a career that combines his interests in New York City politics, redevelopment, and entrepreneurship.

for seniors, and preserving the quality of life of all New Yorkers. The following is an excerpt from the interview conducted on 29 February 2004.

Interview with the Honorable John Lui

AAPR: Has your experience as a New York City Councilman met the expectations you had three years ago when you were elected as the first Asian American to political office in New York City history?

LUI: It's greatly exceeded them. Back then I thought I would spend most of my time cleaning up the messes my predecessor left behind. In addition I knew there would be a lot of responsibility serving as the first Asian American elected official, and that, while it would be rewarding, it would also entail a lot of hard work. Since I've been in office, my experience working on citywide issues and serving as the Chair of the City Council's Transportation Committee has wildly exceeded my expectations.

AAPR: Who are the people who elected you and why do you think they support you?

LUI: The base of the constituency that allowed me to win my campaign cut across different groups: ethnic, racial and age. It was the result of the campaign theme I ran on: that the daily concerns that New Yorkers have (and people in my community have) are concerns that almost everyone has—concerns about schools, educating our kids well, safe streets, and using municipal government to address these quality of life issues. It didn't matter whether I was talking face-to-face to a Korean or Jewish or Chinese or Puerto Rican family, the concerns they told me about were pretty much the same.

People also vote for candidates based not just on their ideas and what they talk about, but credibility is a huge factor in addition to comfort level, and I believe the most important thing I did was to reach out to people individually, on a one-on-one basis; to have a real conversation where I could explain what I would like to do and have them understand it, and they [could] explain what they want for their communities and have me really understand it.

AAPR: You were active in the community for many years prior to your election, weren't you?

LUI: Yes, I served as president of the North Flushing Civic Association and a member of Queens Community Board #7, so people knew that I had been active for a while.

AAPR: Why do you think it has taken so long for Asian Americans in New York City to finally have someone get elected?

LUI: It really has taken far too long for an Asian American to be elected to office in New York City. Although I'm proud to be the first I really wish I wasn't. Asian Americans have been running since early 1980s; and although they didn't win I personally learned lessons from each and every one of those campaigns. It isn't easy to win office in New York City, there is no real Asian American voting base that you can rely upon, we're relatively new immigrant groups and our first con-

cerns have been to take care of your family and meet basic needs like shelter and food, and I think successive generations will begin to realize the value of this country and see that to truly succeed requires full participation.

AAPR: What role did money and organization play in your victory?

LUI: Money is absolutely important. It's hard, very difficult, to raise money, you just have to do it on a daily basis. We were the most well funded City Council campaign that year because I started fundraising three years prior to the election. I raised over \$200,000 and received matching funds from the City. But just as important as the money was the volunteer base, and during the whole time I was raising money I was also recruiting volunteers. If I didn't have the volunteers, and I had to pay for their labor, then it would have cost me nearly a million dollars.

AAPR: What was your path to public service and how was it influenced by your family and professional background?

LUI: I worked full time at PriceWaterhouseCoopers while I was fundraising and running for office; it was hard to juggle, both but I really didn't have a choice since I had to support my family. Running for City Council had been in the works for a long time, and I had strong support from my family that made it all possible.

AAPR: Were there any particular political figures who inspired you? Who do you admire now?

LUI: I've been inspired by prior Asian American candidates for New York City council, and I admire how John Kerry started out high, dropped to rock bottom, and when most people gave up on him, he rose back to the top.

AAPR: Did you have early mentors?

LUI: Nobody. It really would have been nice to decrease the amount of "learn as you go." It would have been easier if there was a mentor or someone to show me the ropes. I learned through a lot of trial and error, mostly lots of error. That's why whenever I have an opportunity to do so, I try to speak to student groups and young people to encourage them into thinking about entering public service.

AAPR: You sometimes joke that you've elected yourself chair of the Asian Caucus in the City Council because you're its only member. What has been your experience in coalition building in the council?

LUI: There are clearly differences of opinions among non-Asian groups about what Asian American interests are, and a relative lack of understanding about Asian Americans in general. I've been pleased to be invited [to] be a member of the Black and Latino Caucus, so that we've expanded the name of the group to the Asian, Black and Latino Caucus. In general, coalition building has not been difficult since my colleagues are very receptive, but there are issues like immigrant rights that are not embraced fully by all communities of color because of perceived economic competition. These are issues that we need to work on. But I've been fortunate that every time I needed them they've provided backup. For example, when Shu-Li Chang [a Chinese American immigrant] was murdered, and in

October 2002 the prosecutors just brought third-degree assault charges that carry a maximum sentence [of] only one year, the story line I was given was that the assailant's punch was not the causal factor in [her] death. That was unjust. Twenty members of the council stood with me to protest the prosecutor's decision. And just a few weeks ago another Chinese delivery person was murdered in New York and many members of the Council are supportive.

AAPR: Can you describe a typical day?

LUI: I usually get up at 6 a.m. in the morning, really excited to begin the day, and I have an idea of what I want to do. Then, throughout the day, I get pulled in fifty different directions and nothing ever turns out the way I expect. I usually go to bed around midnight. I try to grab personal time with my family whenever I can.

AAPR: What has been your proudest moment?

LUI: Passing legislation that changes the thinking and direction of city government by requiring that we stop discriminating against New Yorkers who don't speak English well by providing certain basic services in different languages.

AAPR: What has surprised you most about being a city councilman?

LUI: That government and the people in city government are, for the most part, more committed to helping people than I had previously thought.

AAPR: What has been your greatest setback so far, and how did you deal with it?

LUI: The level of understanding of the Asian American community by city hall and by government in general is shockingly low. We need more appointees and more elected officials to jump on top of issues when they come out, whether it's violent incidents against immigrants or what others may call seemingly "harmless" portrayals in the media.

AAPR: What are the top three issues you deal with everyday?

LUI: The ones that I give the most priority to are issues of consumer protection, especially since immigrants are often taken advantage of, public school reform, especially to help new immigrants and students become English-capable, and addressing transportation needs around the city. Not surprisingly, many of these needs are also in other neighborhoods populated by immigrants.

AAPR: What's your vision for New York City?

LUI: The vision is for New York City to truly act as a capital of the world. We always talk about it being the capital, but too often we don't often behave like it; my hope and vision is that we become a place where all people from all over the world can visit or live and bring up their families; where they are served fully, instead of just certain wealthy narrow segments. This will mean that communities that have not been empowered before need to gain power and voice in government, and it's not easy and won't happen overnight

AAPR: What do you think are the top unaddressed issues facing Asian Americans nationally?

LUI: We need more Asian Americans in federal office. Clearly there aren't enough. There are so few that members of Congress in this day and age, people like Howard Coble [R-NC], feel that it's okay to say that putting Japanese Americans in concentration camps fifty years ago was an okay decision. We need a louder voice and need to do more to protect Asian Americans against federal actions that scapegoat us, cases like Wen Ho Lee and now Captain James Yee. These guys are initially charged with horrible crimes that get a lot of attention. Then, as the process continues, the charges are reduced or dropped to ridiculous levels. Wen Ho Lee was first charged with espionage and then released with no penalty although he'd been shackled and confined in solitary for ten months with no due process. Captain Yee was also charged with espionage, and now they've reduced it to just adultery.

We just need people to make the move to run for federal office. Obviously starting out with a local elected office paves the way to federal office, but plenty of people run straight for federal office and win, like [Representative] David Wu [D-OR].

AAPR: How do you view your role as not only the representative leader for your district but as a symbolic leader for Asian Americans in New York City and beyond?

LUI: Again, I wish I wasn't the first but I relish the opportunity to be the voice for Asian Americans and to be the "go to" person that my colleagues in city, state, federal government—in addition to labor unions and business groups—reach out to. People all over call my office with questions about how to approach members of the community, how to do outreach, be aware of customs and traditions, and other small but important things like where the best restaurants are. It's a lot of work, but I think it will be worthwhile in the long run.

AAPR: What sort of research do you wish public policy schools like the Kennedy School produced more of?

LUI: The most useful research, in my opinion, arrives at a solid conclusion that can be summed up in one or two sentences, with those conclusions being rock solid because of the amount of work that has been done to back them up.

AAPR: If you had access to a research team at a public policy school what issues would you have them research?

LUI: I would use them first to research whether the criminal justice system treats Asian Americans differently. In my opinion there is a disparity—but it's just a gut feeling and I haven't done the research—but I'd like to know if there are differences and see what changes can be made.

I would then have them do research on issues concerning consumer protection; I believe that certain financial institutions treat Asian Americans differently, in an undesirable way. For example I think that credit card fraud is perpetrated disproportionately on Asian immigrants.

AAPR: What do you think of the presidential race in 2004?

LUI: This is the most important race the country has witnessed in a very long time because the current administration has taken us into a very dangerous position in so many different ways both domestically and isolating us globally as a cowboy nation. I support John Kerry.

AAPR: You reach your term limit in 2009. What are your plans for the future?

LUI: My plan is to continue serving in the city council for the time being; we'll see what happens in 2009.

The Global Enclave Model: Economic Segregation, Intra-ethnic Conflict, and the Impact of Globalization on Chinese Immigrant Communities

by Angela Fuhn Chan¹

Abstract:

I offer a conceptual model, called the Global Enclave Model, to describe and explain immigrant Chinese enclaves in a comparative world context. By analyzing interview data collected from studies of the Chinese communities in Monterey Park, California, and London, Great Britain, I assess the relevance and applicability of existing theories on ethnic enclaves in describing and explaining the relationship between Chinese enclaves, host societies, and the world economy. I thereby illustrate the necessity of using the Global Enclave Model to more accurately explain the marginalization of Chinese immigrants, the growth of suburban and urban ethnic enclaves, and varying levels of intraethnic conflict in enclaves. My comparison study of two Chinese enclaves also supports the development of a Dual Enclave Model to elucidate the differences between urban and suburban enclaves.

Chinese Immigrant Enclaves in a Comparative World Context

Chinese enclaves, in the form of urban Chinatowns and developing suburban Chinatowns, are prevalent in most major cities in Western countries. The lack of


Angela Fuhn Chan is a J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. She was born in Portland, OR, and earned her bachelor of arts degree in sociology from Occidental College in Los Angeles, CA. She is a recipient of the Harry S. Truman Scholarship and the Asian Pacific American for Advancement National Scholarship. She has worked for the national office of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the Harvard Civil Rights Project. At Harvard Law School, she is co-president of the Asian Pacific American Law Students Association, general editor of the Harvard Black Letter Law Journal, and a student attorney for Harvard Prison Legal Assistance Project.

extensive comparative research on Chinese immigrant communities, however, highlights the need to understand the general dynamics and particular characteristics of different Chinese enclaves. This is especially the case in Britain, where the government has until recently ignored this minority group.² A few scholars have compared Chinatowns in a national context, such as Min Zhou (1999), who juxtaposed Los Angeles' with New York's Chinatown.³ My study contributes to an emerging field of research comparing ethnic enclaves in a global context.⁴ My research focuses on the Chinese restaurant industry in the suburb of Monterey Park, CA, and in London's urban Chinatown. By comparing Monterey Park's suburban enclave and London's urban Chinatown, I have sought to cultivate a better understanding of the following: 1) the impact of globalization on Chinese ethnic enclaves, 2) the causal factors that segregate Chinese immigrants into ethnic enclaves away from mainstream society, and 3) the interracial and intraethnic dynamics of Chinese immigrant enclaves. I chose to study the suburban Chinese immigrant community in Monterey Park because it was the first majority-Asian American city in the continental United States. For this reason, Timothy Fong dubbed this city the first "suburban Chinatown."⁵ I also decided to focus on London's Chinese enclave because Britain's historical colonialist relationship with Hong Kong has stimulated Chinese immigration to that country, and London has the largest Chinese community in Britain.

This article seeks to elucidate the economic, political, and social forces that cause Chinese immigrants to work in ethnic enclaves, such as the suburban enclave in Monterey Park, and ethnic niches, such as the Chinese restaurant industry. In particular, I examine: 1) how globalization and immigration policies have shaped the migration of people and capital from Asia to Western countries; 2) once in their adopted Western country, how various push factors influence Chinese immigrants to work in ethnic enclaves and/or ethnic niches; and 3) how differences along class, gender, nationality, and generational lines result in varying levels of intraethnic conflict amongst immigrants working in ethnic enclaves and/or ethnic niches.⁶ Comparative analysis on how globalization differentially impacts new and old Chinatowns helps to explain the rapid financial development of suburban Chinatowns and the mass influx of low-skilled, undocumented immigration into urban Chinatowns. The causal factors that propel immigrant groups to fill economic niches, such as Chinese takeout⁷ restaurants in Britain, elucidate the implications of social and economic segregation. My model posits that four main factors lead to the spatial and economic segregation⁸ of Chinese immigrants into ethnic enclaves: language ability, social networks, skill level, and racism. Analyzing these four main factors explains the resulting variations in the level of intraethnic conflict along lines of class, gender, national origin,⁹ and generation in urban and suburban Chinese immigrant enclaves. I summarize these three areas of investigation—immigration, economic segregation, and intraethnic conflict—through comparing two global cities, Monterey Park and London, to lay the foundation for my theory that marginalization from mainstream society, concentration in ethnic niches, and intraethnic conflict are stages that characterize the development of and resulting dynamics in Chinese immigrant communities (see Figure 1). I call this model the Global Enclave Model.

Figure 1. The Global Enclave Model

Stages:



Globalization: The Development of Urban Chinatowns and Suburban Chinese Enclaves

In applying the theoretical concepts of globalization to Chinese enclaves, I employ Saskia Sassen's notion of global cities. When referring to the developing, evolving concept of globalization, I shall rely on the following elaboration:

We should recognize . . . the antiquity of the interpenetration of cultures and forms of life. But we must also accept that, in our century, the balance has shifted. The ratio of what is settled to what has traveled has changed everywhere. Ideas, objects, and people from "outside are now more . . . obviously present than they have ever been" (Sassen 1998, xi).

Thus, while the Chinese Diaspora has been occurring since the outward-looking empire of the Ming Dynasty during the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, the character of Chinese immigration has shifted dramatically with the rise of globalization in the 1960s. Chinese immigrant communities have diversified immensely along lines of nationality, class, and gender (Pan 1990, 3). For example, prior to 1965, Chinese immigration to the United States mainly consisted of uneducated bachelor men from Southern China. In the postmodern period of immigration, the gender ratio among the Chinese immigrant population has balanced out dramatically (Lin 1998, 26). In addition, Chinese immigrants are immigrating from a wider array of countries, including Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, and mainland China. Finally, the bimodal distribution of skills among

the post-1965 flow of Chinese immigration to the United States has caused a rising class gap between “downtown Chinese,” who live in urban Chinatowns, and “uptown Chinese,” who settle in the suburbs. Thus, the post-1965 immigration period has ushered in a growing Chinese immigrant middle class, leading to the development of suburban Chinese communities. According to Wei Li (1999, 9), “[m]ore than 96 percent of all Chinese immigrants in the [suburban Southern Californian area called] San Gabriel Valley immigrated to the U.S. after 1965.” Monterey Park is at the center of a cluster of nine suburban cities in the San Gabriel Valley with a strong Chinese concentration (Li 1999, 9).

Similar to the history of Chinese immigration in the U.S., although Chinese immigrants have been finding their way to Britain’s shores since the mid-nineteenth century, the British Chinese immigrant population did not begin to diversify until the 1960s with the arrival of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam. Prior to this period, Britain’s Chinese immigrant population was composed almost solely of immigrants from the New Territories, a predominantly rural area in northern Hong Kong that borders mainland China, and from Guangdong Province, a southern province in mainland China.

The concept of globalization helps to explain the changing makeup of Chinese immigration to global cities. According to Saskia Sassen, both London and Los Angeles are global cities because these cities are at the center of the production and consumption of services, such as computer technology.¹⁰ Applying the concept of global cities, my research suggests the need to develop a Dual Enclave Model to explain labor and capital flows that shape various immigrant Chinese communities (see Figure 2). While the Global Enclave Model illustrates the similarities among immigrant Chinese communities in terms of causal factors propelling immigrants to work and live in ethnic enclaves, the Dual Enclave Model is a useful concept to compare and contrast the differing experiences of Chinese immigrants in urban as opposed to suburban enclaves.

Figure 2. The Dual Enclave Model

Old Chinatown	New Chinatowns
London	Monterey Park
Urban	Suburban
Established in the nineteenth century ¹¹	Established in the late twentieth century
Working class	Middle class and upper middle class
Influx of labor	Influx of labor and capital
Produce, buy, and sell goods	Buy and sell goods
Cantonese dialect	Mandarin dialect
Caters to tourists, mainstream society, and co-ethnics	Caters almost exclusively to co-ethnics

In Britain, the recent influx from China's Fujian Province of low-skilled immigrants looking for work in London's Chinatown is an example of the increased labor flow that results from globalization. Monterey Park, in contrast, is not experiencing as visible an influx of low-skilled Chinese immigration. This suburban Chinese enclave, however, receives flows of capital from rapidly developing Asian countries and cities, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, and Taiwan. According to a *Forbes Magazine* article describing the economic boom of this suburban city, "Monterey Park is a . . . mini-international financial and commercial center, a haven for flight capital. Combined deposits at the city's banks (38 at last count), mostly small and Chinese-run, are at least \$1.5 billion" (Tanzer 1985, 68-69).

Theoretical Framework

Effects of Globalization on Enclaves

My research sites, London and the Los Angeles suburb of Monterey Park, can be described as "global cities" because they are among the "seven most influential metropolitan areas in the advanced capitalist world" (Lin 1998, 13). Global cities, such as London and Los Angeles, have developed service-based economies, which in turn create a polarized labor system within these cities:

Growth in producer services creates low-wage work through demand for a range of personal services, domestic household services, customized construction and repair work, and building security services in offices and high-income gentrified neighborhoods. Thus, postindustrial global cities require not only a corps of highly skilled and educated managers and administrators but also a phalanx of low-skilled and low-paid clerical staff, who are often recent immigrants (Lin 1998, 14).

Global cities attract highly skilled workers to fill professional service jobs, like banking and lawyering, which in turn draws unskilled labor to serve as the support staff for this growing professional industry. Applying this concept describing capital and labor flow in global cities to Chinese immigrant enclaves, I assert that the influx of middle-class Chinese immigrants to suburban communities also has drawn unskilled Chinese immigrants to fill janitorial and wait staff positions at businesses that sprout up in these thriving communities. Thus, the character of global cities illuminates the interdependent relationship of old Chinatowns and new suburban Chinese communities. For example, unskilled workers who live in Los Angeles's old Chinatown and its surrounding area may commute to the middle-class suburb of Monterey Park to fill positions as servers, cooks, and kitchen help.

Factors Leading to Entrepreneurship and Entrance into Ethnic Niches

Chinese immigrants in both Britain and the U.S. rely on ethnic enterprises, namely the Chinese restaurant industry, for employment. In Britain, over 40 percent of the Chinese in the Britain are in the restaurant business (Peach 1996, 178). In the U.S., the Chinese restaurant industry also has provided a vital source of

employment for Chinese immigrants. For example, the suburban city of Monterey Park is saturated with Chinese restaurants. In fact, Monterey Park's finance director, when interviewed in 1999, reported that the city has about eighty Chinese restaurants. The over-concentration of Chinese immigrants in the restaurant business is problematic because workers in this industry often have to put in long hours and hard labor for minimal wages while receiving no healthcare benefits and no overtime compensation. The *Second Report from the Home Affairs Committee* reports that:

A typical working day for a waiter might be from 11 a.m. to 1 a.m. with a break on some days from 3 to 5 p.m. There is usually a maximum of one day off a week, if that, and annual leave is often commuted for cash. Thus not only do workers have little leisure time, but their periods of relaxation do not correspond to those of the rest of society, thereby increasing their isolation. Nor do their working hours correspond to those of the schools their children attend (Home Affairs Committee 1985, xiv).

Thus, because of the drawbacks of working in ethnic enclaves, it is important to understand the factors leading to an immigrant's entrance into the enclave in order to develop public policies that will expand the range of employment options available to Chinese immigrants. Scholars have asserted differing and competing explanations for why many Chinese immigrants enter ethnic enclaves. The factors listed for entrepreneurship range from racism in the mainstream labor market to differing cultural practices amongst ethnic immigrant groups. While researching Chinese restaurant owners and workers in London and Monterey Park, I gathered data to shed light on this ongoing debate among enclave scholars. Before presenting my data on the causal factors that push Chinese immigrants to work in enclaves, I would like to provide a brief review of the main theoretical explanations of ethnic entrepreneurship and ethnic niches: the middleman minority theory, the cultural theory, the situational theory, and the enclave economy theory.

Edna Bonacich (1973, 583) developed the term "middleman minority" to describe the niche that some immigrant groups fill when they concentrate in small, family-owned businesses, such as restaurants or liquor stores. Bonacich's theory argues that middleman minority groups serve as buffers between dominant and subordinate groups by purchasing goods from white capitalists and selling the goods to poorer, less successful minority groups. As a result of their precarious middleman position above less successful minorities but below the owning class, these ethnic groups are the targets of both resentment from the subordinate class and scapegoating from the dominant class. Thus, middleman minorities often cope with this antagonism towards them by strengthening bonds amongst their ethnic group.

Bonacich's theory is helpful in understanding that aggression from outsiders can strengthen ethnic solidarity amongst middleman groups, if only temporarily. Her theory also sheds light on my findings that exclusion from the mainstream labor market pushes Chinese immigrants into middleman minority positions. The middleman minority theory, however, is only partially applicable to my two studies. Rather than catering to economically disenfranchised groups, the Chinese

restaurants in London's Chinatown serve co-ethnic customers along with members of mainstream society and other minority groups. Chinese restaurants in Monterey Park also deviate from the middleman minority theory because they cater to mostly co-ethnics. In addition, although the Chinese restaurants I studied did buy some supplies from white-owned companies, they also purchased much of their goods from co-ethnic suppliers.

Pyong Gap Min's situational theory seeks to explain ethnic solidarity amongst Korean American petty bourgeoisie in Atlanta, Georgia. Min's situational theory contends that in general, Korean immigrants decide to become entrepreneurs based on calculated, economically rational motivations. In addition, Min posits that lack of English proficiency, not racism, prevents highly educated Korean immigrants, who had professional jobs in Korea, from attaining white collar jobs (Min 1988, 124–25). Although over half of the Korean merchants whom Min surveyed reported having experienced job discrimination, only a third stated that job discrimination was an important consideration in their decisions to become entrepreneurs (Min 1988, 124). Thus, Min concludes that "Korean immigrant's anticipation of economic mobility through business, together with their perception of labor market disadvantages, is the central factor in the decision to start a business in this country" (Min 1988, 125).

Min's theory holds true for many of the educated Chinese restaurant owners whom I interviewed. My informants stated that because it was difficult for them to find a job in the mainstream labor market due to language barriers, they sought to make money in the restaurant industry. However, my findings differ from Min's in that my informants placed more weight on racism as a factor preventing them from finding work in the mainstream labor market.¹²

Ivan Light's theory focuses on the culturally-specific reasons that Asian immigrants often become entrepreneurs. Light's theory asserts that ethnic traditions and a system of kinship networks aid in the entrepreneurial success of Chinese and Japanese petty bourgeoisie (Light 1972, 98–99). Specifically, rotating credit systems serve as an informal strategy for raising capital to start businesses. For example, Chinese men from Canton, China, used a rotating credit system called *hui* in which eight to fourteen members each contribute an equal amount of money to be given to the winner of a lottery (Light 1994, 85). Light also supports his cultural theory by arguing that, "both Chinese and Japanese had regional associations, extended families, and nepotistic trade guilds" (Light 1972, 98). Light's theory is applicable to my research in explaining the kinship ties that facilitate the hiring of co-ethnic employees. However, my research found that in addition to perceived cultural ties, restaurant owners also hire co-ethnics for economic reasons—unskilled recent Chinese immigrants serve as an inexpensive source of labor. Light's theory also is not fully applicable in the context of Monterey Park and London where the emergence of Chinese-owned banks has caused Chinese entrepreneurs to rely on formal, rather than informal means to gather start-up capital.

Kenneth Wilson and Alejandro Portes argue that ethnic groups, such as Cubans in Miami, voluntarily and consciously choose to enter the "enclave economy" as an alternative to assimilation into mainstream society (Wilson and Portes 1980,

296). This enclave economy theory is controversial because it holds that there is no substantial cost to social isolation in the ethnic enclave away from mainstream society (Wilson and Portes 1980, 315). Wilson and Portes's theory supports my findings that lack of English proficiency and lack of familiarity with Western culture causes Chinese immigrants to view assimilation into mainstream society as a difficult and seemingly impossible process. The enclave economy thesis, however, does not explain why some children of Chinese immigrants, who are educated and raised in Western society, end up working in the ethnic enclave. Second-generation Chinese generally are fluent in English and are familiar with the political, economic, and social systems of Western society. Thus, factors other than an interest in avoiding assimilation, such as economic rationality and racism, are better explanations for why Chinese immigrants may remain segregated in ethnic enclaves for several generations.

Ethnic Enclaves: Advantageous or Disadvantageous?

My research will help to arbitrate an important and ongoing debate in the study of enclave economies: whether working in enclaves is equally advantageous to ethnic workers and employers as compared to working in the mainstream labor market. On one side of the debate, Min Zhou and John R. Logan (1989, 745) and Jimmy Sanders and Victor Nee (1987, 819) argue that working in ethnic enclave economy benefits owners much more than workers, and that these workers would be better off in the mainstream labor market. Zhou and Logan contend that, "whatever the returns to human capital, the absolute earnings gap between workers (both male and female) within and outside the enclave is large: enclave workers have worse jobs at lower pay" (Zhou and Logan 1989, 819). Similarly, Sanders and Nee argue that "employers typically draw on ethnic solidarity to enforce and maintain sweatshop conditions, including low wages and closure to union organizing" (Sanders and Nee 1987, 763). On the other side, Alejandro Portes, Kenneth Wilson, and Roger Waldinger believe that "the enclave allows immigrants to find employment that brings better return to their human capital than would be found in the secondary labor market outside of the enclave, and that it is therefore beneficial for workers as well as employers" (as summarized by Waters and Eschbach 1995, 438). This theory argues that "there is a reciprocal relationship" between owners and their co-ethnic employees in the ethnic enclave (as characterized by Fong 1994, 164-65). Employers in the enclave economy have the advantage of cheap labor that is unlikely to unionize while workers receive employment and an opportunity for promotion which usually is not attainable outside of the enclave.

My research supports elements from both sides of this debate. It confirms Zhou, Logan, Sanders, and Nee's proposition that high levels of intraethnic conflict characterize ethnic enclaves. For example, my studies show that Chinese restaurant owners prefer to fill their higher paying position with co-ethnics from their same region of origin. Chinese restaurant entrepreneurs in London, who tend to be from Hong Kong, often discriminate against immigrants from Fujian Province in China. Thus, workers from Fujian Province usually fill the lowest positions in the restau-

rant employee hierarchy, working as vegetable cutters or dishwashers. My research also supports Waldinger, Wilson, and Portes' theories because I found that the enclave is one of the few employment avenues open to unskilled and uneducated Chinese immigrants.

Developing a New Framework: The Global Enclave Model

Taken together, the main theories on ethnic enclaves make clear the need for a model which more accurately explicates the unique characteristics of the Chinese enclaves in a comparative world context. The Global Enclave Model is a synthesis of the applicable propositions from the main theories on ethnic enclaves coupled with additional factors not directly addressed by these theories (see Figure 1). The Global Enclave Model contends that Chinese enclaves are characterized by intraethnic conflict due to competition between the large number of densely located ethnic businesses in an enclave. In addition to competition between Chinese-owned businesses, intraethnic conflict also is prominent along lines of class, language, education, generation, and national origin. Because my studies find that co-ethnic exploitation occurs in Chinese enclave economies, my model holds that ethnic enclaves are more advantageous to employers than employees. The Global Enclave Model also contends that globalization, caused by capital flow between prospering cities in Asia and cosmopolitan centers in Western countries, has resulted in the rapid sprouting of large Chinese restaurants in suburban Chinese communities to cater to the tastes of a rising Chinese immigrant middle-class. My model also holds that Chinese businesses are mainly buying from and catering to co-ethnics. Capital flow from Asian countries has made possible the development of co-ethnic owned banks, real estate companies, and restaurant suppliers. This in turn has led to a decline in the significance of the rotating credit system, and to a need to purchase supplies and real estate from white capitalists.

Research Methods

My primary method of data collection consisted of in-depth interviews, which I conducted in *London and Monterey Park*. Through a *Ford Foundation Research* grant distributed by Occidental College in the summer of 1999, I completed 25 in-depth interviews with Chinese restaurant owners and employees in Monterey Park. I also interviewed 11 other informants, including the president of the Monterey Park chamber of commerce, Mayor Judy Chu, Chinese immigrant real-estate agents, Chinese immigrant bankers, and a scholar on Asian American history. Through the Richter International Fellowship, also facilitated by Occidental College, I conducted 23 interviews with Chinese restaurant owners and workers in London. I also interviewed 28 other informants, including a member of the United Kingdom House of Parliament, leaders of Chinese community centers, numerous professors and scholars, chief of the Chinatown Police Division, and managers of several British Chinese media organizations. In summary, the bulk of my data on Chinese enclaves comes from completing 87 interviews in Monterey Park in 1999 and London in 2000.¹³

Since my research focuses on the ways in which the over-concentration of Chinese immigrants in ethnic niches shapes intraethnic relations in these communities, both of the Chinese communities that I studied exhibited similar patterns of economic segregation in the Chinese restaurant industry. I narrowed my research of ethnic enclaves to focusing on Chinese restaurants because Chinese immigrants in the restaurant business are a very isolated group. By concentrating in the catering sector, Chinese immigrants avoid competing directly with workers for jobs in the mainstream labor market (Watson 1975, 194). Specializing in the catering business also has secluded Chinese immigrants from the mainstream because this line of work does not require them to utilize English on an extensive basis. Owners mainly work in the kitchen, encountering Westerners only through short simple exchanges over the counter. "The concentration on catering . . . [has shielded] the Chinese from the wider society through its long and unsocial hours and its ability, at least until recently, to absorb all available Chinese labour" (Cheng 1994, 14). Therefore, focusing my research on the Chinese restaurant industry has allowed me to tap into an economically isolated, well-defined entrepreneurial community.

In addition to in-depth interviews, I collected data via participant observation. For example, in the Monterey Park study, I attended the annual banquet for the Monterey Park Chamber of Commerce and paid numerous visits to the Monterey Park City Clerk's Office. In London, I volunteered for the Chinatown Millennium Celebration, participated in the Rights for Asylum Seekers March, attended community meetings addressing the plight of Chinese asylum seekers from Fujian Province, and attended the memorial service to honor the lives of 58 Chinese asylum seekers who died in their efforts to smuggle into Britain.¹⁴

Setting the Stage: A Brief History of Monterey Park's and London's Chinese Enclaves

The Emergence of Monterey Park as a Suburban Chinese Enclave

Monterey Park has caught the eye of the American public as well as academics, because it is the setting of a large and thriving Chinese ethnic enclave. Monterey Park is a 7.7 square mile city within a 15 minute driving distance from downtown Los Angeles. This middle-class suburban community has approximately 62,000 residents (Castillo 1994, A3). According to Wesley An, a real estate agent and member of the Monterey Park Chamber of Commerce, in the 1960's Monterey Park was a quiet, predominantly white suburb. In the 1960's, white residents composed 85.4 percent of the city while Asian Americans composed 2.9 percent. By 1990, the percentage of white residents decreased to 11.7 percent, and the Asian population shot up to 56 percent—estimates put the 1999 Asian population even higher at 62 percent. Monterey Park has thus become the first Asian majority city in the continental United States, which led scholar Timothy Fong to dub this area as "the first suburban Chinatown" and Wei Li to describe this city as an "ethnoburb."¹⁵

Monterey Park did not smoothly transition from a predominantly white community to a majority Asian city. Inter-ethnic conflicts between the “old” white and Latino residents and the “new” Chinese immigrant settlers have complicated the formation of this ethnic enclave. While white residents enjoyed the economic benefits of raised property values and increased tax revenue due to the influx of Asian immigrants, they felt threatened by the large number of Asian immigrants moving into their neighborhoods. The established white residents also resented the newly arrived Chinese because these immigrants started businesses that catered mainly to co-ethnics. The English-only movement in the mid-1980s exemplifies outraged responses by established residents to the proliferation of Chinese-owned businesses. Although the English-only initiative was unsuccessful, the Anglo-dominated city council did pass a resolution making English the official language of the city in 1986 (Horton 1995, 82). One councilperson even attempted to pass a law that would remove all foreign language books from the shelves of the local library (Frolik 1996, 1A). This rough transition period in the 1980’s has led some scholars and the media to focus mainly on inter-ethnic conflict between non-Asians and Asians, and thus diverted attention from intraethnic conflict within the Chinese community.

Several factors, including changes in immigration laws as well as the strengthening of economic ties in the Pacific Rim, have facilitated the transformation of Monterey Park into a suburban Chinese enclave. The passage of the 1965 Hart Cellar Act loosened the strict quota on immigration from Asia, causing a new wave of immigrants to flow from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. The 1965 immigration reform also created a “bimodal distribution of skills among immigrants” because of its two preferential categories: family reunification principles and special manpower requirements (Waters and Eschbach 1995, 439). On one hand, “professional and skilled workers who arrived through manpower preferences were mainly from the middle classes” (Lin 1998, 28). In contrast, the Act’s family reunification preference attracted mainly Chinese immigrants with working class backgrounds.¹⁶

The liberalization of immigration policies in 1965 coupled with the political instability in Asia caused an influx of Chinese immigration that greatly diversified the Chinese immigrant community in the U.S..¹⁷ Most recently, there has been an influx of Chinese immigration from Fujian, a province to the northeast of Guangdong, due to poverty and instability in that region. While Fujianese and ethnic Chinese from Vietnam tend to settle in urban Chinatowns, wealthier immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan move to suburban middle-class enclaves, such as Monterey Park. Since many immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan have come to the U.S. by taking advantage of the skills preference in the 1965 Act, their middle-class status allows them to settle in this suburban city. The visibility of Taiwanese immigrants in Monterey Park has led scholars and residents to nickname Monterey Park “Little Taipei.”¹⁸ In the past decade, many of the wealthy Taiwanese businesspeople who first settled in Monterey Park at the height of the real-estate boom in the 1980s have moved to more upscale surrounding cities, such as San Marino and Arcadia, while many middle-class immigrants from mainland China are moving into Monterey Park. This shift is reflected in a com-

ment by Wesley An, the owner of United Reality, who told me, "Monterey Park was once called little Taipei, but now is known as Little Beijing."

The Impact of Britain's Immigration Policies on London's Chinatown

Bangkok's Chinatown has existed since the founding of the city, and New York's Chinatown originated in 1844 (Pan 1990, 307). London's Chinatown in its current location in central London is relatively new, however, dating back to only 1965 (Pan 1990, 307). Before the Second World War, there was a Chinatown in the Limehouse area of London that served a small population of Chinese seafarers. Bombing during the war demolished the two streets that made up this historic Chinatown. A new Chinatown reemerged in a different location, but not until well after the war ended (Watson 1975, 116). In the mid-1960's, five Chinese restaurants opened in rapid succession on a little street called Gerald Street in the theater district of Soho (Pan 1990, 307). Chinese businesses and restaurants began to concentrate in this area in the heart of London, which became known as London's relatively small, but rapidly growing Chinatown.

The founding of London's Chinatown occurred simultaneously with a new wave of Chinese immigration into Britain. Between 1962 and 1966, the rate of Chinese immigration to Britain from Hong Kong increased tenfold (Pan 1990, 308). This influx of immigrants from Hong Kong was caused by the passage of the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, which restricted immigration through a voucher system that required Commonwealth citizens to have a job waiting for them upon arrival (Mason 1995, 28).¹⁹ The restrictive immigration act had an unintended effect of stimulating a "beat-the-ban" rush of immigrants who flowed in from India, Pakistan, the West Indies, and Hong Kong in the short period before the restriction was enforced (Pan 1990, 308). Residents of Hong Kong took part in this immigration rush because they were afraid of possible economic and political instability stemming from the impending return of Hong Kong from Britain to the Republic of China in 1997. After the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, xenophobia amongst the British mainstream fueled passage of a series of restrictive immigration acts (Pan 1999, 305).²⁰

The diversity of the Chinese immigrant population in Britain stems from the history of the British Empire's colonial ties with numerous Chinese-populated regions in Asia, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Mainland China, and Hong Kong. Thus, Britain's colonialist relationships with numerous Asian countries had the unintended result of opening an escape route to England for Chinese immigrants fleeing their countries for economic and political reasons. As a result, the Chinese community in London is diverse in terms of dialect, class, education, English-fluency, and native country of origin.

There have been six main waves of immigration to Hong Kong. The first wave of significant Chinese immigration occurred before Britain's 1962 immigration restrictions. Chinese immigrants fled Hong Kong after the influx of inexpensive Thai rice into the Hong Kong market drove them out of the agricultural business (Pan 1990, 308). This group of immigrants speak the Cantonese and Hakka dialects and arrived in Britain from uneducated rural backgrounds with little or

no English skills. Because these immigrants from the New Territories make up the first large wave of Chinese immigration, New Territory Chinese have had the advantage of strong kinship networks in Britain. The second group of Chinese immigrants is composed of former mainland Chinese refugees from the poor, rural areas of nearby Guangdong Province who had previously settled in Hong Kong. The third group of newcomers are made up of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, who arrived as refugees from Hong Kong. More established Chinese immigrants in Britain look down on this Cantonese-speaking group, which is composed mostly of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, because they view Vietnamese Chinese immigrants as less than “completely” Chinese (Pan 1990, 309). Beginning in the 1970s, a fourth group, ethnic Chinese from Singapore and Malaysia, have immigrated to Britain as students and stayed to work as servers in Chinese restaurants. Most recently, there has been a large and controversial influx of young men from Fujian Province. The Fujianese enter Britain through informal channels; some apply for asylum but others stay indefinitely underground. They work in the lowest echelon of London’s Chinese enclave and are willing to work for much lower wages than other Chinese immigrants. These five groups — New Territory farmers, mainland Chinese refugees from Hong Kong, ethnic Chinese-Vietnamese refugees, Malaysian and Singaporean Chinese, and Fujianese Chinese — all have found work primarily in the Chinese restaurant business, either as entrepreneurs or as employees. In contrast, the most recent group of immigrants from Hong Kong are wealthy business people, who use their financial capital, English language skills, and business connections to open trading companies in Britain.

Monterey Park Study Research Results

The Impact of Globalization on Suburban Ethnic Enclaves

I have entitled my theory the Global Enclave Model because none of the four major theories that seek to explain causal factors of ethnic enclaves account for the impact of globalization on the development of enclave economies. The rise of *Monterey Park into a majority middle-class Chinese immigrant city exemplifies* this phenomenon. Monterey Park’s connections with Asia’s financial centers run deep; in fact, cities in Taiwan and China are “sister cities” with Monterey Park. Scholar Charles Choy Wong reports that globalization has a “tremendous” impact on this suburban city because Chinese people have, “brought money from Asia as a source of the regeneration of Monterey Park. Many banks in Monterey Park house foreign money.” Andrew Tanzer also supports this contention in his article highlighting Monterey Park in *Forbes* magazine, “[h]undreds of millions of dollars fleeing political uncertainty in Asia have flowed into Monterey Park real estate, driving up the cost of prime commercial space fifteen-fold and houses three to four time over the past decade” (Tanzer 1985, 71).

In the 1980s, real-estate companies sprung up in Monterey Park to take advantage of the city’s growing ties with Asia. These companies raised the prices of Monterey Park’s commercial property by attracting investors from Asia. Lucy

Kelly, interim president of the Monterey Park Chamber of Commerce, recalls that in the 1980's real-estate dealers "couldn't sell the property fast enough." As a result, wealthy overseas speculators in Asia bought up much of the commercial property in Monterey Park during this period, seeking huge returns on their investments. When the value of commercial property increased, these overseas speculators then subdivided their commercial buildings and leased to Chinese business owners at inflated prices. Many of the Chinese restaurant owners I interviewed said that they were leasing the property at very high prices and that those who were paying reasonable leasing rates were not in good locations. Real estate speculation in Monterey Park by Asian investors has resulted in class conflict among the Chinese on a transnational scale. Business people in China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan own the property that is rented by local Chinese entrepreneurs, often charging the immigrants absorbent prices.

In addition to raising the costs of renting or leasing commercial property in Monterey Park, globalization has had another effect on immigrants in the Chinese restaurant business. To cater to the tastes of the city's middle-class Chinese immigrant population, large Hong Kong style seafood restaurants have emerged to offer an upscale dining atmosphere and pricey gourmet seafood dishes. Happy Harbor, located in a shopping complex along with a video store renting the latest Hong Kong movies and a trendy hair salon catering to Asian clientele, is one example of these sprouting Hong Kong style restaurants.²¹ On any given day, customers waiting to be seated fill the elaborate lobby of this bustling restaurant, which is lined with fish tanks displaying live fish, crab, lobster, muscles, and shrimp. The dining room is so large that the employees carry walkie-talkies to communicate with one another. Lui Pang, one of the partners, reported that this restaurant seats 800 customers and employs 100 people. Authentic Chinese seafood restaurants, such as Happy Harbor, cater to the city's burgeoning middle-class Chinese immigrant population and wealthy Chinese professionals. These business people came to Monterey Park in pursuit of opportunities to take advantage of the thriving connections between financial markets in the Pacific Rim.

Factors Leading to Entrance into Ethnic Enclaves

My study of the restaurant community in Monterey Park illustrates that the middleman minority theory is only partially applicable to this suburban ethnic enclave. The middleman minority theory argues that ethnic immigrants purchase from white suppliers to sell to lower income racial minority groups. Contrary to the theory, rather than purchasing mainly from white suppliers, Chinese restaurant owners purchase food, equipment, and supplies from both white and co-ethnic companies. Dameon Chou, the owner of Garden Delight Seafood, stated that he prefers to buy from co-ethnic suppliers because "the communication is more convenient and they give better prices." Chinese restaurant owners also choose to purchase from co-ethnics because they are serving authentic Chinese cuisine instead of Americanized Chinese food. As a result, they only can attain these specialized products from Chinese suppliers who import the foods from Asia. For example, one owner who bought mainly from Chinese suppliers, Jonathan Pu, told

me that, "you can't get a lot of items at Price Club for my restaurant. If you want dried mushrooms, [you] can't get it at Costco."

Furthermore, instead of playing the middleman role of selling products to lower income racial minority groups, most of the owners in my study reported that the majority of their clientele are middle-class co-ethnics. Chinese restaurants in Monterey Park target co-ethnics by serving authentic Chinese cuisine, such as fresh crab in ginger sauce and roast duck, rather than the chop suey and sweet and sour pork dishes that were developed for the tastes of mainstream America. Owner Lui Pang informed me that his employees "do not have to speak much English because the customers are all Chinese." Thus, Monterey Park's Chinese American petty bourgeoisie is a not "go-between group;" rather, the large population of middle-class Chinese residents in the city coupled with the availability of imported products from Asia allow these entrepreneurs to buy from and sell products to co-ethnics.

Racism as a Stimulus of Ethnic Solidarity

The middleman minority theory, however, is helpful in describing the temporary ethnic solidarity that results when outsiders attack the Chinese community. In the mid-1980's, established Latino and white residents, who were angered by what was dubbed as the "Asian invasion" in Monterey Park, poured their energies into passing city ordinances that targeted Chinese people. This movement strengthened ethnic solidarity amongst the Chinese community in Monterey Park, who began to organize themselves to fend off the hostility they were receiving. In response to the nativist movement, Chinese American merchants formed the organization A Better Cityhood (ABC) to recall city council members, whom they saw as anti-Chinese, such as Patricia Reichenberger and Barry Hatch (Horton 1995, 104). ABC contended that racism against the growing Chinese population motivated these council members to support the passage of English Only laws in the city.

Economic Segregation of College-Educated Chinese Immigrants

Unlike the Korean immigrant community in Atlanta upon which Pyong Gap Min based his situational theory, a majority of the Chinese restaurant owners I interviewed do not have professional backgrounds and do not hold college degrees. Only five of the restaurant owners I interviewed attended college. One college educated owner stated that he went into the restaurant business because he found it to be more lucrative than their professional jobs (see Appendix A). Harrison Pang, New Star Cafe owner, had received a degree in mechanical engineering from UCLA, but told me that mechanical engineering "does not pay too much, only \$10-\$17 an hour," and all you do is "work your whole life, it is no good." Others went into the restaurant business because they felt they had no other opportunity. William Jang, a part owner and a cook at Beijing Noodle restaurant, originally immigrated to the U.S. to study at the University of Southern California. After one year at USC, he found that he did not have the finances to finish his business administration degree. Luke Tsu, partner of Tien Café, had an accounting degree from Cal State Hayward. When he finished college at Cal State

Hayward, he could not find a job in the U.S. so he went overseas to do business in Asia. He eventually came back to the U.S. and resorted to working in the restaurant business.

Most of the Chinese restaurant owners and workers whom I interviewed cited lack of English proficiency as an influential factor in their decision to enter this ethnic niche. Cameron Lai, manager of Mei Mei Seafood Restaurant, told me that he works in the Chinese restaurant business because he "does not know English. [He] can work in the kitchen and does not have to face customers." John Chang, partner of Silver Palace Restaurant, said that lack of English skills is one of the reasons he entered the restaurant business. "When I came here, I did not know English. There was nothing else for me to do except for this." Thus, Min's theory is applicable to Monterey Park in that language difficulty and perception of economic mobility are important factors leading to entrepreneurship for some immigrants.

Racism as a Principle Factor Limiting Entrance to the Mainstream Labor Market

My research, however, demonstrates that Min's situational theory underestimates the extent to which racism also prevents many minority immigrants from entering the mainstream labor market. Like Min, I asked Chinese restaurant owners whether they experienced racial discrimination to assess how important a factor it was in their decision to become entrepreneurs. It was very difficult for me to attain answers to this question because racial discrimination was a sensitive topic for most of my interviewees. This was clearly demonstrated when Harrison Pang asked me to turn off my tape recorder before he would speak about his experiences of discrimination. Structural barriers were apparent to these immigrant entrepreneurs because a majority of restaurant owners cited lack of opportunity to enter other fields as a reason for their decision to become entrepreneurs. John Chang, a partner of the Silver Palace, told me that

America is different from China. China does not have much freedom. In the U.S. we are second-class citizens because not all Americans like Chinese people. I do not have much opportunity and no money to continue my education in the U.S. If I continued my education, I would be a mechanic.

Chang is one of a number of restaurant owners who would rather work in the mainstream labor market, but felt that racism, lack of resources, and a low level of education prevented him from working outside the Chinese restaurant industry. Another restaurant owner confided about the sensitive topic of discrimination. Manager Cameron Lai worked as an architect before entering the restaurant business. When I asked him if he had faced racism in the mainstream labor market, he said, "Yes . . . you feel it when you are working for them."

Employment in the Chinese restaurant industry, however, does not afford Chinese immigrants a complete escape from racism. Lui Pang, owner of Happy Harbor, said

In the restaurant some times, some white people come in and they think they are . . . I don't know what should I say. Sometimes they do take advantage of you because you are Chinese. Sometimes because you don't speak good English, they do take advantage. Sometimes they are mean.

Because mostly Chinese customers frequent the Chinese restaurants in Monterey Park, I did not find many other complaints of racial harassment perpetrated by non-Chinese clientele. Thus, working in the Chinese enclave appears to shield Chinese immigrants from having to interact with whites and from being harassed or racially discriminated against. This changes when Chinese immigrants, like those in London, work in urban Chinatowns that cater mainly to a white clientele.

When discussing their experiences of discrimination, a few restaurant owners commented that they felt the Chinese community lacked political power in Monterey Park. Harrison Pang, an ethnic Chinese refugee from Vietnam, told me that he also felt "like a second-class citizen," and that "you don't need to go out of the county to see discrimination because even though the city is mostly Chinese, the city council is mostly white and Latino." Margaret Toe, a Chinese immigrant who is owner of Asia Pacific International Advertising and a former president of the city's chamber of commerce, lost several elections for city council of Monterey Park. Toe recounts that she did not have a strong chance of winning a seat on the council because Chinese residents are consistently underrepresented on Monterey Park's city council. At the time of my interview with Toe, the city council was made up of three Latinos, one white person, and one Chinese member. Developer Gregory Tse offered an explanation for why the city council is not representative of the large Chinese population in Monterey Park: "The Chinese are 40 percent of the city, but many of us are not citizens, so we cannot vote . . . the council knows this and feels they can get away with what they're doing" (Arax 1987, 1). Thus, although the Chinese in Monterey Park may have some economic power, their lack of political power highlights their continuing minority status and vulnerability to being the targets of xenophobic and racist policies.

Declining Significance of the Cultural Theory: Sources of Capital for Entrepreneurship

In addition to speaking with my informants about racial discrimination, I also asked them if they used rotating credit systems or relied on kinship networks. My findings show that Light's cultural theory is partially relevant. While Chinese business owners in Monterey Park rely on kinship networks, they do not practice the rotating credit system traditionally used among the Chinese bachelor men in urban Chinatowns. According to scholar Charles Choy Wong, with whom I spoke in 1999, the rotating credit system is outdated because it does not raise enough capital to start most businesses in Monterey Park. Rather than a rotating credit system among community members, those who do not have sufficient capital to start a business gather friends and family members to create a partnership. Thus, the existence of kinship networks is readily apparent in the formation of a partnership between friends and family members to purchase and run businesses. I also found that when the owners and employees of a restaurant are from a particular region of China or Southeast Asia, the majority of their customers tended to be from a similar place of origin. Therefore, ties of regional origin between owners and their customers play an important role in the success of their restaurant businesses.

Advantages of Entrance into Chinese Enclaves

Wilson and Portes's enclave economy theory accurately describes Monterey Park in that the city's ethnic economy is self-sustaining. Lisa Lam, a hostess at Garden Seafood Restaurant, told me that the city is very convenient for recent immigrants from China who do not speak English because the city has Chinese banks, supermarkets, and even electronics stores. Thus, working in an enclave economy provides Chinese immigrants with the advantage of not having to learn fluent English and gives them convenient access to purchase ethnic goods and services.

Co-ethnic Exploitation and Limited Mobility

On the other hand, I also found evidence to support Sanders and Nee's argument that ethnic enclaves tend to benefit ethnic owners more than workers. Because of such factors as racism, language barriers, skill levels, and lack of social networks in the mainstream labor market, unskilled Chinese immigrant workers depend on the enclave economy for jobs. As a result, they are in a vulnerable position to be exploited by co-ethnic restaurant owners. These uneducated immigrants do not have the required skills or social networks to work outside of Chinese enclaves. As a consequence of the limited avenues available to them, workers in the Chinese restaurants tend to be unsatisfied with their job. A number of restaurant managers stated that they were dissatisfied with their employment situation because they worked long hours and received no medical benefits. Manager Michael Fong, who had a college degree but did not have time to continue his studies in the U.S. complained, "when I get home, I'm tired and can't study anymore. I have to work as a waiter; I have to work as a busboy . . . I do everything here." In addition, upward mobility in the Chinese restaurant business is very limited. Most Chinese restaurant owners said it took them 20 years to move from being servers to becoming their own bosses. The employees with the most chance of upward mobility are the chefs who have the cooking skills needed to attract co-ethnic customers. But these talented chefs must first acquire enough capital on their own or find investment partners before they can begin their restaurant business.

Even the few employees who are able to start their own restaurants face a difficult challenge in cultivating a successful business in Monterey Park because of the competitive environment within this saturated ethnic enclave. Cameron Lai, a long time manager, told me that he wanted to start a Chinese restaurant business outside of Monterey Park because there are "too many restaurants here, if you want to own a Chinese restaurant, you better go somewhere else." Margaret Toe, a former president of the city's chamber of commerce, also pointed out to me that there is stiff competition amongst Chinese restaurants in Monterey Park. "You see all this competition in the Chinese restaurants. Take for example lunch specials. I see that his specials cost \$4.95, so I will make mine \$4.55." Wilson and Portes's enclave economy theory does not adequately explain the intraethnic conflict that exists in Monterey Park, which results from the vulnerable positions of workers and the competitive environment caused by an over-concentration of ethnic businesses.

Also, contrary to the enclave economy theory, social isolation does have a significant economic cost on Chinese restaurants owners and workers. Jonathan Pu, owner of one of the few restaurants serving American style Chinese food in Monterey Park, told me that it is difficult for Chinese restaurants serving authentic Chinese food to reach out to a broader market. He contends that many white and Latino Americans are “unfamiliar” with authentic Chinese food, and “a majority of these waitresses don’t even speak English.” His observations demonstrate that the language barrier, which propels many Chinese immigrants to enter the restaurant business, may also work to limit their pool of customers. Dennis Yamamoto, consultant to a downtown merchants association and owner of an advertising agency in Monterey Park, explained to me that

More often, Chinese businesses target the ethnic Chinese market and don't want to attract mainstream customers. Unless the owners are fluent in English, and their staff is fluent in English, it causes a difficult time, and slows down their business. There also are less arguments and lawsuits.

My interviews with restaurant owners demonstrated a cost of ethnic enclaves not accounted for by Wilson and Portes’s theory. The social isolation of Chinese immigrants, who lack English fluency and a cultural understanding of the host society, limits the market appeal of businesses in Chinese enclaves and deters owners from wanting to cater to non-Chinese customers.

Class and National Divisions as Primary Forms of Intraethnic Conflict

My study found that the Chinese ethnic enclave in Monterey Park primarily exhibits intraethnic conflict along class and national lines. Chinese immigrants from Taiwan tend to be from the middle to upper middle class with professional backgrounds. In contrast, immigrants from mainland China and Hong Kong are much more diverse in terms of socioeconomic class. While the Taiwanese in Monterey Park are concentrated in high skill jobs, such as real estate and accounting, many Chinese from Hong Kong and mainland China work in the low skill restaurant industry. This may explain why I only encountered one Taiwanese restaurant owner in my study of Monterey Park’s Chinese restaurants (see Appendix A). Moreover, the servers and buspersons in the Chinese restaurants who receive minimum wage and work long hours are mainly immigrants from mainland China and Hong Kong. Another class and nationality division arises due to the presence of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam in the 1970s. Because they had to quickly flee persecution by the Vietnamese government, ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam generally came to the U.S. with little financial capital. This group of ethnic Chinese tends to settle in Los Angeles’ urban Chinatowns because they cannot afford to live in or own businesses in the suburbs. The Vietnamese Chinese, who can afford to own restaurants in Monterey Park, tend to own small businesses specializing in selling low-profit noodle soups.

Gender Inequality in the Chinese Restaurant Industry

During my field research in Monterey Park, I met only one restaurant that was solely owned by a woman. Susan Chen is the owner of Quizhou Restaurant, a

small establishment that serves simple Northern Chinese fare of soup and dumplings. My observation data found that women were generally present in Monterey Park's Chinese restaurant industry as waitresses and hostesses. Their segregation in these low wage service jobs parallels the overrepresentation of women in service jobs in the mainstream labor market. Because the women serve mainly as waitresses, they rely upon gratuities from customers to supplement the minimal wage they earn.²² In contrast, the chefs, who are overwhelmingly male, are paid by monthly salaries and do not need to serve customers directly for a portion of their wages. In addition, when married couples owned restaurants in Monterey Park, I found that the husbands are usually the official owners of the establishment, who controlled the finances, while their wives work as unpaid family laborers. The unpaid labor of the owners' wives in small-scale restaurants maximizes the limited profit made by these establishments.

London Study Research Results

Influx of Low-Skilled Chinese Immigration to Britain

In contrast to Monterey Park's notoriety as a magnet for Asian financial capital, London's urban Chinatown has made the headlines of Britain's papers as a gathering place for illegal Chinese immigrants. In the last decade, a wave of Fujianese asylum seekers have entered the country primarily through illegal channels. When I spoke to Officer Eddie Morse of the Chinatown Police Unit, he estimated that "up to 500 Fujianese a month claim asylum in the U.K." These immigrants serve as low paid labor for Chinese restaurant owners because of their extremely vulnerable status as undocumented immigrants. The influx of Fujianese immigrants adds another dimension to my hypothesis that globalization uniquely impacts the development of Chinese enclaves. In my Monterey Park study, I found that the economic success of "little dragon" countries, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, have stimulated capital flow between Asia and that suburban Chinese enclave. In contrast, I found less visible signs of capital flow from Asia to London's urban Chinatown. According to Steven Tan, partner of Canton Restaurant in London's Chinatown, whom I interviewed in 2000:

Chinese immigrants came here and are all settling here now. They are becoming a part of this society. All their resources stay here. Some Asian investors do come here to buy property.

Furthermore, community organizer Jabez Lam told me that, "in terms of investments from Asia, there is no comparison to the States." The lower presence of Asian capital flowing into London's Chinese enclaves probably is attributed to the peasant origins of this Chinese immigrant population in comparison to the middle-class community of Monterey Park. The majority of Chinese in the U.K. were rural farmers in the New Territories. In contrast, Chinese immigrants in Monterey Park, who are mainly from urban, middle-class backgrounds, are in a better position to do business with companies in Asia. Conversely, businesses in Asia find it

more profitable to invest in Chinese enclaves like Monterey Park, which has a large and growing middle-class ethnic customer base.

Globalization has affected London's Chinatown, not through financial capital investment from Asia, but from a mass influx of labor capital from Fujian. The opening of China's borders that came as a result of modernization and the development of stronger economic ties between Asia and Western countries has stimulated a steady flow of low-skilled immigration from China to London. Bobby Chan, head of the Central London Law Center, which offers legal services to asylum seekers, told me:

The tide of people running out of China is only happening because of liberalization of Chinese policy. If the U.K. and the U.S. think liberalization is good then they need to accept this immigration. If you look at the wage level between these countries, it is very different. There is no policy to stop mass migration between continents except by assisting the country of origin so that there is no reason to emigrate.

Chan's comment reflects the reality that the strengthening of financial ties between less developed countries in Asia and developed Western countries has pushed low-skilled Chinese to emigrate and find better paying job opportunities in countries, such as Britain.

Factors Leading to Entrance into the Chinese Restaurant Niche

My interviews with restaurant owners and workers support the proposition in my Global Enclave Model that Chinese immigrants enter ethnic niches because of language barriers, racism in the mainstream labor market, low levels of education, and lack of social networks. For instance, these four "push" factors are applicable to Maggie and Jim Li, owners of a Chinese restaurant in Tower Hamlets, which is the location of the original Chinatown in the dockland district of Eastern London. Mr. and Ms. Li have limited English skills and have little formal education. When asked why he went into the restaurant business, Mr. Li replied, "We didn't go to school. We don't know how to read English so we opened a restaurant." In fact, *their English barrier was so high that, even after 39 years of residence in the U.K., my entire interview with them was conducted in See Yup Hua, a rural dialect of Cantonese.*

Educated Chinese restaurant owners also cite lack of English fluency as an obstacle to working in the primary labor market. Steven Tan, partner of Canton Restaurant, earned a bachelor degree in mechanical engineering in Britain after emigrating from the New Territories. When I asked him about his employment experience in the engineering field, Tan commented:

In this country, Chinese immigrants do not get opportunities. It is very difficult to get a promotion. We come from Hong Kong, our English is not that good. It takes five minutes for an English person to write up something; it takes me fifteen minutes.

Tan's comment elucidates the English barriers that many educated Chinese face when competing with native English people in Britain's primary labor market.

Thus, Chinese immigrants who lack English proficiency may choose to work in Chinese restaurants in part to avoid having to compete with native English speakers.

Racism as a Principal Cause of Economic Segregation

Like my Monterey Park research results, I also found that racism is a principal factor leading to economic segregation for Chinese immigrants in London. Although the Mr. Li cited language, lack of social networks, and a low skill level as push factors, Mr. Li contended that racism was the most important causal factor. He told me that:

England has the most racism. England has more racism towards Chinese people because most Chinese are from Hong Kong, a colony of England. Chinese are a third class . . . the manner of the English is ruder. England is not as diverse as the U.S."

Whereas informants in Monterey Park commented that they felt like second-class citizens in the U.S., Maggie and Jim Li told me that they felt that racism in England was even more severe — causing them to feel like third-class citizens. When I asked why they would immigrate and settle in such a racially hostile climate, they contended that they had no other choice to escape China. Their only connection outside of China was Mr. Li's mother, who was in Britain. Mr. Li's mother sponsored the Lis to Britain.

Jung Lee, a retired owner of a Chinese take-away business, also believes that racism was one of the main factors limiting his employment to the restaurant industry. He told me that:

Chinese do not have the same opportunity as the English because our skin color is different. Everything is different. It is racism. Whites don't want their own kind to be unemployed. There is more racism in the U.K. than in the U.S.

Lee's remarks is consistent with Mr. Li's sentiment that racism against Chinese in Britain is more severe than in the U.S.. One of the reasons for this heightened sense of stigmatized minority status is that the Chinese population in Britain is much smaller than that of the U.S. According to the 1991 British census, the Chinese population in Britain is estimated at 156,938 (Peach 1996, 161). In contrast, the 1990 U.S. census reported that there are 1,645,472 people of Chinese descent in the U.S. (Kwong 1987, 4). In addition, as Maggie and Jim Li told me, Britain's colonialist history with Hong Kong has resulted in the British mainstream viewing Chinese immigrants to be inferior (Pan 1990, 294). Alego Poon, editor of the popular overseas Chinese newspaper *Sing Tao Daily*, expressed the sentiment that assimilation into British society is very difficult for the Chinese. He commented, "there is no such thing as integration. [Some believe] that if you integrate with mainstream society, you will then lose your special and exotic characteristics, and you are still treated as a second-class citizen." There is another explanation for the heightened feeling of racism by my informants in Britain — London's Chinatown serves both co-ethnics and members of mainstream society.

Chinese immigrants working London's Chinatown interact with members of the dominant society more frequently than Chinese immigrants working in Monterey Park who cater almost exclusively to co-ethnics.

Another finding in regards to racism demonstrates that the four factors leading to entrance into the enclave — racism, language difficulty, skill level, and social networks — do not always operate at the same time. Even some Chinese born in Britain, called British Born Chinese (BBCs), who speak English fluently and are college educated resorted to working in the restaurant business because they cannot attain professional jobs. Thus, since language and education factors are not barriers for educated BBCs, some of my informants assert that racism is the main explanation for why BBCs cannot find jobs in the mainstream labor market. Editor Alego Poon told me that:

If a Chinese child majors in law and tries to find a job in a law firm, it will not be easy. There is discrimination still. If his parents want him to run a restaurant, he is more than willing to take it.

Community leader Jabez Lam's expressed a similar sentiment:

A lot of second generation Chinese have qualifications and no language barrier. Many go back to catering jobs because of racism and lack of jobs in other professions. They earn more money as waiters.

Maggie and Jim Li told me, "our sons and daughters are born here, but they could not find jobs here, so they went to Hong Kong and are now working for airlines. They didn't want to work in the restaurant, because it is too boring to work in a restaurant." Although 7.3 percent of BBCs aged 16 to 30 have a degree in college compared to 5.5 percent of whites in this same age category, educated BBCs still go into the restaurant business (Peach 1996, 172). However, there has been some progress for successive generations of Chinese in Britain. The difference between the second generation and the first generation of Chinese in Britain is that while recent Chinese immigrants tend to be workers in Chinese restaurants, BBCs generally become owners and managers.

The frequency of interracial conflict between the Chinese community and Britain's white majority further supports the hypothesis that racism is a principal factor leading to entrance into the Chinese enclave. Dr. Hugh Baker, a scholar on the British Chinese community, told me:

The relationship between the Chinese and whites are badly fraught. Large groups of the host community go into Chinese and Indian restaurants to harass these people; they "dine and dash." They think of it as a game on the Chinese.

In fact, most of the restaurant owners interviewed complained that whites target Chinese restaurants for harassment, and that the police usually do nothing to address this problem. Chinese restaurant owners Maggie and Jim Li told me:

Two weeks ago, the restaurant was robbed. The police didn't help; they just wrote a report. The thieves stole beer, alcohol, and broke a door. The police came three hours later and said they were very busy because there is not enough police in the area.

According to the *Second Report From the Home Affairs Committee*, the Lis' negative experience with the police is a common experience for Chinese restaurant owners in Britain. The Metropolitan Police reports, "there were a number of complaints and evidence about the unhelpfulness of police when responding to trouble in restaurants, and even allegations of racial bias" on the part of the police (Home Affairs Committee 1984, 175).

Jabez Lam, a Chinese activist who founded the Chinese Monitoring Group to protect Chinese workers from racial harassment, informed me about the famous Diamond Four incident to illustrate the harassment from white customers and the police that Chinese restaurant workers face (Interview, 2000). In 1988, five whites were dining at the Diamond Chinese Restaurant. When asked to pay for the meal that they had consumed, the customers pushed the waiter to the floor and began punching and kicking him (Clegg 1994, 47). Three workers then joined in the fight in an effort to help their colleague. When the police came, they immediately assumed that the waiters were responsible for the incident. They took the waiters to jail. Later, the waiters were charged for assault and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Chinese activists rallied the Chinese community to raise \$12,800 for the Diamond Four's legal defense (Clegg 1994, 47). This resulted in the police dropping all charges.

National and Class Divisions as Primary Factors Causing Intraethnic Conflict

My model also accounts for the high levels of intraethnic conflict in Chinese enclaves that result because diverse populations of Chinese are segregated into the same ethnic niche. Divisions occur due to class conflict, difference in country of origin, and language differences. The 1991 Census reports that the largest group of Chinese in the U.K. is from Hong Kong, making up 34 percent of the Chinese community. The majority of these immigrants were farmers in the New Territories, the buffer zone between Britain's former colony of Hong Kong and mainland China. After affordable, quality rice from Thailand flooded the Hong Kong market, many of these farmers were displaced, coming to the U.K. in the 1950s and 1960s. Because they came to the U.K. during the founding of London's Chinatown, most Chinese restaurant owners there are from the New Territories.

The attitude of New Territory Chinese, who make up the owning class, toward other Chinese groups demonstrates that intraethnic conflict reaches a peak with each new wave of Chinese immigration from different countries. Jason Wong, a Chinese business owner, told me that, "Thirty years ago, when there was a problem in the community, it was blamed on those from Singapore. Twenty years ago Malaysians were the problem. Ten years ago, it was the Vietnamese. Now the Fujianese are seen as the problem." The most recent wave of immigrants from the coastal province of Fujian, China come mainly as undocumented asylum seekers, claiming that they are fleeing political persecution. Fujianese immigration became an important aspect of my research because of a tragic event on June 18, 2000. Fifty-eight Fujianese asylum seekers were found dead in a locked cargo truck, which was being transported by ferry to Dover, Britain (Birkett 2000, 1). Chinese activists, such as Jabez Lam and Bobby Chan, blame the deaths upon the

British government for enacting harsh penalties against "snakeheads," those who smuggle undocumented immigrants. In contrast to Lam and Chan's view, a number of Chinese restaurant owners blamed the Fujianese themselves for the deaths. Furthermore, these entrepreneurs were embarrassed by the negative publicity that illegal Fujianese immigrants bring to London's Chinese population. Danny, a restaurant owner in Chinatown, told me:

There are a lot of illegals from Fujian Province just standing out there [on the streets of London's Chinatown.] The Chinese community doesn't really like it. When they started selling massages out there, others followed. In the eyes of Western people, it is quite an eye sore. You see them gather together everyday without work.

Danny was complaining about a very visible phenomenon in London's Chinatown, which I also observed. Undocumented Fujianese immigrants set up green fold-up chairs on the streets in Chinatown and aggressively sell "Chinese" massage services to tourists walking by. Because they do not have a license to do this and they are undocumented, they grab their fold-up chairs and run away whenever police approach. Fujianese asylum seekers also were prevalent in London's Chinatown because they passed out advertisements for Chinese restaurants at the gates of Chinatown in exchange for minimal wages or housing supplied by restaurant owners. Fujianese immigrants, who did not sell massages or pass out fliers, stood around in groups in Chinatown.

While many of London's Chinese restaurant owners may dislike Fujianese immigrants, they likely benefit greatly from this new supply of cheap labor. Fujianese fill the lowest paying jobs within restaurants as dishwashers, janitors, and vegetable cutters. Because of the desperate situation of these new immigrants, owners are able to pay the Fujianese much less than their co-workers and work them for excessively long hours. According to Eddie Morse of the Chinatown police unit, the average wage of a kitchen hand in Chinatown is 300 pounds (480 American dollars) a week, while Fujianese kitchen hand's earn 100 pounds (160 American dollars) for equivalent labor. Co-ethnic exploitation in London's Chinatown supports a hypothesis undergirding the Global Enclave Model. My model holds that enclaves are more advantageous to owners than to workers because the owners receive a steady supply of cheap immigrant labor without having to compete with mainstream society for labor.

Gender Inequality and Generational Gap as Forms of Intraethnic Conflict

I found more gender inequality in the Chinese restaurant industry in London than in Monterey Park because London has a higher number of small-scale restaurants, which are usually run by married couples. Large Hong Kong style restaurants in Monterey Park are usually owned by a partnership of Chinese immigrant males. While women in these restaurants are segregated to waitress and hostess work, they do not have to work under the control of their husbands and they generally received wages. In London's Chinatown, restaurant owners also are primarily male. The restaurants employ women to fill the majority of their wait staff posi-

tions with salaried male cooks in the kitchen. However, outside of London's Chinatown, there are an abundant number of mom and pop Chinese take-aways throughout Britain, particularly in small towns. In most of these small Chinese restaurants, the husband is the manager and cook who manages the finances while the wife serves as the waitress who has to deal with sometimes hostile white customers. Thus, an owner of a small takeaway generally relies on the labor of their wife and children in order to maximize low profit margins.²³ This argument is supported by my observation that Chinese take-aways that I interviewed averaged two to zero non-familial employees. William Chung, owner of Silver Dynasty Restaurant in London's Chinatown, was concerned that:

In take-away restaurants they have to cut margins very thinly. They have to use family labor . . . the owners use their wives like slaves. The women have to work harder because they get up early to look after the children. Then they go to the restaurant and work.

My observations of take-aways supported Chung's critique of gender roles in takeaways. I frequently observed wives of restaurant owners juggling multiple responsibilities as a waitresses, hostesses, and bus persons while also taking care of young children, who often stay in the back of the restaurant.

My research results in London also support the proposition in the Global Enclave Model that the generation gap between Chinese immigrants and their Westernized offspring is a causal variable of intraethnic conflict. The friction that occurs between first-generation and second-generation Chinese in Britain can be partially attributed to the segregation of Chinese immigrants into the restaurant business. In order to turn a profit in small Chinese take-aways, parents often require their children to help out. Due to the reality that many owners of Chinese take-aways are not fluent in English, they often rely on their children to work at the front counter and communicate with customers. Once in the primary position of interacting with customers, BBCs are vulnerable to racial harassment from the predominantly non-Chinese clientele of take-aways. The struggles of BBCs working for their parents in Chinese take-away restaurants have been the subject of at least two recent books, Miri Song's *Helping Out* and David Parker's *Through Different Eyes: The Cultural Identities of Young Chinese People in Britain*. These authors write about the racism that children of restaurant owners must put up with when working in Chinese take-aways. One child, whom David Parker interviewed, said "now I can cope with being out there and from 10:30 onwards. [My mother] used to just push me out there and I used to get racial abuse, sexual harassment, I used to get *everything* . . . saying we're this and that and the other . . . I hated it, they just used to make me feel so small" (Parker 1994, 627).

Because of the labor-intensive and humiliating situations children must endure in the restaurant business, some BBCs grow up to resent their parents and the Chinese restaurant business in general. My research of Chinese restaurants supported Song and Parker's findings that children often worked in their parents' Chinese restaurants. Owner Thomas Chow told me, "at the moment, we can't afford to hire another worker. That's why [Jake] is very helpful, he takes orders and helps out." Chow's son, Jake, was nine years old in 2000. During the two

and a half hour interview I conducted with Chow, I watched as Jake received take-out orders, managed the cash register, and make a run to a local store to purchase restaurant supplies. Edward Woo, an advertising marketer for a Chinese media company and a former restaurant worker, reported to me that, "the generation gap is caused by children being resentful of their parents and working in the restaurant business." Because of this generation gap, second generation Chinese in Britain often try to distance themselves from Chinese immigrants by taking great pains to assimilate into the mainstream and avoid identifying with their Chinese heritage. Sam Jong, a community worker and member of political Chinese organization, remarked to me that "most Chinese immigrants think they are only Chinese, not British. A lot of BBCs have a cultural identity crisis. They say they are just British." Because children of Chinese restaurant owners usually spend much of their youth laboring in the restaurant business, a generation gap often develops between the first and second generations, whereby BBCs attempt to avoid identification with the Chinese community and assimilate into the mainstream. Furthermore, the frustration experienced by BBCs from working in the restaurant business at a young age is compounded by mainstream society's rejection of their claims to being "just British."

Towards the Development of a Dual Enclave Model

Chinese immigrant enclaves in the U.S. and Britain have grown and diversified dramatically in the last half century. As the economic ties between Asia and Western countries continue to strengthen, the rate of Chinese immigration to the U.S. and Britain will continue to rise. Limited research, however, has been conducted on these thriving ethnic minority communities. While a handful of scholars have studied the development of Chinese enclaves in a national context, my research assists in extending research on Chinese enclaves to a world-comparative context. My comparison of Chinese enclaves in London and Monterey Park, thus, places me in an opportune position to develop a Global Enclave Model to explicate the stages and causal variables of Chinese enclaves.

In order to understand why Chinese immigrants tend to be segregated into enclaves and particular economic niches, such as the Chinese restaurant industry, my model provides four causal variables. Both the Monterey Park and the London research results point to language ability, lack of social networks, skill levels, and racism as the main push factors. Racism, in particular, is a principle factor causing Chinese immigrants with varying levels of skill, education, and English Language abilities to work in Chinese enclaves. In both the Monterey Park and the London study, informants working in the Chinese restaurant industry asserted that they experienced racism from members of the host society. Informants from both studies contend that racism has limited their opportunity to work in the mainstream labor market, and that they had little choice but to work in the restaurant industry. Chinese immigrants in London, however, report experiencing more overt racism than those in Monterey Park. I attribute this difference to the smaller size of the Chinese population in Britain, Britain's imperialist history with Asia, and the less isolated position of immigrants working in Chinese restaurants.

My Global Enclave Model also states that once Chinese immigrants are propelled into ethnic enclaves, intraethnic conflict results. My two case studies have found that intraethnic conflict occurs along lines of class, nation of origin, gender, and generation. In both studies, class conflict between Chinese sub-ethnic groups stands out as the primary line of division. This is because Chinese sub-ethnic groups have immigrated to the U.K. and the U.S. during different time periods, for varying reasons, and with differing financial resources. Thus, not only are Chinese immigrants segregated into ethnic enclaves, but, once in the enclave, they fill different levels of the Chinese restaurant hierarchy depending on how wealthy and established their sub-ethnic group is. For example, Chinese immigrants from the New Territories, who were one of the first groups to arrive in Britain, have had several decades to establish their dominance as restaurant owners. Their financial resources and established social networks in the British Chinese community place them in a position to take advantage of the cheap labor of newcomers, such as Fujianese Chinese.

While intraethnic conflict is apparent in these two cases, the Chinese communities of Monterey Park and London also have moments of temporary ethnic solidarity. This occurs when there is outside racist and/or xenophobic aggression towards the ethnic group. I use the English Only movement in Monterey Park and the Diamond Four incident in London to illustrate this point.

Comparing the Chinese community in Monterey Park, which is the first Asian majority city in the continental U.S., to the Chinese enclave in London, which is the largest Chinese community in Britain, my research suggests that the development of a Dual Enclave Model helps to explain the differences between these two case studies. Globalization has impacted the middle-class, suburban enclave of Monterey Park in the form of capital flow from Asia. The abundant number of Chinese-owned banks in Monterey Park with deposits from business people in Asia demonstrates this phenomenon. In addition, real estate developers in Asia manage many of the commercial properties in Monterey Park. Business people in Asia have taken advantage of opportunities opened by the growth of a middle-class Chinese community in Monterey Park by leasing out property for large Hong Kong style restaurants in the city. London's Chinese enclave, in contrast, represents the prototype of a working class urban Chinatown. Although there is little capital flow between Asia and London's Chinatown, globalization has affected London's Chinese enclave in the form of an increase in low-skilled labor. Specifically, the recent wave of Chinese immigrants from the Fujian Province in China has become an important source of inexpensive labor for Chinese restaurant owners.

The development of contrasting urban and suburban Chinese enclaves is the result of immigration policies in the U.K. and the U.S. that have family and skill preferences, which create a bimodal distribution of skills and education among immigrants. Moreover, the rapid modernization of China and the economic prosperity of "little dragon" countries, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, stimulate capital flows into suburban Chinatowns and labor flows into urban Chinatowns. The existence of a dual system is supported by the fact that many major cities in the U.S. and the U.K. have both a suburban and an urban Chinatown. Further

research on the Dual Enclave Model should include a comparative examination of suburban and urban Chinese enclaves within the same county. For example, Los Angeles has both an urban Chinatown, composed mainly of working class ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, and a nearby suburban Chinese enclave in Monterey Park, which is made up of wealthy Taiwanese and Hong Kong immigrants. In addition, London has an urban Chinatown in central London and an emerging suburban Chinese immigrant community in Collinsdale, an area on the fringes of Northern London.^{xxiv} My comparison study of Monterey Park and London serves as a starting point for developing the Dual Enclave Model because I have compared ideal examples of a suburban Chinese enclave and an urban Chinatown.

Continuing Salience of the Global Enclave Model

The dual model, which contrasts old and new Chinatowns, helps illustrate the complexity of Chinese immigrant communities and the dramatic effects of globalization on ethnic enclaves. However, since the governments of Britain and the U.S. have little information on this growing minority group, the overarching commonalities of Chinese immigrant communities should first be understood before the detailed differences between Chinese enclaves is investigated. The Global Enclave Model addresses this need by elucidating the stages that lead to the economic segregation of Chinese immigrants into enclaves and explaining the resulting intraethnic conflict in Chinese enclaves.

I have conducted these two studies London and Monterey Park's Chinese restaurant communities with the intention of elucidating systemic factors leading to the over concentration of Chinese immigrants in the restaurant business. My study seeks to inform the development of public policies that make more opportunities available to Chinese immigrants outside the ethnic enclave. Further research on this topic will facilitate the development of an in-depth understanding of the barriers preventing Chinese immigrants from entering the mainstream labor market. My comparative study seeks to move away from cultural determinist explanations of the Chinese community as hard working, quiet, and self-sufficient. Arguments such as these, which are included in the *Second Report From the Home Affairs Committee*, only serve to justify ignorance towards the economic segregation and social marginalization which Chinese immigrants continue to face in the U.S. and in Britain.²⁵ Further research on Chinese ethnic enclaves promises to improve the quality of life for Chinese immigrants by ensuring that future and current public policies address the needs and concerns of this population.

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Appendix A: Monterey Park Informant Profiles

Name	Business	Origin	When Immigrated	Education	Languages Spoken	When Opened Business
Sam Kuan	Hong Kong Seafood, Manager	Hong Kong	1984		English, Cantonese, Mandarin Spanish	
William Jang	Beijing Noodle House, Partner	San Tong, China	1977	College	Mandarin English	1981
Lee Wong	988 Seafood, Partner	Toi Shan, China				
	1975	Elementary		1986		
Helena Ng	Celestial Café, Manager	Guangdong, China		High School	Cantonese, English, Mandarin	
Lui Pang	Happy Harbor, Partner	Hong Kong		High School	Cantonese, English	
Chris Xu	Happy Harbor, Manager		1977	High School	Cantonese, English	
Michael Fong	Golden Dragon, Manager	Hong Kong	1979	College		1996
John Chang	Silver Palace, partner	Toi San, PRC	1980	College		1987
Charles Ding	Alcove Seafood, Partner	Hong Kong	1989	High School		1998
Lucas Jang	August Café, Partner		1984	Elementary		1995
Harrison Pang	New Star Café, Owner	Vietnam	1978	College	Cantonese, Vietnamese, English,	1996
Lisa Lam	Garden Seafood Restaurant, Cashier	Guangdong, PRC	1998	College		
Yin An	Garden Seafood Restaurant, Temporary Manager	Toi Shan, PRC	1988	High School		

Sally Chow	Diamond Restaurant, Owner	Taiwan	1982			1984
Johnathan Pu	Pu's Restaurant, Owner	Guangdong, China	1952	College		1950's in another location, 1977 reopened
Janis Mei	Mandarin Express, Owner		1986		Mandarin	1995
James Yu	Valley Seafood, Manager	Toi Shan, China	1989	High School		1991
Calvin Jung	Jerry's Noodle House, Owner	Beijing, China	1993		Mandarin	1999
David Lee	Fortune Restaurant, Owner	Vietnam	1978	High School		1986
Cameron Lai	Mei Mei Seafood, Manager	Hong Kong	1969	College	Cantonese	1980
Susan Chen	Quizhou Restaurant, Manager/book keeper (niece of the owner)	Cambodia	1979	College	Mandarin, Qui Zhou, Cantonese, English	1980
Ben Tse	Bay City Restaurant, Manager	Hong Kong	1983			
Brien Wu	Atlantic BBQ, Manager	Hong Kong	1989	College		1984
Jack Fong	Harbor King, Manager	Hong Kong	1976	High School	Cantonese, English	1989
Andrew Lau	Chan's Restaurant, Cook	Beijing, China	1998		Mandarin	1984
Luke Hsu	Tien Café, Partner	Vietnam	1980	College		1997
Dameon Chou	Garden Delight Seafood, Partner	Vietnam	1978	High School	Mandarin, Cantonese, Vietnamese, English	1998

Key Terms:

Elementary: Kindergarten to Eighth Grade Education

High School: Ninth to Twelfth Grade Education

College: Post-High School Education

Other Informants:

1. Larry Chu, Chu and Ass., CPAs, partner
2. Thomas Young, Phoenix Bank, partner
3. Peter Hong, *Los Angeles Times*, writer
4. Charles Choy Wong, scholar, Ph.D from University of California Los Angeles
5. Dennis Yamamoto, advertising agency owner
6. Lucy Kelly, chamber of commerce, interim president
7. Wesley An, United Reality, real estate agent
8. Margaret Toe, Asia Pacific International Advertising, owner
9. Andy Islas, Handfore Reality Corp., real estate agent
10. Johnny Tompson, Johnny Tompson's Music, owner
11. Judy Chu, Monterey Park City Council, Mayor of Monterey Park

*For purposes of confidentiality, names of some informants and businesses have been given pseudonyms.

Appendix B: London Study Informant Profiles

Name	Business	Origin	When Immigrated	Education	Languages Spoken	When Opened Business
Jason Wong	Golden Fortune, Owner	British Born				
(Father is Hakka from New Territories)	N/A	College	Cantonese, English	1970		
Maggie and Jim Li	East Takeaway, Owners	Toi Shan, China	1965	Elementary	Cantonese	
Danny Chen	Fu Zhou, Partner	New Territories Hakka	1960's	College	Hakka, Cantonese, English	1972
Kevin Jung	Emerald, Owner	New Territories Hakka	1970	Elementary		1975
Jenny Tan	Thai Orchid, Owner	New Territories Hakka	1977	High School	Cantonese, English	1989
William Chung	Silver Dynasty, Owner	Kowloon, Hong Kong		High School	English, Cantonese	1984
Tony Lee	Lotus, Owner	New Territories	1969	College		1986
Jin Chan						
Twin Rivers, Partner	New Territories	1962	College		1984	
John Kwok	Mandarin China, Owner	New Territories Hakka	1960	College	Cantonese, English	
Eric Liu	Zhong Guo, Owner	Hong Kong	1975	College	Hakka, Cantonese, Mandarin, Some English	1990
Thomas Chow	Lung Fung Owner	Beijing, China	1987			

College	Mandarin, English	1996				
Phillip Wong	Lucky Sun, Owner	Shanghai, China	1966	Elementary	Mandarin, Some English	1980
Ken Ng	Dragon Spring, Manager	Hong Kong	1959	College	English, Cantonese, Mandarin	1982
Karen Wong	Jade, Owner	Hong Kong	1985	College	English, Cantonese, Mandarin	1986
Steven Tan	Canton, Partner	New Territories	1972	College	Some English, Cantonese	1985
Wei Luk	Beijing Restaurant, Retired, Owner	New Territories Hakka	1959	Elementary	Hakka, Cantonese	1965-1980
Eric Wan	Phoenix Sky Restaurant and New Day Restaurant, Waiter	New Territories Hakka	1970	College	Hakka, Cantonese, Little English	
Michael Lee	Aberdeen Restaurant, Owner	New Territories	1972	Elementary	Cantonese, Mandarin, Some English	1983
Mary Lau	Dockland Friends, Owner	Hong Kong Hakka, Originally from Guangdong	1976	Elementary	Cantonese, Hakka	1986
Jim Chow	Palace Restaurant, Owners	Vietnam	1985	Elementary	Cantonese	2000
Lung Chu	Chu's Garden, Owner	New Territories	1969	Elementary	English, Cantonese	1993
George Ku	Hi Hat Restaurant, Owner	Fujian, China	1970's	College	English, Cantonese	1943 (First Established By Previous Owner)
Chun Yan	Mandarin Star Restaurant, Owner	Fujian, China	1989	College	Mandarin, Fujianese	1999

Key Terms:

Elementary: Kindergarten to Eighth Grade Education

High School: Ninth to Twelfth Grade Education

College: Post-High School Education

Other Informants

1. Sam Jong, Community Center A, worker and Political group member
2. George Zhang, School of Oriental and African Studies, professor
3. Anne Kershen, Queen Mary and Westfield College, professor
4. Phillip Ogden, Queen Mary and Westfield College, professor and vice-president
5. Hugh Baker, School of Oriental and African Studies, professor
6. Simon Lok, Community Center B, social worker
7. Dic Lo, School of Oriental and African Studies, professor
8. Harriet Jones, Institute of Contemporary British History, resident scholar
9. Rick Wong, Community Center B, staff
10. Alego Poon, Sing Tao Daily Newspaper, chief editor
11. Eddie Morse, Charing Cross Police, Chinatown unit police officer
12. Tony Pang, Community Center A, social worker
13. Bobby Chan, Central London Law Center, legal adviser, and Chinese Monitoring Group, co-founder
14. Jeremy Corbyn, British Parliament, member
15. Betty Yau, Phoenix Television Channel, president
16. Kenny Luk, Golden Fish Store (supplies Chinese restaurants), owner
17. Aaron Kwan, Phoenix Television Channel, advertising agent
18. Yao Gang, Taipei Representatives Office (unofficial Taiwan Embassy), vice president
19. Jasper Lee, South China Bank, manager
20. Richard Man, Spectrum Radio Station (Chinese radio station), employee
21. David Tan, Chinese Liaison Officer
22. Kevin Chun, Chinese Import/Export Company, owner
23. Henry Lo, Chinatown business owner
24. Thomas Chan, Chinese Conservative Party, president
25. Michael Chan, Commission for Racial Equality, commissioner, and Liverpool University, professor
26. Richard Lam, Chinese Community Center, director
27. Jabez Lam, Chinese Monitoring Group, co-founder, and Chinese Advice Center, founder
28. Derek Keene, Center for Metropolitan History at the University of London, director

*For purposes of confidentiality, names of some informants and businesses have been given pseudonyms.

End Notes

1 For inspiring me to conduct this comparison study, I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my hard-working parents, Loi Fu Chan and Samantha Chan, who have worked in the Chinese restaurant business for over twenty-three years and counting. For providing me with guidance and support, I would like to warmly thank Professor Monique Taylor, Professor Jan Lin, Professor Xiao Huang Yin, and Professor Wellington Chan. I also would like to thank the Richter Foundation, the Ford Foundation, Occidental College, and all my informants for making this research possible.

2 According to the *Second Report From the Home Affairs Committee*, a report ordered by the House of Commons of the British government, "The Chinese have hitherto figured very little in discussions concerning race relations and ethnic minorities in Britain . . . They have had little contact with the wider society, and have appeared to want to keep a low profile" (Home Affairs Committee 1985, vii).

3 See also Light and Gold, 2000, which examines a range of ethnic economies in the United States.

4 There are two particularly notable books that examine a variety of immigrant economies in the international context. These are Roger Waldinger's *Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant and Ethnic Business in Western Industrial Societies* (Sage Publications, 1990); and Robert Koosterman and Jan Rath's *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Venturing Abroad in the Age of Globalization* (Berg Publishing Ltd, 2004). In addition, Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini's *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism* (Routledge, 1996) discusses the phenomenon of the overseas Chinese in the Asia Pacific region and the nature of Chinese transnational identity.

5 The term "suburb" and "city" both can be used to refer to Monterey Park because it is both a suburb of Los Angeles and a city in and of itself. Monterey Park has a city council and a chamber of commerce.

6 Waldinger et al. in *Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies* offered a theory on conditions that are conducive to self-employment. They characterize the process in three categories: "(1) premigration characteristics, (2) the circumstances of migration and their evolution, and (3) post-migration characteristics" (Waldinger et al. 1990, 41). My Global Enclave Model differs from this theory in that my model focuses on how varying levels of characteristics, such as nationality differences, exacerbate or decrease intraethnic conflict.

7 Chinese restaurants that specialize in takeout orders are called "Chinese take-aways" in Britain. They usually offer only food to be taken out. In the U.S., we call this "to-go" food or "take out." Chinese take-aways typically have no dining room, just a counter and a kitchen. For this reason, they require very little start up capital.

8 I have called this phenomena "economic segregation" because by working in ethnic enclaves, alongside and under other Chinese immigrants, Chinese immigrants become isolated from employment in mainstream society.

9 While all Chinese immigrants can be categorized as ethnically Chinese, their national origin may differ. For example, many Chinese immigrants migrate to London or Monterey Park from Singapore, Vietnam, or Malaysia.

10 "They are not like the cities of the past, at the hearts of geographically bounded regions whose economics they center: rather, they connect remote points of productions, consumption, and finance" (Sassen 1998, xii).

11 While urban Chinatowns in many cities were originally established in the nineteenth century, they may have moved locations due to urban renewal projects, gentrification pushing the Chinatowns to less desirable locations, and changing immigration patterns.

12 Chinese restaurant workers and owners reported being the victims of racism on an individual level in day-to-day interactions with mainstream society. They also experienced racism and exclusion from

mainstream society on a systemic level. For example, a number of educated Chinese restaurant owners cited lack of social networks and cultural capital as a reason for their entrance into the ethnic niche. These two factors indicate that racism in the mainstream labor market goes beyond individual levels of discrimination to a macro level of institutional discrimination. That is, applicants often rely heavily on social networks and cultural capital to secure employment in the mainstream labor market. Chinese immigrants in both the United States and the United Kingdom have a difficult time establishing connections in the mainstream labor market because they are new to the country, lack English skills, and generally do not inhabit the same social milieu as those with connections to mainstream employers.

13 My interviews with informants averaged from one to three hours; I interviewed some informants several times. I usually conducted interviews in multiple languages, including Mandarin and various dialects of Cantonese, because my informants generally were not proficient in English.

14 My study also includes primary written sources, such as newspaper articles and census data, from various government archives. I gathered newspaper articles from the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New York Times*, *The English Illustrated Magazine*, *Siyu: The Chinese Magazine*, and *The Evening Standard* on the topic of overseas Chinese communities, immigration policies, race relations, and ethnic enclaves. These published materials were gathered from research in the Occidental College Library, the British Library, the School of Oriental and African Studies Library, Queen Mary and Westfield Library, Library of the Commission for Racial Equality, the Institute for Contemporary British History, and Tower Hamlets Historical Library. I also analyzed data from the 1991 British census report, the 1990 United States census report, and recent British labor statistics reports.

15 While some have dubbed Monterey Park as America's "first suburban Chinatown," this name is somewhat misleading. Because, according to Wei Li, the term implies "the continuation of the traditional ethnic enclave in a different geographic location." Instead, Li argues, the term "ethnoburb" is more accurate in describing the Chinese enclave in Monterey Park (Li 1999). John Horton, author of *The Politics of Diversity*, offers a vivid image of Monterey Park's current status. "Today Monterey Park is a city completing its transition from a quiet, racially mixed bedroom suburb of aging single-family dwellings and dying commercial streets to a Pacific Rim hub with higher-density housing and a globally oriented financial and service center for a rapidly expanding regional Chinese population" (Horton 1995, 11).

16 "While the 1965 Immigration Act favors professionals, 74 percent of the quota is actually reserved for the relatives of American citizens. Since most citizens of Chinese descent were traditionally of humble origin, mainly from the rural areas of southern China, their relatives are likely to have similar backgrounds" (Kwong 1987, 22).

17 Historically, the majority of Chinese immigration to the U.S. has come from Guangdong, a province in Southern China where Cantonese is the dominant spoken language. Several factors, including the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion, which ravaged Guangdong, pushed many Cantonese peasants to begin immigrating to the U.S. in the 1850s. With the completion of the Transcontinental Railroad, which relied heavily on Chinese immigrant labor, an anti-Chinese movement surfaced. The economic reason for Chinese immigration ended, and whites feared that the recently unemployed Chinese would compete with them for jobs in the mainstream labor market. This climate of xenophobia led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. "Exclusion from the mainstream drove those who remained to create their own ethnic economies within the confine of congested Chinatowns." (Horton 1995, 23)

18 Los Angeles and its surrounding suburbs tend to attract the skilled and educated portion of the Chinese immigrant population because of Los Angeles' "engineering jobs in high-tech and aerospace industries, and its Asia-Pacific business environment" (Tseng 1994, 39). Therefore, unlike immigrants of the past, many of these skilled and educated Chinese immigrants use their capital to immediately settle into comfortable suburban neighborhoods, rather than in Los Angeles' cramped and run-down Chinatown. These immigrants first settled in Monterey Park and then spread out through the rest of the San Gabriel Valley. Chinese immigrants also choose to live in suburban Monterey Park because of its proximity to Chinatown and downtown Los Angeles. Monterey Park is also accessible to several freeways, including Interstate 10 and Interstate 60.

19 Before the Commonwealth Immigration Act, Commonwealth citizens, such as residents of Hong Kong who were not Chinese citizens, could enter and work in Britain relatively unrestricted. The act also provided a very limited number of vouchers to Commonwealth citizens who had recognized skills or qualifications that were in short supply in Britain (Mason 1995, 28).

20 Many British citizens feared that the return or independence of the last several British colonies would cause millions of Commonwealth citizens to immigrate to Britain (Chan 1999, 3). However, after the Tiananmen Massacre of protesters for democracy by the Chinese government stimulated further reasons for the exodus of Hong Kong residents, the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Bill passed in 1990. This legislation permitted 50,000 heads of households and their families with Commonwealth status in Hong Kong entrance into Britain (Parker 1995, 75).

21 In order to protect the anonymity of informants and commercial businesses, pseudonyms are used for restaurants and persons interviewed.

22 Some businesses violated the minimum wages laws and relied upon tips as the main form of pay for waitresses.

23 The larger Chinese restaurants in London's Chinatown, in contrast, depend on the low-paid labor of Chinese immigrants.

24 Wealthy Hong Kong immigrants, who arrived because of a 1990 law reserving 50,000 immigration slots for well-connected Hong Kong Chinese, are settling in Collinsdale.

25 The *Second Report From the Home Affairs Committee* ordered by the British government, states "The Chinese have hitherto figured very little in discussions concerning race relations and ethnic minorities in Britain . . . They have had little contact with the wider society, and have appeared to want to keep a low profile. They are regarded, rightly, as hard-working and law-abiding. They have rarely made complaints about any aspect of their lives in Britain, and have made few calls on social services or other forms of assistance, so it has been assumed that they have few problems (Home Affairs Committee 1984, vii).

A Case for Cooperation: Engaging the Philippine News Media during Times of Crisis

Antonio Lambino II

I. Overview

A journalist is a grumbler, a censurer, a giver of advice, a regent of sovereigns, a tutor of nations. Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets.

—Napoleon¹

This paper explores the special role of the Philippine news media during times of crisis. For this purpose, the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings in 2000 and 2001 will be employed as a springboard for discussion. A general framework will then be constructed for cooperation between the journalistic profession and other societal stakeholders in negotiating coverage guidelines for crisis situations.

During the 2002 UNESCO World Press Freedom Day pre-conference held in Manila, Philippines, attorney Michael Mastura (2002) of the Al-Khairah Foundation said, “TV footage, film clips or images, sounds and sights taken together today form the most powerful but ‘subliminal cultural consciousness’ in the public’s mind.”

This subliminal influence of the press is magnified during crisis situations. Due to perceptions of peril, both the public and political leaders perceive the situation as elevated from the “secular” realm to that of the “sacred” (Jones 2003b). Crisis coverage attains higher salience in the minds of policy makers and increases the size of the attentive public. Therefore, due to heightened emotions in the public sphere during these periods, honest, fair, and responsible reporting should especially be promoted and secured. Institutional mechanisms should be established

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for this purpose, since the possibility of unwittingly (or even purposefully) misleading news consumers is a legitimate concern when protecting the integrity of democratic processes.

Democratic societies should also guard against media's tendency to be temporarily too supportive of one party or another during crises. For example, excessively positive coverage of the government is induced by a "rally-'round-the-flag effect" (Nacos 1990, 8–9). When a threat to the state is encountered, the news media and their reporters in the field tend to be supportive of sitting administrations due to patriotic sentiments.

On the opposite extreme, terrorists have been known to use the mass media as tools to disseminate their messages, which cyclically begets more terrorism (O'Neill 1986, 34–35). During the Abu Sayyaf hostage crisis, reporters and editors "gave the gang's colorful leader 'Commander Robot' prime space and time as he played up to the media, issuing statements on radio and managing to hold media attention even when the story lagged" (de Jesus 2002).

These criticisms are given perspective in Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel's (2001, 12–13) proposed nine-point criteria for good journalism. The first two points are "journalism's first obligation is to the truth" and "its first loyalty is to citizens." This argument can be extended into claiming that although a journalist is a professional, he or she is also a citizen (Jones 2003a). This selfsame idea is echoed by veteran Filipino journalist Luis Teodoro (2002) when he writes, "the practitioner . . . is a citizen who only happens to be a journalist, either out of choice or happenstance, who does not turn in his citizenship at the newsroom door."

According to Melinda de Jesus (2003), we should not look at "these two values as a trade-off but as a matter of balancing of needs that one finds articulated and sharpened in society."² But during crisis situations, it can be argued that the heavy pressures brought to bear on journalists and other stakeholders often require them to make the trade-offs that Teodoro suggests, rather than "balancing" their personal convictions with objectivity.

II. The Philippine News Media

It is the best and worst time to be a journalist.

—Ramon Tuazon (VP, Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication)

The Philippine news media have been free from government control since the end of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 (de Jesus 2002). Although it is the "freest press in Asia . . . , it has one of the highest casualty counts" (Limpattamapanee 2002). Forty-two journalists have been killed since the 1986 People Power Revolution, and fifty-nine since 1961 (CMFR 2003). Philippine newspapers "are noted for a freewheeling . . . treatment of news, an unrelenting criticism of government and politics and a flamboyant editorial style" (de Jesus 2002).

Since the early 1990s, there have been two prevailing trends in the country's news media: sensationalism and commercialism (Rimban 1999; de Jesus 2002).

Taken together, these are the drivers of what is known as infotainment programming in Philippine journalism (Rimban 1999), which gained earlier prevalence in American news media in the 1980s (Patterson 2000, 3–4.).

Infotainment is a fusion of journalistic methods and entertainment techniques. Its twofold advantages are seemingly inversely related—higher ratings at lower production costs. It “highlights the commercialism of press enterprise whether in TV, radio or print—all three of which are dominated by the private sector” (de Jesus 2002).

David Celdran (2001) argues that the divide between news and entertainment should be reestablished because it will “keep journalists from framing reality in the language of entertainment where war is adventure, crime is drama, politics is competitive sport, and where all of existence is reduced to spectacle.”

One of the underlying causes of this phenomenon is the shrinking pie of advertising revenue. As the country has repeatedly gone in and out of recession, advertising budgets have dipped, and this “has forced network programmers to seek formats that provide more bang for the buck” (Celdran 2001).

For television network executives, “the bottom line is that news is no longer as important . . . as it used to be. If they could replace it with entertainment, they would” (Rimban 1999). Television newsrooms are also becoming more expensive to maintain because of the high costs of new technologies. Competition among the country’s six television networks exacerbates the situation because costly infrastructure upgrades are required for them to keep pace with each other (de la Peña-Reyes 2002).

For newspapers, there has been a painful decline not only in advertising, but also in readership. *The Philippine Daily Inquirer*, the market leader in the broadsheet category, saw its circulation drop from 260,000 to 220,000 between 2001 and 2002 (Rimban 2002). In the 2000 Asia Research Organization’s Trimedia Exposure Study, two out of three respondents had not read any newspaper for one week. While the country’s twenty or so nationwide broadsheets and tabloids are competing for the third of the population that reads, they are simultaneously applying measures to cut costs (Rimban 2002).

According to Angelito Pangilinan, chairman of the Associated Accredited Advertising Agencies (4A’s), “more and more people are giving up reading because radio and TV have become more aggressive in news gathering. Now . . . you practically don’t have to buy a newspaper . . . [as] TV sets are one-time purchases that provide a steady source of news, information and entertainment.”³ As a result of this decline in readership, twelve broadsheets were whittled down to nine from 2001 to 2002 (Rimban 2002).

III. The Abu Syyaf Hostage Crisis

The war on terrorists has increased the hazards of journalists beyond the risks of being killed or wounded while being caught in the crossfire.

—1 May 2002 Editorial from the Philippine Daily Inquirer

Background of the Crisis

The modern Muslim insurgency in Mindanao in the southern Philippines has a four decades-long history. It started during the Marcos regime in the 1960s, when Muslim paramilitaries were killed by the Philippine military as they were undergoing administration-sanctioned covert training to infiltrate Malaysia's island of Sabah. This event is remembered as the Jabidah Massacre (Vitug and Gloria 2000, 2–23).

There are two major armed Muslim groups currently operating in Mindanao. The first is the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with which the Philippine government is currently carrying out peace negotiations. The second is the militant Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), whose name means “bearer of the sword” in Arabic (Clark 2002). The ASG is a terrorist group that is known for violent operations such as kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion (DOS 2003, 102).

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has not had the military capacity to completely subdue the MILF and ASG. Newsbreak Magazine editor Marites Vitug said, “While the AFP deployed 70 percent of its resources in Mindanao against the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf, it only decimated three percent of the MILF forces” (Lingao 2000). It is believed that a few hundred ASG members remain at large (DOS 2003, 102).

In April 2000, the ASG kidnapped twenty-one people, including ten foreigners from a Malaysian resort. In May 2001, three Americans and seventeen Filipinos were taken hostage from a Philippine resort. While in captivity, several of the Filipinos and one American were murdered. During a military rescue operation in June 2002, an American hostage, Gracia Burnham was saved, but her husband Martin and a Filipino named Deborah Yap were killed in the crossfire (DOS 2003, 2).

News Coverage of the Crisis

According to the executive director of the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) and former Kennedy School of Government Shorenstein fellow, Melinda de Jesus (2003), “the Philippine press is adversarial in terms of its coverage of state and public officials.” In contrast, when journalists cover “terrorist incidents, [they rely] on government sources: the military or police, the local officials and Malacañang [Office of the President]. In [CMFR's] study on Mindanao coverage . . . the military dominated all other sources” (de Jesus 2002). This could be an indication of the “rally-‘round-the-flag” effect (Nacos 1990, 8–9).

Another key finding of the study was that, although the Abu Sayyaf successfully gained access to mass media channels to disseminate their propaganda, this strategy backfired as the ASG was publicly cast in a bad light by the coverage (de Jesus 2002).

Despite journalists' heroic efforts on the ground during the ASG hostage crisis, two major criticisms were leveled against the news coverage. First, there was a

lack of information provided on the context and history of the crisis. Second, there was evidence of dishonest news presentation.

Understandably, journalists had difficulty coping with the dangerous and unfamiliar turf. According to a 1 May 2002 editorial in the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, there were no “formal fronts in the campaign against terrorism.” Press credentials did not protect journalists working in the field. Several French correspondents were kidnapped and released only after ransom had been paid. One local journalist was mistakenly included in the Philippine military’s wanted list because a “souvenir” photo had been taken with ASG members after she had conducted an interview with their leadership. It took two months for her name to be cleared (Tamayo 2002).

From this insecure work environment, the reportage failed to provide adequate information on the story’s context. Some of the Manila newsmen and newswomen understood the situation as follows: the MILF “wanted its own Islamic State” and the Abu Sayyaf “was just after more money” (Lingao 2000). Marites Vitug commented that “their understanding of the situation is very broad . . . [I]f you have a story, give the background, and explain also the context of a rebellion. You owe it to the public” (Lingao 2000).

There was also evidence of dishonest reporting. According to Ed Lingao (2000), “soldiers were . . . on special missions to save Philippine democracy . . . [but] the overzealous editor had . . . dubbed the sounds of battle into scenes that showed people just walking around or standing around without a care in the world.”

Print journalists generally did a better job in providing accurate portrayals and substantial context, largely because a number of correspondents based in local areas were hired as stringers. The accompanying photographs in the national newspapers, however, mostly depicted “a jungle battleground” that reflected the biases of *Metro Manila* editors (Cayon 2002) who were making editorial decisions in newsrooms eight hundred miles north of actual military operations in Mindanao (Pesek 2003).

Michael Mastura (2002) argues that unevenness in crisis reporting stems from difficulties in determining who decides what news is and “how it is news.” He expresses concern about how “centralized broadcasting networks shape the materials delivered by the media about terrorism,” and how nightly expert opinions replace daily newsgathering in the field.

Coordination with Multi-Sectoral Stakeholders

During her Philippine case study presentation at the 2002 UNESCO-sponsored Media and Terrorism Conference, Melinda de Jesus recommended that:

Media practitioners should have . . . background training in the development of terrorism. Journalist education can then lead to the formulation of meaningful guidelines or guiding principles. Such guidance [should] emerge from within an informed news community . . . [with] a broad understanding of the impact of news on the course of events.

In a separate interview, de Jesus (2003) said “the process of establishing guidelines can involve inputs from . . . those who have more knowledge about these issues and subjects . . . [but] the newsroom should issue their own guidelines.”

Since public attention to the news is heightened during crisis periods, and since media practitioners and executives have to face aggravating commercial pressures, this paper proposes that such guidelines be crafted by a multi-stakeholder group. This body should be dominated by journalists, but it should also include grassroots representatives, civil society leaders, academics, representatives from various professions, and government officials. Such cooperation is deemed necessary, considering the coordination that has to be done on the ground toward the twin goals of protecting journalists’ lives and promoting effective coverage of crisis situations.

The group’s task will be to achieve a delicate balance between two sets of poles: first, freedom of expression and access to information versus security of the state (“Fair Game” 2002); second, reporting the truth versus advocacy for solutions (Teodoro 2002). The crucial objective is to empower citizens with the truth without unduly compromising state interests. A tender balance should also be struck between an information “free for all” on one hand, and illegitimate censorship on the other.

IV. Is Coordination Justifiable?

Abuses of freedom of speech ought to be repressed, but to whom dare we commit the power of doing it?

—Benjamin Franklin⁴

Concepts of Journalistic Freedom and Control

While William Hachten and James Scotton (2002, 148) believe that an unfettered free press is indispensable in liberal democratic societies, alternative media-state relations are viable in other types of regimes.

They begin by discussing several “concepts” of journalistic regulation in undemocratic societies. First, the “authoritarian concept” refers to state-controlled media. “Truth” or “untruth” is thus a monopoly of the monarch or ruler. Dissenting views are seen as troublesome and destructive. Under this model, the primary role of the media is to support the state in achieving its goals. Anything deemed contrary to this objective is considered subversive and unlawful. Still, the media industry is privately owned and left to its own devices, as long as it does not attack state authority (Hachten and Scotton 2002, 149–151).

Second, the “communist concept” does not allow for private ownership of news media. It argues that information dissemination should serve the interests of society at large, as decided by the state. Thus, the media should be owned and controlled by the state. The key role of public communication is the socialization of desired beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Hachten and Scotton 2002, 155–159).

Third, the “revolutionary concept” espouses the use of print and broadcast media in “illegal and subversive communication . . . to overthrow a government or wrest control from alien or otherwise rejected rulers” (Hachten and Scotton 2002, 159–161). This model is being used today in challenging centralized control of the news in totalitarian regimes through the use of the Internet and other new technologies.

Fourth, the liberal democratic “western concept” refers to a system wherein the media are free to scrutinize and challenge duly designated authorities by “reporting on, commenting on, and criticizing its own government without retaliation or threat of retaliation . . .” (Hachten and Scotton 2002, 151–155). There is a free flow of ideas and diversity of opinions. Nobody can claim to have a monopoly on the truth, and dissent is encouraged. Freedom rests on the faith that people will make the right decisions given enough information and a fair presentation of options.

Lastly, Hachten and Scotton discuss the “developmental concept.” This model directly applies to the least developed countries and to the far-flung areas of developing countries that are often characterized by inadequate and antiquated communications infrastructures. The main argument being made is that scarce media resources must be employed in nation building (i.e., fighting illiteracy and poverty, building a political consciousness, assisting in economic development), even to the detriment of personal liberties and the freedom of expression. The state controls the flow of information, and the media is supportive of authority. It argues for a “guided press . . . restricted according to the development needs of the country” (Hachten and Scotton 2002, 161–164).

Skeptical Authoritarianism

Thom Brooks (2002, 152), in his article entitled “A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism” argues that there is a space on the ideological spectrum between totalitarianism and nihilism that sits comfortably beside liberal democracy. He calls this “skeptical authoritarianism” and claims it fulfills the goals of democratic theory while allowing a society to be guided by specialists and experts from various academic and professional fields.

Brooks defines totalitarianism as “a refusal to permit scepticism” and nihilism as “extreme moral relativism.” Neither of these schools of thought fulfills the difficult balance between the exercise of personal freedom and the justified rule of law, which are both necessary to make a democratic society tenable.

This balance is achieved by liberal democratic theory, as well as by what Brooks calls skeptical authoritarianism. This form of governance espouses societal guardianship by specialists and experts appointed to parliament by academic and professional societies. This group of “authorities” will be outnumbered two to one by a popularly elected body (Brooks 2002, 156).

Brooks (2002, 159) argues that his theory is compatible with “freedom of association, speech, press, religion, etc.,” and that dissenting opinions would still be heard. On the other hand, he admits that such a form of government would not provide each citizen with an equal voice in the public sphere.

Despite this inequality, he considers this societal arrangement legitimate because “1) some people make better judgments than others, 2) some people do not have anything more than a vague and uninformed opinion about certain issues, and... 3) we regularly weigh voices differently in society” (Brooks 2002, 159).

Skeptical authoritarianism fulfills democracy’s desired twin outcomes of the exercise of civil and political rights and the protection of freedoms with the added benefit of expert guardianship.

Multi-Stakeholder Journalism Regulation

By juxtaposing the Developmental Concept of Journalism and Skeptical Authoritarianism, we can assemble a palatable strategy for journalism regulation in the Philippines that will be strictly limited to times of crisis.

If under the Developmental Concept, liberalism must give way to urgent socio-economic needs, then the same logic can be applied during crises. When a country is placed under threat by lawlessness and violence, then a limited and temporary lifting of journalistic independence and freedom of expression can be justified. The threats to journalists’ lives and lack of media infrastructure in the country’s far-flung conflict areas are factors that should be especially considered.

This is not a novel idea, but it is likely to be very unpopular in the press and broadcasting communities. As Melinda de Jesus (2003) argues, “A process [of coordination] should be initiated from within [the journalism profession] that has taken into consideration the knowledge and the needs that are articulated by other sectors.”

Under normal circumstances, this position is preferable from a democratic standpoint, but more is required during crisis situations. The challenge is to make the jump from theoretical arguments to palatable regulations of news coverage.

This impasse might be overcome by adding skeptical authoritarianism into the equation. A multi-sectoral body can be convened to serve as a formal regulator of newsgathering and presentation during crisis periods. This arrangement should protect journalistic independence from unqualified state control when the latter deems it necessary to restrict press access for national security reasons.

The broadcast and print media can elect or appoint their representatives, who will be joined by experts from the government and other relevant professions and constituencies. This collective body will approve institutional arrangements and decide how news coverage will be conducted, by protecting press freedom on one hand, and promoting national security on the other. It will also specify requisite training for journalists working on the ground, both for their own safety and also for understanding the contexts of crises. It should be sanctioned with the power to grant and revoke press credentials for coverage of crisis situations.

These preparatory steps are essential for crisis reportage because information released to the public can seriously influence political discourse and action. As Luis Teodoro (2002) wrote, “If inaccurate reporting can escalate war rhetoric, endanger peace processes and even set off a chain of events that can lead to actual conflict, on the other hand, accuracy can help a community acquire the understanding of events and their contextualization critical to democratization.”

Under conditions of severe societal stress, it is essential that the news media contribute to well-informed public opinion and responsible policy-making processes. When extraordinary circumstances arise, coordination among various stakeholders in regulating the journalistic enterprise is justified.

V. Conclusion

Delivering the news after all is not just business. It is also a public service. Despite the competition . . . networks do sometimes make that service their priority.

—Grace de la Peña-Reyes (News Director, GMA 7)

The Philippine news media's role as gatekeeper of information is essential toward the promotion and safeguarding of democratic processes. During times of crisis, this function is critical in achieving democratic outcomes. Due to highly charged emotions, news stories command heightened public attention and apply extreme pressure on public officials to craft and enact popular but possibly ill-informed and inadequate policies.

The 2000–2001 Abu Sayyaf hostage crisis shows us that there is much good the news media already does, but that there is also still much that can be improved.

By juxtaposing the Developmental Concept of Journalism and Skeptical Authoritarianism, it is justifiable within a democratic framework to convene a multi-stakeholder group to set guidelines and enforcement mechanisms for crisis coverage in the Philippines. Existing self-regulatory media bodies should take the lead in this endeavor and involve other societal stakeholders. The state should be represented and sanction this group to exercise relevant coercive powers.

Such a group will be tasked to empower the citizenry with the truth without unduly compromising state interests. A tender balance should also be struck between an information “free for all” and illegitimate censorship.

Before seriously considering such a policy shift in Philippine media-state relations, various concerns need to be addressed, including the following: first, crises need to be clearly defined; second, the need for new legislation needs to be determined; and third, the composition of the regulatory body needs to be carefully calibrated to ensure dominance of the journalistic profession, and meaningful representation of other groups.

This paper's overarching objective is to enhance journalists' capacities in their roles as contributors to, and guardians of, democratic discourse when circumstances make it difficult to discharge these duties. Through cooperation with other societal stakeholders, it is possible to better safeguard journalists' lives in risky environments and improve the quality of news coverage during times of crisis.

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1 Quoted in Hachten and Scotton 2002, 147.

2 Melinda Q. de Jesus is executive director of the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility.

3 Rimban 2002.

4 Quoted in Hachten and Scotton 2002, 147.



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The Asian American as Victim and Success Story:¹ A Discursive Analysis of the Brian Ho v. SFUSD Lawsuit

Rowena Robles

Abstract

Public policy is often framed by larger social and political contexts and racial formations. The arguments put forth by the plaintiffs in and the media's depiction of the case Brian Ho, Patrick Wong, and Hilary Chen v. the San Francisco United School District (147 F3d 854) demonstrate how race can be a malleable and fluid construct and how such constructs serve to influence public opinion and policy. The Ho lawsuit was filed by a group of Chinese Americans to challenge race-based admissions policies that were intended to ensure diversity by giving special consideration to African American and Latino students. I argue that the Ho plaintiffs were able to take advantage of the dominant racial construction of Asian Americans as the model minority and of the neoconservative discourse on reverse racism to portray themselves as victims of discrimination. Further, their successful discursive strategy relied on contrasting constructions of African American and Latino students as undeserving and unqualified beneficiaries of race-based policies.

In a span of approximately ten to fifteen years, the backlash against affirmative action and other race-based policies gained strength, momentum, and visibility. This was due to several high-profile anti-affirmative action lawsuits. These include the case of Hopwood against the University of Texas law school, as well as suits waged against the University of Michigan at both the undergraduate and

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graduate levels. Peter Schrag wrote in *The Nation* on 22 April 1996 that, “*Hopwood* [*v. Texas*], like *Bakke* [*v. Regents of the University of California*], began with a suit by rejected white applicants who charged . . . that they had been turned down solely because of their race.” Similarly, in 1997 the Office of University Relations at the University of Michigan documented that, “the University was sued by the Center for Individual Rights on behalf of two white students not admitted to the University who claim that different standards are used to admit students of different races,” resulting in the *Gratz and Hamacher v. Bollinger* (538 U.S. 959) lawsuit. In California, the University of California (UC) regents passed SP-1 and SP-2, which banned the consideration of race in admissions and hiring system wide. One year later, a citizen-initiated referendum—Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative—was passed by voters and banned racial considerations in admissions and hiring. Before these direct assaults on affirmative action, UC Berkeley became embroiled in an admissions controversy in which its admissions office, along with admissions offices of other prestigious universities, was accused of discriminating against Asian Americans. These accusations, however, were transformed into a critique of affirmative action, and students became racially constructed into what Dana Takagi calls “Asian victims” and “black villains” (Takagi 1992, 114–118), effectively constructing an interracial conflict around admissions.

This larger backlash against affirmative action forms the political and social backdrop in which *Brian Ho, Patrick Wong, and Hilary Chen v. the San Francisco United School District* (hereafter referred to as *Ho v. SFUSD*) was initiated. The *Ho* lawsuit demonstrates how far we have come as a nation from the civil rights movement that initiated African American struggles toward social justice in the form of racial equality.

The image of a “traditional civil rights discourse” refers to the constellation of ideas about racial power and social transformation that were constructed . . . by . . . the mass mobilization of social energy and popular imagination in the civil rights movements of the late fifties and sixties (Crenshaw et al. 1995).

It is this movement’s victories and legal tenets, specifically equal rights and equality of opportunity, that were transformed by a neoconservative movement that co-opted this discourse to further its own agenda. This neoconservative agenda also incorporates a racial project in which the propagation of colorblindness, along with the idea of meritocracy, has worked to obscure the continuing significance of race in the debates around affirmative action, desegregation, and other race-conscious policies.

It is within these political, legal, and social contexts that *Ho v. SFUSD* was initiated in San Francisco in 1995. The case was waged by a group of Chinese Americans that effectively ended race-based school integration in the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD). The Chinese American plaintiffs not only were suing the San Francisco public school district, but also contested the legal decision in favor of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). It was the NAACP’s original suit that resulted in the

desegregation policy established in 1983, known as the SFUSD's Consent Decree. The plaintiffs specifically targeted the differential entrance requirements for different racial and ethnic groups. *Ho v. SFUSD* is evidence of political and public policy shifts away from an overt focus on race in education policy, as well as of how the Asian American supporters and plaintiffs of *Ho* have exploited these shifts.

How did the *Ho* plaintiffs situate their case such that it was accepted by the courts? How did they specifically frame their arguments against racial desegregation? Lastly, how did the plaintiffs and supporters' framing of the case racially construct Chinese Americans, and how did they assert this racial construction? In a broader sense, do the political sentiments of the Chinese American supporters of this case racially situate all Asian Americans? The answers to these questions can be found in the way race, racial construction, and neoconservative politics meshed to produce the political and social contexts in which *Ho v. SFUSD* was filed.

A myriad of social and political factors come into play in a discussion of *Ho v. SFUSD*. First, the Republican and neoconservative assault on affirmative action frames Asian Americans as a minority group that does not need racial considerations in admissions, and is allegedly harmed by these policies. Second, the assertion of race by the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters as the model minority fits squarely within the neoconservative propagation of colorblindness and meritocracy within education policy and politics. While these political catchphrases appear to be racially neutral, they still work to evoke race and construct African Americans and Latinos as undeserving beneficiaries of race-based policies, necessarily antithetical to the construction of Asian Americans as high-achieving victims of these policies. I attempt to demonstrate how the Asian American supporters of *Ho v. SFUSD* utilize the combination of racial stereotypes and neoconservative ideologies to further their cause within these highly politicized discursive contexts. While larger political and social forces racially construct minority groups such as African Americans and Latinos, the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters demonstrate how Asian Americans possess the ability to transcend race—specifically negative racial stereotypes—and assert an arguably positive racial stereotype through the model minority myth. In doing so, they effectively produce the simultaneous construction of victim and success story.

Background of the *Ho* lawsuit

The *Ho* lawsuit was waged by a group of Chinese Americans that effectively ended race-based school integration in the SFUSD. The Chinese American plaintiffs not only were suing the SFUSD, but also contested the legal decision awarded to the NAACP. The NAACP's original suit resulted in the desegregation policy established in 1983, known as the SFUSD's Consent Decree. The plaintiffs specifically targeted the differential entrance requirements to Lowell High School, the premier academic secondary school in the district, for different racial and ethnic groups.

Gerard Lim noted in an *AsianWeek* article on 19 August 1994 that the plaintiffs in *Ho v. SFUSD*, who were publicly represented by members of the Chinese American Democratic Club (CADC), “contend[ed that] the very desegregation plan originally designed to remedy discrimination in the schools now fosters discrimination.” The CADC began as a progressive group, representing the various interests of the Chinese American population in San Francisco. The CADC became more and more politically conservative, however, as the club’s membership changed to predominantly represent the interests of Chinese business people who were mostly middle class and well off financially (Wang 2001).

One of the major allegations in the lawsuit was that, “the operation of the public schools of the SFUSD under the current system of race or ethnicity-based admittance and transfer quotas constitutes race-based treatment of Plaintiffs” (*Ho v. SFUSD*, 6). The plaintiffs alleged that this race-based treatment violated the U.S. Constitution, and was especially unfair to Chinese students of the SFUSD. The lawsuit accused the SFUSD of condoning and supporting the

operation and maintenance of [a] system [that] severely restricts the ability of each Plaintiff Class member to attend the public school of his or her choice solely on the ground that the student is of Chinese descent (Ho v. SFUSD, 2).

The lawsuit also alleged that the school district was maintaining and supporting a race-based quota system.

The three student plaintiffs in the suit were Brian Ho, Hilary Chen, and Patrick Wong. Brian Ho was an elementary school plaintiff who applied to attend two schools in his neighborhood, thus opting out of being automatically assigned according to the district’s desegregation guidelines. His requests were rejected and he was assigned to a school outside of his residential area. The lawsuit alleged, “Brian was rejected from both schools, because they were ‘capped out’ for students of Chinese descent” (*Ho v. SFUSD*, 12). “Capped out” is the term utilized by the school district meaning that a particular racial or ethnic group had reached the percentage cap mandated by the Consent Decree at any individual school, and that no more students from that particular group could be admitted to the school. Hilary Chen was another elementary school plaintiff who was rejected from three of her neighborhood schools on two separate occasions, when her family moved from one neighborhood to another. Both elementary school plaintiffs alleged that they did not receive any of the school assignments they desired because of their Chinese ethnicity.

Of the three plaintiffs, the most controversial one, and arguably the highlight of the case, was the high school-age plaintiff and his rejection from Lowell High School. Patrick Wong was denied admission to Lowell High School, which was his first choice on the optional enrollment request form. After he appealed the decision with the school district, he was given his third choice on the optional enrollment request form, which was Lincoln High School. The lawsuit alleged that Patrick was denied admission to Lowell High School based on his Chinese ethnicity, while Brian and Hilary, the other plaintiffs, were assigned to elementary schools not chosen by their parents because of their ethnicity.

At the time the court case was filed, the media attention was largely focused on Lowell High School because of the differential admission requirements for Chinese students. According to the *Ho* legal document,

For admission to Lowell's entering class of 1993–94, students of Chinese descent were required to score a minimum of 66 out of a possible 69, while applicants who were Other White, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, American Indian, or Other Non-White were required to score only 59 and students who were Hispanic or African-American were required to score 56 (*Ho v. SFUSD*, 4).

Henry Der, however, then the executive director of Chinese for Affirmative Action, pointed out that the lawsuit stated this incorrectly. The minimum score for Chinese students was actually 61 out of a possible 69. He also found, after running a rigorous statistical analysis, that a score of 59 is very similar to a score of 61 (Der 1994). So if the goal was to maintain academic rigor and excellence while also achieving racial balance and representation, Der believed that the differential in composite scores from students of different racial and ethnic groups did not make a difference when the students all attended Lowell.

The Chinese American plaintiffs and supporters of the lawsuit contended that the goals and objectives of the Consent Decree never represented their particular group's interests, even though the desegregation mandate was designed to benefit all racial and ethnic groups. "[The decree] was not designed only to integrate African Americans with whites; the plan recognizes nine different racial and ethnic groups for desegregation purposes" (Orfield et al. 1992). The *Ho* plaintiffs, however, believed that they—meaning, all Chinese-American public school students in San Francisco—were being discriminated against because of the stipulations of the 1983 Consent Decree. While it was a desegregation mandate that was at stake, the *Ho* supporters and plaintiffs publicly appeared most concerned with the affirmative action aspects of this policy. They did not, however, fight only parts of the policy; their lawsuit attacked the entire Consent Decree in an attempt to end all racial considerations in the SFUSD.

Situating Asian Americans within Traditional Civil Rights Goals and the New Neoconservative Ideology

The issues that underlie the lawsuit possess a larger history, involving both desegregation and affirmative action policies. The *Ho* plaintiffs, however, argued for colorblind policies that ensured meritocratic admissions and rearticulated recent history to situate the plaintiffs as both victims of past discrimination and victims of the policies addressing discrimination in the present. Ironically, their argument garnered widespread acceptance because they were Asian American and not white males crying reverse discrimination. The *Ho* lawsuit may not have been accepted judicially by the courts or socially by the public had not the tenor and meaning of equal rights and civil rights shifted in the larger political and social contexts. These shifts include the anti-affirmative action backlash as well as the growth and spread of neoconservative rhetoric, with the *Ho* lawsuit fitting squarely within and even complementing these political changes.

The success and widespread acceptance of the *Ho* lawsuit and the neoconservative and anti-affirmative action ideals it represents emerged within a context that is a turning point in the history of racial politics in the United States. Within this context, we can view the utilization of traditional civil rights demands for neoconservative ends. The *Ho* suit represents how the racist arguments of anti-affirmative action forces were changed to advocate an “end to discrimination” and a push for “equality of opportunity”—both rearticulated to demand an end to race-based policies such as affirmative action.

Although *Ho v. SFUSD* legally pointed to dismantling of the Consent Decree and ending race-based desegregation, the main issue presented by the plaintiffs—that of race-based school assignment restricting the choice of Chinese American students (*Ho v. SFUSD*, 2)—was strengthened by the links between the backlash against affirmative action and the rise of neoconservatism. The politics of neoconservatism attempt to garner widespread support by simultaneously attacking anti-discriminatory policies such as affirmative action and advocating individual rights (Omi and Winant 1994, 130). The cornerstone of their ideology rests on the “rearticulation of the meaning of racial equality as a matter of individual rather than group or collective concern” (Omi and Winant 1994, 130). In contrast, a basic tenet of the civil rights movement was group rights. Neoconservatives utilize the term “racial equality” yet envision racial equality to be the end of race-based policies. Instead, they put forth the belief that racial discrimination lies at the heart of these policies. The key in the political and legal strategy of the *Ho* plaintiffs was that by asserting a neoconservative stance, they were able to make the contradictory claims of being discriminated against while also taking an anti-affirmative action position.

The neoconservative stance propagated by the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters both alludes to discriminatory treatment and encapsulates the larger backlash against affirmative action and other race-based policies. Their seamless merging of these contradictory ideals exemplifies the political strength of rearticulation. Michael Omi and Howard Winant define rearticulation by neoconservative forces as redefinitions of traditional civil rights ideals (Omi and Winant 1994, 131). This neoconservative assault on race-based policies has taken flight as the meanings of discrimination and equality have shifted to focus on the harm inflicted upon individuals as opposed to groups classified by race.

The neoconservative framing of race-based policies, such as affirmative action, that advocated equal rights had been gaining momentum and garnering widespread support since the 1980s (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 147). This political and social context created the space in which the *Ho* supporters were able to employ neoconservative language around racial equality and gain support. For example, according to Gerard Lim in *AsianWeek* on 19 August 1994, the Chinese plaintiffs declared that “the justification for race-conscious assignment policies has ended.” The group believed that they were not being treated equitably or fairly and felt that this unfair treatment stemmed from the fact that they were Chinese. In an article by Mamie Huey in *AsianWeek* on 27 January 1995, Lawrence Siskind, a San Francisco attorney and supporter of the lawsuit was quoted as stating, “A yellow skin can be a curse in San Francisco.”

In employing neoconservative definitions of racial discrimination, the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters offered a convoluted version of equality that is widely acceptable in the current political climate. Elaine Woo, in a *Los Angeles Times* article on 13 July 1995, found that the Chinese Americans involved in the *Ho* suit claimed to “not [be] opposed to affirmative action.” The plaintiffs and supporters of the lawsuit, however, still put forth the racially coded language of neoconservative and anti-affirmative action forces and subliminally pointing to the undeserving beneficiaries of these policies—stereotypically framed as African Americans and Latinos. The *Ho* argument appeared to be one that included Chinese American students as a group, but it really focused on the individual rights of these students. Because they were actually arguing for the individual rights of Chinese American students, the contradictions in their argument lay in how they purported claims of discrimination against the group as a whole—an effective strategy for them politically but, in the end, detrimental to race-conscious policies.

The supporters of the *Ho* lawsuit simultaneously evoked racist and prejudicial treatment along with their rearticulated version of discrimination. This neoconservative version of racial equality confuses racist treatment with racial considerations in education policy. The supporters of *Ho* link these racist experiences to the allegedly discriminatory aspects of the desegregation policy. The supporters and plaintiffs of the *Ho* suit directly appealed to the idea of being discriminated against—that they as minorities have experienced racial discrimination and now desire “equality.” Elaine Woo in the *Los Angeles Times* on 13 July 1995 documented how Lee Cheng, the vice chair of the CADC’s Educational Reform Task Force, utilized his personal experiences to demonstrate this neoconservative rhetoric.

“I grew up knowing a lot of racism,” said Cheng, 23, [then] a UC Berkeley law student . . . “I was beaten up as a kid, referred to as a chink, a Chinaman. But in school I was taught that the laws will treat everyone the same, that discrimination was being eliminated . . . Then my friends and I applied to public high school. We discovered that if you are Chinese, you have to do better than anyone else.”

Cheng equates desegregation, specifically Lowell’s affirmative action policy, to discrimination. Several issues and concepts are combined here in order to affect a neoconservative tone that simultaneously evokes civil rights ideology—notably the elimination of what they perceive as racially discriminatory practices—and opposition to race-based policies.

For the supporters of the *Ho* lawsuit, racial discrimination was equated with the racial and ethnic caps imposed on all groups in order to achieve integrated schools. The CADC believed that these caps constituted discriminatory treatment. The *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters claim that they experienced racial discrimination firsthand and equated the desegregation policy with racism. In comments made to Nanette Asimov for an article in the *San Francisco Chronicle* on 19 June 1995, Daniel Girard, the attorney representing the *Ho* parents stated that, “Diversity doesn’t justify racial discrimination in public assignments . . . Don’t treat Chinese

people differently and don't penalize them for being Chinese. Let's put an end to race-based assignments." Girard alludes to racial discrimination in his statement while also denigrating race-based policies. In this statement, one can view how neoconservative "logic" situates the *Ho* plaintiffs as a racial minority group that is experiencing discrimination and that is being penalized in order to uphold desegregation policies. The underlying subtext is that Asian Americans are succeeding yet are being penalized for this academic success.

The *Ho* plaintiffs and their supporters contended that they were being penalized for doing well in school and label this treatment as discrimination. They perceived themselves as victims of "the system," namely the SFUSD Consent Decree. Gerard Lim documented this stance in an article in *AsianWeek* on 19 August 1994. "Chinese American students are the victims in this sick school district, which often rewards failure while punishing achievement," said Cheng in the article. In the *Ho* suit, the plaintiffs and supporters embraced this victim status, saying that, like whites, they have been wronged by race-based policies. But unlike whites, they have experienced structural discrimination and racial prejudice.

In their other political dealings, members of the CADC contradicted their stance against the SFUSD's desegregation and affirmative action policies. While the CADC fought vehemently against racial quotas and affirmative action in the public school system, they supported affirmative action when it involved the businesses of their members and the granting of city contracts to these businesses. The CADC's apparent support of affirmative action for themselves in minority contracts and hiring stands in direct contrast to their dispute with Lowell High School's affirmative action policy. Roland Quan, who spoke so vehemently against racial quotas in school assignments, supported affirmative action for minority-owned businesses while the *Ho* lawsuit was still being settled in the courts, and was quoted by Janet Dang in *AsianWeek* on 16 September 1999 as stating the following.

"Affirmative action is a good law but nobody is enforcing it," Quan said. "We're saying someone has to do some enforcement and we don't see anyone doing any enforcement. We believe in the program but have been frustrated."

While their fight with SFUSD centered on the issue of overrepresentation for Chinese students and was not concerned with the under-representation of blacks and Latinos, the CADC changed its stance completely when the issue centered around their business interests.

The model minority myth supports the *Ho* plaintiffs' and supporters' ability both to be victims of discrimination and to be against anti-discrimination policies, and the myth provides a structure for the *Ho* supporters to make these contradictory claims. The racialization of Asian Americans as both victims and success stories enables this contradictory political stance, and it is the political savvy of these Chinese Americans that enabled such racial articulation. The Asian Americans involved in the *Ho* lawsuit were able to achieve this discursive feat of racial constructionism by establishing a link between popular neoconservative ideology and rhetoric with arguably positive and negative racial imagery. According to the

model minority myth, the *Ho* plaintiffs are success stories, yet neoconservative discourse has allowed them to ideally situate themselves as victims—victims of discrimination, victims of race-based policies, victims of racial and ethnic ceilings—establishing an important link to the larger backlash against affirmative action.

The dual construction of Asian Americans as success stories as well as victims of discriminatory treatment through race-based preferences is complex and multi-layered. Beginning in the 1980s, portrayals of Asian Americans as the model minority filled newspapers and magazines. These range from labeling them as the “New Whiz Kids” to highlighting prestigious colleges and universities that were composed largely of Asian American students (Osajima 1988). In the mid 1990s, these stereotypic constructions began to change along with an upsurge in the backlash against affirmative action. Asian Americans became viewed as victims of their own success. Whereas before they were lauded and praised for their achievements, now their success was arguably threatened by policies such as affirmative action, effectively creating their dual construction as both success stories and victims.

Along with the strategic political construction of Asian Americans as the model minority, neoconservative rearticulations of equality and discrimination have opened up a space in which traditional calls for civil rights and equal access are no longer politically powerful. While the supporters of the *Ho* lawsuit demanded that race-based policies be ended in the district, the SFUSD and the NAACP fought back, arguing that racial diversity and representation was still necessary. Unfortunately, the court did not view their calls for equal access as legally and politically viable, proving that those who continue to support civil rights law and advocacy must find new ways to do battle with those who oppose race-based policies (Robles 2004, 27).

It is within these political and social contexts that we can view Asian Americans as being first framed as the model minority that is allegedly harmed by race-based policies in education and, secondly, as a specific group of Asian Americans who embraced this stereotype and articulated race through the model minority myth. On the one hand, the dual construction of Asian Americans as victims and success stories rests within the hands of a larger neoconservative political and social project. The *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters represent a racial minority group utilized by neoconservative politicians in attempts to prove the harm and unfairness of affirmative action policies. On the other hand, within a common neoconservative political agenda, the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters consciously asserted the identity of the model minority in order to further their lawsuit. Neoconservatives may have first utilized this dual construction of Asian Americans (Omi and Takagi 1996, 156), but in the *Ho* lawsuit, the Chinese Americans accepted and asserted the model minority myth. On both levels, the model minority stereotype is evoked to further a neoconservative political agenda.

By asserting this political stance and racial identity, the supporters of *Ho* “launch a broad attack on race-based remedies” (Der 1999). The *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters believed that they were furthering their legal case, yet they were also perpetrating harm on other groups who had benefited from the racial considera-

tions in desegregation and affirmative action policies and who were eventually harmed by the outcome. The assertion of the model minority myth worked to situate African American and Latino students as the antithesis of this stereotype—the underachieving and undeserving beneficiaries of affirmative action policies.

The Asian American Model Minority Stereotype as Racial Currency in a “Colorblind” Society

Interestingly and rather ironically Asian Americans have been able to articulate race through the end of affirmative action policies and the ensuing incorporation of colorblindness, merit, and equality into educational policy debates. In contrast to African Americans and Latinos, who have been framed negatively as undeserving beneficiaries of these policies, Asian Americans have emerged with arguably positive stereotypes. Further adding to the irony, the focus on the educational sector of society, the same site in which African Americans sought racial justice, has enabled Asian Americans to assert themselves as the model minority.

The racial construct of the model minority myth has gained its widespread currency because it functions within the American framework of meritocracy and equality. The *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters have been able to successfully play on a stereotype created by whites. This could be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, Asian Americans as a racial minority are able to exploit an arguably positive stereotype and be accepted into mainstream white society. In the acceptance of this stereotype, however, Asian Americans also function as the good minority, in direct contrast to the other minorities who are framed by negative racial stereotyping. Asian Americans as the model minority get situated somewhere between black and white racial constructions.

The United States has historically operated and continues to operate within a simplistic paradigm of race. The black/white model of race relations informs historical as well as current battles around public policy, education, and politics (Omi and Takagi 1996, 155). Asian Americans, neither black nor white, are often constructed as “‘near-white’ or ‘like Blacks’” (Okihiro 1994, 33). This simplistic model of race and race relations and its fixity within the American mindset allows Asian Americans to transcend race to a certain extent. While the black/white racial paradigm remains fixed, Asian Americans, by virtue of the changeability and historical contexts of racial stereotypes, are situated and situate themselves at opposing ends of the model. Operating and shifting back and forth between the black and white ends of the U.S. racial paradigm, Asian Americans possess the ability to transcend race, existing as both race-less and racially constructed at the same time. Okihiro (1994) presents a historical perspective on how Asian Americans have often traversed between black and white racial constructions in the United States—being framed as black when they immigrated as railroad workers and migrant farm workers, and then as white when larger numbers of professionals from Asia composed a great number of immigrants to the United States—thus demonstrating that for Asian Americans, the black/white model is one in which their constructions exist as dynamic and changing.

This dynamic nature of the racial construction of Asian Americans works to support the assertions of the Asian Americans involved in the *Ho* lawsuit. Michael Omi and Dana Takagi assert, "Unlike 'black' and 'white' as racial categories, there is a greater fluidity to 'Asian American' that can be manipulated in particular ways to suit particular positions" (Omi and Takagi 1996, 156). They theorize that the media and politicians hold the power to frame and construct Asian Americans as the model minority or as more white than black or other. I would add to Omi and Takagi by suggesting that some Asian Americans accept and assert the arguably positive racial identity of the model minority, situating themselves at the white end of the racial paradigm. The widespread acceptance of the black and white model of race could also be viewed as allowing Asian Americans the currency of leaving the black side of the model in favor of the white. This perceived ability of Asian Americans to transcend negative racial stereotypes might even be considered a privileged position.

For the *Ho* plaintiffs, such racial transcendence situated them in a powerful position as well. The power of racial transcendence for Asian Americans was enabled by the elimination of explicit talk about race in all public policy issues, especially in regards to education. Meritocracy, a concept initiated by neoconservatives in their assault on affirmative action, opened up a space in which the Asian American model minority myth gained more acceptance. Neoconservatives have advocated the use of merit to take the place of racial considerations in education policy. Meritocracy works well with the stereotype of the model minority—diligent, hardworking, and quintessentially apolitical. What is then discussed outright within the space in which race was eliminated is the merit and achievement that these Asian American students possess, but what is evoked is race. The model minority myth works to both deflect the need for affirmative action programs (in support of merit) while simultaneously invoking race (in attempts to garner a political and social backlash around affirmative action and integration). In other words, if merit connotes Asian-ness, then lack of merit connotes black-ness or Latino-ness, which shifts the blame from the system to underachieving minority groups.

The Dangers of the Asserting the Model Minority Myth

In the *Ho* lawsuit, the framing of Chinese Americans as victims of a desegregation policy lay entirely in the hands of a group of Chinese parents and their children. Thus, while the *Ho* lawsuit advocated an end to racial preferences and the institution of colorblindness in admissions policies, the supporters and plaintiffs also effectively employed a discursive strategy in which Asians, specifically Chinese Americans, were cast as victims and African Americans and Latinos were framed as undeserving beneficiaries of the desegregation policy (Takagi 1992, 79).

While Asian Americans can be seen as political tools for the purposes and goals of conservative and neoconservative politicians and their respective agendas, in the *Ho* example, they can be seen as actively negotiating the racial, political, and social terrain of the United States. By situating themselves as the Model Minority

and a "class of innocents" being unfairly harmed by race-conscious policies, the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters engage in constructing and asserting their race (Freeman 1995, 30). On the one hand, they are the Model Minority, immigrants or children of immigrants who have achieved educational and professional success. On the other hand, they are also a minority group who believes that they have not personally discriminated against other racial minority groups and, therefore, should not bear the brunt of desegregation and affirmative action policies.

Asian Americans have been able to transcend notions of fault or blame for racial discrimination and prejudice because they themselves are racial minorities. This lack of "fault" on their part, coupled with the Model Minority stereotype, allows Asian Americans to frame themselves as innocents, making the *Ho* lawsuit that much stronger. Additionally, this lack of fault allowed the plaintiffs and supporters of *Ho* to distance themselves from the negative ramifications of their lawsuit, political stance, and racial assertions. The dangers that the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters initiated with their assertion of the Model Minority Myth include obscuring the need for race-preferential policies and possibly engendering inter-racial conflicts with other racial minority groups.

This power and privilege of racial framing and constructionism, as well as the acceptance of a socially and politically constructed racial stereotype in the form of the Model Minority, functions to situate Asian Americans such that they may be held in positive esteem. These positive depictions, however, can also work to their detriment when utilized to further neoconservative politics as well as inter-racial divisions. While the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters assert the arguably positive aspects of the Model Minority Myth, these positive aspects can also be re-framed such that they are, in the end, damaging to Asian Americans.

In Takagi's study on the Asian Admissions Crisis at some of the United States' premier universities, admissions officers were quick to point out that Asians were "good, but not exceptional students" (Takagi 1992, 79). The power of framing Asian Americans as good or bad, as deserving or not of admissions, resided with the admissions offices and university officials. Also in Nancy Abelmann and John Lie's analysis of the Black and Korean conflict in the aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, many Korean American merchants claimed that the media too often took the easy way out and portrayed them as greedy yet successful immigrant entrepreneurs (Abelmann and Lie 1995). The power of framing lay in the hands of the mainstream media and university admissions offices; these forces merely extended and re-constructed the Model Minority Myth, negatively in these cases, to suit their political purposes.

While racial constructionism for all racial and ethnic groups has historically lain in the hands of larger political and social forces (Omi and Winant 1994, 65-69), Asian Americans have recently been more active participating in the articulation of their own race. Some Asian Americans, because of their economic and educational achievements, believe that they are now able to dictate their own racial constructions. This is evident in the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters conflation of their racial positionality with that of being a Model Minority. Buying into the Model Minority Myth lends itself to the belief in the American Dream and individual

success and away from group empowerment. Situating oneself and one's ethnic group within the hierarchical social formation is one thing. But what if, on the other hand, these attempts at positively defining one's positionality negatively affected the positionality of other minority groups, such as blacks and Latinos?

Since the birth of the Model Minority Myth, Asian Americans have often been pitted against other minority groups. The Model Minority Myth publicizes the academic and professional success of Asian Americans, and attempts to prove that the American Dream is attainable—that minority groups can succeed in the United States. Before the Model Minority Myth, Asians often levitated between being framed as part of a “yellow peril” invading the United States and the extreme opposite—as a successful minority student and professional, often times “out-whit[ing] the whites” and making great contributions to United States' society (Okiihiro 1994, 34). This key paradox embedded within the Model Minority Myth works to prove the inaccuracy of the Myth, but still does not detract from the power of invoking and asserting the Myth.

Many Asian American scholars demonstrate the inaccuracy of the Model Minority Myth with discussions and studies of the high poverty rate, extensive employment stratification, and relatively lower incomes of Asian Americans (Chan 1991, 171; Ong 2000, 329). Although these scholars definitively dispel the Myth, however, they do not take power away from the widespread acceptance of the Model Minority stereotype by whites, African Americans, Latinos, and, as in the *Ho* case, Asian Americans. While Asian Americans are placed close to the top of this racial hierarchy, we must also pay attention to who is placed below them and why. Stereotypes regarding whiteness, blackness, and Asian-ness were exploited in order for the *Ho* lawsuit to gain viability within the current political and social contexts, which do not support any race-preferential policies, yet they also cast a negative light on African American and Latinos who are never characterized as the Model Minority.

Gary Okiihiro recognizes that the Model Minority Myth is more than a mere construction but also a reality. “The construct, importantly, is not merely ideology but is a social practice that assigns to Asian Americans, and indeed to all minorities, places within the social formations” (Okiihiro 1994, 34). Okiihiro illustrates the dangers in accepting any stereotypes, regardless of the positive light they might shed on certain groups, stating that Asians are positioned within an insidious circle, in which the Model Minority can also be equated with the Yellow Peril. “Asian workers can be ‘diligent’ and ‘slavish,’ ‘frugal’ and ‘cheap,’ ‘upwardly mobile’ and ‘aggressive’” (Okiihiro 1994, 170). Beyond the stereotypical framings of Asian Americans, their own decisions around their personal and political positions have engaged neo-conservative Asian Americans into a hegemonic compromise, in which they are attaining academic and professional success at the expense of African Americans and Latinos.

Conclusions

Although the *Ho* lawsuit focuses on education policy set in a very specific context, it should be thought of as a case study in which the focus distinctly shifted away from desegregation and race, and moved toward advocating merit. This case is emblematic of the nationwide and state shifts away from any race-based programs or policies. Additionally, this discourse and policy analysis also serves to situate Asian Americans within these changing social and political contexts.

While the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters claim to have been especially harmed and discriminated against by the district's racial integration policies, Chinese students in SFUSD, as a group, have been accessing magnet academic schools at higher rates than any other ethnic group in the City.

Relative to their overall representation in the freshman class of 1995,

Chinese students were more likely to be granted choice and enrolled in one of the City's alternative academic high schools. In contrast, Black and Hispanic students were considerably less likely to be enrolled in a school of choice. White students had an even chance (Der 1999).

The SFUSD Consent Decree did not harm Chinese Americans, as a group, directly. Before the *Ho* lawsuit was filed, Chinese Americans were largely granted their choices on the Optional Enrollment Request forms, and were able to attend public schools of their choice, usually those with the best academic programs.

In the 1993-94 school year, Chinese students constituted 30.54% of all OERS granted to high school students . . . Relative to their overall high school representation, Hispanic and Black students are respectively 1.81% and 4.07% underrepresented among high school students granted an OER to attend a school of choice (Der 1994).

Even before the lawsuit was filed, Chinese students as a group were gaining greater access to schools of their choice. In 1999, when the *Ho* lawsuit was settled out of court and race based policies were eliminated in the district, there was a drastic decline in African American and Latino enrollment at Lowell High School. While both African American and Latino enrollment dropped by nearly fifty percent, Chinese American enrollment increased, comprising the majority of the school at 52.9 percent. Chinese American students represented only 34.3 percent of the total high school population. In contrast to Chinese American enrollment, African Americans represented merely 2.3 percent of the students at Lowell and 13.8 percent of all high school students in the district. Latinos at Lowell comprised only 5.6 percent of the student body, while they composed 18.1 percent of San Francisco public high school students (SFUSD 2001; Robles 2004, 24).

In the end, Chinese American students were successful relative to other groups. There was really no discriminatory intent or harm towards them as a group. Thus, the issue was not really racial discrimination as the *Ho* lawsuit claimed. The issue clearly was one of access, not access for Chinese Americans students, but for underrepresented groups. The way the *Ho* lawsuit was framed by its plaintiffs and supporters demonstrates how they rearticulated discrimination to mean harm to a

particular set of individuals with no broader concerns for social justice for other public school students in San Francisco.

The assertion of the Model Minority Myth by the Chinese Americans involved in the *Ho* lawsuit also categorically asserted the negative stereotypes of other groups who benefit from the SFUSD's desegregation and affirmative action policies. The racialized body of an Asian American automatically symbolizes the Model Minority, and subsequently, the body of an African American or Latino symbolizes an undeserving affirmative action beneficiary. References to the stereotypes of the black or Latino beneficiary of race-based policies have not disappeared but have changed to allusions to them through racial code words such as "under qualified" or "under-achieving." The neoconservative and anti-affirmative action political forces advocate colorblindness along with equality of opportunity and meritocracy yet still consciously allude to these racist stereotypes.

While the *Ho* plaintiffs and supporters believe that they were discriminated against, the larger issue really surrounds other minority groups and the negative stereotypes attached to them through the propagation of the Asian Model Minority Stereotype. Combined with the present neoconservative political and social contexts, the acceptance and assertion of the Model Minority stereotype by Asian Americans is directly detrimental to African Americans and Latinos, on both the levels of ideology and policy.

Endnotes

1 Matsuda and Lawrence in their arguments for affirmative action situate Asian Americans as both victims and success stories. Their analysis of media portrayals demonstrates that Asian Americans are often portrayed inaccurately in order to situate them within the model minority myth stereotype. See Matsuda, Mari, and Charles Lawrence III. 1997. *We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 194.



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APA Web Sites: *AAPR*'s Picks for the Year's Best

The following Web sites provide important information on issues surrounding Asian Pacific American policy, current events, culture, and arts. In the brief descriptions below we offer comments on each Web site, as well as provide information about each organization's mission.

National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium

www.napalc.org

The National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) strives to improve the legal and civil rights of Asian Pacific Americans through litigation, public education, and public policy. NAPALC is a nationally recognized voice on behalf of Asian Pacific Americans. If advocacy is your calling, start your journey with www.napalc.org. The Web site offers information on a variety of program areas, ranging from affirmative action to voting rights.

South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow

www.saalt.org

South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) is an organization dedicated to fostering the civic and political engagement of South Asians in the United States. The Web site has both an eye-catching appeal and a user-friendly design. The Web site's most useful section is the scrolling breaking news on the front page. As such, SAALT is poised to become a convenient one-stop site for the South Asian American community.

AsianWeek

<http://news.asianweek.com/news/>

AsianWeek is the national English-language newsweekly for the rapidly growing Asian Pacific American community. This national newsweekly, currently available online or in print, has been publishing since 1979 and is the only one of its kind in the United States. Based in San Francisco, CA, the publication aims to unite the community by chronicling the Asian Pacific American experience and involving Pacific Americans in the democratic process. You will find stories on Asian Pacific Americans in the national news, arts and entertainment, business, culture, and sports. The Web site also features a discussion board for readers to post and exchange comments.

National Asian Pacific American Bar Association

www.napaba.org

The National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA) is the United States' only national association of Asian Pacific American attorneys, judges, law professors, and law students, providing a national network for its members and affiliates. Formed in 1988 by representatives of twenty-three Asian Pacific American bar associations from around the country, NAPABA advocates for the legal needs and interests of the Asian Pacific American community. Through its network of committees, NAPABA is in the forefront of national and local activities in the areas of civil rights reform, combating anti-immigrant backlash and hate crimes, increasing the diversity of the federal and state judiciaries, and professional development. This Web site provides a calendar of NAPABA events throughout the nation.

U.S. Census Bureau

<http://www.census.gov/pubinfo/www/NEWapiML1.html>

The U.S. Census Bureau's Asian and Pacific Islander site is a research gold mine for students and policy advocates alike. The site provides data on a wide range of matters—from voting and registration to fertility.

Book Review: Diaspora and Community: Learning from the Pilipino Experience

Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora: Transnational Relations, Identities, and Communities* (Garland Publishing 1998)

During my undergraduate years at the University of California San Diego I had the privilege of being introduced to several Pilipino¹ Americans who affirmed their cultural identity in the face of American assimilation. The Pilipino American college organization Kaibigang Pilipino often sponsored community-wide events like their annual Pilipino Cultural Celebration, high school conferences, and fund raisers such as food sales and *Magkasama* (or “to come together”), which brought awareness to the campus about Pilipino Americans’ contributions, struggles, and history. At the same time, it was the goal of Kaibigang Pilipino to involve the larger Pilipino community in San Diego in these events.

But why would second-generation Pilipino Americans, now making claims to U.S. citizenship and privileges, continue to do so much community work celebrating their Pilipino heritage? Should Pilipino Americans be considered part of the Asian American rubric, despite separating themselves from other Asian American organizations? *Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora: Transnational Relations, Identities, and Communities*, by Jonathan Y. Okamura, aims at understanding the complex ways by which Pilipino Americans maintain ties to the Philippine homeland. In addition, Okamura reveals the complexity behind Pilipino Americans and Asian American coalitionbuilding and organizing. More importantly, Okamura is able to provide examples of the ways that Pilipinos forge transnational links and ties. In this short study, Okamura clearly explains the Pilipino dispersion process yet fails to capture the voice of Pilipino people experiencing the process of moving.

Okamura provides a historical backdrop for Pilipino policy, attitudes, and migration in order to best understand the diaspora that connects Pilipinos and Pilipino Americans. Okamura specifically addresses Hawaii, the state where much of his research is concentrated, but also brings up California and New York City as places where Pilipino culture is “being transcended on a daily basis by transnational linkages of people, money, goods, and information.” Diaspora need to be understood “as consisting of transnational linkages between an immigrant/ethnic minority and its homeland (or cultural center) and its counterpart communities in other host societies” and “the development and maintenance of those transnational relations by people in diaspora that link them culturally, economically and politically with their homeland” (14). Specifically setting out his theoretical understanding of diasporas, Okamura later attempts to compare how other Asian American communities can work together in a diaspora model. In particular, he argues that “the continuing and increasingly more threatening rightward shift in

the U.S. racial politics, evident in the elimination of affirmative action programs, anti-immigrant legislation, hate crimes against people of color, and racial scapegoating, necessitate that both Pilipino Americans and other Asian American groups maintain and expand their political alliances with one another but with a greater degree of power and resource sharing to preclude marginalizing and tokenism" (28). As a group that also has been racialized and marginalized through anti-immigrant sentiments, language discrimination, public policy, and hate crimes, Pilipino Americans are finding ways to form solidarity with the Asian Americans to resist exclusion.

Imagining the Filipino American Diaspora is able to provide much information that will be of great interest to policy analysts studying demographic changes, capital flows, political participation, attitudes and behaviors, and the history of Pilipino Americans. From 1946–1965, there were about thirty-four thousand Pilipinos in America, while by 1990 that number had increased to 1.4 million. In addition, Pilipino Americans are not only growing in number, but in the way that they are contributing to their home country: in 1991 \$8.9 billion was sent to the Philippines by Pilipinos working abroad. Immigration policy is also explored in regards to Pilipino inclusion and exclusion, such as the active recruitment from the Hawaiian sugar industry, and the 1934 *Tydings-McDuffie Act* that restricted the entry of Pilipinos to Hawaii to fifty. Other important facts are the higher education attainments of Pilipino Americans, as well as the number of Pilipino Americans who have held political office. These examples show the strength of the Pilipino American community, but also how, as Asian Americans, we can emulate situations that produce social movements, thus bringing about change in the United States.

Despite Okamura's careful articulation of the diasporas model, he fails to bring out the actual community voices that shape and form ties to the Philippines. How do Pilipino Americans and Pilipinos feel about these changes? Though he makes it clear that transnational ties exist through *balikbayan* (or returning) boxes and trips, Okamura does not provide the community's reaction to these events (i.e., the family's reaction or sentiment of love). At times, the study seems to be caught up more in description and theory than the actual lives of people. Overall, the study does well in providing concrete examples of the ways transnational ties are kept, and used by businesses (such as AT&T's exclusive marketing to Pilipino Americans for long distance phone calling, or the high number of *balikbayan* boxes shipped during Christmas).

After reading this book, my understanding and appreciation of Pilipinos and Pilipino Americans grew. This short book is not a complete study of Pilipino Americans but, rather, an introduction that sets the stage for future scholarly work. More research about Pilipino identity, mobilization, and coalition building is needed, and Okamura's book is a great place to start.

Endnotes

¹ The P and F are used interchangeably in Pilipino and Filipino because the letter F does not exist in the Philippine alphabet. Using "F" reflects the English pronunciation, but does not exist in the Philippine language. Both uses are acceptable, but for purposes of this piece, we will use the term Pilipino.

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
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